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 i 
Abstract 
A central problem for charitable organisations is that they do not derive revenues from 
their core philanthropic activities. Consequently they cannot survive unless they can 
derive revenues from other sources. The three major sources of these revenues are:  
(a) Government grants; (b) commercial activities that cross-subsidise the philanthropic 
activities; and (c) private donations. In each of these fund-raising activities they 
compete with other organisations, but none more so than in seeking private donations. 
Consequently, this thesis is concerned with the competition for private donations among 
charities with similar aims. Fundraising efforts through government grant competition 
and commercial activities are not considered. The charities considered are located in 
Australia and Japan, a comparative analysis being an initial major purpose of the 
research. This was based upon the argument that the behaviour of charitable 
organisations will be influenced by local culture far more than profit making 
corporations facing global markets. There was, therefore, an interest in examining how 
different the forms of competitions might be in the countries.  
Charitable organisations compete for private donations in two ways. The first is by an 
efficient and effective service to the charitable organisations‘ recipients. Unfortunately 
for fundraising, such service is not usually directly observable by potential donors. The 
second form of competition is the public provision of information, services and 
marketing and promotion to potential donors, specifically with the aim of eliciting 
donations. Competition in this form, of course, requires fundraising expenditures on the 
part of charitable organisations.  
The effects of competition for donations on the behaviour of charitable organisations are 
investigated at both the theoretical and empirical levels. In particular, this thesis 
examines the effects of fundraising expenditure on donation levels, and how donation 
levels to organisations are affected by the level of competition in the market for 
donations. Such competition is treated as a form of Cournot oligopoly. The degree of 
competition can then be measured by the level of fundraising expenditure of ―like 
charitable organisations‖. Like charitable organisations are those that serve similar 
purposes so that their philanthropic services are similar, i.e. in economic terms they are 
substitutes. This was tested among a group of charitable organisations providing in 
similar services in both Australia and Japan.  
 ii 
The effectiveness of donation raising behaviour of charities in Australia and Japan is 
considered by examining organisational financial accounts within the model framework. 
The application of the oligopoly model throughout this thesis has resulted in the 
following major findings. First, it was found that increases in total fundraising 
expenditure by all charities increases total donations to all charities but at a decreasing 
rate. Second, an increase in competition is related both closely and positively to 
fundraising spending and the total level of donations in the current year rather than 
previous years. Third, and again, supporting the oligopoly model, the fundraising 
expenditure of a charity‘s competitors relates both closely and negatively to the level of 
donations to that charity in the current year. Fourth, and very importantly, it was found 
that the numbers of volunteers associated with an organisation significantly increased its 
level of donations in the following year. Fifth, and finally, the impacts of organisational 
age and size, government grants and administrative costs vary across groups of 
charitable organisations, but still indicate the effectiveness of using the oligopoly 
model.  
The thesis uses organisational level data to capture the competitive behaviour of 
charitable organisations, whereas most previous studies have analysed donors. Although 
charitable organisations in both Australia and Japan have the same perceived objectives, 
their behaviour differs due not only to cultural and political variations but with the size 
and history of charities. It appears that the model is much more appropriate for Australia 
than to Japan. The reasons for this are given. Most notably these differences appear to 
be due to the intense regulation of charities found in Japan.  
The significance of the research lies not only in the empirical success of the modelling. 
It also lies in the fact that although charitable organisations play a crucial role in the 
delivery of public and private goods and services, there are relatively few attempts to 
pay attention to the economic analysis of this sector. 
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Chapter 1  
Understanding the Behaviour of Charitable 
Organisations 
1.1 Motivation and objective of the thesis 
 
The fundraising behaviour of charitable organisations is analysed both theoretically 
and empirically. This grows out of an interest in the benevolent response of both 
individuals and groups to other human beings in trouble — often people they have 
never met and never will meet.  
 
Because of the many recent global humanitarian crises, both natural and man-made, 
attention throughout the world has been attracted to the charity sector. The Global 
Financial Crisis has also highlighted the role of welfare charities. In Australia, as the 
demand for charitable services has risen, the number and size of donations to other 
causes and organisations have fallen (Falk et al., 2006). At the same time, charitable 
organisations are being forced to become more independent of the government as a 
result of government policy (because, quite simply, government funds are less 
available). It is then an irony that governments are increasingly relying on charitable 
organisations to provide services and goods that neither government nor private 
enterprise are either able on willing to provide. Consequently increasing numbers of 
charitable organisations around the World are seeking donations from broader 
sections of the community (Salamon et al., 2000). 
 
This growing sense of its importance has been paralleled by the charitable sector‘s 
expansion in the last decade, opening a fertile area of investigation for researchers 
from different disciplines. Previously most research has examined donor behaviour. 
The focus of the present research is on the behaviour of charitable organisations. 
Nevertheless, in fundraising, charities have to understand the motivation of donors. 
While individuals and corporations may donate because they have deep concern for 
others in what is predominantly an altruistic act, they may also expect some form of 
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benefit for themselves. These donors‘ benefits can include receiving recognition from 
others, a more self-centred motivation. As opposed to these altruistic donors are 
described as being focused on the goal of benefiting others, while status seeking 
donors are interested in receiving higher social recognition. The observability of 
donation participants in prestigious charities is highly correlated with the total 
donations received by those charities: for instance, the announcement of a wealthy 
donor's substantial donation may influence individual smaller donors to contribute. 
Increasingly charitable organisations, in a wide variety of activities, understand and 
utilise these different motivations in their fundraising activities. This means they 
increasingly engage in fundraising expenditure. 
 
Most contributions from individuals go to charitable organisations instead of for-
profit organisations or government agencies. Given the difficulty of monitoring work 
related to social welfare, it is possible to suggest that donors may fear that for-profit 
firms will convert contributions into compensation for the owners. People may trust 
that charitable organisations have particular beliefs about the best way to provide 
more diverse services than is possible in the public sector. Therefore, if people are 
willing to make such a comparison, charitable organisations are in a position to 
compete for such altruistic contributions better than for-profit organisations. The 
question may then be one of understanding how charitable organisations operate with 
respect to each other, and especially how they compete with each other for donations.  
 
In view of both the current growth and the significance of the charity sector, there is a 
need to understand how charitable organisations operate in a competitive ―market‖. 
Little attention has been paid to competition and the operation of markets in this 
sector. There seems to be potential for empirical models of the competition between 
charitable organisations for donations. Empirical questions of fundraising activities of 
charitable organisations. How fundraising expenditures determine the level of 
donations; how charitable organisations maximise private donations, and whether or 
not competition between charitable organisations affects donor behaviour and 
donations are important questions. It is highly likely that such competition is 
oligopolistic in nature, especially given the (non-profit) barriers to entry.  
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This thesis, therefore, investigates two research questions. Firstly how effective 
fundraising activities relate to the competition of charitable organisations for 
donations. And secondly what characteristics or other factors of charitable 
organisations are affected by fundraising, using the data from samples of Australian 
and Japanese charitable organisations. As the concluding chapter indicates, answering 
these deceptively simple questions is very difficult. This thesis uses the term 
―charitable organisations‖, rather than philanthropic organisations, because it is in 
more common usage in Australia (see 3.2.4).  
 
1.2 Contemporary events 
 
The charity sector has grown substantially in size and importance over the past 
decades, both in Australia and Japan (Srnka et al., 2003a), playing an important role 
in improving the quality of life in communities by providing a wide range of services 
to meet critical communities‘ needs (Guo and Brown, 2006). Salamon et al. (2003) 
have estimated that charitable organisations are responsible for more than 50% of the 
finance and delivery of social services provided in the United States. In Australia it is 
almost 60% (Australian Council of Social Service, 2001; Australian Government, 
2001), and in Japan it is 50%. At the same time, Australian and Japanese charitable 
organisations are becoming less able to rely on help from government, partly as a 
reflection of government policy. There is also a marked impact on the economy as a 
result of donations and collective action (Lyons, 2001) as the service role of charitable 
organisations in Australia and Japan is now complementing or supplementing that of 
the government. Arguably it is making up for the deficiencies in government action 
(Salamon, 1994). There is also increasing competition of not-for-profit with for-profit 
organisations (Srnka et al., 2003a). It follows that charitable organisations are 
increasingly under severe pressure to minimise costs and deliver services in more 
efficient ways, while seeking donations based on wider community trust in their 
operations.  
 
Two recent events in Japan and Australia stand out as affecting charities and 
perceptions of charities. In January 1995 the Kobe-Awaji earthquake disaster drew the 
Japanese people‘s attention to the importance of the charity sector. This earthquake 
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brought about a death toll of over 6,400 people and the destruction of some 70,000 
buildings, and in addition caused huge damage to the Japanese economy (Fujimoto, 
1995). Since central governments were not prepared for this disaster, rescue work at 
an official level only occurred after a considerable delay (Fukushima, 1995). 
However, within the first three months more than 1.2 million volunteers 
spontaneously gathered from different parts of Japan, and the total voluntary 
donations amounted to JPY173 billion (AUD2.03 billion) (Hasan, 2005). This 
earthquake led to a marked increase in the numbers of volunteers to other charities, as 
well as the enactment of the NPO Corporation Law for the introduction of 
incorporated, purpose-specific not-for-profit organisations. This was passed in 1998 
(Kawashima, 2001; Matsura, 2001). The year 1995 was also named as the year of 
―renaissance of voluntarism‖ (Tatsuki, 2000; Shaw and Goda, 2004). Since 1999, the 
number of Japanese charitable organisations registered with the NPO Corporation has 
dramatically increased reaching 26,000 NPO Corporations in January 2006 (Cabinet 
Office, Government of Japan, 2004, 2006).  
 
In Australia, the Victorian Bushfires in February 2009 created greater awareness of 
the role of charitable support to the community in Australia. The Victorian Bushfire 
Appeal has now raised over AUD375 million which has been transferred to a trust 
account established by the Victorian Government (Australian Red Cross, 2009). 
Similar attention has been given to the whole charity sector in Australia (Dollery and 
Wallis, 2002). In 1999 the Howard government established the Prime Minister‘s 
Community Business Partnership policy. During the financial year (FY) 2006-2007, 
over 51,671 tax concession charities were recognised in Australia. This was up by 
2.1% on the previous year, and 25,292 organisations were given the status of 
deductible gift recipients, increasing by 3.7% from the previous year (Australian 
Taxation Office, 2009). Australian charities received AUD 472 million and 
distributions of AUD117 million (Australian Taxation Office, 2009) were made in 
2009. There are 40,976 not-for-profit organisations registered in Australia, which 
employ about 884,476 people with approximately 2,434,815 volunteers (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2008a). The total revenue for the Australian charity sector during 
FY 2006-2007 was $74.5 billion, representing 7% of GDP, and total donations were 
over $6 billion. This was twice larger than the FY 1999-2000 (Australian Bureau of 
Statistic, 2002 and 2008). These phenomena are not restricted to Australia and Japan. 
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The voluntary sector was much more effective in delivering aid to victims of 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans than was the US government. The same has been 
true of the Haitian earthquake in 2010.  
 
1.3 Culture and behaviour: Donors and organisations 
 
Charitable contributions may differ in relation to political, social, cultural economic, 
religious and historical features of the society. In an influential comparative study of 
cultures Hosftede (1987, 2001) claims that donations are given according to the 
psychological needs of the donor rather than the material needs of the receiver. 
Hosftede (2001) also suggests that political differences may influence charities. 
Australia is based on common law, whereas Japan is a civil law code nation, so 
related differences are expected in the behaviour of charitable organisations. This 
encourages a comparison of charitable organisations between the two countries, 
Australia and Japan.  
 
Nevertheless charitable organisations in Australia and Japan have similar objectives 
and their growth has been encouraged by their respective governments. Behind this 
outward similarity, they have institutional and cultural differences, as discussed in 
Chapter Two. Institutionally, charitable organisations in Japan are subject to relatively 
tighter control than their counterparts in Australia, and the latter enjoy more 
favourable tax incentives.  
 
Culturally, Japan has been classified as having a strong masculine culture by Hofstede 
(2001), where the social consensus is that the fate of the poor is their own fault, while 
Australia has been classified as having a much weaker masculine culture that shows 
greater benevolence (Hofstede, 2001). These institutional and cultural differences are 
likely to influence donors‘ decision-making process as, a study of which will enable 
Australia and Japan to share their experience, with a view to improving the efficiency 
of the charity sector. 
 
There are distinct differences in the history, culture and social norms of Australia and 
Japan. Consequently, there is a distinct possibility that the outcome of modelling the 
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behaviour of charitable organisations in the two nations will yield different results. 
This implies that one task for modelling charitable organisation behaviour lies in, if 
possible, accommodating those differences. There is the distinct possibility that in 
identical situations, their donors will behave in different ways. This could be, for 
example, because altruism is constructed according to different social norms. The 
same is perhaps even more true for the study of volunteerism that forms part of this 
thesis. Of more immediate relevance to differences in fundraising behaviour is the 
fact that the two samples of charitable organisations are constructed differently. 
Certainly the samples are of organisations of very different sizes in Japan and 
Australia. Those in Australia are much larger and have longer individual histories. 
Quite apart from distinct differences between organisations within the samples, 
examining the pattern of fundraising sources in the two nation‘s samples (Table 1.1) 
yields distinctly different outcomes. Not notable one the three sources of revenue are 
defined as (a) private and corporate donations; (b) all other sources of revenue and (c) 
government sourced revenues.  
 
Other sources can include investment portfolio income, but the revenue comes largely 
from the direct business activities of the organisations. For most (but not all) 
charitable organisations such portfolios are negligible. Portfolios aside, business 
activities are of two main types. These are (a) selling services to clients, albeit often at 
heavily subsidized rates, and (b) selling goods to non-clients. In the Australian context 
this would include for example, include revenue streams for the charitable 
organisations St Vincent de Paul and Oxfam, that come from their high street shops. 
 
The Japanese sample is very much more heavily biased towards these activities. As a 
consequence, very little of their revenues come from government and donations. The 
implication is that any modelling that concentrates on donation raising activities may 
not be applicable to Japan and would be less successful in empirical terms. In the case 
of the Australian organisations, which are much larger and older, there appears to be a 
much greater ability to gain government grants. This is perhaps recognition that these 
organisations perform some functions that government would otherwise be called 
upon to perform and/or the organisations can perform these functions more effectively  
and cost-efficiently. In addition there are a greater proportion of funds that comes 
from private individual and corporate donations – the focus of this study. 
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Table 1.1: Revenue sources for Australian and Japanese charities in 2003 
 
Australia D/TR O/TR G/TR Japan D/TR O/TR G/TR 
World vision              0.87 0.01 0.12 UN Shien 0.92 0.08 0.00 
Caritas Australia       0.86 0.03 0.11 Kyukyu Heli 0.86 0.14 0.00 
WWF Australia 0.76 0.10 0.14 Futoko 0.80 0.20 0.00 
Anglicare Australia                              0.54 0.46 0.00 JPFI 2,3,6 0.75 0.25 0.00 
RSPCA NSW                                        0.50 0.45 0.05 Hunger Free 0.73 0.22 0.05 
Care Australia                                   0.45 0.39 0.16 Kids Energy 0.71 0.29 0.00 
Royal Institute for DBC  0.45 0.26 0.30 Asia Environment 0.70 0.18 0.12 
The Smith Family    0.44 0.52 0.04 Nippon Ryujojoi 0.67 0.33 0.00 
Uniting Care QLD.  0.38 0.15 0.48 L Angel International  0.64 0.01 0.35 
Oxfam Australia                                  0.32 0.51 0.17 Project Hope Japan 0.63 0.14 0.23 
Salvation Army East 0.31 0.29 0.40 St. John Ambulance 0.63 0.26 0.11 
Salvation Army South 0.27 0.30 0.43 Bramer Cm/s 0.62 0.38 0.00 
Endeavour Foundation                             0.26 0.35 0.38 Sougyo Shien Suishin 0.60 0.40 0.00 
Royal Rehabilitation  0.25 0.19 0.56 Recycle Solution 0.57 0.43 0.00 
Royal Flying Doctor SE                0.23 0.56 0.21 Japan  Seijin 0.56 0.44 0.00 
Spastic Centre NSW                        0.23 0.15 0.62 Sport and Intelligence 0.52 0.48 0.00 
Minda                                            0.22 0.08 0.70 RAS Fuhoutoki 0.51 0.49 0.00 
St Vincent de Paul Vic                 0.17 0.49 0.34 Yigi 0.50 0.50 0.00 
Cerebral Palsy League 0.13 0.10 0.76 Nihon Kenpo 0.43 0.57 0.00 
Multiple Sclerosis Vic.           0.13 0.63 0.24 Kokusai Kendo 0.38 0.61 0.00 
Anglicare Vic.  0.12 0.18 0.69 J Karate 0.34 0.66 0.00 
Anglicare NSW 0.11 0.32 0.57 J. Wheelchair Dance 0.31 0.45 0.24 
Australian Red Cross                               0.11 0.23 0.65 HIV 0.31 0.39 0.30 
St Vincent de Paul WA                     0.11 0.87 0.02 Asia addiction 0.29 0.71 0.00 
Yooralla Society  0.11 0.22 0.67 Zenshichosonhoken 0.27 0.13 0.60 
Scope Vic 0.10 0.16 0.74 J Toshi 0.25 0.75 0.00 
Mission Australia                                0.09 0.73 0.18 BHN  Telecomm. 0.25 0.75 0.00 
Zoological Parks &Gns  0.08 0.52 0.40 New Start 0.23 0.77 0.00 
Wesley Mission Sydney                            0.08 0.46 0.46 Furusato Ourai Club 0.22 0.78 0.00 
Melbourne City Mission                            0.07 0.17 0.75 Kiko Network 0.21 0.56 0.23 
Southern Cross Care            0.07 0.28 0.65 Jutaku Seisan 0.20 0.80 0.00 
Royal Freemasons Vic. 0.05 0.30 0.65 Chiiki Kyoryuu  0.18 0.82 0.00 
The Benevolent Society                           0.05 0.39 0.56 Nichu Engeki Koryuu 0.17 0.03 0.81 
Anglicare SA  0.04 0.24 0.72 Joy Club 0.13 0.87 0.00 
Baptist Community Vic                  0.04 0.27 0.69 J. Kokusai Kouryu 0.11 0.89 0.00 
Silver Chain                                     0.04 0.14 0.83 Corporate Gov. 0.10 0.90 0.00 
Uniting Care Victoria  0.03 0.33 0.63 Chisistuosen 0.07 0.93 0.00 
Activ Foundation                                 0.03 0.31 0.66 AB Free 0.06 0.94 0.00 
Villa Maria Society                              0.03 0.12 0.85 Kenkokagaku 0.05 0.95 0.00 
Benetas  0.02 0.22 0.76 Nippon Iryo Fukushi 0.05 0.95 0.00 
Annecto  0.02 0.05 0.92 Kyoikushien 0.04 0.96 0.00 
Anglican Homes WA                 0.02 0.45 0.53 IHMA Japan 0.04 0.96 0.00 
Churches of Christ Care                          0.01 0.35 0.64 Tomnet 0.02 0.98 0.00 
Diabetes Australia                               0.01 0.02 0.97 Japan Zaitaku 0.02 0.98 0.00 
    Toyo 0.02 0.95 0.04 
    We Can 0.02 0.98 0.00 
    Zenkoku Kyoiku 0.01 0.74 0.25 
    Aikoku 0.002 0.998 0.00 
Source: Data collected from financial reports for 44 Australia charities and 48 Japanese charities for the year of 
2003. This table compares the ratio of Total Donations (D), Other Sources of Revenues (O), and Government 
Sourced Revenues (G) to Total Revenues (TR) of charitable organisations. Charities are ordered by the percentage 
of their revenues coming from private donations.  
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1.4 Theoretical framework of the thesis 
 
This thesis attempts to investigate the effectiveness of competitive fundraising 
activities of charitable organisations, developing theoretical and empirical models to 
answer this question.  
 
Philanthropy is the act of given money for causes that operate for the social good. 
Philanthropy, especially corporate philanthropy, may nevertheless have purely self-
interested motives. If a distinction is to be drawn, ―charitable‖ giving as opposed to 
―philanthropy‖ is often used to imply that there is a ―need‖ to be addressed. This 
includes people (both groups and individuals) who are in need, be it either long-term 
or short-term need. Here there may be a greater likelihood of altruistic donor motives 
but self-interest is still not only possible but plausible.  
 
In addition, the concept of altruism and the logical possibility of an altruistic 
charitable organisation is also discussed. In the context of altruism, the theoretical 
basis for specifying the shape and content of a charitable organisation‘s preferences is 
recognised, because embracing a substantive theory of rationality has significant 
consequences for economics and especially for its methodology. Therefore it is 
extremely important to discuss the development of theoretical models.  
 
Lastly, bearing in mind the heterogeneity of the individual‘s choices (Andreoni and 
Miller, 2002), some critical observations on the individual‘s preference for donation 
are analysed. In this thesis, however, such concerns are necessarily placed in the 
background.  
 
Charitable organisations compete with each other for donations. Glaeser has found 
that market competition for donations is a primary instrument for a charitable 
organisation to be more disciplined (Glaeser, 2003; Thornton and Belski, 2009). Yet it 
is not clear how donor markets might be influenced by variations in organisational 
efficiency. The effects of competition among charitable organisations may emphasise 
their ability to use donations (Castaneda et al., 2007). One potential avenue of inquiry 
is the interest on financial information shown by potential donors, as a tool for 
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selection of the most effective and trustworthy charitable organisation for donations 
(Seidman, 1998). In addition, a charity‘s fundraising spending is important because it 
determines the future value of the charitable organisation and thus affects future 
services and aggregate to recipients.  
 
There are two theoretical poles, of perfect competition and pure monopoly, in most 
productive activity (Baumol et al., 1998). This can also apply to the market of 
charitable organisations. The market of charitable organisations has a few 
organisations dominating the market. This critical feature implies oligopoly, and is 
vastly different from either monopoly or a perfect competition. An oligopolist 
assumes to be very much concerned about what other organisations in the same 
industry do and the resulting interdependence of their decisions (Baumol et al., 1998). 
However, economic theory contains many models of oligopoly (Baumol et al., 1998). 
This thesis investigates how the effectiveness of fundraising activities is affected by 
the ―competition for donations market‖ of charitable organisations, employing a 
modified Cournot theory of oligopolistic competition markets. 
 
The competition for donations is modelled as Cournot oligopoly. Oligopoly is most 
simply characterised as competition in a market between a few firms. More 
appropriately oligopoly can be seen as competition between firms in a market where 
the actions of the firms have discernible impacts upon the other firms. It is also the 
case that these firms may take counteracting actions. This means that there is strategic 
interdependence between the firms. This is the case within the groups of charities 
which have similar or identical objectives. Thus the fundraising activities of one 
charity will have impacts upon the fundraising efforts of the other firms in the same 
group. Definitions and explanations of oligopoly can be found in a wide variety of 
sources including Eatwell, Milgate and Newman (1998, pp. 701-708). Although there 
are many forms of and models of oligopoly, Cournot oligopoly is a specific form of 
oligopoly model that is especially appropriate to oligopolistic competition between 
charitable organisations. This is because it does not rely on the existence of prices for 
the outputs of the competing organisations. In the charitable organisation model the 
output level of the organisations is represented by the fundraising expenditure/ 
fundraising expenditure ratios of the charitable organisations. 
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The contribution of this thesis is made in several ways. These encompass utilising 
individual charitable organisation financial data, focusing on competition of charitable 
organisations for donations; attempting theoretical and empirical modelling and, in 
this area, testing empirical models with a sample of Australian and Japanese 
charitable organisations. In summary, this research is defined in terms of its 
contribution to our understanding of the relationships between the donations seeking 
behaviour of organisations, and the characteristics such as corporate governance and 
the financial reporting information. This is especially true in relation to how 
charitable organisations vie with each other for donations. In the political field, both 
Australia and Japan have shown some similarity in giving the charitable sector 
increasing independence in their scope of operation (Australian Government, 1999; 
Salamon et al., 2000; Cabinet Office Japan, 2001; Australian Government, 2005b). 
 
This study proposes to investigate charitable organisations‘ approach to soliciting 
donations. The aim is to foster a better understanding of the charitable organisation 
via the role of financial reporting information. Most previous studies using the 
quantitative approach have focused on results of experiments, laboratory study or a 
survey analysis on donors, and there is little employment of financial information of 
charitable organisation. The analysis of financial information is necessary because as 
the importance of charitable organisations in the economy of Australia and Japan 
increases, it is necessary to understand how charitable organisations fit in the basic 
economic theory of philanthropy.   
 
1.5 Limitations of the research  
 
No thesis can cover all aspects of this topic. Consequently it is important to recognise 
the limitations this imposes on both the work itself and the results and conclusions 
that can be obtained and made. Furthermore, in order to model the competition 
between organisations as an oligopolistic market structure a variety of simplifications 
have to be made. These simplifications place their own limitations on the research. 
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly from a marketing viewpoint, the marketing 
methods employed by the charities are not examined. Secondly, it is implicitly 
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assumed that these methods and the outputs of the charities are identical within the 
charity groups, and that the charities are equally efficient in their use of marketing 
tools as used for fundraising. In reality it is clear that the outputs of these charities are 
not identical, even within groups with like objectives. Thirdly, under above conditions 
the level of fundraising expenditure is the appropriate measure of fundraising effort. 
Overall this is clearly a limitation of the research in that marketing methods can vary 
in type and method; in quality and effectiveness. 
 
There is a body of literature including Ball and Brown (1968), and Lev and Zarowin 
(1999) on the boundaries of financial reporting organisations. From these it has to be 
recognised that there is some uncertainty as to how far financial statements appear to 
be significant in their operations and the sustainability of charitable operations in the 
current political and economic environment. In addition, the inability of traditional 
financial reporting to incorporate the emerging non-financial concerns of charitable 
organisations has been well documented in the economics, business management and 
accounting literature (Aldridge and Colbert, 1997).   
 
Consequently, the results of the empirical analyses in this research must be treated 
with caution.  
 
Closely associated with the financial representations of the activities of these 
charities, the impacts of the governance of non-profit organisations on donations and 
fund raising have been largely ignored. Many researchers of for-profit organisations 
have demonstrated how the importance of effective corporate governance in financial 
affairs, including a stronger long-term financial performance (Verschoor, 2004). Poor 
governance standards have been blamed at least in part for the financial crisis in East 
Asia (Krugman, 1994; Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Sycip, 1998; Yamazawa, 1998; 
Rasiah, 1999) and witnessed current financial crises in 2008 and 2009 worldwide. 
However, Gold (2005) asserts that over the long-term, firms with poor governance 
outperformed the S&P/ASX 200 index by 5-13% per annum. Thus the results of 
corporate governance research remain somewhat controversial even for for-profit 
organisations but have not been treated in the same depth for not-for profit 
organisations. This thesis cannot pretend to shed much light on this unsettled topic. A 
stark question is how corporate governance of charitable organisations can be treated: 
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within a unitarist model, a model based on altruism or some further variations? In 
fact, whether or not organisations can be truly altruistic is a governance question that 
is ignored in favour of simplifications for modelling purposes.  
 
Another limitation, as a piece of comparative research is that as a consequence of the 
problems with the Japanese data, this thesis necessarily concentrates on Australian 
charitable and philanthropic organisations, with the analysis of Japan having to be 
relegated to a subsidiary research objective. Nevertheless, this thesis aims to 
contribute some information to accounting studies and mixed discipline research and 
policy makers of not-for-profit organisations, as it will be the first analysis of results 
on Japanese NPO Corporations for this issues. Furthermore, it will be the first time 
analyses of Japanese NPO Corporations are presented and discussed on the basis of 
Cournot oligopoly competition theory.  
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis    
 
The thesis is organised into nine chapters. First Chapter One introduces the research 
topic, and understanding of the behaviour of charitable organisations.  
 
Chapter Two discusses the background of charities in Australia and Japan, which may 
emphasise cultural and institutional differences between these two countries. 
 
Chapter Three comprises a literature review discussing various relevant issues in 
charitable organisation research. The purpose of the review is to provide a basic 
theoretical and empirical foundation for the thesis and a detailed review of the 
typology of donors relevant to their decision to donate.  
 
Chapter Four provides a discussion of the theoretical framework for the models used 
in the study and how these have been created from previous research.  
 
Chapter Five details research design issues and variables designed for the models used 
in this study, focusing on a detailed discussion for a quantitative analysis approach.  
 
13 
 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight outline the results of empirical research undertaken 
into the oligopolistic competition among charitable organisations in the similar 
industry types of groups.  Chapter Six focuses on the analysis of the family of 
oligopolistic competition models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and finding a 
relationship between the logarithm of total donations, and financial and non-financial 
information among a similar group of charitable organisations in Australia and Japan.  
 
Chapter Seven also employs OLS models, however, this chapter places more 
emphasis on the models of shares of donations, shares of fundraising expenditures and 
shares of volunteers among group of charitable organisations in Australia and Japan.  
 
Chapter Eight focuses on Two Stage Least Squares models using a group of charitable 
organisations in Australia and compares the results of Two Stage Least Squares 
models on shares of donations, shares of fundraising and shares of volunteers.  
 
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis with a summary of the findings and discusses the 
general implications of the research in terms of its contribution to our understanding 
of the relationship between donations, and financial and non-financial information.  
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Chapter 2  
Background of Charitable Organisations:              
Australia and Japan 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides the historical and current context of charitable organisations, 
and a profile of charitable organisations in Australia and Japan. These two histories 
are very different. Some Australian charitable organisations, for example, have 
histories which date back to the initial European settlement. The churches guided 
social welfare institutions and started charitable organisations beginning in 1788. 
Conversely, Japanese organisations are very new, due to the Japanese government 
policy of restricting the establishment of community based organisations until 1998.  
 
This late start occurred because the Japanese Government did not realise the necessity 
of a policy for accepting community based organisations until the Kobe earthquake hit 
Japan at 5:46 am on 17 January, 1995. At that time people from all over Japan came 
spontaneously and formed volunteer groups to help victims in the shelters (all schools 
became instant shelters, and victims and volunteers were accommodated there until 
the new school year started in April 1995). The Japanese Government delayed taking 
action and relied on these spontaneous volunteer groups for immediate assistance for 
the following few years, until the last shelter closed.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: The selection of the two countries is discussed in 
Section 2.2. The background of the charitable organisations in Australia is discussed 
in Section 2.3 and in Japan in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 the sample of Australian and 
Japanese charitable organisations is presented. A summary is provided in Section 2.6.    
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2.2 Selection of countries 
 
Both Australia and Japan are under-researched compared to other countries, 
especially the USA and the UK. There are also distinct cultural differences between 
Australia and Japan. Cultural differences seem to influence an individual‘s donation 
decisions, according to Hofstede (2001), who established a theory of culture of 
masculinity or femininity. Hofstede stated ‗Masculinity versus femininity is about ego 
enhancement versus relationship enhancement‘ (1980, p. 18). Based on a survey of 
the international subsidiaries of one large multinational organisation in 40 countries 
(once in 1968 and once in 1972 for a total of more than 116,000 questionnaires), 
Hofstede (1984, 1993; 2001) found that high ‗masculine‘ culture people do not 
generally care about others, while in a low ‗masculine‘ cultures, people are more 
benevolent. While both Australia and Japan are grouped as masculine nations by 
Hofstede (2001, p. 286), Australia‘s masculinity score was 61 (position 16), while 
Japan ranked number one with a masculinity score of 95. A request for charity should 
trigger the norm of nurturing and a perceived moral obligation to help others 
(Hofstede, 2001).  
 
O‘Neill and Young (1988) argued that a high ‗masculine‘ culture government is more 
likely to control charitable organisations, while those with a lower ‗masculine‘ culture 
are likely to impose higher tax rates to generate revenues to look after those who are 
less fortunate. Solicitations for charity donations should motivate greater feelings of 
personal obligations in high masculine countries, but trigger greater perceptions of the 
government‘s obligation in low masculine countries (Nelson et al., 2006). The 
altruistic behaviour and values of the individual may be reflected in their cultural 
differences (Nelson et al., 2006). 
 
Other research has been broadly applied in cross-culture studies (Kamibayashi, 2001; 
Brown, 2005; Sato, 2008). Hofstede‘s research has been criticised and the masculinity 
and femininity dimensions, in particular, have received the most criticism (Jandt, 
2007). Yeh (1988) argues that Hofstede ignores the stage of economic development of 
each country: thus a country in its early stage emphasises economic growth more than 
the problem of environment. Sato (2008) also has concerns for Hofstede‘s sample 
validity. Sato (2008, p. 827) states that, ‗It is obvious that a large multinational 
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company‘s employees are not representative of the Japanese nation‘. Thus, Hofstede‘s 
(2001) judgement of Japan is the judgement of employees in the sample of a 
multinational company, one which encourages its employees to focus on work and 
higher positions, rather than family or relationships with other co-workers. It requires 
a higher need for dominance, autonomy, aggression, exhibition and achievement 
(Jandt and Hundley, 2007), while the  Japanese possess a totally different character 
(Sato, 2008). In the Japanese culture, Beatty et al. (1991) also finds a strong tradition 
of reciprocation and moral obligations towards the needier.  
 
One of the subsidiary aims of this study is to examine altruism and its impacts on 
charitable organisations. Previous studies find that it is far too difficult to measure. 
Can altruism be affected by culture? Titmuss (1970) states that the blood donation is 
pure altruism. Titmuss (1970, p. 239) states that,  
 
Unlike gift-exchange in traditional societies, there is in the free gift of blood 
to unnamed strangers no contract of custom, no legal bond, no functional 
determinism, no situations of discriminatory power, constraint or 
compulsion, no sense of shame or guilt, no gratitude imperative and no need 
for the penitence of a Chrysostom. In not asking for or expecting any 
payment of money these donors signified their belief in the willingness of 
other men to act altruistically in the future. 
 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) reports in 2001 that the blood donation rate 
per 1000 population was 18 times higher in countries with a high Human 
Development Index (HDI) than countries with a low HDI during the years between 
1997 and 1999 (World Health Organization, 2001). While this is not directly cultural, 
it does suggest that the level of altruism can be societally determined. The HDI is a 
standard means of measuring well-being and the impact of economic policies on 
quality of life. It is a comparative measure; life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, 
combined gross enrolment ratio in education, GDP per capita of standards of living 
for countries worldwide. Table 2.1 presents the top ten ranking countries and their HD 
indices (The United Nations Development Program, 2008). Of course, the immediate 
methodological problems are that those nations with a high HDI will also possess 
greater technical and organisational capabilities for collecting blood.  
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Australia and Japan are only two countries in the Asia Pacific region placed in the top 
ten in the Human Development Index (HDI) in the world (The United Nations 
Development Program, 2008) and this is important for validity of comparisons. 
 
Table 2.1: Top 10 countries in the human development index trends 
 
Rank  Country Human Development Index in 2006 
1  Iceland 0.968 
2  Norway 0.968 
3  Canada 0.967 
4  Australia 0.965 
5  Ireland 0.960 
6  Netherlands 0.958 
7  Sweden 0.958 
8  Japan 0.956 
9  Luxembourg 0.956 
10  Switzerland 0.955 
Source: Human development indices (United Nations Development Programme, 2008) 
 
2.3 Background of charitable organisations in Australia  
 
Australian charitable organisations have become a major provider of services that the 
government or business sectors are either unable or unwilling to provide (Kim, 2004). 
The expectation for providing quality of services has risen especially in the service 
areas of support and community-building (Salamon et al., 2000). Thus, in recent years 
there has been a steady and recognised increase in expectations of the Australian 
community about professionalisation and maturation of the charitable sector, and the 
expansion of the roles of the charitable sector in the community (Sernik, 2005).  
 
Following the previous prime minister‘s Community Business Partnership policy 
declared on 30 November 1999 at the Philanthropy Australia Conference in 2003, 
Gonski (2003) suggests that the Australian government would no longer be the sole 
engine for social innovations and national development. In the last half of the 20
th
 
century in Australia, a large number of state or local government programs provided 
the funding for charitable organisations to deliver services at the community level on 
behalf of the federal government (Australian Government, 2005a). With the 
significant growth in the welfare state, the federal government has taken an active role 
in promoting various services and assistance to individuals through community-based 
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charitable organisations, rather than delivering them directly (Australian Government, 
2001).  
 
One reason for this is that to deliver welfare services and meet the needs of the 
community, community-based charitable organisations are considered to have a better 
understanding of individual and community needs (Lyons, 2001). Similarly can 
provide services in a more flexible, cost-effective and more accommodating manner 
than the federal government‘s welfare services (Lyons, 2003). In this context, 
examining competition in the charitable sector is appropriate. In addition, there are 
various concessions offered by the federal government, which include deductible gift 
recipient status and income tax exemptions (Australian Government, 2005b). 
 
Charitable organisations have broadened the scope of the number and variety of the 
services they provide, not only in response to the diversifying and changing needs of 
the community (Australian Government, 2001; Garcia and Marcuello, 2002), but also 
in response to the changing environment of federal government policy on charitable 
organisations in Australia (Australian Government, 2001). Hence, diversity of service 
is an important element for survival, because those charitable organisations with a 
narrow mission and who depend only on government funding can be more vulnerable 
in the current environment (Liddell and Murphy, 1999). Thus, Australian charitable 
organisations are adopting a more business-like approach in their administration 
(Garcia and Marcuello, 2002). Australian charitable organisations are seemingly keen 
to move away from a dependency on government and to explore a market-oriented 
approach. This explains the recent moves of charitable organisations to appoint their 
managing directors from for-profit organisations (Goerke, 2003).  
 
Currently, Australian charitable organisations face complex problems (Centre of 
Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, 2006). These include increasing federal 
government regulatory and legislative requirements including reporting standards for 
obtaining grants, the increasing importance of management leadership, increasing 
competition to satisfy changing individual needs and decreasing or increasing 
instability of funding (Australian Government, 2006).  
 
 19 
2.3.1 History of the earliest organisations 
 
As already indicated, from 1788 the social welfare institution affiliated to the 
churches created the Australian charitable organisations sector. These church 
organisations have taken an important role in innovating and forming social, 
economic and political policies in Australia (Lyons, 1993). Australian charitable 
organisations have diversified in various areas, including sporting and social clubs, 
religious affiliations, human service organisations and art institutions (Lyons, 2001). 
Initially, primarily social welfare institutions were affiliated with churches (Lyons, 
1993) however, in the nineteenth century, secular Australian charitable organisations 
in the form of community service clubs, orphanages, disability services, business 
associations and hobby and sporting associations became more common (McGregor-
Lowndes, 2000). Those established before the 1980s were mostly church-sponsored 
(Lyons and Nivison-Smith, 2006). Many were established by Acts of Parliament, 
either indirectly through church sponsorship or in their own right as charitable 
organisations (Lyons, 1993; Commonwealth of Australia, 1995).  
 
The oldest religious charity still operating in Australia is the Wesley Mission Sydney, 
which has its origins in the first Methodist Church established in Sydney in 1812. In 
the early 1880s, this church was renamed as the Central Methodist Mission. In 1997 
the Uniting Church was created from a union of the Methodist, Presbyterian and 
Congregational Churches and, subsequently, the Central Methodist Mission became 
the Wesley Mission (Wesley Mission Sydney, 2005). Currently the Wesley Mission 
Sydney operates over 200 centres and employs over 3000 staff with an annual budget 
of $160 million (Wesley Mission Sydney, 2008).  
 
The second oldest charity with a religious affiliation in Australia today is the St. 
Vincent de Paul Society Australia, established in Melbourne in 1854. It established 
branches in other states: in Western Australia in 1865, New South Wales in 1881, 
South Australia in 1886, Queensland in 1894, Tasmania in 1899 and the Northern 
Territory in 1949. Home visits have been the core work of the society in the past, 
aiming to help disadvantaged people and families in the Australian society (St 
Vincent de Paul Society, 2008). In 2007, the St Vincent de Paul Society reported total 
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revenues of AUD$207 million with 40,000 volunteer members assisting in the good 
works of the St Vincent de Paul Society (St Vincent de Paul Society, 2008).  
 
The Salvation Army is also recognised as one of Australia's major charitable 
organisations (The Salvation Army, 2005). It was originally known as the Christian 
Mission. In 1883, a former Methodist minister, Major James Barker, began 
conducting chapel services in a prison-gate home in Carlton, Melbourne. This was the 
first organisation of its kind in the world. At first, the Salvation Army's main converts 
were alcoholics, drug addicts, prostitutes and other ―undesirables‖ (The Salvation 
Army, 2005). Following its establishment, the Salvation Army grew rapidly and in 
1885, a missing person‘s bureau was established as one of its first social services in 
Melbourne and Sydney. Since then, their services have diversified to helping 
individuals who suffer from various social issues and various tragic events as the 
main focus of its operation (The Salvation Army, 2005). During the financial year 
2006–2007, the Salvation Army reported its total revenues at AUD$658 million, 
including the financial donations of AUD$72 million and goods to the value of 
AUD$34 million with a staff of 10,000. (The Salvation Army Australia Southern 
Territory, 2008; The Salvation Army Eastern Territory, 2008). 
 
Today, one of the largest charitable organisations in Australia with religious 
affiliations is World Vision Australia. World Vision was first established in the 
United States of America (USA) by a Baptist church missionary, Bob Pierce, in 1950. 
Initially, he set up orphanages in South Korea to look after abandoned or orphaned 
children, using money raised in the USA. In the 1960s, World Vision expanded its 
operations to establish refugee camps in Indochina, Bangladesh and in several African 
countries. In 1966, it established a charity to provide child sponsorship (World Vision 
Australia, 2004).  
 
In the 1970s, World Vision expanded its program from child sponsorship to 
developing welfare programs to assist communities. Since the 1980s, its programs 
have taken a much broader outlook by expanding their programs to include minority 
groups and communities, in addition to the poor (World Vision Australia, 2004). The 
total revenue in 2007 was reported as AUD356.5 million, an increase of 13.9% 
compared with 2006. In 2007, 350,000 Australians sponsored 400,000 children world 
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wide, donating AUD189.3 million in cash and AUD97.7 million worth of goods (an 
increase of 40.7% compared with 2006). In addition, 3,808 Australian volunteers 
contributed 157,056 hours of work, with a financial value of AUD3.4 million (World 
Vision Australia, 2007, p. 42).  
 
The oldest secular charity in Australia is the Benevolent Society, which was 
established by Mr. Edward Smith Hall in 1813 with the support of its first patron, the 
New South Wales Governor, Lachlan Macquarie (The Benevolent Society, 2005; The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 2008). The society began to provide a social service for 
motherhood and opened the Sydney Asylum for the poor, blind, aged and infirm in 
Sydney in 1821 (The Benevolent Society, 2005). The society‘s concern for the cause 
of social problems has been well recognised by the community and it is still in 
operation, providing a wide range of services to individuals (The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2008). 
 
The second oldest secular foundation is the Wyatt Benevolent Institution, established 
in 1881. Dr Wyatt bequeathed an estate of nearly £50,000 in 1886. The foundation 
began to provide financial assistance to individuals and to improve the quality of life 
of people in South Australia. They still maintain the same services in South Australia 
and have been a major supporter of the Smith Family‘s Learning-for-Life scholarships 
since 1997.  
 
According to a report in the July 2006 issue of the Business Review Weekly (BRW) 
(2006), the 12
th
 largest secular charity out of Australia‘s top 200 Charitable 
organisations is the Australian Red Cross. This was established in 1914, nine days 
after the commencement of World War I, by Lady Helen Munro-Ferguson, the wife 
of the Governor-General Munro-Ferguson, as a branch of the British Red Cross. 
According to the history of the Australian Red Cross (2008b), Lady Munro-Ferguson 
wrote a letter to the mayors of every shire and municipality in Australia requesting the 
establishment of local branches. Within four months of this request, 88 city or 
suburban branches and 249 country branches had been established in New South 
Wales. Currently, the Australian Red Cross organises over 60 community services 
including blood donation programs, first aid projects, disaster and emergency relief 
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services, youth and education support. Australian Red Cross has a staff of over 1,800, 
with 31,000 volunteers and 30,000 members (Australian Red Cross, 2008a).  
 
The Endeavour Foundation is also a secular charity, and it was established in 1951 in 
Queensland by a group of parents and friends. They were responding to the need for 
education, care and support services for their children with intellectual disabilities. In 
1986, the Department of Education took over the educational role of Endeavour, 
leaving it to concentrate on the provision of development and support services to 
adolescents and adults with disabilities. During 2006–07, Endeavour reported its total 
revenues at AUD112 million including donations of AUD18 million. It provides 
services to almost 3,000 Queenslanders with disabilities and their families (Endeavour 
Foundation, 2007).  
 
2.3.2 The size of the Australian non-profit sector   
 
At the end of the financial year (FY) in June 2007, there were 40,976 ‗Economically 
significant non-profit organisations‘1 in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2008a). This has increased by 28% since 1996 (32,000 charitable organisations). The 
non-profit sector includes organisations such as universities that are not generally 
perceived as charitable organisations in Australia. At that the religious organisations 
accounted for 21.3% (8,743) of all non-profit organisations, followed by culture and 
recreation organisations that accounted for 20% (8,214) (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2008a). A significant proportion was social welfare organisations, often 
recognised by their charitable status (Shergold, 2009). A major source of income for 
the charitable organisations in Australia is funding from federal, state and local 
governments, which is reported in the FY of 2007 as just over one third (34.1% or 
AUD25.4 billion) of total income (see Table 2.3) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2008a). The highest share of funding is accounted for by ―education and research‖ 
organisations (32.4% or AUD8.2 billion) followed by social services organisations 
(26.5% or AUD6.7 billion) in the FY to June 2007 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2008a). Over two-thirds of total government funding (68.1% or AUD17.3 billion) for 
                                                 
1
 They employ staff or access tax concessions (see the Office for the Not-for-Profit Sector, 
Australian Government: http://www.notforprofit.gov.au/about-us/about-us-page-1). 
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non-profit organisations was volume based funding (for example, granted on a per 
student or a per client basis) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008a). 
 
Table 2.2 presents a comparison of the incomes of the non profit sector in Australia 
between the FY 1999–2000 and the FY 2006–2007. During the FY 1999–2000, the 
non-profit organisations in Australia received AUD20.8 billion in income (3.3% of 
the GDP) and employed 604,000 people (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002). The 
primary source of income was from funding by federal, state and local governments, 
which totalled AUD10.1 billion. Services brought AUD7.3 billion, and donations, 
sponsorship and fundraising brought another AUD3.3 billion (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2002). During the FY 2006–2007, non-profit organisations in Australia 
received AUD74.5 billion in income, representing 7% of the GDP (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2008a). The primary source of income is from federal, state and local 
governments, AUD25.4 billion (2.4% of the GDP), income from services at AUD21.6 
billion (2.1% of the GDP), and donations, sponsorship and fundraising at AUD6.75 
billion (0.6% of the GDP) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008b), while GDP for the 
FY 2006–2007 represents AUD1,046,620 billion (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2008b). Total employment is reported as 884,476 people (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2008a) with an additional 2,434,815 people as volunteers (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2008a).  
 
Table 2.2: Non-profit sector in Australia, 1999–2000 and 2006–2007 
 
Revenue/Employment 1999–2000 billion 2006–2007 billion 
Total income  20.80 74.50 
Government grants  10.10 25.40 
Service fees  revenues  7.30 21.60 
Donations, sponsorship and 
fundraising  
3.30 6.75 
The number of employees 604,000 884,476 
 Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002 and; 2008a) 
 
This growth is close to spectacular, but it remains to be seen how far this is affected by the 
Global Financial Crisis. 
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2.3.3 The Australian regulatory framework  
 
Australian charitable organisations have received a substantial amount of government 
subsidy over the years. However, this has changed over the last two decades because 
the federal government began to seek higher public accountability from charities 
(Kim, 2004). The governments‘ large amounts of funding were never an open-ended 
commitment but its requirements are increasingly stringent. The federal government 
expects outputs and an acceptable achievement of desired outcomes for communities 
(Lyons et al., 1999). The onset and aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis have 
exacerbated this.  
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 stated the need for 
accountability and the Royal Charter required organisations to register to be eligible 
to receive state funding (Scouts of Australia, 2003). Incorporated charitable 
organisations came under the Corporation Act 2001, the same regulation as for-profit 
corporations. Thus, incorporated charitable organisations (generally the larger 
charitable organisations) are regulated by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission and are subject to the same reporting and auditing requirements that 
apply to corporations (Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2009). It is 
this that creates a data source for the present study. In addition, the Australian Council 
for Overseas Aid has developed codes of conduct for the members of charitable 
organisations and other development charitable organisations to follow (Kim, 2004).  
 
To be recognised as a charitable organisation, under common law it is necessary to 
have ―charitable purpose,‖ where organisations represent the advancement of health, 
education, social and community welfare, religion, culture, natural environment 
and/or other purposes beneficial to the community (Australian Taxation Office, 2002). 
An organisation, conducting a charitable purpose, is allowed to receive various 
taxation concessions and fundraising licenses (Lyons, 1993; McGregor-Lowndes, 
2004). The division of government responsible for the NPO legal framework is shared 
primarily between the states and the federal government (Lyons, 1993, 2003) and 
each State in Australia has a different statutory framework for permitting the 
incorporation of charitable organisations under the general code of business 
corporations (Lyons, 1998).  
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In the last decade, there has been a significant evolution of the governmental 
structures and economic institutions by agreement between the states and the 
Commonwealth Government (McGregor-Lowndes, 2004). The registration of 
charitable organisations has been in accordance with Section 21 of the Company‘s 
Act 61 of 1973. Since 1922, the income of a charitable institution and the income of a 
fund established by will or an instrument of trust for a public charitable purpose have 
been exempt from income tax. Unregistered charitable organisations were not 
subjected to income tax legislation until 1977 (Philanthropy Australia, 2008); after 
1997, all charitable organisations were required to register under the Nonprofit 
Organisations Act 71 of 1997 to receive tax exemption.  
 
The Income Tax Assessment Act of 1997 (Division 50), imposed tax on the income of 
certain charitable institutions to prevent charitable organisations shifting tax-exempt 
income offshore. Lyons (2001, 2003) states that the charitable sectors have a tendency 
to limit the disclosure of their operations to their members, supporters and clients, and 
therefore, governments have introduced laws and regulations to prevent such practices 
and protect their stakeholders (Lyons, 2003). Governments can also protect and 
maintain the reputation of the charitable sectors through legislation and regulation to 
prevent dishonest individuals forming a charitable organisation with hidden agendas 
or engaging in illegal operations (Fleishmen, 1999). 
 
Furthermore, in order to have income tax exemption, all charitable organisations are 
required to be registered as income tax exempt charitable organisations (Public 
Interest organisations) since July 2000 (Australian Taxation Office, 2002). At present, 
the government responsibility for the legal framework of the NPOs is shared between 
the states and the Commonwealth, with each state having different statutes permitting 
the incorporation of the NPOs in its general code of business corporations. The legal 
framework of the charitable organisations in Australia is not a rational jurisprudential 
structure, nor is there a uniform law for the creation of charitable organisations 
(Lyons et al., 1999; 2004). Instead there are a number of diverse jurisdictions 
(McGregor-Lowndes, 2004). Thus, currently charitable organisations face a number 
of difficulties in relation to the lack of co-ordination of the laws in the differing state 
jurisdictions (McGregor-Lowndes, 2004). 
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2.3.3.1 Accountability of Australian charitable organisations 
 
In relation to financial reports, if a charitable organisation receives either government 
grants or philanthropic grants or donations, a charitable organisation is deemed a 
―reporting entity‖. It is therefore necessary for the organisation to prepare a general 
purpose financial report and comply with the Corporation Act 2001 and Australian 
Accounting Standards.  
 
The Australian Accounting Standards Board, in its project Accounting Policies, 
changes in accounting estimates and errors' summary, states that both reliability and 
relevance of data are critical to decision usefulness. Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) 
stated the fair that the attributes of organisations may affect the perceived relevance 
and reliability of financial information and the testing of results. Tinkelman et al. 
found several aspects of data affect the relevance and reliability of the data to donors. 
These were as follows:  
 Start-up organisations, organisation younger than 4 years. Organisational 
performance in the start-up may be seen by donors as typical and having 
limited relevance. 
 Organisations that normally received less than 20% of their revenues from 
donations. For such organisations, the overall expenditure (including 
administration costs) will be predominant. Donors are likely to regard 
organisational expenses disclosures as of limited relevance. 
 Smaller organisations which are not required to be audited.  
 Organisations with unusual aspects, defined as zero fundraising or 
administration costs.  
 
In addition, if a charity asks for fundraising in public it has to comply with regulations 
of various State Fundraising or Collection Acts. Table 2.3 presents legislations for 
fundraising in each state. The legislation of New South Wales is the Charitable 
Fundraising Act 1991 and its regulation is the Charitable Fundraising Regulation 
2003. It requires charitable organisations to report fundraising expenditures and ratio 
of fundraising expenditure to total expenditures. Queensland‘s Acts are the 
Collections Act 1966 and Collection Regulation 1998.  
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The behaviour of Australian charitable organisations is not only constrained by 
mandatory compliances of state and federal law requirementa, but also by voluntary 
compliance including professional and industry codes of conduct, and organisational 
policies and codes of conduct.  
 
Table 2.3: Legislation for fundraising and states 
 
State Title of legislation  
Australian Capital Territory  Charitable Collections Act (Regulation) 2003 
Victoria Fundraising Appeals Act 1998 (Regulation 2001) 
New South Wales Charitable Fundraising Act 1991 (Regulation 2003) 
Queensland Collections Act 1966 (Regulation 1998) 
South Australia Collection for Charitable Purposes Act 1939 (Regulation 
1995) 
Western Australia Charitable Collections Act 1947 (Regulations 1947) 
Tasmania Collections for Charities Act 2001 (Regulation 2001) 
Sources: (New South Wales, 2000; Queensland, 2000; South Australia, 2000; Western Australia, 2000; 
Victoria, 2001; Tasmania, 2003; Australian Capital Territory, 2005) 
 
The Australian Institute of Fundraising [now Fundraising Institute Australia (FIA)], 
the major professional association for fundraisers, has amended its Code of 
Professional Conduct to include references to acceptable levels of cost of fundraising 
in various kinds of fundraising campaigns (Fundraising Institute Australia, 2000).  
 
Many charitable organisations increasingly rely on income from sources such as 
merchandising, fee for service, government grants and fundraising. Fundraising is an 
important activity and a growing part of the Australian community and many 
government and  semi government organisations and not-for-profit organisations have 
established significant fundraising programs to provide new and innovative services. 
To enhance fundraising trends, there are numerous bureaucratic issues at state 
government and federal government levels involved. As well, there is a need for 
greater public accountability and transparency for all fundraising which can only be 
achieved through the use of standardised reporting procedures. 
 
In September 2009, the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) announced 
that the project, ―Disclosures by Private Sector Not-for-Profit Entities,‖ suggests 
including disclosure requirements or guidance to fill the gaps in relation to non-
financial information and service performance (Australian Accounting Standards 
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Board, 2009). They argue that donors and others interested in charitable organisations 
be provided with financial reports that are both easier to understand and useful, 
donors may want non-financial information to help them make financial decisions 
such as whether to make a donation. Furthermore, donors most likely want to know 
how a charitable organisation spends its resources and the specific outputs and 
outcomes from those resources. AASB Chairman, Kevin Stevenson stated that, ―The 
AASB does not wish to increase the disclosure requirements …but the matter of 
disclosure of non-financial information needs to be further explored‖ (Australian 
Accounting Standards Board, 2009). AASB further comments that cost-benefit 
approaches should be removed to meet not-for-profit specific needs (Australian 
Accounting Standards Board, 2009).   
 
2.3.4 Current issues for Australian charitable organisations 
 
Government regulators are concerned to protect consumers from bogus fundraisers 
and to regulate some fundraising activities which have the potential to cause 
problems, such as telephone fundraising campaigns. Door-to-door collections are 
favoured by Australian donors. As yet Australian charitable organisations have not 
seen corruption on the scale of some of those in the U.S.A. (Leat, 2004). However, 
corruption still exists in Australian charitable organisations and it is usually seen as 
the work of individuals, bad apples or single operators (Leat, 2004; ABC Net, 2008). 
Individuals who have been involved in such corrupt practices have been publicly 
prosecuted and imprisoned (ABC Net, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, the low level of corruption in Australia can also be explained by the fear 
of scandals, which has acted as a major factor in charitable organisations improving 
their effectiveness, governance and accountability (Bothwell, 2001). For example, the 
Australian Red Cross was accused of failing to send sufficient money to Australian 
Bali bombing victims, revealed when the financial details of its Bali appeal were 
made public. An accounting firm (Price Waterhouse Coopers) subsequently 
established that there was no evidence of fraud or misuse of donor funds by the 
Australian Red Cross (ABC Net, 2008).  
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Currently, Australians are targeted by sham charitable organisations which send e-
mails asking for donations to what are fake charitable organisations. In 2001, the 
Victorian State Government warned that requests had come from spam e-mail or 
online requests under titles such as ―Express Relief Fund‖ or ―Victims Survivor 
Fund‖ (Pro Bono Australia, 2001). In 2005 the police also reported the investigation 
of ‗fake‘ Tsunami website ‗lncybernet‘, with the Australian Red Cross symbol 
featured in the background in 2005 (Net Australia, 2005).  
 
The Australian Government Agency has opened the web site, SCAMwatch, to warn 
Australians to be careful (SCAMwatch, 2005). Fake charitable organisations are a big 
problem because they divert much needed donations away from legitimate charitable 
organisations and causes (SCAMwatch, 2005).  
 
Regulators have responded to recent calls (from the media and charity ‗watchdog‘ 
organisations such as Givewell (2005) in Australia and Guidestar (2009) in the US, 
for controls on the proportion of donations that can be spent on administration and 
fundraising and for greater efforts to educate donors about such measures. One of the 
responses to these calls has been increased attention given to (a) the proportion of 
program expenses to total expenditure, and (b) the proportion of fundraising expenses 
to total fundraising revenue. This latter ratio is important to the modelling in this 
thesis. 
 
2.4 Background of charitable organisations in Japan 
 
This section describes the position of charitable organisations in Japan. It 
demonstrates that both the history and the present position of charitable organisations 
in Japan are vastly different to that of Australia in almost every aspect.  
 
Recently, most municipal governments in Japan have outsourced projects to non-
profit organisations including NPO corporations. Local government reported that over 
40% of governmental welfare services and 20% of governmental general services 
have been outsourced to non-profit organisations (Oyama, 2003). This was not only 
because they anticipated that the outsourcing might reduce the cost, especially given 
 30 
the recent Japanese stagnant economy, but also to respond to the increasing diversity 
of community needs (Oyama, 2003).  
 
Oyama (2003) argues that the collaboration or partnership between the municipal 
governments and the NPOs is to exercise their authorised government over the NPOs. 
This is enforced by providing funds in return to improve this new sector of the NPOs 
to help them become more professional organisations, and also to keep the 
discretional power of municipal governments to send their retired employees to the 
NPOs, a strategy carried out by Central Government to the Public Interest Legal 
Corporations
2
 (PICs) (also see Pekkanen, 2000). This practice is called ―Amakudari‖ 
in Japanese and is common at all levels of the public bureaucracies. The fact is that 
inter-organisational networks are tied to the governments. The reappearance of 
corruption and illegal acts in the process of providing public services may indicate the 
weakness of government monitoring and accountability in the NPO sector (Oyama, 
2003). However, the proposed new system of the NPO sector, enacted in December 
2008, is to provide all small voluntary organisations with incorporated status 
(Yamamoto, 2007). This also minimises the involvement of bureaucracy and keeps 
less discretional power in the procedure of granting corporation status (Oyama, 2003). 
More importantly, retired bureaucrats from the ministry will no longer be allowed to 
take up positions in the NPO sector (Pekkanen, 2000).  
 
2.4.1 History of the earliest charity organisations   
 
During the Tokugawa era (1603–1868), many aspects of social work in Japan were 
shaped by the ideals of Buddhism with its emphasis on the virtues of sympathy, 
gentleness, kindness, mercy, pity and benevolence (Higgins, 1981). Buddhism came 
to Japan from Korea in the mid-6
th
 century and Buddhism has been the adopted faith 
of the Japanese people. It is centred on the temple
3
 and the family altar
4
 (Jandt, 2007, 
                                                 
2, In 1898, during the Meiji era, Civil Law was enacted as regulation for nonprofit organisations, and legal 
foundation status was given to public interest corporations, named as Public Interest Legal Corporations (PIC or 
Koeki-hojin in Japanese) (Yamamoto et al., 1999).  
3 There are more than 200 sects of Buddhism in Japan, with wide differences in doctrines (2007). Most households 
observe some ceremonies of both religions, for example, holding a Shinto wedding and a Buddhist funeral.  
4 In 1991, overall 91% Japanese believed themselves for Buddhist, whereas South Korea was 15.4%, China, 63.3% 
and Thailand, 52.5% (The Los Angels Times, 1991, p. H6 October).  
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p. 166). Buddhist temples in village society maintained community welfare support 
systems (Funaki, 2002). During this period, fundraising was introduced for orphans, 
the elderly, and others who suffered from natural disasters (Marcure, 1985). Buddhist 
temples were directed to form a ―danka‖ (Marcure, 1985), a network by which the 
temples were supported financially, and were formed in each village throughout the 
country. During the Tokugawa era, the ―danka‖ system developed into ―Chonai-kai,‖ 
local district associations in the urban areas. However, the ―danka‖ system continued 
to operate in the rural areas (Marcure, 1985).  
 
Thus, the Japanese non-profit sector has a very long history. Pekkanen (2000, p. 116) 
stated that ―Japan has managed its non-governmental organisations with one of the 
most severe regulatory environments in the developed world‖. It was, however, 
institutionalised in its contemporary sense in the Meiji era in 1896
5
 when Civil Law 
defined the regulations governing the non-profit organisations, which were called 
Public Interest Corporations (PICs) (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). These corporations 
were strictly regulated by the government and they were required to obtain 
government approval for their establishment (Pekkanen, 2000), as well as being 
subject to government supervision for their operations (Yamamoto et al., 1999).  
 
The Japanese Government permits ministries or agencies to handle the approval of the 
PICs, but this has allowed retired bureaucrats from the ministries to establish PICs 
with funds and operating incomes through the ministries (Pekkanen, 2004). To be 
recognised as PICs, Japanese bureaucrats were required to possess a capital of more 
than US $3 million (Pekkanen, 2000), however, it is not easy for PIC to become a 
corporation. Without legal status as a corporation, small groups can still operate in 
Japan, but they are at a significant disadvantage (Yamamoto et al., 1999). They 
cannot sign a contract, which means they are unable to open a bank account as a 
corporation, employ staff or own property (Yamamoto et al., 1999; Pekkanen, 2000). 
Thus, Japan has perhaps the most severe regulatory environment in the developed 
world for establishing and operating non-governmental organisations (Pekkanen, 
2000).  
                                                 
5  The Civil Code Article 34, provides the legal foundations for the objectives of worship, religion, charity, 
education, arts and crafts, and other activities for ‗Public Interest Corporation, and not-for-profit (PICs, or Koeki 
Hojin) (Yamamoto et al., 1999). 
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The PICs serve as complementary agencies for the government, supporting its goals 
in the fields of education, health and welfare. Such organisations were not recognised 
as collectively constituting a common non-profit sector (Matsubara and Todoroki, 
2003). The government limited the content and quality of services and continually 
interfered in decisions regarding how these organisations' resources were to be used. 
Because the government generally provided a certain level of financial resources for 
the PICs, the PICs were not encouraged to raise funds from the public (Matsubara and 
Todoroki, 2003). However, the development of a system that allowed tax deductible 
contributions came as late as 1961, when certain organisations — special public-
interest promotion corporations for the PICs, including social welfare institutions — 
could become eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions (Ministry of Finance 
Japan, 1967). Because the government was providing the funds for social services 
directly or indirectly through public interest corporations, the collection of donations 
dwindled in Japan (Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003). From the Meiji era (1868–1912) 
until World War II (WWII), approximately 6,700 non-government welfare institutions 
were recognised. These were Buddhist, or mainly Buddhist institutions (Matsubara 
and Todoroki, 2003). Large Japanese conglomerates also supported these non-
government institutions with financial contributions (Funaki, 2002). 
 
After WWII, during the time when democracy was supposed to have grown, many 
PICs, such as private schools, hospitals, social welfare institutions and others, were 
increasingly subjected to the control of the government (Matsubara and Todoroki, 
2003). In accordance with directives of the post-war Allied Occupation after WWII, 
large conglomerates were broken up and government organisations were prohibited 
from giving public money to private, charitable, educational, philanthropic, or 
religious organisations (The Constitution of Japan, 1946). Following this, the national 
governments and local governments took full responsibility for the welfare industry 
(The Constitution of Japan, 1946; Hasan, 2001).  
 
In 1947, the Central Community Chest of Japan was established by the Japanese 
Government, with 47 Prefectural Community Chests‘ branches set up to help people 
living in poverty (Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003; Hasan, 2005). The 47 Prefectural 
Community Chests have taken the responsibility for the collection of community 
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donations since 1950. In practice, the great majority of Japanese have donated to the 
Red Feather Community Chest for social welfare every year since 1947, to the Green 
Chest for care of the environment and tree-planting since 1950, and to the White 
Chest (also known as the Japanese Red Cross) for medical needs, since the nineteenth 
century. Donations are raised every year through neighbourhood community groups 
(so-called Chonai-kai) and through fundraising events at primary, junior and senior 
schools, including public and private schools. With the enactment of the Social 
Welfare Services Law in 1951, the government introduced further regulations to the 
Community Chest Activities (Community Chest, 2003).  
 
In 1897, the associations and foundations were permitted to become legal non-profit 
entities under the Civil Code ‗with the objective of worship, religion charity, 
education, arts and crafts, and other activities for public interest, and not for profit‘ 
(The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2006, p. 2). In 1949, the Ministry of 
Education approved private non-profit schools as legal non-profit Educational 
Corporations, followed by approval of the Medical Corporation in 1950, and 
certification to the Religious Corporation in 1951.  
 
Currently, there are two types of civic organisations in Japan. The first is the Chonai-
kai, as noted before, a traditional neighbourhood association (Pekkanen, 2004; 
Nishide and Yamauchi, 2005). The second is the non-profit organisation. Currently, 
there are approximately 298,000 neighbourhood associations in Japan (Zenkokujichi-
kai, 2005), 90 per cent of them have been set up by the Japanese Government 
(Pekkanen, 2004). Civic communities in Japan have long fostered trust and the 
forming of associations among neighbourhoods, which provide assistance for health, 
festivals, ceremonies at public events, including fire and criminal prevention activities 
(Nishide and Yamauchi, 2005). Currently membership in Chonai-kai is in decline 
because of the reduction in the ―sense of belonging‖ to the community, and people‘s 
busy lives (Nishide and Yamauchi, 2005). Chonai-kai is a neighbourhood association, 
but it has been under the guidance of local government and its participation is semi-
mandatory (Nishide and Yamauchi, 2005). On the other hand, non-profit 
organisations as another type of civic organisation, have been dramatically increasing 
since 1995, because the NPO is a voluntary organisation with a civic purpose.  
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After the Kobe earthquake of 1995, the Japanese people recognised the need for 
(independent-of-government) citizen action in a crisis rather than being entirely 
dependent on government action. In the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the Japanese 
Government failed to provide immediate assistance and support for the victims, and 
assistance came mainly from volunteers from all over Japan (Fukushima, 1996). 
Almost four years later, in 1998, the Special Non-Profit Activities Promotion Law 
was established to certify non-profit legal status to the NPO Corporation (Kawashima, 
2001; Matsura, 2001). This NPO law was established due to the need for a public 
commitment to society‘s needs (Tatsuki, 2000). The NPO law allowed charity 
organisations to have bank accounts under the name of the corporation, employ staff, 
rent or own property and engage volunteers (Yamamoto et al., 1999). Some 
researchers have commented that the NPO law was the first step in the long process of 
developing an NPO infrastructure in Japan (Okabe, 1999). 
 
2.4.2 The size of the Japanese non-profit sector   
 
Table 2.4 presents data on the gross domestic product (GDP) and the total income of 
the non-profit sector, in addition to a breakdown of the total income by; i) donations, 
membership fees and grants and, ii) services fees for the period from 1999–2000 to 
2006–2007. It should be noted that the depreciation of the Japanese yen (JYP) against 
the Australian dollar (AUD) has reduced the dollar denomination revenues of these 
organisations, particularly during the last few years. The last column of the table gives 
the growth in employment over the same period.  
 
During the financial year (FY) 1999–2000, the total income of the non-profit sector is 
reported at JPY 25.4 trillion (AUD 0.377 trillion) at 5.1% of GDP (JPY502.9 trillion) 
(Yamauchi, 1999; Statistic Bureau & Statistical Research and Training Institute, 
2001; Cabinet Office Government of Japan, 2004) and total employment as 1,344,803 
people (Takayanagi et al., 2002), which has increased by 3.5% since 1997 (Miyamoto 
and Nakata, 2001; Miyamoto, 2003). The primary source of income is the total of 
donations, member fees and government grants, which totals JPY 20.9 trillion (82.3% 
of total income of NPO), while services fees are JPY 3.9 trillion (15.4% of total NPO 
income) (Cabinet Office Government of Japan, 2004).  
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During the period 1999–2000, the total of individual contributions are reported as JPY 
163 billion (AUD2.3 billion) and approximately JPY 1,561 per person (AUD22) 
(Statistic Bureau & Statistical Research and Training Institute, 2004).  
 
Table 2.4: Comparison of the years between 1999–2000 and 2006–2007 for non-
profit sector in Japan in AUD (JPY) 
Financial year 1999–2000 2006–2007 
Total income JYP (AUD) trillion   26.717 (0.377)  30.299 (0.337) 
a) membership fees & government grants 
JYP (AUD) trillion  
21.560 (0.304)  24.352 (0.271) 
b) Service fees revenues JPY(AUD) trillion  4.214 (0.059) 5.421 (0.060) 
GDP JYP (AUD) trillion  499.544 (7.039)   512.186 (5.692) 
The number of employees 1,344,803 2,253,839 
Average exchange rates JYP (= AUD1) 70.97 89.99 
Sources: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2004; 2008) 
 
During the FY 2006–2007, the non-profit sector in Japan receives total income at 
JPY30.299 trillion (AUD0.337 trillion), which has increased by 13.4% from the FY 
1999-2000 (Cabinet Office Government of Japan, 2004; 2008). The main source of 
income is also from donations, membership fees and government grants as at JPY 
33.057 trillion (AUD0.271 trillion), representing 6.4% of the GDP (JYP515.807 
trillion) (Statistic Bureau & Statistical Research and Training Institute, 2008). During 
the year, the total employment level is reported as 2,253,839 people, which has 
increased by 67.6% since the FY 1999-2000 (Cabinet Office Government of Japan, 
2008b). 
 
During the FY 2006-2007, the total of individual contributions are reported as JPY 
114.6 billion (AUD1.27 billion) and approximately JPY1,073 per person (AUD12). 
The donation per person is much smaller in Japan compared to Australia (or other 
developed countries). Resent studies highlight problems in relation to the various 
reasons for the low per capita contribution of donations in Japan. These consist of (i) 
the complexity of the registration procedures and the structure of the Japanese non-
profit sector (Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003), (ii) the low tax incentive for charitable 
organisations and donors (Hasan, 2005), (iii) the difficulties of receiving tax 
deductibility status for donations (Matsumoto and Takahashi, 2002; Matsubara and 
Todoroki, 2003), (iv) the complexity of the structure in the Japanese non-profit sector 
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(Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003), and (v) the inadequate guidelines regarding 
donations to charitable organisations (Kashiwagi and Higashide, 2005). Thus, even if 
the charitable organisations hold tax deductible status, donors may still not receive tax 
benefits for their donations owing to (a) the complexity of the tax system (the tax 
benefits cannot be obtained unless the donation is to an NPO over JPY10,000 at a 
time, compared to AUD2.00 in Australia) (Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003) and (b) the 
absence of proper guidelines to prepare tax returns (Kashiwagi and Higashide, 2005).   
 
2.4.3 The Japanese regulatory framework 
 
During the Meiji era, in 1897 Article 34 of the Uniform Civil Code was promulgated 
and this caused heavy regulation (Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003). ―Legal persons‖ 
are organisations legally empowered with an independent existence and the ability to 
possess rights and obligation (Yamamoto, 1997). Thus, the Civil Law enacted 
regulation for non-profit organisations and legal foundation status was given, as they 
become Public Interest Corporations (PIC or Koeki-hojin in Japanese) (Yamamoto et 
al., 1999). There are two types of PICs established, the Association (Shadan Hojin) 
and the Foundation (Zaidan Hojin). There are seven types of Japanese NPOs. They 
include two PICs, the Association and the Foundation, and Social Welfare 
Corporation (Shakaifukushi Hojin), School Corporation (Gakko Hojin), Religious 
Corporation (Shukyo Hojin), Medical Corporation (Iryo Hojin), and Special Non-
profit Activities Corporation (NPO Hojin, hereafter NPO Corporation). Japanese 
NPOs are also heavily regulated by the central government and in the Civil Law 
(Pekkanen, 2000). For the establishment of the NPOs, they need the approval of the 
municipal government, and the legal structure for NPOs is governed by a separate 
legal provision (Pekkanen, 2000). In addition, Japanese NPOs are also subject to 
lifelong government supervision (Yamamoto et al., 1999).  
 
Table 2.5 presents seven types of Japanese NPOs and the approval of government 
agencies. The establishment of each NPO requires approval from different 
government agencies. For example, in 1897 the enactment of Association and 
Foundation Corporation was permitted by the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 
Existing for more than 112 years, in 2007 the number of associations and foundations 
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in Japan was 12,749 and 12,792, respectively. The establishment of the Social 
Welfare Corporation and the Medical Corporation require the approval of the 
Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare, and the laws were enacted in 1951 and 1950, 
respectively. In addition, the Social Welfare Corporation consists of 13,307 
organisations throughout Japan, while the Medical Corporation is a little larger, 
consisting of 140,048 organisations in 2007. 
 
Table 2.5: Categories of non-profit legal organisations in Japan 
 
Categories  
 
Enacted 
Year 
Based law  
 
Authorisation 
Agency 
NPO Status Disclosure 
of Financial 
Information  
Numbers 
Association 
(Shadan)  
1897 Civil Code, 
Article 34   
Cabinet 
Office, 
Government 
of Japan 
Permission   Not 
required 
12,749 
Foundation 
(Zaidan) 
(12,792)   
1897 Civil Code, 
Article 34   
Cabinet 
Office, 
Government 
of Japan 
Permission  Not 
required 
12,792 
Social Welfare 
Corporation 
(Shakaifukushi 
Hojin)  
1951 Social 
Welfare 
Business 
Law Article 
22   
Ministry of 
Health, 
Labour and 
Welfare 
Approval  Not 
required 
13,307 
School 
Corporation 
(Gakko Hojin)  
1949 Private 
School Law 
Article 3   
Ministry of 
Education, 
Culture, 
Sports, 
Science and 
Technology 
Approval  Not 
required 
11,765 
Medical 
Corporation 
(Iryo Hojin)  
1950 Medical Law, 
Article 39   
Ministry of 
Health, 
Labour and 
Welfare 
Approval  Not 
required 
140,048 
Religious 
Corporation 
(Shukyo 
Hojin)  
1951 Religious 
Corporation 
Law Article 4   
Agency For 
Cultural 
Affairs 
Certificatio
n 
Not 
required 
183,894 
Specified Non-
profit 
Activities 
(NPO Hojin)  
1998 Promote 
Specified 
Nonprofit 
Activities   
Municipal 
Government 
or Cabinet 
Office, 
Government 
of Japan 
Certificatio
n 
 
Required  37,198 
Source: Nihonkonin Kaikeikyokai (2000), Pekkanen (2000), The International Centre for Not-for-
Profit Law (2006); Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2005) and Cabinet Office 
Government of Japan (2008a).    
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The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology has provided 
approval for the establishment of the School Corporation since 1949 there have 
involved a total of 11,765 corporations. The establishment of the Religious 
Corporation required the approval of the Agency for Cultural Affairs, and enactment 
of this law began in 1951.  
 
To promote locally support mechanisms (Yamamoto, 2002), the Special Non-profit 
Activities Corporation (hereafter refer as NPO Corporation) was introduced in 1998. 
Since the enactment of Promotion Specified Nonprofit Activities, 37,198 
organisations have been given certification for acceptance of establishment from the 
municipal government. If the NPO Corporation expands beyond more than one 
municipal government, the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan will assist with 
certification.  
 
In relation to accounting requirements for Japanese NPOs, there are seven types of 
NPOs in Japan (Table 2.5). Government agencies require NPOs to submit financial 
reports every year, which comply with the accounting standards produced by each 
authorised government agency. Table 2.6 presents each type of accounting guidance 
for Japanese NPOs. There is no one set of accounting standards for Japanese NPOs 
since each NPO has different government authorisation agency. 
 
Since 2001 only the Special Non-profit Activities Corporation is required to disclose 
financial and other information (see the final column of Table 2.5). Other 
organisations are not required to disclose financial information and are required the 
disclose only limited information including their name, the address of the main office 
and the main the objective of organisation ( Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, 2005).  
 
Table 2.6 presents the accounting guidance for each NPO in Japan and its enactment 
date. Because of recent changes in social economic progress, such as falling birth 
rates and an increasing ageing population, the various activities in relation to NPOs 
have been reviewed.  
 
 39 
Since 1998, the introduction of the Specified Non-profit Activities Corporation, NPO 
Corporation Law (hereafter the NPO Law) promotes numbers of NPOs to be 
incorporated as NPO Corporation. At the enactment of the system in 1998, the 
number of corporation was zero and it reached 37,198 in 2008 (Cabinet Office Japan, 
2004b, 2006). The certified Special Non-profit Activities Corporation is called 
‗Ninsho‘ NPO (registered NPO). The NPO Law provides not only incorporated status 
to organisations, but allows the organisations to obtain legal contracts, employ staff 
and hold their organisations‘ bank accounts.  
 
Table 2.6: A nonprofit organisation Accounting Guidance and Standards 
 
NPOs Authorisation Agency Accounting Standards (Enacted Date) 
Association & 
Foundation 
Cabinet Office, 
Government of  Japan 
Public Interest Corporation Accounting 
Standards (17 September 1985) 
Social Welfare 
Corporation  
Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare 
Social Welfare Financial Rules  
(31 January 1976); Social Welfare 
Corporation Accounting Standards (17 
February 2000) 
School Corporation  Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology 
School Corporation Accounting 
Standards (1 April 1971); Partial 
Revision of School Corporation 
Accounting Standards (13 May 2005) 
Medical 
Corporation  
Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare 
Accounting Code of the Hospital 
(20 April 1995); Hospital Accounting 
Standards (22 August 1983); Accounting 
Code of Long-Term Care Health Facility 
(1 June 1989, 2001) 
Religious 
Corporation 
Agency For Cultural 
Affairs 
Religious Corporations Law (Dec.1995); 
Religious Corporation Tax Accounting 
(18 November 1971) 
Special Non-profit 
Activities  
Municipal government or 
Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan 
Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit 
Activities (25 March 1998); Accounting 
Guidance for Certain NPO Corporation 
(June 1999); Disclosure requirement of 
financial information (2001) 
Source: Summary of white paper on public service corporations (Prime Minister's Office, 2000) 
 
The ―Special Tax Measure Law‖ is introduced by the National Tax Agency to award 
―Nintei‖ NPO Corporation. Thus, a ―Nintei‖ NPO Corporation is designated by the 
National Tax Agency to be given special tax exemption status for contributions and 
gifts, allowing these to be tax deductible (as with Deductible Gift status to Australian 
Charities). However, Yamamoto (2003) argues the complexity of the requirement of 
the new law makes it difficulty for many NPO Corporations to receive a ―Nintei‖ 
NPO, Deductible Gift Tax Exemption status. Thus, in 2002 only 10 NPO 
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Corporations hold Deductible Gift Tax Exemption status under the ―Special Tax 
Measure Law‖, which was just 0.11% of the total number of NPO Corporations at that 
time (Yamamoto, 2003).  
 
Despite its negative impression to existing NPO Corporations, this provided hope for 
many small to medium-sized non-registered NPOs and they rushed to register as an 
NPO Corporation (Yamamoto, 2002). Table 2.7 presents the growth in the number of 
NPO Corporations from 1999 to 2008, showing that the total number of NPO 
Corporations has increased by 66% from 5,625 organisations in 2001 to 9,329 in 
2002.   
 
To simplify registration procedures on, in 2003, the NPO Law was amended to 
abolish the requirement for a budget plan at the time of application (Yamamoto, 2003). 
Table 2.7 shows the growth of NPO Corporations from 1999 to be 1,176 
organisations. There wee zero NPO Corporations in December 1998.  
 
Table 2.7: Growth of NPO Corporations (1999–2008) 
 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
NPO 
Corporation
s 
1,17
6 
3,15
6 
5,62
5 
9,32
9 
14,65
7 
19,96
3 
22,42
4 
31,11
5 
34,37
1 
37,19
8 
Nintei NPO 
Corporation
s 
0 0 0 10 18 26 39 58 80 93 
Sources: Cabinet Office Government of Japan (2004b, 2006, 2009) and National Tax Agency Japan 
(2006, 2009). 
 
In 2008, the total number of NPO Corporation reaches 37,198 organisations. The 
second column of Table 2.7 also shows the number of ―Nintei‖ NPO Corporations, 
which award Deductible Gift Tax Exemption status, however, the number of ‗Nintei‘ 
NPO Corporations has not increased as dramatically as the number of NPO 
Corporation. Ninety three organisations were awarded Deductible Gift Tax 
Exemption status in 2008, which is 0.26% of total number of NPO Corporations 
(Cabinet Office Government of Japan, 2009).  
 
Table 2.8 presents the legal requirements for NPO Corporations. NPO Corporations 
are required to have more than three members and one auditor on the board, a 
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minimum of 10 voting members, and a minimum of one annual meeting each fiscal 
year.  
 
Table 2.8: Requirements for the certified (Ninsho) NPO Corporations 
 
Requirements 
 
Management and leadership One board director 
More than 3 members and 1 auditor on the board  
More than 10 members with voting rights.  
Annual meetings  At least once a year . 
Profit activity  Permitted to support non-profit activities only. 
Disclosure information  Activities‘ Report, Balance Sheet, Income Statement, the 
Statutes of Incorporation, the names and titles of board 
members and more than 10 staff members.  
Source: NPO Homepage (Cabinet Office Japan, 2004a)  
 
An NPO Corporation is required to comply with the NPO Corporation rules, which 
originate primarily from the NPO Law under section 27, and the Japanese Generally 
Accepted Accounting Standards, which include General Principle One, ―Fairness‖; 
General Principle Two, ―Justice‖; and General Principle Five, ―Continuous Method‖. 
The purpose of these current accounting rules is to provide supporting information on 
the stewardship of the non-profit entities (Kashiwagi and Higashide, 2005). While 
there are no practical specified standards to comply with, in 2001 the amended NPO 
Law added the disclosure requirements for financial information.  
 
2.4.3.1 Accounting guidance for NPO Corporations  
 
NPO Corporations are expected to play a significant role in the Japanese community, 
and they require proper business management and accountability to Japanese 
community. As mentioned above, NPO Corporations are only the NPOs in Japan 
which have been required to disclose financial activities to the public since 2001. 
Although the the NPO Corporation is obliged to disclose financial statements, NPO 
law has not established its own accounting standards. Nakatuskasa, a Chairman of 
Japanese Certified Public Accountants, points out that ―Many of NPO corporations 
make a skeleton copy of the sample of Cabinet Office Japan‖(Nakatsukasa, 2000). 
The Cabinet Office Japan provides an accounting manual in a booklet titled 
―Guidance for the establishment and operation of a non-profit organisation‖, which is 
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for public benefit entities and which is based on a budget system of Income 
Statements and Balance Sheets (Nakatsukasa, 2000).  
 
However there are advantages for budgets. First, they promote coordination and 
communication among subunits within the organisation. Second, they provide a 
framework for judging performance and third, they motivate managers and other 
employees (Horngren et al., 2006, p. 182). Thus, budget accounting is for 
management but the budget accounting system may focus only on spending all 
budgeted amounts, and can ignore the efficiency of operation (Mizuguchi, 2001).  
 
Nakatsukasa (2000) states that to carry out the organisational mission, it is important 
for an NPO Corporation to disclose any accounting information to outside 
stakeholders, not only to government agencies. However, many NPO corporations in 
Japan have already voluntarily published financial reports based on the Accounting 
Standards for profit organisations in addition to complying with their obligations to 
submit reports and returns to the various municipal governments (Nakatsukasa, 2000). 
Mizuguchi (2001) states that the Accounting Standards for various Japanese NPOs are 
not only different from the Accounting Standards for profit organisations/corporations 
but are also very complicated, so much so that even a member of JICPA can find 
difficult in understanding them. Mizuguchi (2001) argues that it is not a question of 
which accounting standards are theoretically correct for NPOs, but rather their 
understandability to the public.   
 
In March 2009, public discussions about the Accounting Standards for NPOs began.  
The majority of JICPA members suggested using the same Accounting Standards as 
for- profit organisations. However, Accounting Standards for profit organisations are 
currently under re-construction to harmonise International Accounting Standards into 
Japanese Accounting Standards. On 7
th
 and 8
th
  September 2009, the Accounting 
Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) held a meeting with the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and announced the mandatory adopting of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) by Japanese listed companies by 2012 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2009).  
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In September 2009, the ASBJ announced an amended ―ASBJ Project Plan‖ for the 
period up to 2011, which would be followed by ASBJ Chairman, Nishikawa and other 
delegates to attend the World Standards Setters meeting (Accounting Standards Board 
of Japan, 2009). The ASBJ Project Plan was drawn up in response to the proposals 
contained regarding the strategy for International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) adoption in Japan, which may affect the accounting environment of Japanese 
NPOs. To date JICPA has publicly requested public comments about the disclosure 
requirements of other NPOs by 1
st
 December 2009.   
 
2.4.4 Current issues for Japanese charitable organisations 
 
There are arguments about the changing administrative requirements, the regulations 
governing charitable organisations‘ contributions and increase in corrupt practices by 
operators of charitable organisations. As a result of these changes, some people can be 
attracted to charitable organisations because of they feel that they become members of 
an important enterprise of social commitment (Garcia and Marcuello, 2002). The 
importance of social commitment has also spread out via the Internet where 
membership fees are paid through a bank without contact with other members (Garcia 
and Marcuello, 2002). In practice, multiple memberships of charities is common 
(Garcia and Marcuello, 2002). However, donations through the Internet have 
increased the problem of bogus charities, and donors face serious problems where 
collectors for some charities carry forged identification. As in Australian charities, in 
Japan well-known charities have been fraudulently misrepresented and bogus 
collectors have created problems for prospective Japanese philanthropists who with to 
donate to genuine charities. However, the concept of contributing to charities remains 
powerful, and as a consequence, there is an increasing trend for this for contributions 
to charitable organisations in Japan. This trend has influenced the management of 
these organisations to become more efficient and professional. These changes can also 
motivate donors to search for more reliable and effective charitable organisations for 
their donations in the future (Gordon and Khumawala, 1999).  
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2.4. 5  Summary of Japanese charitable organisations 
 
Given the background just presented, there are clearly substantive problems in 
describing, analysing and understanding Japanese charitable organisations. As a 
consequence of these problems and data limitations this thesis focuses on analysing 
Australian charitable organisations. The analysis of Japan becomes a subsidiary 
objective as previously indicated in the first chapter, section 1.5. This thesis aims to 
contribute some information to accounting studies and mixed discipline research and 
policy makers of not-for-profit organisations. Apart from the data limitations the 
major problem for comparison, is the entirely different relationship of Japanese 
charities to their government. This means that fundraising from the public cannot be 
freely undertaken in the same manner that is considered natural in Australia.  
 
2.5  Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented the background for both Australian and Japanese charitable 
organisations. Charitable organisations in Japan are still in the infant stage and are 
still in the process of system transformation. Conversely, charitable organisations in 
Australia are relatively mature organisations both in size and period of operation. The 
governmental system is also different in the two countries. Australia has a federal 
system but Japan has one unitary government (central), with 47 prefectures. The 
Australian states have much more power and a greater budget than Japanese 
prefectures. Australian charities operate under the common law and they are 
registered at the Australian Security Investment Commission, similar to other pubic 
companies. This registration is recognised Australian wide. Japanese charities come 
under civil law provisions. Public Interest Organisations in Japan are classified, based 
on the various incorporation laws, and recognitions are given in different ways in each 
different type of organisation (see Table 2.5). However, like many other countries in 
the world, both Japan and Australia see the government and the charitable sector 
changing their roles and their interrelationships. The importance of charitable 
organisations in the community is increasing in both countries, and this allows for 
comparison of charitable organisations in the two countries.  
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There are significant differences. These are: 
 History of charitable organisations  
 Size of charitable organisations 
 Funding sources for organisations 
 
Compared to Australian charities, Japanese charities (especially same data of NPO 
Corporations) are relatively very young and much smaller in size. Because of the 
different histories, the revenue sources for organisations are vastly different (see 
Table 1.1). Compared to Australian charitable organisations, Japanese organisations 
are significantly reliant on commercial activities, which are undertaken on behalf of 
local government. They take this role as a government subsidiary company.  
 
This suggests that modelling for charitable organisations in Australia does not 
necessarily fit that of charitable organisations in Japan. And modelling for Japan does 
not necessarily fit that of Australian charitable organisations.  
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Chapter 3  
Altruism and the Market for Donations: Donors and 
Charitable Organisations  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This review is to help establish how charitable organisations compete for donations, 
and what influences potential donors in the selection of charities to which they donate. 
This review also serves as a background to the theoretical framework and modelling, 
with a discussion of altruism.  
 
The existence of altruism creates a deep methodological problem in its own right (see 
Chapter 3 Section 3.2). Most immediately it creates a problem for economic models 
that assume that rational self-interest governs the decisions and behaviour of 
individuals, organisations and the actors in markets.  
 
Charitable organisations have been forced to move away from full government 
funding to other financial arrangements such private donations (Lyons and Passey, 
2006; Parker, 2007), due to increasing pressures on a scarce resource. However, few 
studies focus on how the competition of charitable organisations for donations 
operates. It is important to understand how charitable organisations work and their 
donations which influence the effectiveness of their operation (Schervish, 2006; 
Zappala and Lyons, 2006). But the question is, if charities compete how can they be 
regarded as being altruistic? This highlights an even greater methodological problem: 
even if it is possible to regard individuals as altruistic, can we regard organisations as 
altruistic? And if they are altruistic, what are the implications of this in terms of their 
observed behaviours.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on the problem of 
altruism. Section 3.3 reviews the literature on studies of the demand and supply of 
charitable donations, followed by a literature review on studies of the supply side, the 
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donors, in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 reviews studies of the demand side, charitable 
organisations, and Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.  
 
3.2 The concept of altruism  
 
Altruism is generally defined as any form of act intended to favour another without 
expectation of reward (Batson, 1991). In other words, altruism refers to a kind of 
selflessness, which is based purely on the desire to help others (Earl and Kemp, 
1999). One of the major problems is that defining what is meant by ―altruism‖ is 
extremely difficult.  
 
Altruism is typically treated as a main motivation for charitable giving in various 
disciplines, including economics, economic psychology, psychology, sociology, 
human behaviour in the marketing studies and accounting research. However, in 
many ways it is a residual category, i.e., what is left when other explanations of ―non-
selfish‖ behaviour and choice are inadequate. Altruism is, therefore, often a 
descriptive and not an explanatory category. Consequently, there are limitations in the 
generalisation of altruism and the market model of charitable organisation in the 
economic theory.  
 
Pilianvin and Charng (1990b) review altruism theory in the 1980s from various 
aspects, such as social psychology, sociology, economics, political behaviour and 
socio-biology. According to their review, socio-biologists define altruism as self-
destructive behaviour performed for the benefit of others, and behaviour is altruistic if 
it benefits the actor less than the recipient. Economists define altruistic behaviour as 
that of the actor that could have done better for himself had he chosen to ignore the 
effects of his choice on others. Socio-biologists ignored altruistic motivation during 
the 1980s; they define altruism as a human act that is motivated mainly out of 
consideration of another‘s need rather than one‘s own, without conscious formulation 
of an intention to benefit the others. Piliavin and Charng (1990b, p. 27) state that 
―True altruism, aiming at the goal of benefiting another, does exist‖ (1990b, p. 56) 
and note, ―Altruistic reasons are often given by people who volunteer time … altruism 
is truly a cause of voluntarism‖. 
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Hoffman (1981, p. 124) describes altruistic behaviour as ―behaviour that promotes the 
welfare of others without conscious regard for one‘s own self-interests‖. He also 
argues, ―then, it is possible when human action appeared to be motivated by an 
interest in the welfare of others, to adduce a hidden unconscious, or tacit self-
regarding motive (e.g. social approval, self-esteem) as constituting the real source of 
such behaviour‖ (Hoffman, 1981, p. 125). Earl and Simon (1999) define altruism as 
an individual behaviour that helps another at a personal cost. There are a large number 
of studies of altruism in various disciplines and there have been various approaches 
that have found altruistic behaviour among charitable donors. These studies include 
laboratory studies in the economic and the economic psychology fields (Andreoni, 
1989, 1990; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Milinski et al., 2002; Andreoni and Petrie, 
2004; Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2004; Andreoni, 2007b), theoretical studies since 
the 1980s in the psychology field (Piliavin and Charng, 1990b; Harbaugh, 1995; 
Supphellen and Nelson, 2001), and marketing surveys in marketing studies (Cermak 
et al., 1994; Harbaugh, 1995; Bennett, 2003).  
 
For a long time research on altruism in sociology and economics prohibited the 
question of whether true altruism could exist, give the centrality of self-interest as the 
prime motivation (Piliavin and Charng, 1990b). They believe that donors, with no 
doubt all, desire to ameliorate and their person‘s condition for either endocentric 
reasons (i.e. warm glow) or exocentric reasons (i.e. past relationship with 
organisation) (Karylowski, 1982). However, from the beginning of the 1960s, this 
changed. Many researchers have investigated altruism and philanthropy (Friedrichs, 
1960; Olson, 1965; Buchanan, 1968; Titmuss, 1970; MacGill and Wooten, 1975; 
Weisbrod, 1975). Despite studies on altruism dramatically increasing over the 
decades, the analysis using both laboratory and survey data has focused exclusively 
on individuals as donors. The role played by charities is largely unexplored 
(Andreoni, 1998).  
 
Individual acts of altruism, each of which may be of no benefit (or of possible harm) 
to the actor, may nevertheless be beneficial when repeated over time. However, 
because each selfish decision is individually preferred to each altruistic decision, 
people can benefit from altruistic behavior only when they are committed to an 
altruistic pattern of acts and refuse to make decisions on a case-by-case basis 
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(Howard, 2002). Whatever the difficulty of involving donors in the altruism on 
research matter, the limited research on altruism studies can also be explained 
(Piliavin and Charng, 1990b). Because altruistic donors are generally motivated by a 
desire to help others and generally prefer to remain anonymous, it is difficult to find a 
driver for this type of person. The altruism model is complex and difficult to make 
predictions for and to draw generalisations from (Andreoni, 1989). Importantly 
Andreoni (1990, p. 467) notes that ―the absolute magnitudes of the altruism 
coefficients cannot be measured with current empirical models‖.  
 
Andreoni (1989) in a series of laboratory studies, establishes a general model for 
defining charitable giving as being what of two types of altruism; pure and impure 
altruism. He describes impure altruism as ―warm-glow giving‖ (1990, p. 464). He 
argues that people donate with altruism simply because of demands for the public 
good, while a warm glow is people‘s intention for earning some private goods or 
benefit from their giving, or is based on a self-centred motivation (Andreoni, 1989, 
1990, 1998; Piliavin and Charng, 1990b; Ireland, 2000).  
 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) also test the utility function model to measure altruistic 
behaviour and find inconclusive results from a preference-based approach because 
people behave unselfishly in laboratory experiments. They state that altruistic 
preferences are not one single belief that individuals follow, rather a range of 
preferences from perfectly unselfish to completely selfish. Evidently they could 
capture a significant degree of rationally altruistic behaviour, however, 98% of the 
total subjects choose to donate to specific charities, whilst a quarter of the subjects are 
classified as selfish money-maximisers. That is, most of them choose to give only if 
they receive a benefit in return; either prestige or social status. The remainder of the 
subjects show varying degrees of altruism mixed with status-seeking behaviour. 
―Something in return‖ may not be enough to induce altruistic behaviour but it may 
direct its specific directions.  
 
Sometimes people are motivated by a desire to gain respect and recognition from 
others (Piliavin and Charng, 1990b; Vesterlund, 2006). In his study, Andreoni (1989) 
explains this phenomena as people‘s warm glow feeling for donation, and labels it as 
impure altruism. Andreoni and Miller (2002) show that, in their laboratory studies, 
 50 
98% of the total participants are likely to show impure altruism for their donation. 
Similarly, Kumru and Vesterlund (2005) find that impure altruism seems to dominate 
as a reason for most donations. Andreoni and Payne (2008) argue that, to fulfil donors 
demand for their donation, a typical charity in the US publishes the names of donors, 
and finds that charitable organisations spend up to 25 percent of their donation for 
fund-raising purposes. Glazer and Konrad (1996) find that people may simply have 
the intention of gaining status through donation, and this can be used to signal their 
wealth to the public (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  
 
Andreoni (2007a) argues that the way in which altruism fits in a market model is still 
unclear. Some research states that the focus on impure altruism is much more visible 
in the literature, because most donors make donations in the category of impure 
altruism (Andreoni, 1990). The number of donors making donations out of altruism is 
small and, at the same time, there is very limited research on the motivations of 
altruistic behaviour in donors. People also contribute to charitable organisations 
through voluntarism (Gidron, 1983; Smith, 1983; Unger, 1991), which, according to 
some studies, has significant monetary value (Callen, 1994). 
 
3.2.1 Donors and altruism 
 
The primary motives for donating especially money and goods, vary. The reasons 
may include social responsibility, social status and the good image giving has, 
satisfaction from giving and helping, and also continuing need and requests from 
charitable organisations for donations (Hsieh, 2004). The motives do not have to be 
entirely altruistic. Although investigations into donors overall levels are plentiful, 
research into charitable organisations and what make individuals choose to give to 
particular charities is relatively limited. Previous studies in the economics of charities 
are focused on the theory of the utility function of donors and limited study has used 
charitable organisational data for the empirical study.  
 
Callen (1994) describes private donors as being likely to respond to the quality of 
goods and services. However, because private donors do not directly consumer of 
goods or services which are provided by charities, the donors are not usually in a 
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position to judge the quality of services and therefore have to rely on the organisation 
to provide this information. She investigates whether charitable organisations 
recognise the effect of volunteer labour on their operations and whether they 
recognise the work of volunteers in monetary value and include this in their financial 
reports (Callen, 1994). Conducting an empirical test for a relationship between 
monetary donations and volunteer labour (in hours) on the 276 charities in the 
Specific Health Focus Organisations in Canada for the years 1986–1987, Callen 
(1994, p. 218) finds that volunteer labour is significant and there is a positive 
correlation to financial donations. She states that some charitable organisations have 
already begun to report these as ―value-added information‖ in their financial reports. 
 
3.2.2 Volunteerism and altruism 
 
The altruistic behaviour of donors is also considered in Chou‘s (1998) study where he 
finds a correlation between altruistic behaviour and frequency of participation in 
volunteer activities. Bekkers (2001) finds that volunteers donate more often to 
charities than non-volunteers, using the survey to donors on the database of Giving in 
the Netherlands in 1997. Bekkers (2001) also finds that a person who retains a higher 
altruistic value is more likely to volunteer.  
 
Furthermore, Bekker and Graff (2005) find that the act of volunteering increases the 
behaviour of helping others at a cost to the individual and that subsequently, this 
behaviour increases donations to charities. This is possibly a form of self-
reinforcement.  
 
Because of a preference to remain anonymous, altruists are difficult to employ for 
research purposes (Andreoni, 1990). The volunteer is generally a person who provides 
services or benefits to others for motivations other then financial or material reward. 
Voluntarism is linked to ―good works‖ where the reward is intrinsic to the altruistic 
act itself (Gidron, 1976; Wu et al., 2005).  
 
A number of studies on voluntarism cite altruistic reasons among the primary 
motivations for volunteering (Gidron, 1983; Smith, 1983; Unger, 1991), such as 
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helping others (Gidron, 1983; Rehberg, 2005), showing care (Jenner, 1981) and 
serving the community (Wu et al., 2005). Gidron (1983) describes volunteer work as, 
by definition, an act of free will which individuals engage in it or discontinue at their 
will. Alternatively, in paid work, for most people the pay element represents the 
necessity to work, given that an individual has to work to live (related to the 
individual‘s survival).  
 
Guy and Patton (1989) find that an individual‘s previous experience with a charity 
organisation enhances future helping behaviour; typically, those who work as 
volunteers are more likely to give donations. Unger (1991) describes volunteers as 
essentially ―free‖ labour, while Smith (1983) calls it a fundamentally altruistic act. 
Hoffman (1981) argues that volunteer activities are associated with altruism. Rushton 
et al. (1984) show that altruism is predicted in a variety of laboratory and naturalistic 
criteria to determine the community volunteers.  
 
Similar to Bekkers (2001) study, Rehberg (2005, p. 110) finds that, in volunteer work, 
―altruistic motivations‖ play a key role in an individual involvement as a volunteer. 
Conducting a survey of young volunteers‘ primary motivation as volunteers, he finds 
that 77% of the respondents chose ―achievement or changing something positive for 
others‖ as their primary motivation (Rehberg, 2005, p. 113).  
 
As with monetary contributions, many charities take volunteers into account as 
critical in carrying out their missions (Wymer and Starnes, 2001). Despite the fact that 
the estimation of the dollar value of the volunteer contribution would provide would 
be useful information, this is rarely reported in the financial statements of charities, 
because they are not easy to value in terms of monetary figures (Mook et al., 2005). 
Mook, Sousa, Elgie and Quarter (2005) argue whether the volunteers‘ contributions 
(in time and effort) bring a benefit or significant value to the charities. Conducting a 
survey of 156 charitable organisations in Canada, Mook et al. (2005) find that 37% of 
organisations keep records of volunteer contributions and the means of 250.6 
volunteers equivalent to 10.8 full time employees. Furthermore, their findings suggest 
that 68% of respondents agree that reporting the value of volunteer contributions in 
the financial statements would provide a complete picture of the charitable operation 
and increase the quality of that organisation. They (2005) conclude that including the 
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monetary value of volunteer contributions in the financial report are necessary and 
important, and inform the quality of the organisation.  
 
Gittell and Tebaldi (2006) investigate the correlation between total donation and the 
volunteer to total population in 50 states of the USA for the financial years 2000 to 
2002. They find that the volunteer percentage is positively correlated to the total 
donations and furthermore, on average, a 1% increase in a state‘s volunteer population 
increases USD4 in total donations. Peloza and Hassay (2007) discuss the typology of 
the charitable supporters‘ behaviour using data in the USA and they suggest that 
volunteerism is a form of helping behaviour that typically results from the increased 
levels of involvement within the charities. Thus, a number of studies have shown that 
volunteering is associated with individuals‘ altruistic behaviour (Gidron, 1983; Smith, 
1983; Unger, 1991) and subsequently, this has a positive effect on the total donations 
(Wu et al., 2005; Gittell and Tebaldi, 2006).  
 
3.2.3 Can Charitable Organisations be Altruistic? 
 
In the ―unitarist‖ view organisations are treated as single entities – as if they were 
individuals. Therefore, they take decisions, take actions and behave as if they were 
single persons. The neoclassical model of the profit maximising firm is the most 
appropriate example here. Consequently it is possible to attribute to them some of the 
same motivations as humans. Those motivations can include ―altruism.‖ 
 
However, it has long been argued that the lack of a profit motivation alters behaviour 
and induces excessive spending on internal administration by managers of charitable 
organisations. This study is in line with previous studies which examined fundraising 
by charitable organisations, incorporated in a single model to find the effect of both 
the cost of operational expenditure and the opportunistic costs on donors‘ behaviour, 
and competition among charitable organisations (Rose-Ackerman, 1982 and 1996; 
Marcuello and Salas, 2001; Castaneda et al., 2007). Rose-Ackerman (1982) develops 
a model that examines fundraising by charities and how competition leads efficiency 
of charitable organisations by inducing excessive spending on marketing costs. 
Bilodeau and Slivasky (1997) also investigate how rival charities allocate donations to 
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various services to recipients, ending up by specialising in one type of service. 
However allocation of donation differs in several respects. One possibility is that 
competition ―forces‖ charitable organisations to behave as if they are altruistic – even 
when they are not.  
 
3.2.4 Cultural difference in altruistic behaviour 
 
People from different cultures may have different levels of empathic feeling towards 
charity recipients. The word altruism, which comes from the Italian altrui, was coined 
in 1851 by August Comte to refer to benevolence. Even when a language is shared, 
these differences are sometimes simply reflected in the meaning of words.  
 
For example, Wright (2002, p. 7) discusses a comparison of recognition of giving in 
the United States and United Kingdom and states that 
  
the negative connotations applied to the concept of philanthropy in the UK are 
very similar to the meanings that the term charity carries in the US. The terms 
are used almost as minor opposites in the two countries. Moreover, 
philanthropy is viewed in Britain as a somewhat dubious attitude or stance; 
charitable giving on the other hand is a comparatively positive act. In the 
United States the situation is reversed. Philanthropy is an act, and an 
increasingly commanding one, while charity is dismissed as patronising and 
somewhat out of date attitude. 
 
There are as many definitions of cultures as there are researchers on the subject, thus 
―it is unlikely that a universally-accepted definition will ever be agreed on‖ (Brown, 
2005). For example, Parson‘s (1954) definition states ―Culture consists in those 
patterns relative to behaviour and the products of human action which may be 
inherited, that is, passed on from generation to generation independently of the 
biological genes‖ (Parson, 1949). Hofstede was ―Culture is the collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes one group or category of people from 
another‖ (Hofstede, 1993, p. 89). 
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Some of the most widely-cited works on culture, developed from the study of cultural 
differences between nations, are those of Hofstede (1987, 2001) (Sato, 2008). 
Hofstede has long argued that cultures around the world can be measured in terms of 
a set of cultural values (Franke, Hofstede and Bond, 1991). Hofstede proposes that the 
set of values used in such a measurement scheme is irrelevant. Whether using a set of 
traditional western values or an oriental values survey, the differences in the values 
are correlated to economic growth. The work on the cross-cultural studies that has 
been broadly applied is that of Hofstede (Kamibayashi, 2001; Brown, 2005).  
 
As mentioned, a comprehensive analysis of cultural diversity has been carried out by 
Hofstede (1980, 1984, 1987 and 2001). Hofstede finds four dimensions of national 
culture, (1) individualism versus collectivism, (2) power distance, (3) uncertainty 
avoidance and, (4) masculinity versus femininity. Among these values, this study uses 
the masculinity (femininity) that may influence an individual‘s donation behaviour.  
 
Masculinity/femininity refers to the individuals‘ roles in social activities and 
emphasises behaviour and attitudes towards the common welfare. As Hofstede 
defines, a country with a masculine culture is striving for a tough performance 
society, with a larger proportion living in poverty and a relatively higher percentage 
of the proportion of those living in poverty earning less than half of the average 
income, whilst feminine cultural countries strive for the welfare of the whole society. 
Solicitations for charity donations should activate greater feelings of personal 
obligations in masculine countries, but greater perceptions of the government‘s 
obligation in feminine countries (Nelson et al., 2006). The altruistic values reflected 
in the messages should align with caring values, according to the culturally 
predominant sex-role ideologies. A charity request should activate the norm of 
nurturing and a perceived moral obligation to help others (Hofstede, 2001).  
 
According to Hofstede, the value system of the feminine culture is based on a high 
amount of aid for poverty and the amount of money transferred is determined by the 
needs of the donors; whereas, a country with a masculine culture regards being poor 
as the fault of the poverty stricken and that the rich do not have to support the poor. 
Hofstede classifies Japan as a masculine culture with a rank of 1 and a value index of 
95 in the masculinity index out of 40 countries, while Australia is classified as a little 
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above average, a lower masculine country ranking 16 with a 61 on the value index 
(Hofstede, 1987, 2001). Sato (2008) questions Hofstede‘s sample validity and 
exercisability. Hofstede‘s research has been criticised and the masculinity and 
femininity dimensions, in particular, have received the most criticism (Jandt, 2007). 
Hofstede judged Japan as having the highest masculinity culture by the higher needs 
of its population for dominance, autonomy, aggression, exhibition, achievement and 
endurance (Jandt and Hundley, 2007). Hofstede‘s research was based on the survey of 
Japanese employees in a multinational company. Sato stated that it was obvious that a 
large multinational company‘s employees were not representative of the Japanese 
nation (2008, p. 827).  
 
In Australia, people prefer to view themselves as equal to others in status; whereas, in 
Japan, people may focus on complying with the authorities to enhancing the cohesion 
and status within their own groups, even when that entails sacrificing their own 
personal goals (Shavitt et al., 2006, p. 326). Those priorities are also reflected in the 
different national spending patterns for the welfare of the people and the different 
personal obligations in the form of income taxes.  
 
Some researchers found that government policy changes may create institutional 
differences that have an effect on the levels of donations. Jones and Marriott (1994) 
conducted a survey of 6,968 households in 1990 in the United Kingdom (UK) to find 
out how government policy changes had impacted on charitable giving. These results 
were compared with the results of the survey conducted using the sample data in 1984 
(Jones and Posnett, 1991b) and in 1985 (Jones and Posnett, 1991a). They concluded 
that there was a significant difference in the level of donations before and after an 
enactment of the generous tax exemption policy by the UK Government in 1990. 
Beatty et al. (1991) conducted a survey using a sample of 240 university students in 
the US and found gift-giving behaviour was different depending on individual values 
and cultural differences and found a strong tradition of reciprocation and moral 
obligation in relation to the donations existing in the Japanese culture (Beatty et al., 
1991, p. 155). A range of tax concessions is available to Australian charitable 
organisations, provided they are Public Benevolent Institutions (PBIs). These 
concessions include income tax exemptions (ITE), Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
concessions, Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) concessions and the deductible gift recipient 
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status (DGR). The DGR has been designed to facilitate fundraising. Organisations 
with a DGR status have a fundraising advantage, because the members of the public 
that make donations of two dollars and over to these organisations can claim the 
donation as a tax deduction. When a charitable organisation is registered as a public 
interest corporation, these tax concessions are given.  
 
In contrast, only 0.2% of the NPO Corporations in Japan are given a DGR status. In 
addition, no GST concessions, FBT nor ITE are available for Japanese charities. Thus, 
it is difficult for charitable organisations in Japan to be eligible for the deductible gift 
recipient status (DGR). The DGR is entitled to tax benefits only when the individual 
makes a donation of more than 10,000 yen (AUD$125 (AUD$1 = 80yen)) per 
donation, whereas in Australia every $2 donation can be claimed for a tax benefit. In 
addition to this, for Japanese donors it is very complicated, and additional work is 
required to receive any tax benefits
6
.  
 
However, Jones and Marriott (1994) conducted survey of 6,968 households in 1990 in 
the United Kingdom (UK) to find and how institutional change had impacted on 
charitable giving compared with the results of sample data in 1984 (Jones and Posnett, 
1991b) and in 1985 (Jones and Posnett, 1991a). They found a significant difference 
from the previous studies after the introduction of a generous tax exemption policy by 
the UK government in 1990.  
 
An economic relationalist political climate and high demand of service quality needs 
in Australia and Japan have led to increasing public interest in the operation of 
charitable organisations (Bonyhady, 2008).  
 
3.2.5 Provision of public or private goods 
 
The role of charitable organisations is often related to two theoretical constructs: the 
theory of public goods (Weisbrod, 1975) and the theory of contract failure (Nelson 
and Kranshinsky, 1973). In the first, charities arise to meet the residual demand by 
                                                 
6
 Under the Japanese tax payment system, employers are responsible for the submission of tax returns 
and the payment of taxes on behalf of the employees. As a result, any individual donor wishing to 
claim tax benefits is required to submit a separate return to the tax office to receive such benefits. 
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providing public goods in amounts supplemental to those provided by government 
(Hansmann, 1980). However, in contrast to the theory of public goods, one can argue 
that the services provided by many charities do not seem to be public good but rather 
appear to be private ones (Hansmann, 1987). For example, aged care organisations 
providing charitable nursing homes are difficult to recognise in their services to 
elderly individuals as being in the public good. The second case can exist, therefore, 
in charities when markets cannot provide certain private goods.  
  
In the latter theory, when the government or the market fail to provide satisfactory 
services, charities resolve these problems more effectively than other types of 
organisations (Kranshinsky, 1997). In addition, the non-distribution (of profits) 
constraint is thus said to make charities more trustworthy (Steinberg, 1997). Some 
charitable organisations may, therefore, have comparative survival advantage over 
for-profit organisation. However, another argument suggests that this also makes them 
inefficient (James, 1990), although charitable organisations do not follow a profit 
motive and this in turn allows them to provide social services to the recipients. There 
is a built-in inefficiency that can result in a lack of this profit focus. The force of 
competition for donations is intense in these current times, thus fundraising strategies 
are increasingly becoming a way to sustain operations. Donations can be seen as an 
exchange in which charitable organisation provide public/private goods, in return for 
donations. Steinberg (1986) finds that if donors are provided with true facts about the 
distribution of their donations, then total donations will rise. Buchanan et al. (2004) 
also discusses ethical behaviour and honesty behind the fundraising of charitable 
organisations. They suggested that donors cannot be certain of the result of their 
donations, total donations are therefore lower. Consequently the value of such 
protection offsets/covers inefficiencies such as limited access to capital and poor 
incentives for cost minimisation that evidently/or inevitably accompany the form of 
charities (Hansmann, 1987).  
 
Charitable organisations exist in the mixed economy (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 
1991). Thus demand and supply factors partly determine the size of the charitable 
sector relative to other forms of economic and social actors (Steinberg, 1997). With 
the exception of important role of charitable organisations that previous researchers 
described as the demand for provision of services by charitable organisations, there is 
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only a limited study of organisational supply, which plays a critical role in the 
existence of charitable organisations (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1991). 
 
Nonetheless, the ―non-distribution of surplus‖ constraint on charitable organisation 
does serve as a useful criterion (Parker, 2007). There are three actors involved in the 
provision of public goods-donors, the government and charitable organisations, and 
these three influence each other in a mixed market (Payne, 1998). Ambiguity lies in 
the market of charitable organisations (Burlingame, 1997), questions arise such as 
―what is the market?‖ and ―what is the price‖ or whether charities play as suppliers 
when donors play as consumers (Schervish, 2006; Andreoni, 2007b).  
 
3.3 The Demand and Supply of Charitable Donations 
 
Charitable giving involves three sectors donors and volunteers, charitable 
organisations, and government, all involved in the monetary donation market, 
representing either the demand side and/or the supply side of the monetary donation 
market. Donors and government supply public good directly or indirectly through 
charitable organisations to recipients, while the charitable organisations act on the 
demand-side of the donation market, demanding from a donor or from government for 
their contributions (Schervish, 2006). The charitable organisation then supples the 
collected public good to the recipients as in the supply-side of market (Payne, 1998). 
Thus, charitable organisations are presented both in the supply side and the demand 
side of the market (Parker, 2007).  
 
Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (1991) state that the most important supply factor for 
the charitable organisations is the ability to satisfy some demand side of stakeholders 
by showing their quality performance and meeting objectives under the economic 
feasibility constraints. Burlingame (1997) believes that both the demand and supply 
side of of charitable organisations are productively creating philanthropic activity. 
Similarly Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (1991) and Burlingame (1997), Schervish 
(2007) describe how, when charities take the role of the supply side on a satisfactory 
level, subsequently wealthy donors provide a large portion of the wealth to the 
charitable organisation. However, the purpose of this donation is to obtain a tax 
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benefit, and large donations are likely to be generated to charities to successfully meet 
the demand side of the role.  
 
On the demand side of the market, charitable organisations attempt to persuade 
donors and government that their particular organisations are trustworthy, and can be 
relied on completely to fulfil their role (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1991). Of 
distributing the contributions to the needy, as in the supply side of market (Schervish, 
2006). Thus, when charitable organisations represent the demand side of the market, 
they employ strategic fundraising for donation collection (Parker, 2007). Donors and 
the government determine the demand, the donors supply the money and the 
volunteers supply their time to charity (Andreoni, 2007a). Parker (2007) suggests that 
the role of the supply side of charity is mainly to focus on the changing environment 
of recipients rather than requesting money for the varying needs of the organisation.  
 
The government is involved in various ways in the philanthropy sector, directly as a 
supplier in the form of grants to charities or indirectly by providing tax benefits to 
individuals for the amount of their donation to charities when these charities are 
awarded tax deduction status by the government (Andreoni, 2007a). 
 
Weisbrod (1975) believed that charitable organisations have a distinctive set of roles 
in a mixed economy as suppliers of public goods where for-profit (markets) and 
government fail to satisfy individuals‘ needs. Charitable organisations satisfy a 
demand for public goods and act as the main suppliers of collective goods (Weisbrod, 
1975). Using the utility function model, Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986) find that in 
welfare services areas, charitable organiations provide the extra high quality or 
tailored services to meet individual requests, while for-profits or government cannot 
deliver (Weisbrod, 1988). Similarly, Steinberg (2006, p. 120) discusses the ―three-
failures theory‖, in which for-profit sectors fail to provide adequate quantities of 
collective goods or government undersupplies the levels of pubic service goods to 
diversified needs (Hansmann, 1980). Hansmann (1980) also stated that charitable 
organisations take advantage when the quantity or quality of service cannot be 
verified.  
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On the other hand, Salamon and Anheier (1992) argue that charities are expected to 
fail due to the restriction of the distribution of profits. The other two sectors, the for-
profit market and government take an important role in providing public goods 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1992). The demand side of charities competes for private 
donations and government grants from for-profit orgnisations, however, they need to 
finance their activities in the provision of collective goods (Marcuello and Salas, 
2001). Willner (2001) finds that political intervention in government organisations 
may outperform an oligopolistic market under reasonable conditions, even if 
government is biased in favour of output and/or employment. This type of 
organisation may turn out to be misguided as far as cost minimisation is concerned, 
which is not always socially beneficial for the particular type of government 
organisation. 
 
Castaneda, Garen and Thornton (2007) argue that charitable organisations compete 
for donors in two ways. Their study is corresponding demand for donation and supply 
to recipients. The first form of competition is the provision of information. Here, 
donors gain utility from more information about the organisational objectives and 
services to donors such as knowing management strategic operation, financial reports, 
or free gifts with logos. Competition in this form, however, raises the expenditure of 
charitable organisations.  
 
The latter is related to the cost of operational expenditure including administration 
expenditure. However, managers of charitable organisations cannot retain profits or 
obtain their profits in cash; they are able to consume some of the residual income of 
the charitable organisation in kind. Because donors value the charitable provision of 
the goods, the cost of the operational expenditure of donating a dollar increases with 
the portion of donations taken out and not distributed to program services and goods 
to recipients. 
 
3.4 Studies of the supply side: (Donors)  
 
The decisions to donate are sometimes driven by altruism, or by the non-altruistic 
preference of donors. Although no single theory garners universal support regarding 
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the motivations for donations (Milhaupt, 2003), there is, however, a tendency in the 
literature to explain such motivations in the context of an internal faith for 
commitment (Guy and Patton, 1989). Rose-Ackerman (1996) finds that some donors 
believe in the moral value of reciprocity, which is influenced by pure altruism 
(Andreoni, 1989), whereas Pollach et al. (2005) states that donors are motivated by 
material or non-material rewards from donations, which is impure altruism (Andreoni, 
1989).  
 
The donors in the latter category are referred to as status seekers; they are influenced 
by the potential benefits that can be derived from making donations to charitable 
organisations. These include, (i) prestige gained by giving private good (Olson, 1965; 
Beatty et al., 1991), (ii) signalling of wealth or status (Glazer and Konrad, 1996) and 
taking a leadership role in the community (Bac and Bag, 2003), (iii) religious beliefs 
of the charitable donations (Bekkers, 2001), (iv) social desirability (Piliavin and 
Charng, 1990b) and, (v) tax benefits (Okten and Weisbrod, 2000).  
 
3.4.1 Types of donors 
 
The theory of three typologies of donors was established by Supphellen and Nelson 
(2001). From their interviews, they developed a classification of donors according to 
the different styles of decision-making, namely, internal and external styles, with the 
external category further divided into analysts and relationists.  
 
Supphellen and Nelson (2001) found that internalists believe all charities have a good 
cause. As a consequence, they respond positively to nearly any request for donation, 
while the relationists mainly base their decisions on a personal relationship with a 
particular charity. They donate to a few organisations that they can trust and support 
without further evaluation.  
 
Supphellen and Nelson (2001) also find that relationists are the youngest group of 
people, whereas the internalists are the eldest group among the three typologies and 
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these findings are consistent with the previous studies of Rushton et al. (1986)
7
 and 
Srnka et al. (2003b) who also find that the elderly groups are more frequent givers. In 
certain studies, the age and gender of the donors are considered important in the 
decision to donate (Cermak et al., 1994; Srnka et al., 2003b), although Supphellen and 
Nelson (2001) find no evidence to distinguish the relationship between gender and 
donation and also no significant differences exist between genders amongst the three 
typologies. Furthermore, they find that almost half of the participants are analysts, 
one-third relationists and one-fifth internalists.  
 
Supphellen and Nelson (2001) argue that analysts tend to evaluate the causes 
emphasised in donation requests, in addition to the organisational operation and make 
their final decision on the basis of their evaluation. Thus analysts are putting more 
effort into the evaluation and involvements of charities rather than the other 
categories. The analysts show a higher level of subjective knowledge of charities than 
the others and have high scores in response to provocative advertising and an interest 
in the type of programmes, whereas the internalists have low scores and they believe 
charities should not advertise. Supphellen and Nelson (2001) also find that internalists 
donated the smallest annual donations on average, but support the largest numbers of 
charities amongst the three typologies. Internalists also focus on the act of giving, or 
altruism, as such. Therefore, they raise the concern that internalists, who tend to 
accept any request from any charity, would be susceptible to deceptive practices. 
 
The internalist category draws on Adreoni‘s theory (1989) of pure and impure 
altruism. Impure altruism reflects Glazer and Konrad‘s theory (1996) of the status-
seeking category of individuals who signal their wealth through donating. Rose-
Ackerman (1996) also argues that the motivations for giving are inextricably linked to 
status and recognition; people could gain prestige from making a donation only if 
others view their action as worthy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Rushton et al. (1986) found that age showed significant relationship with people‘s 
qualities of altruism, empathy, nurturance and assertiveness. 
 64 
3.4.2 Status-seeking donors  
 
Despite economic theory predicting that charitable donations/contributions would be 
the largest when donors are uninformed about others‘ contributions (Andreoni, 1988; 
Varian, 1994), the experience of many charities find it otherwise. Donors must be 
motivated by something more than the provision of a public good in making 
donations to charitable organisation (Kingma, 1997). Publicity of large donations is a 
powerful fundraising tool (Romano and Yildirim, 2001; Vesterlund, 2003). Piliavin 
and Charng (1990b) and Beatty et al. (1991) describe the important motives for some 
donors as being social desirability, recognition and respect from others. Rose-
Ackerman (1996) also argues that motivations for giving are inextricably linked to 
people‘s gain of social status, recognition or prestige from making a donation only if 
others view their action as worthy. Thus, various studies report that donors use 
charitable donations to maximise their own benefits and their own benefits include a 
―warm-glow‖ feeling, which Adreoni (1989) describes as impure altruism (Andreoni, 
1989 and 1998), recognition and reputation (Harbaugh, 1995 and 1998; Glazer and 
Konrad, 1996; Ireland, 2000; Seinen and Schram, 2001; Milinski et al., 2002; 
Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2004), a signal of wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996; 
Nowak and Sigmund, 1998), the publicity of donations or charities‘ strategic 
fundraising (Wright, 2002; Andreoni, 2006) or tax benefits (O'Neil et al., 1996; Okten 
and Weisbrod, 2000).  
 
Andreoni (1990) finds that most private donors give a donation only to receive the 
warm-glow, or an individuals‘ preferences including both altruism and egoism. He 
(1989, 1995) argues that the pure altruistic gift to public good can be a perfect 
substitute for showing off personal wealth, rather than the individual consuming the 
private good, gift to the public good or the payment of tax (Andreoni, 1989).  
 
The economic theories of impure altruism are explored in the theory of ―indirect 
reciprocity‖ (Alexander, 1987). Alexander (1987) defines indirect reciprocity as the 
indirect interaction between a donor and a recipient. He argues that the individuals‘ 
caring behaviour toward others is influenced by the observation of others, and indirect 
reciprocity is built on a basis of moral systems prescribing cooperation in order to 
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gain reputation or status from others. Thus, indirect reciprocity means that the donor 
may not expect a return from the recipient, but will receive a benefit from someone 
else in the form of prestige, social status (as a leader), access, relief of guilt, control 
over the charity output, or a warm glow from giving (Alexander, 1987; Andreoni, 
2006).  
 
Harbaugh (1995, 1998) describes two effects of impure altruism as a warm glow 
effect of internal satisfaction and a prestige effect from the publicity of donation. A 
number of charitable organisations are already aware of the prestige effect from the 
publicity of donation, which persuades donors to increase the amount of their 
donations (Harbaugh, 1998). He states that donors derive no value in return from their 
contribution at all but they receive benefits such as a warm glow and prestige. 
Similarly, Seinen and Schram (2001) in carrying  on Alexander‘s study in conduct an 
experimental helping game, in which a donor can help a recipient at a smaller cost 
than the recipient‘s benefit. They find that most donors‘ major determinants of 
donation is a desire to build a reputation as a philanthropists.   
 
The impure altruist theory may be inconsistent with the public good theory of 
charitable organisations (Kingma, 1997), where in theory, impure altruists are 
motivated solely by private goals, such as social status, in donation to a charitable 
organisation without receiving utility from the public good (Kingma, 1997). Hochman 
and Rodgers (1969a) find that donors are more likely to attempt to achieve higher 
social status than they currently had in the community, and Ireland (1994) finds that 
private donors are conscious about others‘ view towards the act of giving and 
donation. Similarly, Cermak et al. (1994) and Glazer and Konrad (1996) find that 
some donors donate more if their donations are seen by others, especially their 
friends, because their donation motivation is a desire to ―signal their wealth‖ (Glazer 
and Konrad, 1996, p. 1019). Glazer and Konrad (1996) state that wealthy donors are 
more likely prefer visible donations to achieve their social status in the community. 
For example, large charitable giving can be more visible than buying real estate 
(Glazer and Konrad, 1996). Those donors can be described as ―status-seekers‖ 
(Congleton, 1989, p. 175). Glazer and Konrad (1996) find that less than 1% of 
donations are from anonymous donors.  
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Similarly, Gordon and Khumawala (1999) develop a model of donor and charity 
interactions, a social exchange theory, which economics and socio-biology describe as 
all people being exclusively self-status seekers. They find that the way in which 
charities dedicate themselves to the community is largely influenced by the donors‘ 
preference of charitable giving, where donors can earn more social status from 
donating to charities highly recognised in the community (Gordon and Khumawala, 
1999). Similarly, using experimental computerised helping games, Engelmann and 
Fischbacher (2004) examined the possible motives of choice in helping others in 
relation to indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building. The donors‘ choice 
seem to be influenced at least as much by strategic players who do better than non-
strategic players, while non-reciprocal players do better than reciprocal (give and 
take) players (Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2004).  
 
3.4.2.1 Tax benefits of donations  
 
Having tax benefits for donation provides an incentive for donors to donate to a 
charity (Hansmann, 1980). Thus for a charity, a tax deductive status seems to provide 
a financial advantage to a charity that qualifies. Whether the donation a charity 
receives is deductible or not depends upon whether the donee organisation falls into 
the category of a certain class of charitable organisations, as defined by government8. 
Hansmann (1980) argues that in the case of the exemption of charitable donations 
from taxation, the charitable deduction has more of an impact on the charity‘s activity 
than on its distribution. He finds that a charity without a tax deductible status leads to 
a significant decrease in donations to the charitable organisation, and also it increases 
its ability to survive over time. In many ways tax deductibility status is a signal of the 
charity‘s worth. 
 
Some research finds that government policy, especially tax policy changes may create 
institutional differences in each country, Australia and Japan, which have an effect on 
the levels of the donations. Jones and Marriott (1994) examine whether the level of 
donations has an impact both before and after the enactment of the generous tax 
exemption policy by the United Kingdom (UK) government in 1990, using a UK 
                                                 
8 A certain class that is a subset of the class of charities that quality for exemption 
from Corporate tax. 
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survey of 6,968 households in two years, in 1984 (Jones and Posnett, 1991b) and 
1985 (Jones and Posnett, 1991a). Using these survey data, they discerned that 
government policy changes in 1990 had impacted on charitable giving.  
 
O‘Neil, Steinberg and Thompson (1996) conducted the OLS regression analysis on 
function of donations and after-tax price. They employed a sample of 70811 
individual tax returns in 1985 in the USA. They found that donations appear to have 
an effect on the after-tax price of giving only among the two highest income ranges 
(income is greater than $200,000 or $500,000) and donors are most responsive to an 
increase in charitable giving resulting in significant tax savings.  
 
Okten and Weisbrod (2000) examine the effect of before and after changing of the tax 
policy, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, in increasing the level of tax deductibility, on 
total donations in the USA. A negative effect is found on the total donations in some 
charitable groups such as higher education and scientific research organisations, while 
a positive effect is found in other charitable groups, including art exhibitions, 
museums and zoos, hospitals and organisations supporting the handicapped.  
 
3.4.3 Social relationships and donors  
 
As Gordon and Khumawala (1999) note, the influential factors for donation to a 
particular charity are varied and they include a personal internal faith or external 
influences, such as religious belief, a social relationship, a sense of belonging to a 
community and for a religious organisation. Beatty et al. (1991, p. 154) label some 
donors as ―relationship givers‖ (also see Supphellen and Nelson (2001)), or people 
who maintain a relationship with a charity. Pilianvin and Charng (1990b) find that the 
maintenance or enhancement of the relationships within the community and friends is 
the motivation for some donors. Thus, some donors donate to ensure being or 
becoming a member of a desirable social set (Piliavin and Charng, 1990b).  
 
Cermak et al. (1994) find that social ties with charities impact on the total donations. 
They (1994, p. 124) define a social tie as an ―affiliation with individuals, either 
friends or business connections, who are tied to the non-profit‖. They (1994, p. 126) 
find that the affiliators are relatively young (67% of them are younger than 65) and 
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well-educated (33% of them hold a graduate degree). The findings about affiliators in 
Cermak et al.‘s (1994) research are similar to the relationists found by Supphellen and 
Nelson (2001). Ireland (2000) also finds for social desirability is an important 
motivation for some donors, for instance, their donations are motivated by a desire to 
be invited to elite parties. 
 
Arnett et al. (2003) assume that developing long-term relationships with donors is the 
key strategy in the current competitive charity environment and find that many charity 
organisations adopt this strategy, namely ―relationship marketing‖ (2003, p. 89). 
Conducting a survey of university graduates in three classes, 1954, 1974 and 1994, 
with a total sample of 953 and roughly even gender differences (55% male and 45% 
female), they identify salience play as a key role in charity relationship marketing by 
mediating the relationships between participation and prestige, and donating 
behaviour. Similarly, Pollach et al. (2005) find that charitable organisations have to 
pay particular attention to their relationship with donors to receive more donations. 
Bekkers (2004) also investigate the determinant effect of social conditions  in respect 
to social incentives and psychological characteristics of behaviours, which generate 
inherent rewards for certain social behaviours. He finds many social groups take 
social contributions into account positively, and the members within a group make 
donations to avoid disapproval within their group.  
 
Rose-Ackerman (1996) states that the motivation of some donors‘ for charitable 
donations stems from their religious beliefs or a desire to be involved with a religious 
group, and concluded that the motivations for these charitable donations come from 
the donors‘ close personal ties with religious (or educational) groups.  
 
Using the data base from the USA Internal Revenue Service in 2000 and 2001, Gittell 
and Tebaldi (2006) investigate the determinants of the donations including religious 
affiliated charities, and find that all religious groups do not give equally. The results 
are consistent with previous findings, however, that Catholics‘ donation rates are one 
third to one half of donations from Protestants. On the other hand, using experimental 
data from 168 participants, Eckel and Grossman (2004) find that there are no 
significant differences in the amount of giving to secular charities from religious to 
non-religious people. They also find that religious participants have a tendency to 
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give regularly and are more sensitive to income changes than the participants who are 
non-religious.  
 
Reitsma et al. (2005) find no significant differences in the willingness to donate 
between church members and non-members from interviewing 9315 individuals in the 
seven European countries: Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Portugal. They find that religious people are more likely to donate more to 
their own religious institutions, and that church attendees are positively influenced by 
their religious network to increase total donations to religious affiliated organisations.  
 
The findings from empirical research on the relationship between religious and 
charitable giving provide a positive relationship (Lyons and Nivison-Smith, 2006). 
Using 6,209 survey data from the Australian Giving and Volunteering dataset in 2005, 
Lyons and Nivison-Smith (2006) investigate the contribution behaviour of adult 
Australians and find that the average amount of donations from religious donors is 
AUD$518; whereas, that of non-religious donors in AUD$268. They also find a 
positive relationship with attendance at religious services and the amount of the 
donations in Australia. 
 
 
3.5 Studies of the demand side: (Charitable organisations) 
 
Charitable organisations are important providers of public good in the economies of 
Australia and Japan (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1991). Various studies recognise 
the importance of monitoring quality of services provided by charities (Yamamoto, 
1997) and efficiency of their operations (Weisbrod and Dominquez, 1986) and 
sustainability (Tuckman and Chang, 1991; Trussel, 2006).  
 
Most studies of charitable organisations focus on key factors such as: (a) operational 
efficiency (Weisbrod and Dominquez, 1986; Posnett and Sandler, 1989), (b) views 
regarding the fundraising activities of these organisations (Posnett and Sandler, 1989), 
(c) sustainability of the operation (Tuckman and Chang, 1991), (d) government grants 
(Tuckman and Chang, 1991; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Andreoni and Payne, 2003), 
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(e) organisational size and history (Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Callen, 1994; 
Tinkelman, 1999; Trussel, 2002), and (f) organisational corporate governance (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983).  
 
Charitable organisations differ from for-profit organisations in several ways, and 
perhaps the most perceivable distinction is the ―non-distribution of profits‖ constraint. 
In other words, charitable organisations unlike business firms cannot distribute their 
residual income to owners, in ways such as dividends in the for-profit organisations 
(Parsons, 2003). Charitable organisations do not have the same incentives as the 
commercial sector (maximise profits) (Trussel and Greenlee, 2004), but rather 
advance a charitable objective (Rose-Ackerman, 1996), which includes maximising 
the level output to recipients (Trussel, 2003).  
 
According to the philanthropy study in the US, donors increasingly rely on financial 
information reported by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990 for allocation of 
their donations among charitable organisations. Thus, numerous past economics, 
marketing and accounting studies using the data from US in relation to donations to 
charitable organisations, have examined financial information, such as the efficiency 
and the stability or other non-financial information of the organisations (Hood et al., 
1977; Weisbrod and Dominquez, 1986; Weisbrod, 1988; Tuckman and Chang, 1991; 
Callen, 1994; Tinkelman, 1998; Parsons, 2001; Tinkelman, 2002; Anthony and 
Young, 2003; Parsons, 2003; Trussel and Greenlee, 2004; Trussel and Parsons, 2004, 
2008). These previous studies conclude that potential donors evaluate financial 
information reported by the organisation (Weisbrod and Dominquez, 1986; Posnett 
and Sandler, 1989; Tuckman and Chang, 1991; Gordon et al., 1999; Gordon and 
Khumawala, 1999; Tinkelman, 1999; Trussel, 2003; Trussel and Greenlee, 2004; 
Trussel and Parsons, 2004, 2008).  
 
3.5.1 Empirical models of the level of donations  
 
Charitable organisations compete for private donations (Marcuello and Salas, 2001), 
which are necessary for their operations, and to achieve their objectives. Rose-
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Ackerman (1982) argues that competition for donations leads charities to engage in 
excessive fundraising.  
 
Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986) establish that competition will always be a 
disciplinary instrument for charitable organisations. Market competition should be an 
external factor promoting the charitable organisations‘ efficiency. They argue that 
fundraising has two distinct effects on donations. Fundraising has a positive effect on 
donation by increasing awareness of the charity and its activities; on the other hand 
fundraising expenditures have a negative effect on donation by reducing total output 
of charities. Donors dislike excess fundraising expenditure because it could reduce 
total distribution to recipients. Thornton (2006) finds that competition among charities 
creates an incentive for managers to report efficiency of their management (Thornton, 
2006).  
 
Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986), Posnett and Sandler (1989), and Callen (1994) use 
different approaches, but they all use ―output price‖ to measure the efficiency of the 
donor dollar to produce the output of a charitable organisation. They also employ a 
fundraising expense ratio, administrative expense ratio, or/and revenue sources 
(programs or other) and the organisations‘ operational year as age of organisation. 
Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986), Posnett and Sandler (1989), and Callen (1994) all 
describe competition for donations of charitable organisations as enhancing 
effectiveness of charitable organisations. This is a competition disciplinary 
instrument. However their models are not focused on competition, but other 
characteristics of charitable organisations.  
 
Employing the logarithmic transformation of the variables is to reduce the impact of 
the outliers (Callen, 1994). A common assumption is that the donors prefer to donate 
to charities where a higher proportion of their money is used for ―output price‖. 
Weisbrod and Deminquez (1986) define ―price‖ as the cost to a donor to purchase one 
dollar of output from a charity and the output ―price‖ as one of the variables of the 
measurement of inefficiency of the charitable organisation. And they assume that the 
―price‖ may also depend on either the rate of tax deduction available to the donor. 
Donors use the most recently available price information which is from the end of the 
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previous financial year. The operational definition of the price of donating a dollar‘s 
worth of output to organisation i is  
 
Pricei = (1 – t)/(1 – fit-1)                                                                                          (3-1) 
where  f = (Fundraising expense t-1/Donation t-1) and  t =  marginal tax rate 
 
The term ―f‖ is calculated as the proportion of fundraising expenses divided by total 
donations rather than total expenses. This is based on their assumption that potential 
donors normally compare marginal fundraising expenses per dollar of donations. 
They assume that donors do not favour high fundraising spending, which may reduce 
contributions to the recipients. They expect higher fundraising spending to indicate 
inefficiency of the charity operation so that the level of the donation goes up if the 
level of the fundraising and administrative spending go down, and the total ―price‖ 
will decrease if the level of the fundraising expense increases. Using IRS data from 
1973 to 1976, they estimated the model below: 
 
iiiiiii FundxAGEaAGEaiceaFundaCD   1432110 lnPrlnlnln  (3-2) 
 
where  D = total donation;  
Tax rated effect absorbed into the constant term; )1ln(200 taaC  ;  
Fund = fundraising expenses;  
Price = output price (see 3-1);  
AGE = the number of organisational years; and ε = error term;  
All variables are logged (ln) 
 
Using the 300,000 tax-exempt organisational data from seven groups of charitable 
organisations; libraries, art museums and zoos, supplying goods and services, 
hospitals, aid to the handicapped and scientific research and higher education, they 
find that the elasticity of fundraising spending is insignificantly positive in the range 
from 0.68 to 1.14 and the elasticity of the price has significantly negative correlation 
ranging between -2.65 and -0.73. They state that the results of the fundraising imply a 
very small total revenue-maximising behaviour, whereas the price has no revenue 
maximising behaviour.  
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Posnett and Sandler (1989) test financial year 1985-1986 data for a sample of the 300 
largest United Kingdom (UK) charitable organisations in four types of groups (health, 
religious, social welfare and overseas charities), using a log-log model consisting of 
price, fundraising expenses, government grants, age, autonomous income and legacy 
donations. The price of obtaining charitable output is assumed to increase based on 
the fraction of the organisation‘s expenses diverted from program spending to either 
administrative or fundraising purposes. However, ignoring any tax benefits, Posnett 
and Sandler (1989) defined price as follows:  
 
)1/(1Pr afice                                                                                              (3-3) 
 
where f and a are the fractions of total expenses spent on fund-raising and 
administration expenses. 
 
If all of an organisation‘s expenses are either fundraising, administrative or program, 
then algebraically price reduces to the inverse of the program expense ratio 
(Tinkelman and Mankaney, 2007, p. 44). Thus, their output ―price‖ has two 
significant differences from that of Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986). Firstly, they do 
not include the marginal tax on the calculation of price because their sample of UK 
charities rarely has tax exemption status at that time. Second, Posnett and Sandler 
(1989) employ both the ratios of fundraising and administrative expenditure to total 
expenditures for the calculation of price, whereas Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986) 
had to treat administration costs ratios as zero, due to unavailability of data. Therefore 
they use the ratio of fundraising expenditure to total donations for price. Third, in the 
estimated model, they have additional variables included; legacy donation, central and 
local government grants and other revenues using data from four types of groups; 
health, overseas, religion and social welfare. Fourth, all of the variables used in the 
regression relate to the current period due to the sample availability, however they 
acknowledge that it is preferable to use lagged values of the independent variables. 
Their estimated model is 
 
iiiii
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where D = total donation (excluding legacy donations);  
Fund = fundraising expenses;  
Price = output price (see equation (3-3));  
AGE = organisational age;  
Leg = legacy donation;  
CenG = grants from central government;  
LocG = grants from local government;  
OR = other revenues, rent income, service fees and investment incomes;  
u = error term; Variables are logged (ln). 
 
The results from Posnett and Sandler (1989) are broadly consistent with the results of 
Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986). The results of output ―price‖ with industry specific 
groups are significantly negative elasticity in their full sample (-2.018), health (-
1.422), religious (-3.044), and social welfare (-1.549), but not significant in their 
overseas sample (-0.0096). They find charity age is a significantly positive elasticity 
(full samples at 0.006, religion at 0.004 and welfare at 0.007), while government 
grants have an insignificant and mixed effect on donation except in the social welfare 
industry (0.045 at 5% significant) and rather increase the charitable donations. Their 
contribution includes other revenues – rent, investment income fees from services and 
other income, and isolation of legacy donations from other donations on the basis of 
the argument that such revenues may crowd-in or crowd-out donations. However, 
legacy donations on total donations is insignificant due to the fact that legacy 
donations may take much longer to reflect on total donation. The findings are 
significantly positive elasticity of other revenues on the total donations (at 1 % level), 
in their full sample (0.078), health (0.190), social welfare (0.152) and overseas 
(0.445) but not in religion (0.061), implying a revenue-maximising behaviour because 
they are not significantly different from zero (Weisbrod and Dominquez, 1986). 
These results also indicate that central government grants do not crowd-out in the 
groups of health, religion and social welfare and not for overseas, whereas the local 
government grants show crowding out, insignificant and negative elasticity on total 
donation, in all groups – health, religion and social welfare.  
 
Callen (1994) employs the price without the marginal tax following Posnett and 
Sandler (1989) and conducts an OLS regression analysis of the years 1986 to 1987 
data for a sample of Canadian 72 registered charities with a listing on the Specific 
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Health Focus Organisation. Her investigation is focused on output price as the 
organisational efficiency measurement without legacies donation but adding other 
technical efficiency variables (service fees and other revenues ratio) in the OLS 
regression model (Callen, 1994, p. 221) as follows 
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where D = total donation;  
Fund = fundraising expenses;  
Price = output price (use of Posnett and Sandler‘s (1989) price, see (3-3));  
AGE = organisational age;  
Leg = legacy donation;  
OR = other revenues, rent income, service fees and investment incomes;  
G = government grants;  
µ = error term; and all variables are logged (ln).  
 
Callen (1994) finds that price (-0.302) to be significantly negative to the total 
donations and government grants to be insignificantly negative, while fundraising, age 
and the cross-product term (fundraising is a multiple by age) are all insignificantly 
positive to total donations. Theoretically, fundraising should have a negative 
correlation to the donations (Weisbrod and Dominquez, 1986), however, after 
adjusting the heteroscadasticity in the residual of the OLS regression model (using 
White‘s (1980) test9), the fundraising is positive and significantly correlated to the 
total donations.  
 
Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995), using the period 1983-1992 for a sample of UK 
159 charities  in the four groups, health, overseas, religion and social welfare (from 
the Charities Aid foundation Statistics and Trends data), follow the study of Posnett, 
and Sandler (1989) model (see Equation 3-4). They argue as to whether marginal tax 
needs to be included in output price
10
, because in the period up to 1990 in total, tax 
deductible donations are granted only less than 15% of the total individual giving. 
Therefore, Khanna et al. (1995) arguably, drop off the marginal tax in the calculation 
                                                 
9 White (1980) tested the consistent estimator of the covariance matrix and fixed the possible 
heteroscedasticity problem.  
10 Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995) employ in ―price‖, marginal tax from Weisbrod and 
Dominguez‘s (1986) study, and from Posnett, and Sandler‘s (1989) study, including administration 
expense ratio. This ratio uses the proportion of total expenses assigned to the fundraising expense and 
administrative expense.  
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of output price (see Equation 3-3) and test a log-log linear regression with a time lag 
for independent variables. They (1995) find that output price is significantly negative 
(-1.28) in the full sample but not significant in any of four groups sample. They also 
find that the fundraising expense to total expense ratio is significantly positive. In 
other words, as the implicit price rose from the higher fundraising and administrative 
expenses in the previous period, the charitable donations decrease in the current 
period; whereas subsequently higher fundraising expense increases the total donations 
in the current year. They also (1995) argue that fundraising expense has two opposite 
effects on donation: one is to reduce the resources available to the recipients and the 
other is to increase the donations as an advertising effect, similar to the for-profit 
organisations (see also Weisbrod and Dominquez, 1986). Furthermore, the 
administrative expense is insignificantly negative, while the government grants and 
organisational age have positive and significantly correlated to the total donation. 
They conclude from the fundraising elasticity falling between one and zero that their 
results imply a mixture of budget-maximising and revenue-maximising behaviours.  
 
Balabanis, Stables and Phillips (1997), working in the marketing framework, conduct 
a survey of the top 200 British charities to find a relationship between the charities‘ 
performance and the level of the present donor-market orientation using data from 
two different point years, 1989 and 1994. They find that the efficiency measurement 
of the percentage of the administrative expenses to the total donations shows a strong 
influence factor on donors which reflects on management attitude towards the usage 
of their donation. They conclude that the findings indicate that charities are aware of 
how the donors put pressure on charities to make use of their donations in better ways.  
 
Tinkelmann (1998) also employs a log-log linear regression analysis once using a 
modified Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986) ―price‖, including the marginal tax. He 
then decides to adapt Posnett and Sandler‘s (1989) ―price‖ excluding the marginal tax 
in the calculation of the price because the different tax rates for comparison studies 
makes it more complex and difficult to compare. In addition to the study of Posnett 
and Sandler (1989), Tinkelman (1998) includes joint costs such as program, 
administrative and fundraising expenses, total assets, the organisational age, 
government grants, program and other revenues as control variables in the period 
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1990 to 1992 data for a sample of 191 large charities from the New York State‘s 
Charity Database
11.
  
The estimation model is 
 
lnDi = f(lnPrice, lnAGE, Rations, InFund, lnAssets, Control)                               (3-6) 
 
where D = total donation;  
Price =output price (Posnett and Sandler‘s (1986) price, see Equation 3-3);  
AGE = organisational age;  
Fund = fundraising expenses in prior year;  
Assets = total assets at the beginning of year; explained variables are logarithm (ln); 
Controls = other types of revenues, government grants, program fees, and investment;  
Rating rate by the council of Better Business Bureaus (CBBB) or the National 
Charities Information Bureau (NCIB)  
 
Tinkelmann (1998) separates donation into four categories – individuals, 
corporations, foundations and legacies from deceased individuals. The price elasticity 
on total donation is statistically significant and negative on individual donations in 
each year (-0.89 for 1991 and -1.48 for 1992), whereas the fundraising elasticity is a 
positive (0.58 for 1991 and 0.59 for 1992) which shows slightly below ranging than 
that of Weisbrod and Dominquez‘s (1986) findings. He finds that the age is negatively 
correlated to total donations and argues that the organisational age may not be 
relevant information for donors to judge the quality of the organisation. He also tests 
whether financial statement users are affected by joint-cost disclosures by charities 
and finds that donors are affected by these variables and private rating information as 
an indicator of the quality of the organisation. Tinkelman (1998) concludes that large 
donors appear to penalise an organisation that includes high levels of spending on 
expenditures, but this does not affect small donors. He finds that individuals generally 
tend to give very small amounts after a very quick decision process but, in total, 
individuals give 81% of the funds, while the three other types of donations, 
foundation grants, corporate grants and legacies, are large amounts with a careful 
decision-making process in each, for about 6% of total donations.  
 
Similar results are obtained by other researchers, using the large samples of charities 
in the US. Khumawala and Gordon (1997), Greenlee and Brown(1999), Frumin and 
                                                 
11 New York State charities soliciting over US$25,000 are required to file annually. 
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Kim (2001) and Roberts et al. (2003), each find evidence that the relatively higher 
costs of fundraising are not a significant factor which affects the levels of the 
donations. Khumawala and Gordon (1997) find evidence to support the proposition 
that a higher expense in fundraising seems to increase exposure of the charities and 
results in higher levels of donations in subsequent years.  
 
Using household data, including the marginal tax effect on the log of price, Andreoni 
and Sholz (1998) also conduct a log-linear regression analysis to investigate whether 
preferences to donate from each household are influenced by the knowledge about 
donations by the neighbours. Using a sample of 3,373 households data in 1985 from 
the Bureau of Labour Statistics in US, they find that price and the donation show a 
negative elasticity.  
 
Tinkelman (1999) tests the period 1993 and 1994 data for a sample of 9,625 
charitable organisations from the New York States‘ Charities Database, using the 
Tinkelmen‘s (1998) a log-linear model, but without agency ratings. He compares the 
results between the audited and the non-audited data and finds output price to be 
significantly negative in each year (-0.55 for 1993 and -0.53 for 1994), consistent with 
the previous studies in that price from both data are significantly negative and the 
fundraising ratios from both data are significantly positive.  
 
Furthermore, Tinkelman (1999) investigates the organisational size and finds that 
relatively young organisations are more likely smaller in size and have more financial 
problems (see also Lyons, 2001).  
 
Greenlee and Brown (1999) test a sample of 700 US charities for each year from 1991 
to 1994 using a semi-log model consisting of lagged donations to function of 
administrative ratio and fundraising ratio. They separate the effects of these two 
expenses ratios but omit price in their model. They define administrative ratio as 
administration expenses divided by the sum of administrative and program expenses, 
and fundraising ratio as fundraising expenses divide by total donations. Their semilog 
model is: 
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),,()( 111  tttt DFundARfDLn                                                                            (3-7) 
 
where: D = total donation; 
AR = administration expenses;  
Fund = fundraising expenses 
 
Because they employ a lag period of time for fundraising and administrative ratios 
and their model requires 2 years of data, Greenlee and Brown (1999) separately 
performed regression for 1992, 1993 and 1994. They find that a lagged administrative 
expense has significantly negative correlation to the current total donations for all 
three years, while the fundraising ratios has a positive correlation at a 5% level of 
significance for all three years. The results of a positive relationship in all three years 
for fundraising ratios may indicate that donations tend to favour spending more on 
fundraising expenses to expose publicity of charities as an advertising effect on for 
profit-organisation. However, the theory does not support its relationship (Weisbrod 
and Dominquez, 1986), the results indicate that increasing fundraising ratios in the 
current year appears to enhance future donations (Greenlee and Brown, 1999).  
 
Okten and Weisbrod (2000), employing a similar model to Callen (1994), investigate 
the relationship between total donations and financial variables, fundraising expenses 
to total expenses and fundraising expense to total revenues using the IRS data for 
1982–1983 and 1985–1994 using seven groups; libraries, arts museums/zoos, services 
to the poor, hospitals, services to the handicapped, scientific research and higher 
education. Their model is different from Callen‘s (1994) model (see 3-5) that used 
Program Service Revenues (PSR) whereas Callen (1994) employed Other Revenues 
(OR, including Program fees, rent revenues and investment). They notice that donors 
are sensitive to expense ratios, implying a downward sloping demand curve for 
charity services (fewer people ask for help). They find efficiency of fundraising to 
obtain mixed results but generally it finds a positive and insignificant correlation to 
total donations and that fundraising elasticity for six groups are not significantly 
different from zero.  
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where: D = total donations;  
Price =output price (Posnett and Sandler‘s (1986) price, see Equation 3-3);  
AGE = organisational age;  
Fund = fundraising expenses in prior year; 
 
Okten and Weisbrod (2000), however, expect that the organisational age represents 
the organisational reputation and increase the organisational wealth, they find that the 
effect of age on donations is a negative. They state that ―an unobservable quality may 
not be fully captured by the regression model‖(2000, p. 268). These results are 
consistent with previous studies (Callen, 1994; Tinkelman, 1998; Greenlee and 
Brown, 1999). Furthermore, they also investigate whether other revenues, such as 
project revenues, have any effect on total donations. They find positive effects on 
donations; in other words, other revenues encourage donors to donate in the groups of 
higher education, scientific research, arts and hospitals. These findings are consistent 
with previous studies which show that private individual donations have a positive but 
self-directed project income (Khanna et al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000).  
 
Barber, Roberts and Visvanathan (2001) use the program spending to total spending 
ratio to evaluate the organisational strategy and objectives of charitable organisations 
using a sample of six environmental charities. They define two types of organisations 
as revenue maximisers and cost minimisers. Revenue maximisers‘ charities use direct 
mail solicitation or professional fund-raisers to increase the awareness of charities and 
consequently increase donations. On the other hand, cost minimiser charities do not 
use fundraising techniques. However, those two types of organisations use a different 
strategy, but their program expenses are similar on average among the six charities. 
They note that the organisational financial profiles need to be investigated in detail 
before drawing definitive conclusions about performance, because there are 
considerable strategic differences among the charities.  
 
Similarly, Frumkin and Kim (2001) test a log-log linear regression on a balanced 
panel of 2,359 charities. To avoid an issue of serial correlation, Frumkin and Kim use 
a one-way generalized least squares approach to the function of administrative ratio, 
program expenses, level of fundraising expenses, total revenues, government grants 
for a sample data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistic of Income (SOI) 
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databases for the 11 years from 1985 to 1995 in the US. The IRS encompasses the 
data for all charitable organisations with more than USD10 million in assets of six 
groups of charitable organisations; arts, education, health, human services, public 
benefit and others to control for possible different effects by sector. Their model 
excludes a variety of other variables found to be significant in other research 
including fundraising ratio, organisational age, and other revenue sources, and leaves 
unclear why donors should dislike the administrative ratio which no longer represents 
a diversion of funds from programs as it does in the two previously discussed models. 
Not surprisingly, they find no statistically significant and negative correlations 
between the overheads and total donations for their sample of charitable 
organisations. However, they do not take the log of administration expense ratio and 
they exclude age, program service revenues. In five groups out of six, they find that 
fundraising expense has shown a significant positive effect, whereas administration 
expense has no significant effect on donation, which is inconsistent with the result of 
Greenlee and Brown (1999). Frumkin and Kim (2001) conclude that donors seem not 
to pay attention to the efficiency of the organisation to which they are donating.  
 
Carrying on the study of Okten and Weisbrod (2000) and using their modified model, 
Marcuello and Salas (2001) examine a behavioural model, in the line of competition 
of charitable organisations, in the context of markets with monopolistic competition. 
They test 50 Spanish Nongovernmental Organisations of Development Aids data for 
the period 1992 to 1993. Their main objective is to compare the determinants of time 
donations, which are volunteers‘ work, with the determinants of money donations 
using a two stage least square regression – price and operating expenditure as 
instrumental endogenous variables.  
 
The empirical model produced by Marcuello and Salas (2001) is formulated taking 
into account the total income received in a given year, operating expenditures, and 
some characteristic that can be related to reputation indicators, such as age, 
ownership, and legal form. The assumption that charities use donations to deliver 
output Q and to cover expenditures F and A is equivalent to assuming that they follow 
a pricing policy of price equal to average cost ci. In this model they take logs in 
Equation (1), the empirical model with a log-linear function as follows:  
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ln Dt = a0 + a1 ln Fi + a2 Repi + a3 ln ci + u                                                              (3-9) 
 
where: Repi is the vector of reputation indicators of organisation i; 
pi,: price is substituted by average unit cost,  
ci; and ui is the error term 
 
They find that fundraising expense and output price have a positive effect on 
monetary donation but the age and religious variable have no significant effect on 
monetary donations, whereas the age and religious control of organisations have a 
positive effect on time donations, but operation costs have no sign of effect on time 
donation and price elasticity of time donations is lower than for monetary donations.  
 
Jacobs and Marudus (2003) examine the data from Statistic of Income (SOI) database, 
using the modified Frumkin and Kim (2001) model, on the log form of administrative 
expense ratio and a two-way random effects model. They find significant negative 
correlations in 2 of the 6 groups (education and other), whereas in the other four 
groups the correlation remains insignificant. Furthermore, Marudas and Jacobs (2004) 
examine a panel data of 838 large US charities for the period 1985 to 1994 using a 
two-stage least squares model, similar to the Okten and Weisbrod (2000) model, 
excluding the age-fundraising interaction term due to multicollinearity problem and 
also similar to Tinkelman‘s (1998) model without a size control. They find their 
specified price (total expenses/program expenses) to be significantly negative (-1.32) 
in their scientific research sample, significantly positive (0.08) in their hospitals 
sample, and not significant in their education sample.  
 
iiiiiii ePRaGaAGEaiceaFundaCD   151432110 lnlnPrlnlnln   (3-10) 
 
Where: D = total donation;  
C0, as )1ln(200 taaC   (same with Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986));  
Fund = fundraising expenses in prior year;  
Price =output price (Posnett and Sandler‘s (1986) price, see Equation 3-3);  
AGE = organisational age;  
G= government grants;  
PR = program revenue;  
e = error term; ln = logged   
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Parsons (2003) examines the value of accounting information to donors and discusses 
the current accounting practices of charitable organisations. She finds that the 
accounting reporting practices from charities are varying and diverge greatly. She 
states that the needs of the different accounting standards and the reporting structures 
for charitable organisations reflect significant differences between the business and 
non-business operations. She provides some evidence of charitable accounting 
information to donors and suggests further research to examine the relationship 
between stability measures and efficiency measures that incorporate fundraising costs 
and donations.  
 
Tinkelman (2004) also investigates the managers‘ fundraising strategies using IRS 
data from 1982 to 1994, which is the data used in the Okten and Weisbrod (2000) 
model. He finds a negative correlation between vulnerable organisations and 
organisational age and size. He also find the typical fundraising elasticities in seven 
groups of charitable organisations to be between zero (indication of the net revenue-
maximising level) and one (as the budget-maximising level). These results are 
consistent with the previous results (Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Khanna et al., 1995), 
most managers in charitable organisations following the strategies between pure 
program service maximisation and pure organisational size maximisation. However, 
his findings of the fundraising elasticities for seven groups are different from the 
results of Oken and Weisbrod (2000), which shows elasticity for six groups is not 
significantly different from zero.  
 
Trussel and Parsons (2004) examine the financial information on charitable 
organisations and establish four factors in a conceptual framework. Of these four 
financial factors, they identify financial information as the key to understanding the 
efficiency, stability, quantity and quality of the operations of charitable organisations. 
The four factors used in the analysis are, (i) efficiency of the organisation in 
allocating resources to its programs, (ii) financial stability of the organisation, (iii) 
quantity of information available to the donors and, (iv) quality of information. Their 
efficiency model with efficiency factors is employed as a combination model from the 
Weisbrod and Dominquez‘s study (1986) and the Posnett and Sandler‘s study (1989). 
For their other factors, Trussel and Parsons (2004) employ their theoretical 
foundations from the combination of various previous studies including the studies of 
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Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986), Posnett and Sandler (1989), Tuckman and Chang 
(1991), Baber et al. (2001) and Parsons (2003). Trussel and Parsons (2004) test the 
four factors
12
 with the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model and conclude 
that the donations are significantly related to each factor‘s independent variables at 
the 0.1% level.  
 
More recently, Thornton (2006), using panel data from seven groups of charities 
covering more than a decade of observations, finds that fundraising expenses are 
directly and positively correlated to charitable donations. These results also indicate 
that, as an indirect effect, a higher price lowers the total donations. He finds that some 
charitable organisations, such as libraries and hospitals, are less interested in 
fundraising, whereas religious organisations are very keen to engage in fundraising to 
maximise their resources.  
 
Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) investigate whether when and if a charitable 
organisation reports increased spending on administration costs, donors stop 
supporting it. They employ the efficiency variables on the modified models from the 
previous studies, comparing the results from Posnett and Sandler‘s (1989) price 
model, Greenlee and Brown‘s (1999) model and Frunkin and Kim‘s (2001) model. 
They test three samples. The first sample is for 27,602 observations from the National 
Center for Charitable Statistic database for 2000 and 2001 (NCCS). Two additional 
samples are obtained to replicate the prior studies, which are conducted on data from 
the 1980s or early 1990s, one from 1992 to 1994, 1,962 observations from New York 
State data (NYS) and one from 1982 to 1994 of 1,373 observations from the Statistics 
of Income data (SOI). They also test the residuals using the White‘s test (1980) to 
reduce the impact of heteroscedasticity.  
 
Furthermore, Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) also use Tinkelman‘s (1998) ―four 
price lower factors‖ to examine whether the association between donations and 
administrative ratio may change signs at different levels of organisational size, age, 
administrative spending or administrative ratios. However, they find no evidence of 
                                                 
12
 EFF: the total of price, program expense ratio and administration expense ratio. QUN: the total of the 
ratio of the fundraising expense to the total expense and the ratio of the fundraising expense to the total 
contributions. QUL: the total of the number of the operation years, the logging of the beginning assets 
and the ratio of the grant revenue to the total revenues. 
 85 
an effect on a change of sign in the above circumstances of the association of the 
administrative ratio. The coefficients of fundraising ratio are positive, as expected 
because activities of fundraising increase publicity of charities and consequently 
donation to charities increase, while the coefficients for the administrative ratio give 
mixed results. Using the price model, the administrative ratio is constantly negative in 
the two NCCS samples (the full and the restricted sample
13
), and the full and 
restricted NYS and SOI samples. Whereas in the NCCS full sample, using Greenleen 
and Brown‘s (1999) or Frumkin and Kim‘s (2001) models, the coefficients in both 
models are statistically positive and significant. In the NCCS with restricted sample 
regressions, the coefficients become negative but significant. Tinkelman and 
Mankaney (2007) conclude that mixed results or weaker associations exist when (i) 
the data is from smaller organisations (also see Tinkelman, 1998) in a start-up phase 
(the organisational age is less than four years), (ii) the administrative or fundraising 
ratios are too small or, (iii) the organisation is not able to rely on donations.  
 
Thornton and Beiski (2009) find that using the IRS Form 990, competition among 
charities creates under-reported management and fundraising costs to make their 
organisations more efficient and use. They also find that donors have a higher opinion 
of charitable organisations with accurate financial report, thereby donating more. 
Additionally they find that pricing of donation is sensitive to higher quality financial 
information from charitable organisations.  
 
Marudas and Jacobs (2007) examine whether the charities‘ level of fundraising is 
excessive, insufficient or unrelated to maximising net donations using a sample of 606 
arts charities in the US. They employ a model similar to Marudas and Jacobs (2004) 
but they use normal constant term and additional variable, Y, which is calculated on 
the ratio of net assets / (total expenses – fundraising expenses). Their estimation 
model is  
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13
 Their restricted samples were to meet the following conditions: fundraising and administrative 
expenses must both exceed US$1,000, age must exceed three years, prior year donations must exceed 
both US$100,000 and 10% of the total prior year revenues (Tinkelman and Mankaney, 2007, p. 51). 
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Marudas and Jacobs (2007) find that the effect of a 1% increase in fundraising on net 
donations is varied among the arts charities in the sample data, for instance, giving an 
increase in net donations of 8.91% of gross donations to a decrease of 3.82% of gross 
donations. On the other hand, they find that the top 100 largest donations in all the 
sampled charities may narrow their variance of the effect level. In the top 100 
samples, the effect of a 1% increase in fundraising on net donations indicates from an 
increase in net donations of 0.27% of gross donations to a decrease of 0.32% of gross 
donations. Of these 100 NPOs, they find only 3 engaged in excessive fundraising but 
83 engaged in insufficient fundraising, and 14 do not engage in excessive or 
insufficient fundraising. They also provide evidence that reported organisational 
efficiency does not affect donations to arts NPOs.  
 
Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright (2008) test two separate organisational outcomes, 
for the level of charitable organisational quality and organisational access. They 
examine two separate organisational outcomes on two regression equations of quality 
model and access model. Their purpose of examinations is to achieve the efficiency of 
the estimations, which are addressed as some of the problem associated with the data. 
To correct this problem, they employ the seemingly unrelated regression to estimate 
the two equations jointly (Griffiths, Hills and Judge, 1993). Also they analyse the data 
in a two-stage-least square model, on a system of equations in which the dependent 
variable in the quality model is used as an independent variable in the access model 
and ―vice versa‖ (Amirkhanyan et al., 2008, p. 499). As a result, they find that 
measures of quality and access are endogenous rather than exogenous and become 
correlated with the error terms, which results in biased and inconsistent estimates 
(Amirkhanyan et al., 2008, p. 499)  
 
Measuring charities‘ inefficiency in the previous studies mainly uses price as a proxy. 
The most recent study by Jacobs and Marudas (2009) examines the charities 
inefficiency using both administrative and price ratio on donation, which is based on 
the argument of misspecification of the model by using only one of these two 
inefficiency measures that may create substantial bias. The effect of administrative 
inefficiency on donations varies substantially across groups. They employ data from 
the periods 2000 and 2001 for a sample of 5,493 observations from the Statistics of 
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Income database developed by the National Center for Charitable statistics in five 
industry types (arts, education, health, human services and philanthropy).  
 
They employ a modified model of Marudas and Jacobs (2007) by adding a variable, a 
log of administration expenses. Jacobs and Marudas (2009) state that they include all 
variables currently known to affect donation using five different groups of charitable 
organisations - arts, education, health, human services and philanthropy. 
 
Their empirical model is as follows: 
 
ln Dt = d0 + d1 ln Fund t-1i + d2 ln Pricei + d3 AGEi + d4 lnG-i  + d5 lnPR-i             (3-12) 
    +d6 lnYit + d7 ln Assetsit + d8 ln ARit-1 + ε  
 
where:  i, indicates NPO, t indicates year,  
D = donations,  
Price = total expenses/program expenses,  
Admin = administrative expenses/total expenses,  
FR = fundraising expenses,  
GOV = government support,  
PREV = program service revenue,  
AGE = years since first filing a federal tax return,  
Y = years of available assets at the beginning of the year, considered to be a measure 
of wealth and specified as net assets/(total expenses-fundraising expenses),  
TOTASS = total assets at the beginning of the year and; u = error.  
 
Jacobs and Marudas (2009) use Equation 3-12, however, they test the three models: 
that which includes Price only, that which includes Admin only and that which 
includes both Price and Admin. Other than these two variables they use the control 
variables. They believe that the previous studies, unfortunately, provide confusing 
results of the effect of organisational inefficiency variable on donation ( see Jacobs 
and Marudas, 2009, p. 38).  
 
Jacobs and Marudas (2009) find that administrative inefficiency has a significantly 
negative effect on donations to charities in the full sample and in the philanthropy 
sample, but other groups; arts, education, health, or human services groups, find an 
insignificant effect on donations. They find that ―price‖ has shown statistically 
significant but negative effect on donations in the full sample and the group samples 
with the exception of two groups, the arts and philanthropy samples.  
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In summary, various dependent variables have been employed in the empirical models 
on the demand side of the donations ―effort.‖ The results suggest that donors are 
cautious with respect to spending ratios of charitable organisations, responding with a 
downward shift of the donations demand curve, presumably if those ratios are either 
considered inappropriate or are seen as representing inefficiency (Callen, 1994). 
Fundraising expenditure commonly exhibits a significantly positive effect on 
donations (Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Khanna et al., 1995; Frumkin and Kim, 2001; 
Tinkelman, 2004; Thornton, 2006; Marudas and Jacobs, 2007; Tinkelman and 
Mankaney, 2007). For some studies, however, there were mixed results (Callen, 
1994). Administrative expenditures were mostly found to have either a significantly 
negative correlation to donations (Jacobs and Marudas, 2003), or to have no 
significant effect on donations (Frumkin and Kim, 2001; Tinkelman and Mankaney, 
2007); or to exhibit mixed results (Tinkelman and Mankaney, 2007; Jacobs and 
Marudas, 2009). Such results might indicate fundraising activities increase awareness 
and generate publicity for charities, and consequently donations to charities increase 
(Tinkelman and Mankaney, 2007). Most managers in charitable organisations would, 
therefore, be keen to establish strategies between pure program service maximisation 
and pure organisational size maximisation (Tinkelman, 2004).  
 
Inconsistency and mixed results appear to be associated with weaker associations 
(Tinkelman, 1998) or start-up phase organisations within four years of their 
establishment (Greenlee and Brown, 1999). Organisational age seems to be a proxy 
for organisational reputation and increase the organisational capital (Okten and 
Weisbrod, 2000), but was found to be a negative effect on donations (Callen, 1994; 
Tinkelman, 1998; Greenlee and Brown, 1999; Okten and Weisbrod, 2000). As stated 
by Okten and Weisbrod that ―an unobservable quality may not be fully captured by 
the regression model‖ (2000, p. 268). Other commercial revenues were found to have 
a positive effect on donations, encouraging donors to donate within the groups 
(Khanna et al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Okten and Weisbrod, 2000). It may 
be that donors wish to see revenues generated on a more sustainable basis than just 
donations. 
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3.5.2 Government grants and the market for donations  
 
This section discusses the literatures which examined correlation between donation 
and government grants, which could be grouped as some type of other revenue.  
 
Charitable organisations also compete for government subsidies which they use to 
finance their activities in the provision of collective goods (Marcuello and Salas, 
2001).  
Some studies consider that government grants have a significant effect on donations 
as a quality measurement of the charity (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; Kingma, 1989; 
Andreoni, 1990; Payne, 1998; Khanna and Sandler, 2000).  
 
Khanna and Sandler (2000), Posnett and Sandlar (1989), Khanna et al. (1995) and 
Okten and Weisbrod (2000) find that government grants encourage private donors to 
donate more, whereas others have found that government subsidies crowd out the 
private giving (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; Kingma, 1989; Payne, 1998), or a partial 
government assistance can crowd out donations (Kingma, 1995; Payne, 1998), or any 
increased government assistance can partially crowd out charitable donations 
(Schokkaert and Ootegem, 1998). Kingma (1995) and Kigma and McClelland‘s 
(1995) survey of individuals who are on the list of the national public radio stations 
across the US found that more tightly the crowd-out parameter gave a crowd-out of 15 
to 19 cents for every dollar of government funding. There are several reasons why 
government grants to charitable organisations might discourage private donations. For 
example, the donors may think their donations are less important, which leads them to 
give to other organisations (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984). Charitable organisations 
might also be less interested in more aggressive fundraising strategies after receiving 
a government grant (Bergstrom et al., 1986). Using a 10-year panel data of 430 
charitable organisations in the U.S., Payne (1998) finds that government grants lower 
private donations by 50%. Schokkaert and Ootegem (1998) also find government 
grants discourage private donations, whereas, Tinkelmen (1998) and Callen (1994) 
find no evidence or any significant effect of government grants crowding out private 
donations. In other words, government grants have negative and insignificantly 
correlation the total donation. They conclude that insignificant relationship of 
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government grants occurs because the formal grants proposal procedure may not 
relate to private donations and therefore has no influence on private donations.  
 
On the other hand, using a sample data from 159 charities in the United Kingdom, 
Khanna, Posnett and Sandler (1995) and Khanna and Sandler (2000) find that 
receiving government grants have positive correlation to private giving. This may 
reflect UK and US attitudes to government. They conclude that government grants 
provide some kind of quality approval for charitable organisations, because most 
donors are unsure about the quality of charitable organisations (Andreoni, 1998). 
Similarly using financial data from the US, Okten and Weisbrod (2000) find that 
government grants and program service revenues have a positive effect on total 
donations in higher education and scientific research, arts and hospitals. Government 
grants and program revenues do not crowd out private donations in their seven groups 
(Okten and Weisbrod, 2000).  
 
Financial and theoretical research on donors‘ behaviour towards charitable 
organisations uses utility function modelling, while research on charitable 
organisation uses a variety of estimated models. Economic modelling of the two is 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
In this context, Marcuello and Salas (2001) also find no evidence of the crowding out 
of private donations by government grants. Marcuello and Salas (2001) assume a 
market with N varieties of a public good, each one produced and sold by a single 
charity. Donors purchase quantity ―Qi‖(of variety i (i =1,…,N)), paying a price ―p”. 
Therefore, the total income received in donations by charity i, Di (pi; bi), will be equal 
to price time quantity.  
 
This equation for donation is: 
 

iiiiiii pBbQpbpD );(                                                                                       (3-13) 
 
where: B = a positive constant common to all varieties and  
μ = the price elasticity of demand, also common to all varieties, with μ,<0  
 
The donations, Di (pi; bi) to organisation i all reciprocated by output equal to  
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Di (pi; bi)-Fi-Ai. This means donors pay price pi,, akin to the results of Wesbroad and 
Dominguez (1986) 
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where: pi = price,  
Fi = the fundraising expenditure,  
Ai = the operating cost per unit of output 
 
The output of quantity of charity i 
 
Qi = Di (pi; bi)-Fi-Ai, i =1,…,N 
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This result is consistent with the argument in the sense that such crowding out would 
not occur because government grants may serve as a quality signal for donors 
(Khanna et al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Okten and Weisbrod, 2000) and 
rather provides donors with a secure quality qualification of the organisation. 
Marcuello and Salas (2001, p. 202) conclude  that ―the fact that government grants do 
not affect donations may indicate that crowing out effects cancel out with quality 
signal effect.‖ This is also consistent with predictions from the public literature that 
such crowding out may not occur when a government grant comes from the collection 
of revenues of a whole population, including donors (Bergstrom et al., 1986; 
Marcuello and Salas, 2001).  
 
Andreoni and Payne (2003), for charitable organisations in US, predict that an 
increase in government funds should decrease fundraising efforts (charitable giving), 
namely government grants crowding out private donations. They use  
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where: Cj = cost of services of a charity j;  
xi = an individual‘s consumption of private goods;  
yji = a person i‘s contribution to charity j (yij: 0 );  
θj = the probability that a charity j solicits an individual i.  
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The cost of fundraising sets as Fj(θj), where 0'F  and F''>0.  
 
In addition, if charity j receives government grants as Gj then charity j can be 
described as: ]1,0[jL ; and ]1,0[
* iL .  
 
The utility function if the i
th
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jiij LLd ,  when ),(
*
ji LLd some distance function 
 
Andreoni and Payne (2003, p. 794) state that ―All else equal, this will imply that not 
only will an individual prefer to give to a charity that is closer to its ideal quality, but 
it will also want to give more to it than one farther away.‖ They  describe the 
fundraising model (2003, p. 802) as:  
 
  ististtiist OGF  itstZ   ,                                                           (3-18) 
 
where F =s fundraising expenditure spend in year t by charity i located in state s; 
G = the government grants in year t received by the charity i.  
 
Andreoni and Payne (2003) explain that there are several issues suggesting that the 
OLS results may be biased due to endogeneity or omitted variables in the 
specification, and they estimate equation using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
specification. In the first stage, they estimate government funding based on a set of 
exogenous measures used as instruments. In the second stage, they use the estimated 
level of government funding to measure the coefficient of G (β) using panel data set 
for up to 15 years from the arts and social services organisations. They find strong 
evidence that government grants to charities reduce the total donation, expressed as 
crowding out donations. The variety and contradictions of these results suggest that: 
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(a) we cannot be certain about the ―crowding out‖ hypothesis and (b) it may vary 
from place to place. 
 
3.5.3 Characteristics of charitable organisations  
 
Increasing numbers of researchers are suspicious about accuracy of information 
provided in an IRS Form 99014 from charitable organisation in the US.  
 
Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman (2006) find that the NPOs reported the under-value of 
fundraising expenses owing to managers‘ incentives to show more efficient 
organisations. They find that many charities reported zero fundraising in the IRS 
filings, even though they have fundraising personnel and report fundraising costs in 
their audited financial statements. Their findings are similar to Tinkelmen‘s price for 
the lower four factors (Tinkelman, 1999). They argue that the four attributes of the 
organisations might have an effect on lowering the price. The attributes of the 
organisations are; (1) organisations with a lower operational age - younger charities 
(less than four years in operation) may have a limited relevance between price and 
donors‘ decision to donate to them, (2) organisations with a ratio of charities‘ 
donations out of total revenue of less than 20%, therefore the small size of 
organisations with no requirement to have an audit15 of their financial reports, and (3) 
organisations with a zero level of either fundraising or administrative expenses. 
Various researchers have questioned whether it is plausible that more than half of all 
charitable organisations report spending nothing on fundraisings in US (Tinkelman 
and Mankaney, 2007). A recent study argues that charitable organisations have little 
incentive to accurately expose functional expenses. Potentially this could explain why 
researchers into donations of charitable organisation fail to find a significant negative 
relation of administration costs, because donors penalize organisations with high 
administration costs (Tinkelman and Mankaney, 2007).  
 
                                                 
14
 Federally tax-exempt organizations in US must file with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which is 
the U.S. government agency responsible for tax collection and tax law enforcement.  
15
 In New York the charitable organisations were not required to have audits with less than 
US$100,000 in their total donations.  
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The use of financial information is only partly contractible in the charitable 
organisation (Castaneda et al., 2007), and non-financial reporting may be important as 
a source of trustworthiness information to donors, for example the age of the 
organisation that donors may take as ―a signal of quality charity‖ (Weisbrod and 
Dominquez, 1986, p. 94).  
 
Non-financial information has also been found to have a significant effect on 
donations, including the quality measurement of the charity, such as organisational 
age (Callen, 1994) and size (Tinkelman, 1999; Trussel, 2002), or the corporate 
governance information of the charitable organisations (Callen et al., 2003; Abbott et 
al., 2004) and objectives (Anthony and Young, 2003; Parsons, 2003). Recently more 
charities set their mission statement as a measurable goal by taking a similar strategic 
plan to profit organisations to judge progress against goals (Sawhill and Williamson, 
2001). Charitable organisations are focusing primarily more on areas where 
government‘s attention is limited and inadequate (Salamon, 1994; Salamon et al., 
2000). 
 
O‘Neill and Young (1988) discuss the characteristics of charitable organisations 
looking at the ambiguity of their performance criteria, the technical difficulties of 
measuring complex mission statements and the political difficulties of designing 
measurement systems that accommodate the various stakeholders in these charitable 
organisations. Sawhill and Williamson (2001) investigate charitable organisational 
performance in relation to mission statement. They state that over the decade, the 
number of charitable organisations that have applied a traditional profit organisational 
business model to improve their effectiveness and efficiency has increased.  
 
Bennett (2003), in relation to the selection of a particular charity, states that donors 
are heavily influenced by the promotional image of the charities. He claims that for 
charities to survive, they should recognise the power of the material image to 
emphasise their work in increasing private donations. He also finds that donors seem 
to use the opportunity to select a particular charity for their donations that express 
their personal values. Additionally, he finds that people with a materialistic 
disposition are more generous and this generous group of people seems to prefer to 
donate to charitable organisations financially sound in practice (Bennett, 2003).  
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For the Netherlands, Bekkers (2003) points out that donors have neither legal rights 
nor any control over the allocation of donations and this is also true of other 
jurisdictions. Also in the Netherlands there is no legal obligation for charitable 
organisations to publish their financial information or annual reports to donors, but 
they may possess an accreditation status seal. Bekkers finds significant correlations 
between public trust and the charitable donations. Donors gradually recognise the 
significance of accreditation seals and donated more to those organisations that have 
them than to the organisations without, as can be seen in the increased donations from 
16.5% in 2000 to 31.5% in 2002 (Bekkers, 2003). 
 
3.5.3.1 Age, size and other information of charitable organisations  
 
Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986), Posnett and Sandler (1989), and Callen (1994) 
Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995), and Tinkelmann (1998) employ the operational 
age of the charity for expectation of positive effect on donation and they state that the 
result indicates a stock of goodwill which enhances the quality of the charities, 
subsequently, age is positive and significant on donations for all groups of charitable 
organisations. They conclude that the age of a charitable organisation provides the 
quality assurance to donors. Similar findings are suggested by various other studies 
(Lyons, 2001). However, a number of studies have investigated the association 
between the operational age of the charitable organisations and total donations, 
finding mixed results (Pink et al., 2006; Zappala and Lyons, 2006). Some research 
suggests that younger organisations have greater difficulty in getting funds from the 
government or other organisations, compare to the longer-established organisations. 
This is because the former may not have adequate capital to attract donations (Pink et 
al., 2006; Zappala and Lyons, 2006) and donors may see a smaller organisational 
performance - that is not required to have an audit - as less reliable (Tinkelman, 
1999). Similarly, recently established charities may not have had enough time to build 
a reputation in order to receive grants or donations from the government or donors. 
By contrast, longer-established organisations are more likely to receive grants or 
subsidies from local government or large for-profit organisations through contracting 
partnership programs and thus, they are likely to have established alternate sources of 
revenues (Guo and Brown, 2006).  
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Organisational age is often associated with size (Herman and Renz, 1999; Lyons, 
2001). It takes time for charitable organisations to earn trust and gain a reputation, 
which may generate greater revenue and the ability to grow larger (Herman and Renz, 
1999). Trussel (2002) employs as a financial indicator total assets to measure the size 
of charities in a logistical analysis, and finds a negative correlation between the 
financially vulnerable organisation and the size of an organisation. Larger 
organisations may expand their services to receive revenues or raise larger amounts of 
funds from fundraising (Lyons, 2001). In contrast, relatively younger and newer 
organisations are likely to be smaller and more prove to initially be highly dependent 
on fundraising, whereas the large organisations have a lower dependency on 
fundraising (Zappala and Lyons, 2006).  
 
Increasing the importance of charitable organisations to the world economy, 
charitable organisations need to be responsible for their operations and their 
management (Drucker, 1990). Information asymmetries within charitable 
organisations was a result of consumer or donor demand for information products 
(Kingma, 2006). As the charitable sector continues to grow, it will need to understand 
its role in improving the social well-being of the needy, the psychological impacts of 
aid on recipients. At the same time, they need to understand their funding needs in 
order to sustain their contributions to the community (Parsons, 2003). 
 
3.5.3.2 Corporate governance  
 
Notwithstanding that governance literature of charitable organisations is very small 
with different concerns to for-profit corporate governance literature, Jensen (1983) 
argues that the size of the corporate board is an important element in the effectiveness 
of the operation of the board (see also Beasley, 1996; Beasley and Salterio, 2001). 
Callen, Klen and Tinkelman (2003) also find that the size and the composition of the 
board is an indicator of the board‘s efficiency in charitable organisations. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) explain the theory of the organisational decision process in 
consideration of management decisions and decisions to control the organisation in 
various forms. They argue whether or not the board of directors is responsible for the 
internal control of the monitoring of the actions of top management; and whether or 
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not the non-executive directors are more likely to have a secret agreement with the top 
managers whose interest lies in maximising their profits rather than the shareholders 
wealth. They conclude that the most influential member of the board with respect to 
the organisational activity is the internal manager, and that the inclusion of outside 
directors will enhance the board‘s role to monitor top management and decision 
control effectively.  
 
Similarly, in a study of the board‘s involvement with top management teams and 
corporate board directors by Daily and Schwenk (1996), notice is taken of the 
importance of role of non-executive directors in their empirical investigation of 
interdependencies of top management teams. They find that when organisations are 
transitional or when the knowledge of the chief executive is specialised, the 
distribution of power shifts from the board to the chief executive.  
 
Miller-Millesen (2003) argues that when the organisation is stable, the charities‘ 
boards may be more likely to engage in monitoring activities. However, when the 
executive staff are professionals, the boards are less likely to engage in monitoring. 
She also comments that charities‘ boards are more likely to be influenced by a board‘s 
recruitment strategies to reduce environmental uncertainty.    
 
Beasley (1996) investigates whether or not the inclusion of outside members in a 
board reduces the risk of financial statement fraud, based on Fama and Jensen (1983). 
Employing a regression model with data on 75 fraudulent and 75 non-fraudulent 
organisations, he examined whether or not the board members have the authority for 
internal control or to act as an agent of the organisations. The study consists of an 
examination of the effectiveness of the board‘s mechanisms, including the size of the 
board the percentage of outsiders on the board; the ownership percentage of the 
outsiders on the board and the manager‘s cumulative ownership percentage of the 
firm. The variables also include the average growth rate of the total assets in the two 
years after the restatement of the firm‘s financial statement and if the CEO also acts 
as a chairman of the board. They find that the occurrences of financial statement fraud 
are reduced with the inclusion of outside members on the board of directors, but much 
less so with the presence of an audit committee.  
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Other research finds donors are influenced by the corporate governance information 
on the charitable organisations‘ board committee composition (Klein, 1998; Callen et 
al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004) and the committees effectiveness (Abbott et al., 2000; 
Beasley et al., 2000).  
 
Abbott et al. (2000) focus on an investigation of the effectiveness of the audit 
committee in relation to the audit committee‘s independence and level of activity, 
adopting Beasley‘s (1996) measurements. They study 156 firms, including 78 in the 
list of Security Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases, and 78 non-sanctioned firms. They find that audit committees that consist of 
entirely outside members, and the boards that meet with members at least twice per 
year, show a significant positive correlation to a non-fraudulent financial statement. 
Beasley et al. (2000) examine whether the audit committees‘ effectiveness relates to 
the characteristics of the members. They find audit committees formed entirely with 
outsiders are positively correlated to non-fraudulent financial statements, even though 
the members of the audit committee rarely meet more than annually.  
 
Callen, Klen and Tinkelman (2003) conduct a survey of 473 selected charitable 
organisations from 7,000 charities on the New York State database (NYSD) to 
investigate the association between the governance board composition and 
organisational efficiency. They also employ financial data from the financial reports 
of charities in the NYSD. The financial reports of these organisations are compiled 
with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The selected organisations in 
the NYSD were based on two criteria, (1) charities with more than US$2.5 million in 
direct contributions in 1992 and, (2) the direct contributions
16
 exceed 10% of the total 
donations in 1992. The reasons for the selection of these two are, (1) to examine the 
effect on major donors of charitable governance and, in particular, to examine 
whether or not donations to the charitable organisation need to be large and, (2) to 
understand whether smaller charities would be less useful for a study of the efficiency 
of the board. They state that smaller charities might rely less on donations. Callen et 
al. (2003) also found that the backgrounds of board members and board committee 
members also have some influence in the board‘s efficiency. They found that 37% of 
                                                 
16
 Direct contribution is obtained from private donation minus the funds raised by other organisations 
(Callen et al. 2003, p. 499). 
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charitable organisations have a professionally skilled member on the board; 26% of 
them have a major donor on the board, and 18% of them have a well-known person as 
a board member. They also found that all the variables have a significant positive 
association to the donations. One of the problems this thesis seeks to overcome is the 
unintended bias of current research efforts to the USA. It is always possible that the 
USA is atypical. This is reinforced by the results of the thesis suggesting large 
differences between charities in Australia and Japan. 
 
Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004) examine the association between the possible 
financial restatements and audit committee characteristics in a multivariate setting, 
and the impact of audit committee expertise. Abbott et al. (2004) used a sample of 
for-profit firms with the restatements of the annual reports in the period 1991–1999, 
using a multivariate model with 15 variables. Four dummy variables relevant to 
corporate governance are included. These are (1) being 1 for having at least one 
accounting expert on the board; (2) having the board meeting at least four times 
annually; (3) making a loss three times within the past six years and, (4) taking a 
founder of a charity role of a chief executive officer (CEO), and ‗0‘ otherwise. They 
found that having an accounting expert on the board and the frequency of the board 
meetings (more than four times per year) dramatically reduced the occurrence of a 
fraudulent financial restatement. They conclude that the members of corporate 
committees may enhance the quality of financial reporting.  
 
The organisational corporate governance independency seems relatively important in 
the charitable organisations‘ corporate boards to achieve their missions and 
objectivity, and to enhance internal control and reporting practices (Abbott et al., 
2004). Corporate governance is concerned with ensuring that managers operate the 
organisations honestly and effectively (Child and Rodrigues, 2004). The word 
―governance‖ is used to describe a system of control or regulation (Turnbull, 1997). 
However, a large body of literature investigates the composition of the board of 
management for for-profit organisations, though little is still known about the charity 
sector (Callen et al., 2003), but an identifiable subfield of board research and evidence 
suggests its importance (Ostrower and Stone, 2006). Corporate boards are charged 
with ultimate responsibility for the charitable organisations that they oversee. Within 
 100 
the charity sector, they serve as an important channel for civic participation and play a 
critical role in connecting individual institutions to their larger organisations.  
 
3.5.4 Fundraising strategies of charitable organisations   
 
Bekkers (2003) found that trend the public availability of financial information of 
charitable organisations impels donors to collect information and evaluate of 
charitable organisations. Charities are aware of the impact of announcement of names 
of donors, especially large donations from leaders and well-known persons.   
 
Charitable organisations use publicity of the donations strategically to distinguish 
themselves from other charitable organisations. Generally they report accordingly in 
the dollar categories rather than exact amount (Harbaugh, 1998). Harbaugh (1995) 
finds that if charities reported their donors‘ donation in a graded list, donors would be 
likely to increase their donation in order to be listed in a higher position. For example, 
if donations are listed as ―under $500‖ or ―above $500‖, donors are likely to donate a 
little more than $500 to be in the ―above $500‖ category. A charity uses the donation 
listing strategy to push donors to increase their donations to get into the higher 
prestige group (Harbaugh, 1995). Glazer and Konrad (1996) find that many successful 
charities use expensive fundraising activities such as invitations to dinners or concerts 
to cultivate such donors.  
 
Nowak and Sigmund (1998) and Cooter and Broughman (2005) also find that the 
amounts of charitable giving are doubled when the amount of the donation is 
discussed among donors. Donors are more likely to be eager to earn higher social 
status from giving larger amounts of donations. Similarly, Cooter and Broughman 
(2005) find that if a donation registry is to publish the ratio of an individual‘s 
donations to annual income, the donors would be likely to increase their donations. 
 
In the US, there are about 115,000 charities that employ professional fundraising 
consultants or fundraising specialists (Andreoni, 1998). Andreoni (1998) states that  
charitable organisations larger spend approximately 2 billion US dollars a year on 
fundraising. It will now be in the period of 1995, the twenty five largest charitable 
organisations spent on average over 25 million US dollars on fundraising (Andreoni, 
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1998). Andreoni (1998) also finds that charitable organisations use a strategic 
announcement before a major fundraising event, such as an announcement that they 
have received large amounts of donations or government grants, which may provide 
some kind of guarantee of the organisations, or trustworthiness, to potential donors. 
Andreoni (1998) states that in a way some people may aspire to be a leader of donors 
by providing enough ―seed money‖ to assure others to follow, as his finding of the 
announcement of larger donations brought much larger potential donations. However, 
his findings are contrary to the economic theory that donors prefer to be anonymous.   
 
Vesterlund (1998) observes that fundraising often relies on leadership givers, as 
fundraisers initially solicit wealthier people in the population. She investigates how 
the announcement of donations influences the donations of others as signal of the 
quality of the organisation. She found that reputable charities prefer to announce a 
major donation, and this increased not only potential donors but also encouraged 
continuous donors. Therefore, she concluded that strategic announcements of 
donations was optimal, and also revealed the charity‘s quality. Vesterlund (2003) 
argues that the reason why charities choose to announce past contributions is to reveal 
the charity‘s quality, and that an announcement strategy may be optimal for both the 
charities and the donors. She suggests that initially contributors obtain costly 
information (in terms of time, money or effort) about the charity‘s quality and 
charities are able to signal this information, or make it common knowledge, by 
announcing the amount of the first/earlier donation, which may influence subsequent 
donors (2003, p. 628). Bac and Bag (2003) investigate fundraising strategy by 
comparing the announcement and the non-announcement of a donation in the scales 
of the number of donors and the size of the donations, being large, average or small. 
They state that the announcement of a large number of donors with large donations 
may have a positive impact on potential donors or enhance the credibility of the 
organisation. By contrast, the announcement of a small number of donors with small 
donations may have a negative impact, because the charity seems to be insignificant 
for having only a few donors and small donations. However, they do not release any 
significance to the announcement of large donations, nor to the large number of 
donors of donations, nor to the enhancement of the credibility of the organisation. 
They conclude, inconsistent with the previous arguments, that there is no 
effectiveness to be gained by the announcement of a donation.  
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Romano and Yildirim (2001) model two agents with utility functions to investigate 
the effect of the charities‘ frequent announcements of contributions on donors. They 
conclude ―these announcements are a means of inducing a sequential game among 
donors as an alternative to having them contribute simultaneously‖ (Romano and 
Yildirim, 2001, p. 439), and suggest that the charity may benefit from taking this 
proactive role. Milinski et al. (2002) state that donors are influenced by the 
fundraising strategies of charitable organisations. They find that the announcement of 
the donation increases continuous donations and future donations. Romano and 
Yildirim (2001) and Vesterlund (2003) also find charities frequently chose to inform 
the public of their recognition of donors‘ past contribution to increase their current 
contribution.  
 
Kottasz (2004) in the UK investigated donor‘s behavioural characteristics in young, 
(under 40 year old) affluent (earning more than GBP50,000 (AUD124,377
17
)) a year  
professionals and the differences between male and female of young affluent 
professionals. Kottasz (2004) found significant differences in behaviour and found 
that young affluent males prefer to receive an invitation to social events as a reward, 
while females prefer personal recognition from reputable charities in return. Sixty-six 
percent of interviewees agreed that their charitable donations provided them with a 
warm feeling and personal satisfaction. However, 14% prefer to receive some 
practical benefits and 5% prefer recognition in return. Forty-seven percent donate out 
of a desire for a sense of belonging to a prestigious level of society.  
 
Andreoni and Petrie (2004) conducted an experimental study into how the public 
appearance of donation affected the collection of donations, and found that donors 
preferred to be listed in a higher position by increasing their donations. They stated 
that ―leaders emerge most strongly when the charities can voluntarily report their 
contribution to the rest of the group‖ (2004, p. 1620). Similarly Kumru and 
Vesterlund (2005) found that the listing strategy in the order of the amounts of 
donations influenced potential donors, because generally people desire to be in the 
rank of the wealthier group. They also found that donations from respectable, well-
                                                 
17
 AUD1 = 0.402003 GBP (average rate in 2004). 
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known individuals triggered donations from others. Wright (2002) argued that the 
publicity of individual philanthropy could demonstrate their personal wealthiness 
most effectively to the public, and this satisfied those people‘s social status. Some 
wealthy individuals seek to be a leader of their community by donating large amounts 
of money. 
 
Thornton (2006) empirically investigated charities‘ fundraising effects for both 
donors and charitable organisations. He explained that charities might increase 
awareness and donors could gain valuable information about specific services of a 
particular charity. The fundraising activities could either increase or reduce the overall 
charitable collections. Therefore, they needed to take into consideration the cost 
effectiveness of their operations. Similarly, Andreoni (2006) investigated whether or 
not donations such as ―leadership giving‖ might provide a signal of the high quality of 
the charity to all other potential donors. He found that leadership donations had two 
positive effects on donations: (a) leadership donations draw public attention to the 
quality of the charity, and (b) They provide public awareness of the charity or project. 
However, Andreoni (2006) warned that to convey a creditable signal of the quality of 
the charity, the potential leader may have to encourage enormous amount of 
contributions to signal quality. Andreoni (2007b) found large donation behaviour 
related largely with a desire to earn recognition as a leader in the community. On 
analysing a Bayesian two-stage model, Bag and Roy (2008, p. 60) said that, 
―announcement of donations appears to increase the incentive for donors to add to 
their donations and contribute a higher total amount to the charity than they would 
have had they not learnt about the donations made by others.‖  
 
The impact of the announcement of a donation can also be seen between nations. 
Following the earthquake that struck a southwest Chinese province on 12 May 2008, 
various countries made an offer to help the millions of people severely affected by 
this event. On 16 May 2008 The Consulate of the People‘s Republic of China 
announced these various countries‘ pledges (Consulate of the People's Republic of 
China, 2008). The media release by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Australia 
announced on 20 May 2008, ―The Australian Government doubled its assistance to 
China‖. However, Australia had already donated $1 million (USD 950,00) through the 
International Federation of the Red Cross. A report in the ABC News soon announced 
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on 30 May, ―Japan has announced it‘s doubling the emergency aid to China to almost 
USD10 million to help with the earthquake recovery effort (ABC News, 2008a).‖  
Furthermore, the then Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, told reporters on 20 June that 
the Australian Government provided further assistance of up to $750,000 to help 
disaster recovery and risk and up to $500,000 to assist reconstruction (ABC News, 
2008b). The above is one example of a large number of fundraising drives by 
recipients or charities, where donors may contribute multiple times by adding to their 
pledges, when they learn about the contributions made by other donors. 
 
As an increasing number of charities seek donors‘ support, fundraising is becoming a 
dominant issue (Vesterlund, 1998; Bac and Bag, 2003; Srnka et al., 2003b; Andreoni, 
2006; Thornton, 2006). In the USA, fundraising has become a large and sophisticated 
business (Andreoni, 2006). The demand for strategic fundraising has been recognised 
(Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). Charities use fundraising events strategically to increase 
their donations by publicly rewarding donors, for instance, by giving stickers, badges, 
pins and coffee mugs in proportion to the donors‘ generosity (Srnka et al., 2003b; 
Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). Donors also often respond to this recognition by giving 
more (Harbaugh, 1998; Srnka et al., 2003b). Consequently, to compete in gaining 
more donations, charitable organisations are likely to publicise individual donations. 
Fundraising events are often used to increase the public recognition of organisations 
(Cooter and Broughman, 2005; Thornton, 2006).  
 
3.5.5 Financial sustainability of charitable organisations 
 
Tuckman and Chang (1991) propose that the conceptual framework for identifying 
the charitable organisations‘ vulnerability includes four specific indicators, which are 
commonly used in the for-profit sector to test for stability, for and assessing a 
charitable organisation‘s financial stability. Tuckman and Chang (1991) examine 
these four indicators, adequacy of equity, revenue concentration, level of 
administrative costs and operating margins. They use the sample data from five types 
of charities; a religious affiliated organisation, education, health care, charitable 
support institutions, and government-formed organisations. They find that very few 
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organisations are in a stable condition for their operating margins (surplus), and health 
care and charitable support organisations show instability in their financial positions. 
 
Greenlee and Trussel (2000) employ Tuckman and Chang‘s (1991) four indicators. 
They define as financially unstable organisation having a reducing dollar value to 
recipients for three successive years. And they find that a significant relationship 
exists between the financial instability of the organisation and three of the four 
indicators; including revenue concentration index, margin ratio and administration 
cost ratio. Greenlee and Trussel (2000) differentiate, using these indicators, predicting 
65% of charities are financially unstable and 58% are financially stable. In addition, 
using other sample data with these indicators, they correctly indicate 61% of charities 
as being financially insecure organisations.  
 
A distinguishing feature of charitable organisations compared to for-profit and 
government organisations is that they can obtain their revenue from a much wider 
range of sources (Lyons, 2001). Such sources of revenue include income from 
providing service fees, selling goods, membership fees, government grants and other 
revenue including interest or rents from investments and other organisations. Lyons, 
Hocking, Hems and Salamon (1999) find that 30% of revenue in charitable 
organisations in Australia comes from government, 17% from service fees and 
charges, 39% from selling goods, and 7% from fundraising, with the remainder 
coming from a variety of other sources.  
 
Trussel and Greenlee (2004) also use Tuckman and Chang‘s (1991) four indicators of 
stability to predict the financial distress of charitable organisations using a developed 
logic model. This is commonly used for predicting financial distress in for-profit 
organisations. Trussel and Greenlee (2004) employ the sample data of financially 
distressed charities and non-distressed organisations from the IRS Statistics of Income 
database developed by the National Center for Charitable Statistics in the USA. They 
define the financially distressed organisations as having significant declines in net 
assets from 1992 to 1995. However, they conclude that although the margin and the 
size variables have a large impact on the probability of financial distress, their 
classification of financial distress organisations suffer from misclassification 
problems, i.e. both Type I and Type II errors.  
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Liquidity is also commonly employed in the financial management analysis for-profit 
organisations (Zeller et al., 1997; Pink et al., 2006). Zeller et al. (1997) employ 
liquidity for the factor analysis on a sample of 2,189 non-profit hospitals to find their 
short-term debt payment ability. They find that high values for the current ratios have 
often been viewed as a positive sign of enhanced liquidity, but the factor analysis 
results suggest that the high current ratios may not be a positive sign of good financial 
performance. Pink et al. (2006) also find that liquidity is a good indicator of 
measuring the ability to generate a surplus to meet the increasing demands of the 
variety of services. Trussel (2006) employs liquidity ratios to analyse the financial 
performance and vulnerability of five charity organisations in the health service 
sectors and find that liquidity of the organisations indicates the ability to meet cash 
obligations in a timely manner, which can be a measure of the vulnerability of the 
charities.  
 
3.6 Summary  
 
The studies on charitable organisations find that assisting donors‘ decision making 
processes for their donation is an important function of financial reporting (Parsons, 
2003; Parsons and Trussel, 2003). Potential donors are increasingly interested in the 
financial information of charitable organisations (Anthony and Young, 2003; Parsons, 
2003; Trussel and Greenlee, 2004; Trussel and Parsons, 2004; Pink et al., 2006; 
Trussel and Parsons, 2008) as well as non-financial information (Roberts, 1984; Rose-
Ackerman, 1996; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Roberts et al., 2003; Shoham et al., 
2006). 
 
The following chapter shows the theoretical modelling for the behaviour of a 
charitable organisation for donation in an oligopolistic competition market. 
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Chapter 4  
 Theoretical Framework for Understanding  
Charitable Organisations 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the theoretical framework of this study and its theoretical 
modelling. Two issues, both partly arising from the literature review, require 
attention. They are:  
1) the problem of understanding altruism in the context of organisational behaviour 
rather than just individual human behaviour; and  
2) the problematic of constructing a competitive market model of charitable 
organisation which distribute goods for free and which does not operate for profit.  
 
The two problems are closely linked although they can be separated for analysis and 
discussion. This chapter concentrates on the second of these issues, taking into 
account the more general problem of altruism, particularly as applied to organisations.  
 
In the organisational modelling context, altruistic behaviour is considered as the case 
where it is only the level of consumption of the recipient provided for by the charity 
which enters the utility function of that charity. In other words the charity is only 
interested in maximising the utility of its recipients (Roberts, 1984). One reason for 
this analytically is because we model the charity as if it was an individual, for the sake 
of simplicity. A less direct but more interesting possibility is that altruistic behaviour 
in the real world can arise from organisations whose membership is of incompletely 
altruistic individuals (member, employees and donors). Each has their own utility 
function which contains both selfish and altruistic components, but within the 
organisation the altruistic components create a dominant coalition. If this latter is the 
case it is the external behaviour that is being described as altruistic rather than the 
mental states of individuals that gave rise to it. As a consequence of this definition the 
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behaviour is determined in part by external circumstances and any internal mental 
states cannot be inferred with, nor do they need inference.  
 
Two external states influencing organisational behaviours are monopoly and 
competition. What may look like altruism under monopoly may look very different 
under non-altruistic competition. 
 
Consequently, two market situations for charitable organisations are constructed and 
compared. The first one is where the charitable organisation is a monopoly provider 
of the charitable good (private good in the hands of the recipients); therefore, it is not 
competing with similar charitable organisations for private donations. In the case of a 
monopoly, the assumption of altruism may be able to be maintained. However, it 
becomes more difficult when competition is assumed. In the second case the 
charitable organisation is not a monopoly provider and is, therefore, competing for 
donations with those similar organisations (see Figure 4.1). It is the competitive 
model that forms the basis of the empirical modelling. 
 
Figure 4.1: Economy market 
 
Under a monopoly it is also possible to consider the impact of the objectives of the 
charitable organisation on these situations. The two main situations are where the 
charitable organisation is (a) entirely altruistic and (b) not purely altruistic but also 
seeks to further (in some way) its own interests. We, therefore, move from modelling 
Number of charities 
 
Monopoly 
 
 
Oligopoly 
 
One charity Few charities: 
identical or similar 
services 
 109 
charitable organisations as altruistic monopolists to non-altruistic monopolists to 
oligopoly. Competition between perfect altruistic charitable organisations is 
considered a contradiction.  
 
This study examines the effect of the competition on a group of similar service 
provider charitable organisations in Australia and Japan. It is noted that the concepts 
of monopolistic competition and perfect competition are not employed. 
 
Which of these forms of competition dominates is important in determining how 
greater competition affects the delivery of program goods and services to recipients.  
The maximising of the provision of program goods and services to recipients is 
crucial in this regard. The ability to maximise the value on program goods and 
services enables the charitable organisation to credibly lower its cost of expenditure, 
thereby attracting donors. In the absence of this ability, the competition is only in the 
form of fundraising spending, which does not directly improve the provision of the 
good or service. For a variety of reasons, principally date limitations, charitable 
organisations are considered as providing identical goods. If the charitable 
organisation is an altruistic organisation, donors can trust that their donation directly 
goes to the program services or goods to recipients. Charitable organisations compete 
for donors by providing information, services and promotion to potential donors. In 
the assumption that if donors gain utility from more information about the 
organisational objectives and services to donors, such as knowledge management 
strategic operation or financial reports, competition in this form may increase, 
however, this also raises the expenditure of charitable organisations. The latter is in 
relation to the cost of the operational expenditure including administration 
expenditures. A prevailing assumption in the charitable organisation is that donors 
view administration costs negatively, as a diversion of funds from program expenses 
(the amounts of providing services and goods for recipients) (Tinkelman and 
Mankaney, 2007). Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986) argue that higher levels of 
administration costs increase the price to the donor of obtaining a dollar‘s worth of 
program output. They suggest higher prices discourage donations to particular 
organisations, for the same reasons that higher price in for-profit markets encourage 
consumers to seek out substitute products. It is also possible that high administrative 
and other costs indicate a non-altruistic organisation.  
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Thus managers gain utility from both providing services to recipients and using 
administrative monies to increase their own utility. Managers of charitable 
organisations cannot retain profits or obtain their profits in cash. However, they are 
able to consume some of the residual income of the charitable organisation in kind. 
Because donors value the charitable provision of the public good, the cost of the 
operational expenditure of donating a dollar increases as the portion of donations 
reduce, and are not distributed as program services and goods to recipients.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: In the introduction theoretical framework of this 
study is explained, followed by the problematic market model of charitable 
organisation in Section 4.2; and theoretical modelling in Section 4.3. A summary 
concludes Section 4.4.  
 
4.2 The problematic market model of charitable 
organisations  
 
The importance of a theoretical basis for specifying the arguments of the utility 
function is recognised because embracing a substantive theory of rationality has 
significant consequences for economics and especially for its methodology (Simon, 
1986). Therefore it is extremely important to discuss the development of theoretical 
models. In the following section, on attempt to develop theoretical models of the 
utility function of charities is informed by the utility of donors function models by 
Andreoni (1989, 1990). Rose-Ackerman (1982) develops a model that examines 
fundraising by charities and how competition may induce excessive aggregate 
spending on marketing costs. Bilodeau and Slivasky (1997) investigate how rival 
charities allocate donations to various bundles of public goods and may settle in 
specialising in one public good. Note that this thesis is concerned with the charitable 
provision of private goods such as food and shelter (see Chapter 1). This study 
incorporates the charitable operational information effect on donation, competition 
among charities, the role of altruism, theoretical and empirical modelling and 
provides the results of testing empirical models with sample of Australian and 
Japanese charities.  
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4.3  Theoretical modelling and their interpretation 
 
4.3.1 Monopoly charitable organisations 
 
4.3.1.1  Altruistic monopoly charity organisation model          
 
We assume a charity donation market with one entirely altruistic organisation. This 
means the organisation is only interested in the utility of the recipients of its aid. Let 
subscript i represent monopoly charity with no interactions. 
 
Ui = Ui (UR)                                                                                             (4-1) 
 
So Ui = the utility of the monopoly deliverer of aid; and  
    UR = the utility of the recipient(s) of aid 
 
To find optimum level of Max Ui = Ui (UR)  
Maximising utility of the charity Ui converts into utility of recipients, UR, via a 
monotonic technology and also each can be expressed in units of dollars.  
 
Hence 
Ui = Ui (UR)  
UR = UR (Ri) 
(4-1) 
(4-2) 
Ri = Ti – Mi   (4-3) 
 
From (4-1), (4-2) and (4-3) 
Ui = Ui(Ri) (4-4) 
 
Where:  
Ri = recipient received from charity i in dollars;  
Ti = total dollars charity i received;  
Mi = marketing/fundraising cost for charity i in dollars 
 
To solve for optimum Max Ui  solve for the first and second order derivatives such 
that: 
The first order condition: 0
i
i
dR
dU
 (4-5) 
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The second order condition: 
i
i
Rd
dU
2
2
< 0 (4-6) 
 
Assumptions include: 
1) U(R = 0)  0 then U(0) = 0 
2) U is a strictly monotonic increasing function, then as: 
dR
dU
> 0.  
3) There is diminishing marginal utility of R to organisation i would be the 
second order of derivative: 
Rd
dU
2
2
< 0 
 
Therefore, for a simple altruistic organisation model it is considered that marketing / 
fundraising cost, M, has a positive effect on total dollars to a charity, where marketing 
/ fundraising costs M take an informative role and simply tells greater numbers of 
donors that the charity exists.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Simple altruistic organisation model 
 
              Ui               (+) 
                                     
                                                     Ri 
                                (+)                                     (-)                      
                                                                                                     Ri = Ti -Mi 
             
                    Ti                                                             Mi 
                                                   (+)     
  
Where  
Ui = utility of charity i,  (i = a monopoly charitable organisation);  
Ri = recipient received from charity i in dollars;  
Ti = total dollars charity i received;  
Mi = marketing/fundraising cost for charity i in dollars. 
 
As presenting in Figure 4.2, therefore, total dollars T to a charity is function of 
marketing costs M is proportion of total dollars to a charity i.  
Hence, 
Ti = Ti(Mi)  
 
Therefore 
Ri = Ti (Mi ) – Mi (4-7) 
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Substitute R in (4-4) for (4-7) 
 
(4-8) 
 
Let marketing expenditure be the only control variable, from (4-9) to produce 
    
   (4-9) 
 
          
 
 
 (4-10) 
Then equation (4-10) brings as follows: 
0
i
i
dR
dU
 
(4-5) 
 
(4-11) 
 
Equation (4-5) can be interpreted in two ways. One is that there is no further utility to 
the organisation to increase the dollars to recipients but recipients might still need 
money. Alternatively the other is that there no further use for money by recipients and 
recipients no longer need charity aid. Equation (4-11) can be interpreted as by each 
spending one extra dollar on marketing cost a charity raises extra one dollar. Equation 
(4-11) is a standard economic result and is a necessary condition for maximum, but 
also for minimum of utility function. Therefore, the second order to find maximum 
utility function point is required.   
 
4.3.1.2  Altruistic monopoly charity organisation model with admin costs 
 
A charity is an altruistic monopoly organisation and its objective concerns utility of 
recipients. Thus, utility of this charity is utility of recipients. Let us assume utility of 
charity i is a function of utility of recipients UR as: Ui = Ui(UR). 
Utility of recipients is supposed to be a function of the total dollars to recipients:  
UR = UR(R, Ai)                                                                                      (4-12) 
 
Utility of this charity can be written as  
Ui = Ui(R, Ai).                                                                                          (4-13) 
))(( iiiii MMTUU 
0
i
i
dM
dU
i
i
i
i
i
i
dM
dR
dR
dU
dM
dU
.
0)1
)(
.( 
i
ii
i
i
dM
MdT
dR
dU
1
)(

i
ii
dM
MdT
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However, Ai has a positive effect on total dollars of charity received, but a negative 
effect on the dollars of recipients received. Figure 4.3 presents these phenomena, 
‗Simple Altruistic Organisation model with Administrative costs‘ as follows.  
 
Figure 4.3: Simple altruistic organisation model with administrative costs 
                                                               
                 Ui               (+) 
                                  
                                                      Ri 
                                (+)                                 (-)                             
                                                         (-)                                          Ri = Ti - Ai -Mi 
             
                       Ti          (+)             Ai                                Mi 
                                                         
                                                         (+)    
 
where Ui = utility of charity i, i = a monopoly charitable organisation; 
Ri = recipient received from charity i in dollars;  
Ti = total dollars charity i received;  
Mi = marketing/fundraising cost for charity i in dollars;  
Ai = administrative cost for charity i in dollars.   
 
Also assume that a charity organisation i must necessarily spend administration costs, 
Ai, to survive its operation of charity, consequently, the total dollars recipients receive 
will be less in the dollars of administrative costs as shown in equation:  
iii MATR                                                                                        (4-14) 
 
Total dollars to a charity is a function of administration cost:  
)( iii TAA                                                                                               (4-15) 
 
Marketing cost is function of total dollars to a charity: 
)( iii MTT  .                                                                                             (4-16) 
 
Assumptions draw from equations, (4-15), (4-16) and (4-17) as  
 
The optimum of utility of this charity and total recipients are  
Max Ui = Ui (f (R, Ai ))  
iiiiii MMTAMTR  )(()( )    (4-17) 
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Ui = Ui (f(R, Ai))  
 
Rewriting as  
Ui = Ui (Mi, Ai )  
 
To find the maximum utility of organisation,  
0
i
i
dR
dU
 and 0. 
i
i
i
i
dM
dR
dR
dU
dM
dU
 
        0)
))(()(
.( 
i
i
i
iii
i
ii
i
i
dM
dM
dM
MTdA
dM
MdT
dR
dU
                                          (4-18) 
 
Let 0
i
i
dM
dU
 then equation (4-18) can provide as follows  
0
dR
dU i    (4-5) 
 
1
))(()(

i
iii
i
ii
dM
MTdA
dM
MdT
   (4-19) 
 
Again, Equation (4-5) has two interpretations. The first is that no further utility arises 
to the organisation by increasing aid money to recipients, but recipients are still in 
need. The other interpretation is that recipients have sufficient money. This theoretical 
possibility can be ignored in the real world. Equation (4-19) shows spending an extra 
dollar for marketing to raise more, but for marketing issues, the charity needs to cover 
administration cost as well.  
 
4.3.2 Competing charitable organisations 
 
In the following section, the models are considered based on the assumption of the 
existence of two charities within the same economy, which are targeted at helping the 
same recipients. They collect donations from the same potential donors.  
 
4.3.2.1  Completely altruistic model  
 
Let us assume, there are two charities, i and j in an economy as:  
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(i) )(RUMaxU ii   and )(RUMaxU jj   where ji RRR   
(ii) iii MRT   and jjj MRT   
(iii) )( iii MTT   and )( jjj MTT   
 
In this simplest model there are no interactions between charities i and j, except that 
the shape of the )( ii MT  and )( jj MT  functions are assumed to be identical and can 
indicate that either one or two charities are more efficient and effective. If there are 
economies of scale in marketing for donations then one charity is best. If there are 
constant returns to scale then one or more charities is not important. However, if there 
are diseconomies of scale at certain ranges this indicates there should be many 
charities. If two perfectly altruistic charities exist and serve exactly the same clientele 
and have economies of scale, the two charities should amalgamate to better serve the 
clientele.  
The possibility exists that charities behave differently (e.g. some charities exist just 
for charitable purposes). But some charities exist just from a parent organisation with 
its own objectives, which the charity will share to some degree (e.g. religious 
charities). Here, scale refers to scale of the marketing effort. 
 
4.3.2.2  Altruistic with interaction of marketing efforts  
 
Here we assume that there are two charities, i and j in an economy with an interaction 
of marketing efforts. 
 
(i) )(RUMaxU ii   and )(RUMaxU jj   where ji RRR   
(ii) iii MRT   and jjj MRT   
(iii) ),( jiii MMTT   and ),( ijjj MMTT   
 
This opens up several possibilities.  
If for example, there is )0,( iii MTT  , then charity j does not market for donations, 
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Are there (i) economies of scale, (ii) constant returns to scale, (iii) diseconomies of 
scale? Are the marketing efforts, competitive, complementary or most probably a 
combination of both?  
 
This suggests that the charities might not only amalgamate, but possibly coordinate or 
compete in the recipients‘ interests. However, complete altruism indicates they will 
(must) coordinate as they have the same argument (R) in their objective functions. 
 
An implicit assumption in this model is that the charities have exactly the same group 
of recipients and they compete among the same potential donors.  
 
Charities i and j are: 
     Interactions of                              Economies of scale 
                            marketing efforts            +            diseconomies of 
                                                        scale of marketing 
 
e.g. (1) 
                      Interactions are                                                 Economies of scale 
                         always competitive            +                          marketing (fundraising) 
 
 
 
Imply just one organisation is more efficient  
 
e.g. (2) 
Interactions are                                                            Economies of scale 
             complementary                         +                     marketing (fundraising) 
 
 
 
1 or 2 charities would be more efficient 
 
e.g. (3)   
Charities, i and j are 
          Complementary;                   Economies of scale;                 Coordination; or  
          Competition;               +       Diseconomy scale; or   +          Independency 
          Complementary &               Constant return scale  
          Competition  
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4.3.2.3  Completely altruistic but own contributions matters  
 
Let us assume there are two charities, i and j. They are completely altruistic charities 
but only with respect to their own contributions. This means they value their own 
existence for its own sake, against the interests of their recipients.  
(i) )( iii RUMaxU  ; and  
    )( jjj RUMaxU   where ji RRR   
 
This differs from the previous in that the charity gets utility from either: 
a) its own donations or  
b) a specific group that it caters to, but which donors treat as perfect 
substitutes for donations between i and j.  
 
(ii) iii MRT   and                                                                                             (4-20) 
  
      jjj MRT                                                                                                    (4-21) 
 
(iii) ),( jiii MMTT   and                                                                                       (4-22) 
 
      ),( ijjj MMTT                                                                                               (4-23) 
 
The use of iR  in the objective function, as opposed to R , indicates that the charities 
will be competitive in behaviours. It therefore becomes of less importance for 
determining charities‘ behaviour as to whether or not the charity and its interactions 
are economies of scale etc, but whether or not the marketing interactions between iM  
and jM  are complementary or competitive.  
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4.3.3 Two competing charitable organisation models  
 
This section considers two oligopoly charities in a market. Assume that they might 
compete in the market place for donations. In other words each organisation is 
interested in increasing utility of recipients and their control over utility of recipients 
is determined by the level of coordination among them (Dimand, 1988). This means 
increases in total dollars to recipients affect oligopoly charities‘ utility favourably 
(Hochman and Rodgers, 1969a). This distinguishing characteristic of an oligopoly 
charity is that there a few mutually interdependent charities that allocate either 
identical collection of donations to recipients or heterogeneous collection to 
recipients. Mutual interdependent charities are aware of the effects of their actions on 
rivals and the reactions such actions are likely to elicit. For example, a mutual 
interdependence means that charities such as Red Cross and Salvation Army realise 
that drops in their collection of donations are more likely to be caused by a 
counterpart‘s annual fundraising appeal than its own decision not to increase 
collection of donations.    
 
4.3.3.1  Comparing charity at the oligopoly market (duopoly) 
 
Oligopolies would like to act like monopolies, but if there is an inability to cooperate, 
then self-interest drives them closer to competition. Thus, oligopolies can end up 
looking like either monopolies or more like competitive markets. Firms may benefit 
from cooperation, but in standard oligopoly theory cooperation causes deadweight 
losses. This provides a motive for policy makers to regulate the behaviour of 
oligopolists through competition laws. This need not be the case with cooperating 
oligopolistic charities in their fundraising activities.  
 
4.3.4 Cournot quantity competition  
 
In Cournot quantity competition each firm believes that its rivals will always act to 
maintain their current quantity of fund raising activity. 
 
For simplicity, consider two charities; i and j, are assisting the same group of 
recipients (R) in an economy such that Ri + Rj = R. Assume that i and j are both purely 
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altruistic charitable organisations and these charities matter only in utility of 
recipients, but these two charities are competing at same time. In other words, each of 
them likes to compete with their counterpart to raise their own donations for 
recipients. Figure 4.4 presents each organisation as an altruistic charity and the utility 
of each charity, i and j, is not only a positive in total dollars recipients receive from 
them but is also a positive to dollars recipients receive only from either charity, where 
equations present as (4-24) and (4-25).  
 
Figure 4.4: Comparing a monopolistic charity with oligopolistic charities (duopoly)   
 
               (+)     (+)                                                                                              
),( ijii RRRfU                             Altruistic behaviour                                      (4-24) 
                                                                                                              
                (+)     (+)                           Competitive behaviour 
),( jjij RRRfU                                                                                                  (4-25) 
                      
Where Utility of a charity i and a charity j 
 
The change in total dollars to recipients resulting from a transfer between any two 
charities, i and j, such that  
 
dRdRdR ji   
Also when they maximise each utility, it can be converted into the utility of recipients 
by a linear technology so that each can be expressed in units of dollars.  
 
Thus, utility of recipients are a total of the unit of dollars (T) of charities, i and j are: 
),(TUU RR   
ji TTT   and )( jiRR TTUU  ,  
 
Therefore ))(( jiR TTUUU   
 
Interdependence is present because Ui depends on Rj and because Uj depends on Ri 
and at the same time they are competing with each other. As marketing/fundraising 
costs from charity i (Mi) increase total dollars to charity i, but marketing/fundraising 
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costs from charity j (Mj) is otherwise. This happens identically in charity j and this is 
presented in equations (4-26) and (4-27), respectively. 
 
 
             (+)  (-)   
                                                                                                     (4-26) 
 
         (+)  (-)   
                                                                                                      
 
 
     (4-27)  
Combining the two equations (4-26) and (4-27), equation (4-28) can be produced  
           (+)  (+)   
),( ji MMTT     
 
      (4-28) 
 
where ji TTT   
 
Assume marketing / fundraising costs from each charity increase total dollars from 
each charity, as total dollars are combined from duopoly charities.    
 
Thus, the proportion of total dollars for charity i to total dollars for charity j can be a 
function of marketing cost from charity i and j.  
                (+)  (+)   
),( ji
J
i MMf
T
T
    
  (4-29) 
 
Using Cournot Oligopoly Competition theory, assuming the two charities compete, 
their total dollars to recipients (Ri , Rj), where Ri = F(Rj) and Rj = G(Ri).  
 
The characteristics of these charities are:  
(i) If they cooperate to create a monopoly, the optimum level of utility 
achieved RMaxU  depends on whenever marketing/fundraising 
costs M is optimum for M = Mi + Mj; 
(ii) Competing with each other is shown as two charities as duopoly 
organisations.  
 
For example, if two charities have characteristics of both cooperation and 
competition, and the counterpart has spent an optimum level on marketing costs 
iii MRT 
),( jiii MMTT 
jjj MRT 
jjj MRT 
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bringing a positive effect, but one of the parties has spent too much on marketing / 
fundraising, this will create a utitity lowering effect. Figure 4.5 presents their 
situation, which is based on Elementary Game Theory also known as the Prisoner‘s 
Dilemma. In these cases, the two charities choose their decisions, either choosing to 
cooperate or compete against each other, or both are neither cooperating nor 
competing with each other. The Prisoner‘s Dilemma addresses the decision making of 
two individuals suspected of a crime. The two suspects are being questioned in 
separate rooms by police. By looking at the outcomes for Figure 4.5, the decisions 
deduce the best strategy for the two charities to take.  
 
Figure 4.5: Cooperate and Compete charities 
 
Charity i \ Charity j   
 Cooperate Compete  
 
Cooperate  
(as if a monopoly)  
 
Optimum  
Mi + Mj 
   
  Bad for charity i 
  Good for charity j 
 Optimal  
     for 
recipients  
 
Compete 
 
Bad for charity j 
Good for charity i 
 Sub-Optimal 
Marketing too much  
M = Mi + Mj 
(Nash equilibrium) 
 
 
 
Optimal  
for charities 
 
 
Figure 4.5 can be explained, for example, if a charity chooses to cooperate, charity j 
either faces an optimum level of spending, marketing and fundraising costs and each 
acts as a monopoly if charity j cooperates. If charity j decides to compete, this brings 
bad results for charity i and good results for charity j. If charity i chooses to compete, 
charity j will be either bad/good for charity i, will be sub-optimal or in the Nash 
equilibrium situation.  
 
Under what conditions does a Nash equilibrium situation occur? Two possibilities 
exist:     (i)  Economies of scale in marketing;  
(ii) Competing marketing.  
 
The Nash equilibrium has each charity choosing output optimally, given the 
equilibrium output of all competitors.   
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The first order conditions are:   
 
f (Mi + Mj) Mi + Q (Mi + Mj) – c = 0 
 
f (Mi + Mj) Mj + Q (Mi + Mj) – c = 0  
 
At equilibrium, both conditions are satisfied. The total dollars received in the charities 
i and j can be draw against marketing costs as shown in Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8.  
 
Figure 4.6: Economies of scale: shape of marketing/fundraising costs 
(charities i and j are competing separately) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Economies of scale: shape of marketing/fundraising costs (increasing) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mi 
 
 
Mi 
Mi +Mj 
 
 
Mi/j (Mi +Mj) 
 
 
Mi 
   Ti, Tj 
i, j 
 
   Ti+Tj 
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Figure 4.8: Diseconomies of Scale: Marketing/fundraising costs (diminishing) 
 
 
These charities can be seen as altruistic monopoly charities. The first derivative for 
each charity should be:  
0
i
i
dM
dU
 and 0
j
j
dM
dU
 
where M = Marketing/fundraising costs; i = charities i and j= charity j  
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where U = utility of charitable organisation,  
M = Marketing/fundraising costs;  
R = total dollars to recipients; 
T = total revenues of charitable organisation; and  
i = charities i and j= charity j  
 
Substitute 
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For charity j :  
The same procedure is taken with charity i obtaining 
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Assume two charities are competing each other, which can be expressed with 
equations 4-26, 4-27, 4-28 and 4-29 as constraints of the optimum of two charities. 
 
From equation 4-29  
1),(  ji
J
i MMf
T
T
                                                                                            (4-30) 
 
From equation 4-28  
2 ji TTT                                                                                                       (4-31) 
2),(),(),(  jijjiiji MMTMMTMMT                                                            (4-32) 
 
Substitute from equations, 4-26 and 4-27 
Ti – Ri – Mi = Ti(Mi,Mj) – Ri – Mi = λi3                                                                      (4-33) 
1),( ijjjijjjj MRMMTMRT                                                             (4-34) 
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This can be written as:  
Max ))(( jiR TTUUU   
Equation as follows: 
L = U [UR (Ti (Mi, Mj) + Tj (Mi, Mj))] + λ1[Ti /Tj – f(Mi, Mj)] 
+ λ2 [T (Mi, Mj) – Ti (Mi, Mj) – Tj (Mi, Mj) ] + λ3i [Ti (Mi, Mj) – Ri – Mi ]  
+ λ3j [Tj (Mi, Mj) – Rj – Mj]                                                                                 (4-35) 
 
where: s.t. Ti /Tj – f(Mi, Mj) = λ1  
T (Mi, Mj) – Ti (Mi, Mj) – Tj (Mi, Mj) = λ2 
Ti – Ri – Mi = Ti (Mi, Mj) – Ri – Mi = λ3i  
Tj – Rj – Mj = Tj (Mi, Mj) – Rj – Mj  =λ3j  
 
Set the partial derivatives of the Lagrangean equal to zero such that:  
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These yield as follows: 
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( L /  λ3j) = Tj (Mi, Mj) – Rj – Mj = 0 
 
4.3.4.1  Two competing altruistic charities model alternative modelling  
 
For simplicity, assume two charities; i and j, are both altruistic charities and maximise 
the value deliveries to recipients.  
 
Charity i can be expressed as the objective function: 
       Maximise Vi = Ri  
and the budget constraint 
       Ti = Ri + Mi ,  
From substituting Ri by (Ri = Ti – Mi), brings  
Maximise Vi = Ti – Mi        (4-36) 
When T = Ti – Tj  
      (+)  (+) 
T = Ti –(Mi, Mj)  
      (4-37) 
 
(ii) ij
j
i r
T
T
  and  
(iii) )(
j
i
ijij M
M
rr    
(it is not necessary that 
j
i
j
i
M
M
T
T
 ) 
 
Equation (4-36) can be rewritten as 
Maximise Vi = [T (Mi, Mj) * rij(Mi /Mj)] – Mi              (4-39) 
 
Taking derivative of equation (4-39) by iM  
Maximise Vi = T – Tj – Mj                (4-38) 
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where  
Mi increases T increase and so as rij  
therefore 0
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If the two charities are identical, we can assume that in equilibrium 
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4.3.4.2  Two competing altruistic charities model with administration costs  
 
For simplicity, consider two charities i and j, are both altruistic charities and utility of 
these charities are utility of recipients. Therefore utility of each charity will have a 
positive effect from the total of each charity‘s dollars to recipients and also a positive 
effect on its dollars to recipients, in other words, they are competing for each dollar 
amount to recipients.  
 
),(
iji RRRi
UUUfU   and  
),(
jji RRRj
UUUfU  . 
Where  
),( iiRR ARUU ii   and  
),( jjjRjR ARUU    
where RRR ji  .  
Ri/j = dollars from charity i/j to recipients and  
URi/j = utility of recipients received from charity i and j.  
 
Therefore total collected dollars, Ti/j of each charity (i/j) is not only allocated dollars 
to recipients, Ri/j but also it covers administration cost, Ai/j and marketing costs Mi/j. 
Hence  
 
iiii AMRT   and  
jjjj AMRT  ,  
Where  
),( jiii MMTT   and ),( jijj MMTT    
)( iii TAA  and )( jjj TAA  , where ji TTT   
 
Therefore optimal level of utility of each charity is: 
),,( iijii RARRfMaxU   and ),,( jjjij RARRfMaxU   
 
The first derivative  
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4.3.4.3 Two competing non-altruistic charities model with constraints   
 
Two charities; i and j, are not altruistic charities and utility of these charities is utility 
of recipients but these are competing with each other in their dollars to recipients as:  
 
),,(
iji RiRRi
UAUUfU   and ),,(
jji RjRRj
UAUUfU  . 
 where ),( iiRR ARUU ii   and ),( jjjRjR ARUU   where RRR ji  .  
 
Therefore total collected dollars of each charity is not only allocated dollars to 
recipients but also covers administration and marketing costs. Hence  
 
iiii AMRT   and jjjj AMRT  , where ),( jiii MMTT   and 
),( jijj MMTT    
)( iii TAA  and )( jjj TAA  , where ji TTT   
 
Therefore optimal level of utility of charities is: 
),,( iijii RARRfMaxU   and ),,( jjjij RARRfMaxU   
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s.t. iiiii AMRT    and jjjjj AMRT   
 
Using the Langrangean Function for charity i with three equations in three unknowns, 
A, M, λ. 
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Using the Langrangean Function for charity j with three equations in three unknowns, 
A, M, λ. The optimal level of utility of charity j: 
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    0 jjjj RMAT  
 
Therefore  
 
iMA ii
UU    (4-42) 
0 iiii RMAT   (4-43) 
 
jMA jj
UU    (4-44) 
0 jjjj RMAT   (4-45) 
 
4.3.4.4  Two competing non-altruistic charities with complex constraints 
 
Two charities are non-altruistic organisations and their concerns are both utility of 
recipients and their operation. Assume utility of charities i/j is a function of utility of 
recipients URi/j and administration cost Ai/j as: ),( //// jijiRjiji AUUU  , and utility of 
recipients is a function of the total donors to recipients and administration costs as:  
),( //// jijiRR ARUU jiji   
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Where rewritten utility of charity i/j as 
)),,(( ///// / jijijiRjiji AARUUU ji .  
 
Also total collected dollars, Ti/j, f are from each charity i/j and it is allocated dollars to 
recipients, Ri/j, administration costs, Ai/j, and marketing costs, Mi/j,. Hence  
 
iiii AMRT   and jjjj AMRT  , 
Where ),( jiii MMTT   and ),( jijj MMTT    
)( iii TAA   and )( jjj TAA  , where ji TTT   
 
The level of total dollars from charities i/j depends on the total amount of 
expenditures because some donors may stop donating when charities are 
overspending on expenditure. Therefore to find out optimal level of utility of charities 
i/j , charities may have two constraints; allocation of total dollars and not 
overspending on expenditure. Hence ),,( iijii RARRfMaxU   and 
),,( jjjij RARRfMaxU   
 
Using Lagrangean multipliers λ of charities i and j, with three unknown variables for 
the application of constrained maximisation, the form of the Lagrangean expression 
and four s.t. λ1, λ2, λ3 and λ4 for Lagrangean multipliers is as follows: 
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Combining above models for charity i and j, 1i, 2i, 3i, 1j, 2j, and 3j, brings the 
following: 
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0 iii kTRT   (4-47) 
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0 jjj kTRT   (4-49) 
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4.4 Summary 
 
The problematics of the market model of charitable organisations have been discussed 
in this chapter. This chapter also compared organisations in two different markets:  
(i) a monopoly charity (only one charity providing private goods to recipients and not 
having to compete with organisations for donations), and (ii) the existence of 
competition for donation among similar service providers in the market. This section 
also attempts to explain the completely altruistic models and/or the competition for 
donations within similar service providers‘ market.  
 
This chapter also compares the theoretical modelling of altruistic monopolists to 
impure (mixed motive) altruistic monopolists. Hence this study investigates the effect 
of competition on effectiveness of fundraising expenditure, and how the donations 
have been affected by increasing competition in the oligopolistic market. These forms 
of competition are important in determining how competition affects the delivery of 
program goods and services to recipients.  
 
The maximising of the provision of program goods and services to recipients is 
crucial in this regard. The potential for maximising the value on the program goods 
and services enables the charitable organisation to credibly lower their costs of 
operation, thereby attracting donors. In the absence of this ability, competition is only 
in the form of fundraising spending. This does not improve the provision of the good 
or services although it may increase funds to recipients. This study may find that 
altruistic organisations do play their role ethically and effectively. If charitable 
organisations are altruistic, donors can trust that their donation goes directly to the 
program services or goods to recipients. We therefore moved from modelling 
charitable organisations as (i) altruistic monopolists to (ii) non-altruistic monopolists.  
 
The theory of competition is then approached by considering what competition 
between perfect altruistic charitable organisations might mean. It is considered that 
this involves a contradiction. The third section, considers (iii) competition in the 
private donation market between imperfectly altruistic and/or non-altruistic charitable 
organisation. Much of the rest of the thesis is concerned with the empirical modelling 
of the competition for funds among charitable organisations.  
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The theory of competition is then approached by considering what competition 
between perfect altruistic charitable organisations might mean. It is considered that 
this involves a contradiction. The third section, (iii) considers competition in the 
private donation market between imperfectly altruistic and/or non-altruistic charitable 
organisations. Much of the rest of the thesis is concerned with the empirical modelling 
of the competition for funds among charitable organisations.  
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Chapter 5  
Empirical Modelling  
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter empirical modelling is produced as an implementation of theoretical 
modelling.  
 
Empirical modelling incorporates charitable operational information effect on 
donations, focusing on competition among charities for donations, the role of altruism, 
discussion of theoretical and empirical modelling and providing the results of testing 
empirical models with the sample of Australian and Japanese charitable organisations. 
The thesis concentrates on the effectiveness of fundraising activities of charitable 
organisational competition for donations based on the Cournot quantity competition 
theory.   
 
In the following Section, 5.2, the effectiveness of fundraising is discussed in order to 
develop empirically testable hypotheses to answer the over-arching research questions 
developed in the previous chapter. This is followed by the theoretical modelling and 
development of the models in Section 5.3. Then Section 5.4 describes the data, sample 
selection and the sample data and the definitions of variables used in the OLS regression 
models. The testing of hypotheses is analysed in Section 5.5. A summary is given in 
Section 5.6.  
 
5.2 Developmental empirically testable hypotheses   
 
Based on the theoretical modelling described in the previous sections, hypotheses for 
this study are developed to answer the research questions (Chapter 1 Section 1.1).  
 
5.2.1 Determinants of the level of private donations  
 
To investigate the effectiveness of fundraising activities of competition for donation 
between charitable organisations in Australia and Japan, firstly research question one is 
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asked: What determines the level of fundraising expenditures and the level of donations 
raised by charitable organisations (COs) in Australia and Japan? 
 
To answer Research Question, 1, two direct questions are raised. The first direct 
research question (DRQ) is as follows: DRQ1: Do charitable organisations maximise 
private donations (i.e. non-government grants)   
 
Understanding what determines the level of private donation is crucial to understanding 
fluctuations in the ability of charitable organisations to fulfil their role. A charitable 
organisation needs to spend some of its resources on fundraising to organise its 
fundraising activities. Through this expenditure, a charitable organisation may provide 
potential donors with important information about the existence, objective and the 
nature of the charitable organisation, as well as the ways it uses services donations. 
Fundraising expenditures (Fi) (of a charitable organisation i) are presumably the more 
the charitable organisation spends on fundraising efforts, the objective of which is to 
raise additional donations, the more donations the charitable organisation should 
receive. Thus, the fundraising expenditures contribute directly to maximising private 
donations.  
 
The fraction of donations dedicated to fundraising expenditures to maximise private 
donation to a charitable organisation, and the level of spending on the fundraising 
expenditure of a charitable organisation both have  a positive effect on total donations.  
 
Therefore the major testable Hypothesis is:  
H0: Fi ≤ 0; and H1: Fi > 0 
where Fi = Fundraising expenditure of charitable organisation i . 
 
5.2.2 About competition and cooperation between charities  
 
The second direct research question is as follows: DRQ2: Does competition between 
charitable organisations for donations affect donor behaviour and donations? 
 
To answer DRQ2, it is further divided into three sub-questions: DRQ2-1: How does 
competition between charitable organisations affect the effectiveness of fundraising?  
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DRQ2-2: What characteristics of charitable organisations affect their fundraising 
effectiveness? 
 
DRQ2-3: What other factors in charitable organisations affect fundraising? 
 
Firstly, if a charitable organisational objective is mostly to maximise utility of recipients 
then in this case it is an altruistic charity. When two existing charitable organisations are 
both altruistic organisations, they focus on collecting private donations to increase 
dollars to recipients. However, in reality, the behaviour of the charitable organisations 
and donors is complex and not all are altruists. Charitable organisations and donors 
interact over time, and donors can observe the behaviour of the organisations whether 
they are interested in maximising the utility of recipients or their own utility. Donors 
may be able to observe organisational behaviour or spending patterns of expenditure on 
fundraising activities, administration costs and program costs of organisations Donors 
can compare those or other behaviour of two charitable organisations where these two 
charities focus on their own collection of donations.  
 
Secondly, each charitable organisational objective is assumed to maximise the level of 
utility of recipients, in which case they are both altruistic organisations. One question 
this research does not deal with is that of organisations providing aid only to one group 
of potential recipients, as opposed to all recipients. Secondly, when two charities one 
assumed to be both non-altruistic organisations, they focus on maximising their own 
collection of donations in order to increase dollars from each organisation to deliver to 
recipients. Thus, the utility of each charity is to increase its own collection of donations 
to recipients, which is opposed to total donations from two organisations to recipients. 
In this case, each charity may compete for its collection of dollars using fundraising 
costs. It can be seen that if a charity spends more on fundraising costs, it increases the 
collection of donations. Then, the more a competing charity spends on fundraising, the 
less it collects for its own donation. In other words, the fundraising costs of competing 
charity j reduces the total donation of a charity i. Therefore total donation of charity i 
has been negatively affected by fundraising expenditures of competing charity j. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is tested as:  
H0: Fj ≥ 0; and H1: Fj < 0  
where Fj = Fundraising expenditure of competing charitable organisation j . 
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At the same time, the fraction of its own fundraising expenditure to total fundraising 
expenditures of two organisations is also expected to be a positive for its collection of 
total donations, although the fraction of the competing organisation‘s fundraising 
expenditures to total fundraising expenditures of two organisations would have a 
negative effect on its donations. If the competing charities spend more on fundraising 
expenditure, this may affect on increase in collection of the competing charities total 
donations but it will decrease its own organisational collected donations. Therefore,  
 
Hypothesis 3 is tested as follows: H0: Fi /ΣF ≤ 0; and H1: Fi /ΣF > 0  
Hypothesis 3 with alternative calculation is: H0:Fi/ΣFj ≤ 0; and H1: Fi /ΣFj > 0. 
where ΣF = Total of all charities‘ fundraising expenditures; ΣFj = Total of competing 
charities‘ fundraising expenditures (ΣFj = ΣF-Fi ). 
 
To answer DRQ2-2: What characteristics of charitable organisations affect their 
fundraising effectiveness?, testable hypotheses are produced.  
 
Previous studies find that donors are interested in the size and organisational age of 
charitable organisations when they make you decision to donate (Weisbrod and 
Dominquez, 1986; Tinkelman, 1999; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Marudas and Jacobs, 
2004; Tinkelman, 2004; Tinkelman and Mankaney, 2007). Thus, the size and length of 
organisational age of charitable organisations can be expected to have a positive effect 
on total donations. At the same time, the fraction of organisational sizes in two 
charitable organisations would be expected to have a positive effect.  
 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is tested as:  
H0: Ai ≤ 0; and H1: Ai > 0;  
 
Hypothesis 5 is tested as:  
H0: Ai /ΣA ≤ 0; and H1: Ai /ΣA > 0;  
Hypothesis 5 with alternative calculation: H0: Ai /ΣAj = 0; H1: Ai /ΣAj > 0; and  
 
Hypothesis 7:  
H0: Agei ≤ 0; and H1: Agei > 0. 
where Ai = Total fixed asset of charitable organisation i; ΣA = Total of all charities‘ 
fixed assets; ΣAj = Total of competing charities‘ fixed assets (ΣAj = ΣA – Ai); Age = 
organisational age since charitable organisation i is created.  
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To answer DRQ2-3, What other factors in charitable organisations affect fundraising? 
testable hypotheses, 6, 8 and 9 are produced.  
 
Previous studies find volunteers have a positive effect on total donations because many 
volunteers are involved in fundraising activities, directly contributing to the collection 
of the total donations. Thus, this study assumes that the number of volunteers has a 
positive effect on the fundraising of total donations.  
 
Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is tested as:  
H0: Vi ≤ 0; and H1: Vi > 0.  
where V = the number of volunteers of charitable organisation i. 
 
Previous studies argue that government grants may have crowd in/out effects, and some 
find a positive (crowd in) effect on total donations (Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Khanna 
et al., 1995; Frumkin and Kim, 2001; Marudas and Jacobs, 2007). Thus, information 
relating to the receipt of government grants is considered to measure quality of 
organisation. This study assumes that government grants have a positive effect on 
fundraising of total donations.  
 
Therefore Hypothesis 8 is tested as:  
H0: Gi ≤ 0; and H1: Gi > 0; and  
where G = Government grants to charitable organisation i.   
 
Administrative expenditures are used to measure organisational inefficiency. This study 
assumes that administrative costs are expected to have a positive effect on fundraising 
of total donations.  
 
Hypothesis 9 is tested as:  
H0: ACi ≤ 0; and H1: ACi > 0 
where AC = Administrative costs of charitable organisation i.   
 
Figure 5.1 presents summary of the research topic, research questions and hypotheses of 
this thesis as discussed above.  
In the following section, empirical models are constructed for testing hypotheses to 
answer research questions.  
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Figure 5.1: Research topics, Requestions and Hypotheses of the Thesis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Topic 
 
Fundraising activities of charitable organisations (COs) in Australia and Japan  
(Including competition for donation between charitable organisations) 
 
DRQ2-1: 
How does competition 
between COs affect 
effectiveness of fundraising? 
 
DRQ2-2:  
What characteristic of 
COs affect fundraising? 
 
DRQ2-3:  
What other factors of COs 
affect of fundraising?  
 
Level of 
donation 
H1  
H0: Fi ≤ 0 
H1: Fi > 0 
 
Level of donation  
H4 & H7                  H5 
H0: Ai ≤ 0 
H1: Ai > 0  
H0: Agei ≤ 0 
H1: Agei > 0  
 
H0: Ai /A ≤ 0 
or Ai/Aj ≤ 0  
H1: Ai /A > 0  
or  Ai /Aj  > 0 
       
Level of donation 
H6                    H8 &H9 
H0: Vi ≤ 0 
H1: Vi > 0  
 
H0: Gi ≤ 0 
H1: Gi > 0  
H0: ACi ≤ 0 
H1: ACj > 0 
 
Research Questions  
Indirect Research Question (IRQ):  
Are COs altruistic? 
DRQ 1:  
(How) Do COs maximise private 
donations (non-government grant)?  
 
DRQ 2:  
Does competition between COs for 
donations affect donor behaviour 
and donations?  
Level of donation 
H1&H2                  H3 
H0: Fi ≤ 0 
H1: Fi > 0  
H0:Fj ≥ 0 
H1: Fj < 0 
 
H0: Fi /F ≤ 0       
or Fi /Fj ≤ 0 
H1: Fi /F > 0  
or  Fi /Fj  > 0 
 
Direct Research Question (DRQ):  
What determines the level of 
fundraising expenditures and the level 
of donations raised by COs?  
(In Australia and Japan) 
where:  Hypotheses (H) 1-9 for testing; i = charitable organisation (CO) i;  
 j = competitor CO to CO i; F = fundraising expenditures;  
A = fixed assets (a proxy of size); Age = number of years since the CO was 
formally created (operational age); V = number of persons per year working as 
volunteers; G = government subsidies/grants; AC = administrative costs 
 
 143 
5.3 Empirical modelling   
5.3.1 Competition among charities 
 
Donors value the services of charitable organisations and so wish to provide 
donations. But in reality, charitable organisations usually have preferences about 
administrative expenses and program services. If we assume an organisation is a 
purely altruistic charitable organisation, it will only be interesedt in maximising the 
utility of recipient (Roberts, 1984). However, although most charitable organisations 
may be motivated by altruism, charitable organisations consist of incompletely 
altruistic individuals (members, employees and donors). Each charitable organisation 
has preferences over administrative expenses and program services. However, if the 
charitable organisation is an altruistic organisation, donations from private donors will 
directly go to program services, to recipients.  
 
Of course charitable organisations are not monopoly providers. Which form of 
competition dominates determines how the competition affects the quality and 
quantity of program delivery to recipients. The maximising of the provision of 
program goods and services to recipients is crucial in this regard. Maximising the net 
value of the program goods and services enables the charitable organisation to 
credibly lower its cost of expenditure, thereby attracting donors. In the absence of this 
ability, competition occurs only in the form of fundraising spending, which does not 
improve the provision of the good or service. It is this better situation that is assumed 
in the absence of cost of delivery of service data.  
 
We consider charitable organisations in a market with N organisations. We assume 
the number and size of charitable organisations serves as the index of the degree of 
competition, and as the number of charitable organisations increases, the market is 
considered more competitive. We also assume that each charitable organisation 
produces a service to recipients (P) which is valued by potential donors. Thus, the 
charitable organisations compete for donations via (i) fundraising expenditures and 
(ii) the level of donations going to recipients. Fundraising expenditures are assumed 
to either inform, induce or enhance the utility donors obtain from the output of the 
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charitable organisation. Of course, increased fundraising expenditures reduce the 
resources available for program services so a balancing calculation has to be made by 
the organisation.  
 
Consider a charitable organisation that receives donations from donors. The donations 
are used to cover expenditures on program services (PE), administration costs (AC), 
fundraising expenditure (F), and other expenditures (OE). Each charitable 
organisation operates under the non-distribution of surplus constraint as follows 
 
PE + AC + F +OE = D                                                                                           (5-1) 
 
As indicated, donors derive utility from the services (Pi) of the charitable 
organisations. However, the utility derived from the services of a particular charitable 
organisation may increase with fundraising expenditures. This could occur for a 
number of reasons. For example, if fundraising expenditures enhance the services of 
the charitable organisation or provide other services to donors, then fundraising 
expenditures enter directly in the utility function of donors. If we treat fundraising 
expenditure mainly as being for the purpose of advertising in this thesis, providing 
information about the existence and nature of the organisation, then fundraising 
expenditures do not enter directly into the utility function of donors. It is assumed that 
the services provided to recipients are identical for all charitable organisations in a 
given group. 
 
Donors derive utility from the quantity of their donations (Andreoni, 1989), but can 
nonetheless choose the most efficient charitable organisations if they value the 
recipients. Here, we model the interaction of the charitable organisations their 
competitors, and donors as an extensive form of complete information, where 
 
1. Competition period: In a period, the charitable organisations choose the 
portion of donations )( iF  for fundraising expenditures to raise total donations.   
2. Donations period: Then, the donors observe the choices of the Charitable 
organisations and chooses an allocation of donations ),...,( 1 NDD . 
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3. Ratio of competitors: Assuming CO‘s fundraising activities/expenditure effect 
on donations, then its donations may be affected by competitors‘ fundraising 
actitivies/expenditures or the fraction of its fundraising expenditures to total 
competitors‘ fundraising expenditures.  
4. Relative size effect: Charitable organisations‘ size/age are considered as a 
stock of quality of charitable organisations.  
5. Grouping: Charitable organisations compete with similar service providers of 
charitable organisations, or charitable organisations in the same location area 
(grouping allocation).  
 
As an example, consider two charities that operate in a duopolistic market. Assume 
that they might compete (noncooperative) or cooperate (cooperative) in the market 
place. As a monopoly a charitable organisation would choose a scale of dollars to 
maximise net funds received by recipients. In other words each charitable 
organisation is interested in increasing the utility of recipients, and their control over 
the utility of recipients is determined by the level of coordination among them 
(Dimand, 1988). In other words, increases in total dollars to recipients affect 
oligopoly charities‘ utility favourably (Hochman and Rodgers, 1969b). As we 
discussed in Section 4.3, this distinguishing characteristic of an oligopoly charitable 
organisation is that there are a few mutually interdependent charities that allocate 
either identical collection of donations to recipients or heterogeneous collection to 
recipients. Consider two charities competing for donations as well as each output to 
recipients;  
 
(Ri , Rj), and Ri = F(Rj) and Rj = G(Ri).  
  
where: i = charitable organisation i; j = competing charitable organisation j;  
            R = output to recipient; F and G = function.  
 
The characteristics of these charities may be considered as either: 
(i) Cooperating with each other as a monopoly. The optimum of utility MaxUR is  
     where F is optimum ji FFF  ;  
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(ii) or competing with each other, which shows two charities as duopoly 
organisations.  
 
We assume that charitable organisation i‘s total donation is affected by its own 
fundraising expenditures at competition period and donation period, when fundraising 
activities are taking place; and competitors‘ fundraising activities and ratio of 
competitors‘ fundraising expenditures on its own fundraising expenditure are also 
influenced at the same time. However, as discussed above, the charitable organisation 
i‘s size (fixed assets), age, volunteers, administration costs, government grants and the 
relative effect of competitors‘ size on its own size may have an effect on the previous 
period. Consistent with previous studies, a log-log form of the model is used. This 
form of the model has generally stated as being better
18
 than the linear form of the 
model (Jacobs and Marudas, 2009). The parameter estimates from testing a log-log 
model are interpreted as elasticities; i.e., the percentage (not absolute) change in the 
dependent variable associated with a one percent change in the independent variable. 
The underlying assumption is that the elasticities, rather than the absolute effects, are 
constant across the range of data. The initial empirical model tested was Model 1: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + ε                                                      (1) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation;  
j indicates competing charitable organisations;  
t indicates the year;  
D is donations;  
F is fundraising expenditures;  
Fi /F is the ratio of Fi to F;  
A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size);  
Ai /A is the ratio of Ai to A;  
V is the number of volunteers;  
Age is organisational age; and  
ε is the error term. 
                                                 
18
 The evidence of ‗better‘ was based on US data because most of the previous studies used US data.   
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The dependent variable is total private donations. The major independent variables of 
interest is F, fundraising expenditures is included because presumably the more a 
charitable organisation spends on fundraising activities, the objective of which is to 
raise additional donations, the more donations the charitable organisation should 
receive. 
 
Another independent variable of major interest is A, fixed assets at the end of the 
year. This is included because it can be a measure of organisational wealth and that 
the wealthier an organisation is the less it needs additional donations, suggesting a 
negative relation between years of assets and donations (Marudas and Jacobs, 2004).  
 
5.3.2 Creating a family of models  
 
All of the models in this section are modifications of Model 1. As shown in Figure 
5.2, a family of empirical models, in the first row there are four models, Model 1 to 4. 
Models 2 to 4 are modified from Model 1. For example, a modification for Model 2 is 
created by including an additional variable, Government Grants (G), on Model 1. A 
modification for Model 3 is created by including an additional variable, 
Administrative Costs (AC), on Model 1. Model 4 is created by excluding a variable, 
Organisational Age (Age) and including an additional variable, Government Grants 
(G).  
 
Each Model 1 to 4 is divided into three, major family or two of minor family models. 
Major family models, 1 to 4 are consisted of combination of lagged and unlagged 
independent variables, whereas minor family models, 1 to 4 formed by either lagged 
independent variables only (Minor Family 1) or unlagged independent variables only 
(Minor Family 2). Major family models are labelled as Models 1 to 4. Minor family 
models employ either lagged independent variables only (minor family 1) or unlagged 
independent variables only (minor family 2, labelled as U). Models of minor family 1 
are labelled L for sub-division of Models 1 to 4 (i.e. Model 1_L), whereas models of 
minor family 2 are labelled U for sub-division of Models 1 to 4 (i.e. Model 1_U). 
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Furthermore, major or minor models are each divided into two groups in relation to 
calculation of the ratio, either using denominator as total value of competing charities 
or the value of competing charities j. Figure 5.2 presents a family of empirical 
models, in the third row there are the first and the second box (1 or 2. 3 or 4, 5 or 6). 
Each of the first family models in the first boxes (1, 3 or 5) in the third row use the 
total value of all competing charities as the denominator in the calculation of the 
ratios (i.e., ln Fi / Σln F or ln Ai / Σln A), whereas the second family models in the 
second boxes (2, 4 and 6) use the value of competing charity j as the denominator in 
the calculation of the ratios (i.e., ln Fi / Σln Fj or ln Ai / Σln Aj). The latter models are 
labelled j as an addition of sub-modified Models 1 to 4 (i.e., Model 1_J or Model 
1_LJ or Model 1_UJ).  
The amounts of competing charities j are calculated from the total value of competing 
charities minus the amount of charity i (Σ lnFj = Σ lnF–lnFi and Σ lnAj = Σ lnA–lnAi). 
Therefore the first sub-model of modified Model 1 uses the ratio of fundraising 
expenditure to competing charities j and the ratio of organisational size to competing 
charities j, calculating as, ln Fit / Σln Fjt and ln Ait-1 / Σln Ajt-1, respectively. Model 1_J, 
Equation (2) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε                                                 (2) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age and ε is the 
error term. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, a family of empirical models, in the second row of the first 
box, 3, the second sub-modified model from Model 1 employed lagged independent 
variables only (3. Model Xs_L), and used the ratio of Fi to all competitors, F, and the 
ratio of Ai, to all competitors, A, presenting as ln Fit-1 / Σln Ft-1 and ln Ait-1 / Σln At-1, 
respectively. Model 1_L, Equation (3) tested is:  
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ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε                                                 (3) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age and ε is the 
error term. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2 in the third row, the third sub-modified model from Model 1 
employed lagged independent variables only and used the ratio of Fi to competitors, Fj 
and the ratio of organisational size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, which excluded Fi and Ai 
from all competitors, F and A, presenting as ln Fi / Σln Fjt-1 and ln Ai / Σln Ajt-1, 
respectively.  
Model 1_LJ, Equation (4) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε                                                 (4) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age and ε is the 
error term. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, in the third row, the fourth sub-modified model from Model 1 
employed unlagged independent variables only and used the ratio of Fi to all 
competitors, F, and the ratio of Ai, to all competitors, A, presenting as ln Fi / Σln Ft 
and ln Ai / Σln At, respectively. Empirical Model 1_U, Equation (5) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + ε                                                         (5) 
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where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age and ε is the 
error term. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2 in the third row of the box number 6, the fifth modified model 
from Model 1 employed unlagged independent variables only and used the ratio of Fi 
to competitors, Fj and the ratio of organisational size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, 
presenting as  
ln Fi / Σln Fjt and ln Ai / Σln Ajt, respectively. Model 1_UJ Equation (6) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + ε                                                          (6) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age and ε is the 
error term. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, a family of empirical models, Model 2 is modified from 
Model 1 by adding an independent variable, government grants, Gi, and independent 
variables with combined lag and non-lag. An independent variable, government grants 
to charitable organisation i for a year, is included because the previous studies find it 
affects total donation as this was explained as crowd-in or crowd-out private 
donations (Weisbrod and Dominquez, 1986; Posnett and Sandler, 1989). Model 2 uses 
the ratio of Fi to all competitors, F, and the ratio of Ai, to all competitors, A, 
presenting as, ln Fit / Σln Ft and ln Ait-1 / Σln At-1, respectively. Empirical Model 2, 
Equation (7) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + β8 ln Git-1+ ε                                    (7) 
 
 151 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; G is 
government grants and ε is the error term. 
 
Following the procedures of modifying Model 1, the first sub-modified Model 2 
(Model Xs_J) is produced including the ratio of fundraising expenditure to 
competitors‘ Fj and the ratio of size to competitors, Aj, presenting as, ln Fit / Σln Fjt 
and ln Ait-1 / Σln Ajt-1. Model 2_J, Equation (8) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1+ ε                              (8) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; G is 
government grants and ε is the error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the second sub-modified Model 2 
(Model Xs_L) is produced including lagged independent variables only and used the 
ratio of fundraising expenditure to all competitors and the ratio of size to all 
competitors, presenting as ln Fit-1 / Σln Ft-1 and ln Ait-1 / Σln At-1, respectively. Model 
2_L, Equation (9) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1+ ε                             (9) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; G is 
government grants and ε is the error term. 
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Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the third sub-modified Model 2 is 
employed using lagged independent variables only, and uses the ratio of Fi to 
competitors, Fj and the ratio of organisational size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, presenting 
as ln Fi / Σln Fjt-1 and ln Ai / Σln Ajt-1, respectively. 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fi-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1+ ε                            (10) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; G is 
government grants and ε is the error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the fourth sub-modified Model 2 
employs unlagged independent variables only and uses the ratio of Fi to all 
competitors, F, and the ratio of Ai, to all competitors, A, presenting as ln Fi / Σln Ft 
and ln Ai / Σln At, respectively. Empirical Model 2_U, Equation (11) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln Git+ ε                                        (11) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; G is 
government grants and ε is the error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the fifth sub-modified Model 2 is 
employed using all unlagged independent variables using the ratio of Fi to 
competitors, Fj and the ratio of organisational size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, presenting 
as, ln Fit / Σln Fjt and ln Ait / Σln Ajt, Model 2_UJ, Equation (12) tested is:  
 
 153 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln Git+ ε                                     (12) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; G is 
government grants and ε is the error term. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, a family of empirical models, Model 3 modifies Model 1 by 
adding an independent variable, administration costs, ACi, and all independent 
variables are either lag or non-lag. An independent variable, Administrative costs, 
AC, is included as the measurement of inefficiency of organisations as previous 
studies explained, and it is used to compare the inefficiency between different 
organisations with similar missions (Frumkin and Kim, 2001). The empirical Model 
3, Equation (13) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                               (13) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; AC is 
administrative costs and ε is the error term. 
 
Following the procedures of modifying Model 1, the first sub-modified Model 3 
(Model Xs_J) produced, including the ratio of fundraising expenditure to competitors‘ 
Fj and the ratio of size to competitors, Aj, presenting as, ln Fit / Σln Fjt and ln Ait-1 / Σln 
Ajt-1. Model 3_J, Equation (14) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                         (14) 
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where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; AC is 
administrative costs and ε is the error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the second sub-modified model 
from Model 3 (Model Xs_L) is produced including lagged independent variables only 
and used the ratio of fundraising expenditure to all competitors and the ratio of size to 
all competitors, presenting as ln Fit-1 / Σln Ft-1 and ln Ait-1 / Σln At-1, respectively. 
Model 3_L, Equation (15), we test is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                         (15) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; AC is 
administrative costs and ε is the error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the third sub-modified model from 
Model 3 (Model Xs_LJ) employed lagged independent variables only and used the 
ratio of Fi to competitors, Fj and the ratio of organisational size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, 
presenting as ln Fi / Σln Fjt-1 and ln Ai / Σln Ajt-1, respectively. Model 3_LJ, Equation 
(16) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fi-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                        (16) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
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ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; AC is 
administrative costs and ε is the error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the fourth sub-modified model from 
Model 3 employed unlagged independent variables only and used the ratio of Fi to all 
competitors, F, and the ratio of Ai, to all competitors, A, presenting as ln Fi / Σln Ft 
and ln Ai / Σln At, respectively. Empirical Model 3_U, Equation (17) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln ACit + ε                                     (17) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; AC is 
administrative costs and ε is the error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the fifth sub-modified model from 
Model 3 employed unlagged independent variables only and used the ratio of Fi to 
competitors, Fj and the ratio of organisational size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, presenting 
as, ln Fit / Σln Fjt and ln Ait / Σln Ajt. Model 3_UJ, Equation (18) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln ACit +ε                                     (18) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; Age is organisational age; AC is 
administrative costs and ε is the error term. 
 
As shown Figure 5.2, a family of empirical models, Model 4 is modified from Model 
1 by adding an independent variable, government grants, Gi, after excluding an 
independent variable, organisational age, Agei, with all independent variables either 
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lag and non-lag. Government grants is included after excluding Age because the 
previous studies find both government grants and organisation age affect total 
donation. Government grants is affected by organisational age, so it is necessary to 
find whether government grants relate to total donation without influence from 
organisational age in the competition model. Model 4 is also employed in the 
competition index of ratio of Fi to all competitors, F, and the ratio of Ai, to all 
competitors, A, presenting as, ln Fit / Σln Ft and ln Ait-1 / Σln At-1, respectively. 
Empirical Model 4, Equation (19) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                   (19) 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; G is government grants and ε is the 
error term. 
 
Following the procedures of modifying Model 1, the first sub-modified model from 
Model 4 employed lag and unlagged independent variables and used the ratio of 
fundraising expenditure to competitors‘ Fj and the ratio of size to competitors, Aj, 
presenting as, ln Fit / Σln Fjt and ln Ait-1 / Σln Ajt-1. Model 4_J, Equation (20) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                  (20) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; G is government grants and ε is the 
error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the second sub-modified model 
from Model 4 produced lagged independent variables only and used the ratio of 
fundraising expenditure to all competitors and the ratio of size to all competitors, 
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presenting as ln Fit-1 / Σln Ft-1 and ln Ait-1 / Σln At-1, respectively. Model 4_L, Equation 
(21) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                  (21) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; G is government grants and ε is the 
error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the third sub-modified model from 
Model 4 employed lagged independent variables only and used the ratio of Fi to 
competitors, Fj and the ratio of organisational size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, presenting 
as ln Fi / Σln Fjt-1 and ln Ai / Σln Ajt-1, respectively. Model 4_LJ, Equation (22) tested: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fi-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                  (22) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; G is government grants and ε is the 
error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the fourth sub-modified model from 
Model 4 employed unlagged independent variables only and used the ratio of Fi to all 
competitors, F, and the ratio of Ai, to all competitors, A, presenting as ln Fi / Σln Ft 
and ln Ai / Σln At, respectively. Empirical Model 4_U, Equation (23) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Git + ε                                                            (23) 
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where: i indicates the charitable organisation; j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi /F 
is the ratio of Fi to F; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /A is the 
ratio of Ai to A; V is the number of volunteers; G is government grants and ε is the 
error term. 
 
Following the procedures for modifying Model 1, the fifth sub-modified model from 
Model 4 employed unlagged independent variables only and used the ratio of Fi to 
competitors, Fj and the ratio of organisational size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, presenting 
as, ln Fit / Σln Fjt and ln Ait / Σln Ajt. Model 4_UJ, Equation (24) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Git + ε                                                           (24) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation, j indicates competing charitable 
organisations; t indicates the year; D is donations; F is fundraising expenditures; Fi / 
Fj is the ratio of Fi to Fj; A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size); Ai /Aj is the 
ratio of Ai to Aj; V is the number of volunteers; G is government grants and ε is the 
error term. 
 
As discussed above, Model 1 is consistent with Equations 1 to 6, Model 2 with 
Equations 7 to 12, Model 3 with Equations 13 to 18, and Model 4 is consistent with 
19 to 24.  
 
Figure 5.2 presents the summary of research questions, testable hypotheses and 
empirical models. To answer Direct Research Question 1, hypothesis 1 is tested using 
empirical Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. To answer Direct Research Question 2, further sub 
questions are asked. To answer Direct Research Question 2-1, hypotheses 2 and 3 are 
tested using empirical Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. To answer Direct Research Question 2-2, 
hypotheses 4, 5 and 7 are tested using empirical Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. To answer 
Direct Research Question 2-3, hypotheses 6, 8 and 9 are tested using empirical 
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. Therefore, all models 1 to 4 including all equations 1-24 are a 
family of empirical models and they are used to answer the research questions of this 
study.  
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         Figure 5.2: Research topics, questions, hypotheses and models of the thesis 
 
 
 
 
Research Topic 
 
Fundraising activities of charitable organisations (COs) in Australia and Japan  
(Including competition for donation between charitable organisations) 
 
DRQ2-1: 
How does competition 
between COs affect 
effectiveness of fundraising? 
 
DRQ2-2:  
What characteristics of 
COs affect fundraising? 
 
DRQ2-3:  
What other factors of COs 
affect fundraising?  
 
Level of 
donation 
H1  
H0: Fi = 0 
H1: Fi > 0 
 
Level of donation  
H4 & H7                  H5 
H0: Ai = 0 
H1: Ai > 0  
H0: Agei = 0 
H1: Agei > 0  
 
H0: Ai /A = 0 
or Ai/Aj = 0  
H1: Ai /A > 0  
or  Ai /Aj  > 0 
       
Level of donation 
H6                    H8 &H9 
H0: Vi = 0 
H1: Vi > 0  
 
H0: Gi = 0 
H1: Gi > 0  
H0: ACi = 0 
H1: ACj > 0 
 
Research Questions  
Indirect Research Question (IRQ):  
Are COs altruistic? 
DRQ 1:  
(How) Do COs maximise private 
donations (non-government grants)?  
 
DRQ 2:  
Does competition between COs for 
donations affect donor behaviour 
and donations?  
Level of donation 
H1&H2                  H3 
H0: Fi = 0 
H1: Fi > 0  
H0:Fj = 0 
H1: Fj < 0 
 
H0: Fi /F = 0       
or Fi /Fj = 0 
H1: Fi /F > 0  
or  Fi /Fj  > 0 
 
Direct Research Question (DRQ):  
What determines the level of 
fundraising expenditures and the level 
of donations raised by COs?  
(In Australia and Japan) 
where: M = ordinary least squared (OLS) model (M1-4) for hypotheses (H) 1-9 testing; 
i = charitable organisation (CO) i;  j =competitor CO to CO i;  
F = fundraising expenditures; A = fixed assets (a proxy of size);  
Age = number of years since the CO i was formally created (operational age);  
V = number of persons per year working as volunteers;  
G = government subsidies/grants; AC = Administrative costs 
 
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4 
 
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4 
 
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4 
 
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4 
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5.3.3 A diagrammatic summary of the model family 
 
Figure 5.3 presents the family of empirical models. Model 1 (M1) is the basic model 
and all M1, M2, M3 and M4, and related models are a family models. Model 2 (M2), 
Model 3 (M3) and Model 4 (M4) are constructed from the basic model of M1. M2 is 
constructed from M1 with the additional independent variable Government Grants (G). 
M3 is constructed from M1 with an additional variable of Administrative Costs (AC). 
M4 is constructed from M1 excluding the independent variable of Organisational Age 
(Age) and including the independent variable of Government Grants (G).  
 
Major family models employ combining lagged and unlagged independent values, 
including unlagged fundraising expenditures related variables (lnFi, lnFj and lnFi/lnF) 
and other lagged independent variable. Minor family models are also modification of 
Model 1. The first minor models employed lagged independent variables only and the 
second minor models employed unlagged independent variables only.  
 
Furthermore, independent variables of the ratios are calculated in two ways. Firstly, 
the ratios are either using all competing charities‘ fundraising expenditures or fixed 
assets as a denominator. Secondly, alternative calculation of the ratios are employed, 
either the competing charities j‘s fundraising expenditures or fixed assets as 
denominators of the ratios.  
 
The use of a family of models will allows a consistent form of testing closely related 
but mutually exclusive different functional forms and specifications. These different 
forms and specifications are not themselves dictated by significant theoretical 
hypotheses but all of them are consistent with those major hypotheses.  
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Figure 5.3: A family of empirical models  
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Note: M1 is basic model and M2, M3 and M4 are constructed from M1. M2 contains an additional variable to M1, Government Grants, G. M3 
contains an additional variable on to M1, Administrative Costs, AC. M4 has an additional variable to M1, G, after excluding Age. Therefore M1, 
M2, M3, M4 are family models. Major family models use combining lagged and unlagged values for independent variables [fundraising 
expenditure related variables are unlagged (lnFi, lnFj and lnFi/lnF) and others are lagged]. Minor family models are either all lagged (L) (minor 
family 1) or unlagged (U) (minor family 2) for independent variables. The ratios to competitors are employed in two ways to compute competitors: 
1. all competitors, F (or A); or 2. competing charities J (Fj or Aj), computed from all competitors minus i, (Fj=F–Fi or Aj = A–Ai).  
Empirical models  
M1, M2, M3, M4 
Major Family 
Lagged and unlagged  
 
Minor Family 1 
Lagged 
Minor Family 2 
Unlagged 
3. Ratio of lnFi to 
competitors 
lnFi/ΣlnF 
4. Ratio of lnFi to 
competitors 
lnFi /ΣlnFj 
 
1. Ratio of lnFi to 
competitors 
lnFi/ΣlnF 
2. Ratio of lnFi to 
competitors 
lnFi /ΣlnFj 
 
5. Ratio of lnFi to 
competitors‘ 
lnFi/ΣlnF 
 
6. Ratio of lnFi to 
competitors 
lnFi /ΣlnFj 
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5.4 Data and Sample Selection 
5.4.1 Sample selection  
 
This study uses, as its sample data, the financial and non-financial variables obtained 
from the annual reports of 100 charitable organisations, of which 50 operate in from 
Australia and 50 operate in Japan, for the four financial years from 2001 to 2008.  
 
The choice of the eight year time period provides scope for the inclusion of data that is 
both representative and avoids distortion. With respect to the eight year time period 
selected from 2001, the Australian Government has required Australian charitable 
organisations to disclose their annual reports since 2001. This allows this study to 
employ full data sets from 2001.  
 
The Australian charitable organisations are selected from the Business Review Weekly’s 
(BRW) ―Top 200 Charitable Organisations‖ list, as at July 2006 (BRW, 2006). Annual 
reports for the 50 Australian charitable organisations are obtained via each 
organisation‘s website or, alternatively, following a written request to the organisations. 
The 50 Japanese organisations are selected from the organisations registered to the 
Cabinet Office Government of Japan and disclosed information on the NPO 
Corporation Homepage of the Cabinet Office in 2004. The NPO corporations (like the 
Australian organisations), have also been required to disclose their financial and activity 
information since 2001. The NPO Corporation Homepage of the Cabinet Office of 
Japan provides information about their registered charitable organisations
19
. This 
information includes a financial report, an activity report, an ownership statement, and 
the names and positions of the management staff and board members.  
 
The study excludes government formed non-profit organisations, political party 
organisations, universities, hospitals, social clubs and groups, because the operations of 
these organisations are chiefly dependent on government budgets or club members‘ 
fees. Such individual donations as occur are not likely to influence these organisations‘ 
operations. On the other hand, the charities‘ operations are partly dependent on 
                                                 
19 The registration of a NPO Corporation should be reported to each local government office. However, charity 
organisations that become large enough to have operations in more than two local government areas need to register 
with the Cabinet Office of Japan. 
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individual donations and individual donors‘ determinants for donations and, hence, are 
more likely to influence charitable operations.  
The following criteria were applied to determine the inclusion or exclusion of a 
charitable organisation from the sample: 
 
1. The availability of annual reports of the charitable organisation for the financial 
years 2001 to 2008, providing information including financial performance and 
financial position from 2001 to 2008 and indices of ownership, board members, 
and summary of activities.  
2. The continuity of the recording of sample data over the four-year period. 
3. For reasons previously stated, government-formed non-profit organisations, 
political party organisations, universities, hospitals and social clubs and groups 
are not included in the study.   
 
5.4.2 The sample of Australian charitable organisations 
 
5.4.2.1 Donations for Australian charitable organisations 
 
Providing an overview of the sample data, Table 5.1 presents the total donations from 
the sample of Australian charitable organisations for the financial years 2001 to 2008 in 
descending order from the total donation of the financial year, 2008. Since 2001, total 
donations show steady growth. There is a notable gap between the top three and other 
organisations in the amount of total donations. The top three organisations received in 
total around $50 million in 2008 and above in 2007, two times greater than the average 
($21.8 million and 21.1 million in 2008 and 2007 respectively). If the top three 
organisations are excluded, average total donations reduce to $6.8 million in 2001 and 
$10.7 million in 2008.  
 
Figure 5.4, the scatter plots of the total donations in Australian data during the financial 
years 2001 to 2008, also shows that a few Australian charitable organisations have 
undergone change over this eight year period, and indicates a small but stable condition 
for most Australian charitable organisations in term of total donations for their eight 
years. It also shows a few strikingly large donations.  
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Table 5.1: Total Donations in Australian Charitable organisations (A$’000) 
 
 
Source: The collected data from 44 Australian charitable organisations for 8 financial years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australian Charities 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
1 World Vision                   317524 321962 293266 314530 206869 209809 153003 141198
2 Uniting Care QLD. 276895 209159 276895 178894 7316 5903 6610 5949
3 Salvation South 107487 102361 50679 51604 60625 58135 59420 50033
4 Salvation Eastern 82333 106167 99339 94308 89883 81887 78006 79947
5 A RedCross                              55490 38480 49289 134517 28682 31829 34485 35886
6 Oxfam Australia                          44519 41015 45293 35118 22167 19886 15678 12137
7 The Smith Family                                42834 33328 37230 31061 26530 27412 23322 25565
8 Care Australia                                  39480 28670 34458 41852 39358 37348 43752 50920
9 Endeavour               28731 28848 24518 30940 23529 22103 24132 23986
10 Caritas Australia                               21557 20365 19360 35096 12433 12216 12626 11901
11 Mission Au                             20268 17838 21884 18814 15141 13655 13336 14277
12 WWF Australia 15352 12814 12221 11626 8915 6218 5060 4081
13 RSPCA NSW                                       15143 9917 17023 15954 18091 8146 5632 4463
14 The Spastic NSW                     14796 13345 10950 7975 10612 10778 6553 5763
15 RI forDeaf & Blind 13501 18722 13851 11258 11333 10154 12512 10788
16 Royal Fly.Doctor SE     11503 9791 8133 7078 6105 5721 4696 3748
17 Wesley Mission Syd                           10668 13924 11196 10624 10545 10290 10387 7711
18 Mul.Sclerosis Vic   10446 15984 5052 3876 5472 4969 4108 4583
19 Royal Rehav. Syd           8635 11310 9387 9205 9771 7642 8514 7797
20 St Vinent Society VIC                 8414 6772 6417 5078 4997 6762 6393 6578
21 Aglicare NSW 6910 7359 7397 7028 9257 5978 5547 6927
22 Anglicare Vic.                                  6153 4455 7069 4719 7584 5185 3282 3321
23 Silver Chain                                    6138 4242 4265 2930 3257 3144 2748 2634
24 Yooralla Society Vic         4838 4427 3998 3371 4718 5240 3901 4079
25 Cerebral Palsy QLD.             4622 3416 3531 2771 3467 2963 3467 3298
26 AMANA Living               4502 4576 4246 4124 142 223 684 660
27 Scope Vic                                   4366 4270 2996 3261 2967 4612 3393 3657
28 Uniting Care Vic 3872 788 6012 3400 119 125 75 156
29 Royal FreemasonsVic. 3454 2501 6140 1722 1490 1681 885 1671
30 Southern CrossVic.                     3333 1525 1057 1307 2183 1604 1613 1224
31 Zoological Parks 3196 5628 4085 8674 5550 3167 2723 2375
32 St Vincent Society WA                    3102 2853 2966 3041 2130 964 977 1357
33 Melbourne Citymission                           2426 2557 2969 3402 2816 1824 1739 2965
34 The Benevolent Society                          2072 1380 2015 1668 1756 1380 1815 1721
35 Benetas 1759 1094 1766 315 818 296 891 668
36 Villa Maria Society                             1544 674 709 492 812 1148 981 575
37 Anglicare SA                                    1518 1892 1695 1253 1159 1176 1230 1226
38 Activ Foundation                                838 683 1503 904 900 299 70 423
39 Baptist CommunityVic.           653 1205 641 1514 394 736 486 461
40 Minda                                           522 351 182 264 6818 9729 5672 5407
41 Churches of Christ Care                435 330 411 151 702 505 858 50
42 Anglicare Australia                             418 354 220 297 1275 257 209 185
43 Diabetes Australia                              238 429 174 94 730 524 447 462
44 Annecto 92 84 120 71 66 195 183 167
Total 1212577 1117845 1112609 1106181 679483 643818 572101 552978
Average 27559 25406 25287 25140 15443 14632 13002 12568
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Figure 5.4:Total Donations in Australian data (A$’000) 
 
 
Source: The collected data from 44 Australian charitable organisations for 8 financial years 
 
 
 
5.4.2.2 Volunteers for Australian charitable organisations 
 
Table 5.2 presents the number of volunteers for the financial years 2001 to 2008 with 
the same order to the table of donations. The table reveals that most of the Australian 
charitable organisations have stable numbers of volunteers. The table also shows that 
there are two distinct groups in terms of the number of volunteers. One consists of four 
charitable organisations, whose volunteers number more than 10,000. The other is 
comprised of that group of charitable organisations with less than 6,000 volunteers.  
 
Figure 5.5 presents the scatter plots of the number of volunteers in Australian charitable 
organisations over eight years.  
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Table 5.2: The Volunteers in Australian Charitable organisations 
 
 
Source: The collected data from 44 Australian charitable organisations for 8 financial years 
 
 
 
 
Australian Charities 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
1 World Vision                   3635 3808 4300 9000 2500 4000 4000 4000
2 Uniting Care QLD 8500 3000 3030 3030 3000 3000 1300 1300
3 Salvation South 25000 25000 25000 25000 25000 25000 25000 25000
4 Salvation Eastern 25000 25000 25000 25000 25000 25000 25000 10000
5 A RedCross                              33510 31000 31277 30258 27052 26706 26790 26600
6 Oxfam Australia                          2130 1728 1728 3368 2366 1256 2525 1409
7 The Smith Family                                33500 7000 24500 25000 8000 6500 2000 2000
8 Care Australia                                  1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
9 Endeavour               1088 1500 1500 2000 2000 2000 1997 1997
10 Caritas Australia                               1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
11 Mission Au                             2970 2500 2500 3000 1000 1000 2500 1000
12 WWF Australia 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000
13 RSPCA NSW                                       1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1150 1000 1000
14 The Spastic NSW                     1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
15 RI forDeaf & Blind 1700 1700 1500 1500 1691 1791 1691 1591
16 Royal Fly.Doctor SE     300 300 300 300 400 400 400 400
17 Wesley Mission Syd                           3050 3300 3400 3300 3400 3400 3300 3300
18 Mul.Sclerosis Vic   2200 2200 2712 2864 1443 1314 1000 1000
19 Royal Rehav. Syd           100 86 100 100 100 100 100 100
20 St Vinent Society VIC                 3625 3400 3325 4000 3000 2900 2200 2000
21 Aglicare NSW 1500 2000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
22 Anglicare Vic.                                  1400 1149 1600 1200 1200 1200 845 541
23 Silver Chain                                    700 650 660 600 550 450 455 600
24 Yooralla Society Vic         1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
25 Cerebral Palsy QLD.             183 190 200 250 250 250 250 250
26 AMANA Living               600 600 600 569 585 528 518 525
27 Scope Vic                                   2600 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 1000 1200
28 Uniting Care Vic 784 784 784 300 724 844 784 784
29 Royal FreemasonsVic. 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
30 Southern CrossVic.                     340 335 341 340 350 345 356 450
31 Zoological Parks 1000 1000 1000 1000 841 841 801 852
32 St Vincent Society WA                    2000 2000 1850 1800 1700 1300 1200 600
33 Melbourne Citymission                           1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
34 The Benevolent Society                          900 900 900 900 900 900 500 500
35 Benetas 600 600 600 580 480 200 200 200
36 Villa Maria Society                             300 320 350 350 350 350 350 350
37 Anglicare SA                                    902 800 900 900 700 564 650 650
38 Activ Foundation                                975 1130 1070 945 500 412 400 400
39 Baptist CommunityVic.           700 750 470 260 260 200 207 230
40 Minda                                           360 360 200 200 200 200 200 200
41 Churches of Christ Care                478 321 378 431 593 553 1093 347
42 Anglicare Australia                             10385 10400 10400 10385 20900 11642 11642 11642
43 Diabetes Australia                              233 233 233 233 233 235 230 225
44 Annecto 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Total 186648 151444 169108 175363 153668 141931 135884 116643
Average 4242 3442 3843 3986 3492 3226 3088 2651
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Figure 5.5: The Number of Volunteers in Australia data 
 
Source: The collected data from 44 Australian charitable organisations for 8 financial years 
 
 
5.4.3 The sample of Japanese charitable organisations  
 
5.4.3.1 Donations for Japanese charitable organisations 
 
Table 5.3 presents the total donations from the sample of Japanese charitable 
organisations for the financial years 2001 to 2008 in descending order, by the total 
donations of the financial year 2008. For comparison, total donations are shown in 
Australian dollars. The averages from the monthly exchange rates are employed for 
transferring the currency from yen to Australian dollars, in view of the fact that 
donations are given over the year from individual donors to Japanese charitable 
organisations. In contrast to Australia, the financial year in Japan starts on 1st of April 
and ends on 31st of March. The average exchange rates for twelve months for the eight 
financial years are therefore employed as standing at 88 in 2008, 99 in 2007, 88 in 2006, 
84 in 2005, 79 in 2004, 68 in 2003, 64 in 2002 and 61 yen in 2001 per one Australian 
dollar.  
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This table indicates that some charitable organisations showed rapid growth (e.g., No. 1, 
7, 15 and 17) and some showed a sharp decline (e.g., Nos 28, 31, 32 and 42) over the 
four years. However, the majority of Japanese charitable organisations (73%) receive 
fairly small donations (of less than $300,000 annually) and only two charitable 
organisations have received more than $1 million. This is vastly different from 
Australia.  
Source: The collected data from 48 Japanese charitable organisations for 8 financial years 
 
 Figure 5.6 shows the scatter plots of the total donations in Japanese charitable 
organisations over the period 2001 to 2008. Compared to the Australian sample data, 
Japanese charitable organisations indicate more instability in total donations. This 
instability may be due to smaller size and the differences in period of operation. 
Japanese NPO corporations have only had official recognition from the Japanese 
government since 1998, while the date of formation of some of the Australian sample 
spans more than a century, with an average of 85 years
20
 for the sample data. 
 
Figure 5.6: Total donations in Japanese data (A$’000) 
 
Source: The collected data from 48 Japanese charitable organisations for 8 financial years 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Many of the large Australian charitable organisations were church sponsored and many were 
established by Acts of Parliament. They received fixed asset grants in the latter half of last century 
(Industry Commission, 1995, p. 535).  
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Table 5.3: Total donations in Japanese data (A$’000) 
 
Source: The collected data from 48 Japanese charitable organisations for 8 financial years 
 
 
J Charities 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
1 J Seijin 1,710        1,457        1,560        1,641        1,345        1,241        740           241           
2 Hunger Free 1,179        1,155        1,053        1,074        989           1,243        1,216        1,326        
3 Project Hope 1,058        887           987           1,235        1,130        1,744        1,014        998           
4 New Start 822           573           995           1,263        836           906           889           707           
5 JPFI 2,3,7 685           515           815           642           691           859           930           877           
6 Sougyo Shien 626           718           784           723           444           352           97             1               
7 BHN Telecom 510           434           530           624           588           631           1,000        784           
8 J Karate 433           372           459           405           500           355           655           466           
9 Fuhoutoki 409           163           61             326           584           585           931           1,986        
10 Chiiki Kyoryu 243           228           184           243           347           539           278           282           
11 Kyukyu Heli 205           282           233           124           293           292           58             124           
12 Jutaku Seisan 189           162           195           146           94             132           120           227           
13 L Engel_Volun 149           151           175           108           230           102           154           170           
14 Yigi 141           117           150           143           133           154           154           162           
15 J. Kouryu 133           100           123           161           157           183           164           275           
16 Futoko 119           90             136           147           181           250           287           401           
17 Kids Energy 119           106           117           144           136           144           105           49             
18 Recycle 119           96             129           151           166           213           301           275           
19 ZenshiHoken 118           105           113           119           129           147           156           162           
20 UN Shien 118           68             159           115           91             118           300           186           
21 St John Amb 116           94             129           158           183           250           204           213           
22 Kendo 110           94             114           124           130           147           166           184           
23 Asia addiction 105           132           61             102           89             351           385           368           
24 Bramer 100           88             101           93             112           107           115           153           
25 J Toshi 83             61             79             100           100           71             77             105           
26 Nippon Soil 78             75             70             127           185           181           160           246           
27 Nihon Kenpo 77             38             112           74             49             73             68             84             
28 Kyoikushien 64             36             159           57             119           85             61             74             
29 JWheel_Dance 63             69             47             28             30             65             54             52             
30 Kiko Network 57             38             58             54             50             83             51             112           
31 Furusato Club 48             85             13             86             95             108           152           129           
32 Corporate Gov. 48             38             43             50             57             103           139           196           
33 China_J Play 31             6               31             5               154           66             11             21             
34 Tomnet 23             23             30             29             11             12             9               9               
35 ChisitsuOsen 22             21             21             23             33             33             35             19             
36 Asia Environt 21             29             9               7               76             104           59             7               
37 HIV 14             86             157           252           263           538           559           365           
38 Kenkokagaku 13             11             14             18             18             30             56             43             
39 Sport&Intellige 11             10             11             14             12             245           124           56             
40 We Can 10             12             3               5               25             7               12             17             
41 AB Free 8               6               9               13             41             30             16             8               
42 IHMA Japan 7               4               10             24             5               12             32             33             
43 Toyo 7               6               7               9               4               6               7               7               
44 J Zaitaku 5               4               6               39             21             12             13             13             
45 Aikoku 5               3               6               4               3               2               9               16             
46 All_J Kyoiku 3               3               4               5               4               11             5               7               
47 Joy Club 1               1               1               1               3               23             137           16             
48 J Fukushi 1               1               1               4               4               36             95             51             
Total 10,218      8,851        10,266      11,039      10,939      12,981      12,360      12,302      
Average 213 184 214 230 228 270 258 256
AUDJYP= 88 99 88 84 79 68 64 61
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5.4.3.2 Volunteers for Japanese charitable organisations 
 
Table 5.4 presents the number of volunteers from the sample of Japanese charitable 
organisations for the financial years 2001 to 2008, and the list of charitable 
organisations are in descending order from the total donations for the financial year of 
2008. The number of volunteers is fairly small with less than 500 volunteers annually 
on average from the sample of Japanese charitable organisations.   
 
Figure 5.7 presents scatter plots of the number of volunteers in Japanese charitable 
organisations over the four years. It shows that the majority of Japanese charitable 
organisations in the sample data consist of unstable and one large group of less than 
1,000 volunteers.  
 
Most importantly, the number of volunteers is 10 times smaller for Japanese charitable 
organisations compared to Australian charitable organisations in the sample data. The 
patterns of scatter plots of the number of volunteers in both sample data are very 
different.  
 
Figure 5.7: Scatter Plot of the Number of Volunteers  
 
 
Source: The collected data from 48 Japanese charitable organisations for 8 financial years 
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Table 5.4: The Number of Volunteers in Japanese charitable organisations  
 
Source: The collected data from 48 Japanese charitable organisations for 8 financial years 
 
J Charities 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
1 J Seijin 1,514       1,585       1,622       1,577      1,564       1,272      710        452        
2 Hunger Free 216          174          234          217         269          436         410        371        
3 Project Hope 588          534          572          657         738          784         325        293        
4 New Start 520          454          525          564         573          600         717        617        
5 JPFI 2,3,7 304          140          180          407         381          460         384        432        
6 Sougyo Shien 1,221       1,813       1,781       1,304      698          348         132        52          
7 BHN Telecom 372          331          371          345         471          646         681        229        
8 J Karate 329          265          351          308         322          348         330        411        
9 Fuhoutoki 1,335       1,253       1,245       2,187      1,147       1,424      1,712     1,698     
10 Chiiki Kyoryu 1,038       880          743          1,125      1,436       1,831      1,480     1,778     
11 Kyukyu Heli 191          309          210          189         203          232         42          5            
12 Jutaku Seisan 136          115          143          153         193          248         259        300        
13 L Engel_Volun 276          248          272          252         310          239         213        122        
14 Yigi 248          248          217          309         144          161         165        165        
15 J. Kouryu 750          811          584          978         807          766         470        530        
16 Futoko 45            43            41            61           83            113         124        171        
17 Kids Energy 192          161          202          165         84            181         69          75          
18 Recycle 115          123          90            69           89            123         230        43          
19 ZenshiHoken 186          155          153          196         211          220         243        244        
20 UN Shien 42            17            64            88           111          102         85          152        
21 St John Amb 211          170          230          249         162          229         156        173        
22 Kendo 89            83            84            74           66            73           91          99          
23 Asia addiction 1,101       59            30            24           29            20           32          59          
24 Bramer 67            62            63            69           89            100         73          55          
25 J Toshi 502          447          498          572         698          722         751        791        
26 Nippon Soil 10            7              11            14           34            26           43          69          
27 Nihon Kenpo 75            69            72            38           20            24           8            15          
28 Kyoikushien 254          97            64            293         321          360         276        623        
29 JWheel_Dance 45            51            33            38           158          80           70          85          
30 Kiko Network 260          364          110          115         142          166         178        172        
31 Furusato Club 187          205          209          171         356          350         288        300        
32 Corporate Gov. 386          507          421          454         333          1,963      2,081     10          
33 China_J Play 14            13            13            28           63            76           28          25          
34 Tomnet 63            15            109          282         172          330         134        0            
35 ChisitsuOsen 693          431          899          91           84            130         172        234        
36 Asia Environt 138          81            185          37           2              1             1            1            
37 HIV 320          202          411          487         453          555         735        771        
38 Kenkokagaku 168          172          142          141         47            93           60          17          
39 Sport&Intellige 129          105          138          115         179          300         153        105        
40 We Can 303          239          370          267         315          109         320        32          
41 AB Free 138          118          143          153         131          169         158        120        
42 IHMA Japan 8              3              13            6             6              8             28          26          
43 Toyo 109          95            111          214         143          372         10          37          
44 J Zaitaku 158          111          190          243         211          247         112        146        
45 Aikoku 48            976          1,098       826         953          1,059      1,182     1,317     
46 All_J Kyoiku 2              1              1              2             3              4             3            3            
47 Joy Club 467          357          499          499         468          438         507        613        
48 J Fukushi 120          100          127          184         227          178         264        149        
Total 15,684     16,806     17,882     18,840    17,706     20,718    18,697   16,187   
Average 327 308 331 351 327 390 348 296
AUDJYP= 88 99 88 84 79 68 64 61
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5.4.4 Groups of charitable organisations  
 
5.4.4.1  Allocation of groups into industry segmentations 
 
Because, Charitable organisations compete with each other for donations, the greatest  
competition may exist within groups with similar objectives and missions (Frumkin and 
Kim, 2001). Consequently it is very important to investigate samples within group to 
find the effectiveness of charitable organisations‘ competition for donations and to find 
how the determinants of donations relevant to the accountability of charitable 
organisations (Castaneda et al., 2007).  
 
As described in previous section, this study uses a modified Cournot oligopoly 
competition model. Charitable organisations use fundraising expenditures as the 
principal strategy in their competition for donations. Yet charitable organisations, as 
oligopolistic groups containing a few large organisations might be considered as 
‗uncompetitive‘ (Baumol et al., 1998, p. 659). Conversely the provision of services of 
some large charities can be as close to perfect competition as any industry in the 
economy.  
 
The grouping taxonomy used is the International Classification of Nonprofit 
Organisations (ICNPO). The classification groups of ICNPO are: 1. Culture & 
Recreation; 2. Education & Research; 3. Health; 4. Social Services; 5. Environment; 6. 
Development & Housing; 7.Law, advocacy and politics; 8. Philanthropic intermediaries 
and voluntarism promotion; 9. International; 10. Religion 11. Business and professional 
associations, unions; 12 not elsewhere classified.   
 
Yamauchi used the classification of four groups: 2. Education and Research; 3. Health 
Care; 4. Social service; 10 Religion; 11 professional associations, unions (Yamauchi, 
2006). This study includes neither unions nor religious societies as charitable 
organisation and use samples of Australian charities and Japanese NPO Corporations. It 
may be too broad if this study employs remaining three classifies in the Yamauchi 
Report, Education and Research, Health Care, and Social service, therefore this study 
disaggregates his grouping.  
 
The Australian sample of charitable organisation has a variety of objectives and 
missions and many organisations provide expanded support and services for the 
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wellbeing and welfare. The largest grouping of welfare is disaggregated into three: (i) 
humanitarian, if it provides emergency services, and (ii) disability, if their services are 
focused on a group of disabled people, and (iii) welfare group. There are a few 
organisations that look after animal welfare and these are classified as animal. There is 
no organisation which specialises in environment or education in the Australian sample. 
 
Consequently this study sees a grouping of Australian charity samples as: 1. Global, 
focused on international emergency aid; 2. Welfare, focused on national;  
3. Humanitarian, focused on national; 4. Disability, focused on national; 5.Animal, 
focused on national; 6. Culture and Science and not elsewhere classified; 7. Rural and 
outback based and 8. All combined group.  
 
At first, Japanese charitable organisations follow the classification of the Australian data 
in order to have consistency in grouping. However, there is no group focusing on animal 
or rural, and there are very different interest groups in Japanese charitable organisations.  
Therefore Japanese samples are grouped into: 1. Global;2. Welfare; 3. Humanitarian;  
4. Disability; 5. Environment; 6. Education; 7. Culture and not elsewhere classified and 
8. Combined group (All) 
 
It is also recognized that the Japanese groupings were unlikely to be useful in 
oligopolistic groupings due to other factors.  
 
The samples in Australia and Japan are disaggregated into geographical groups. The 
geographical groupings are based on the addresses of head offices of each organisation, 
however, their branches may spread out into different states in Australia and prefectures 
in Japan. Accordingly, the samples in Australia divide into 6 geographic groups: 1. 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT); 2. Victoria State (Victoria); 3. New South Wales 
State (NSW); 4. Queensland State (QLD); 5. West Australia State (WA); and 6. South 
Australia (SA). Also the samples in Japan spread out into 6 different prefectures. 
However, some prefectures, Saitama, Chiba, Shizuoka, Hyogo and Fukuoka, have the 
head office of only one charity. One reason for the geographical groupings is to 
determine whether the competition is based on a specific locality rather than the purpose 
of the organisation. Therefore this thesis focuses on three geographical groups, Tokyo, 
Kanagawa and Kyoto as the samples of Japan. Table 5.5 presents 44 Australian 
charitable organisations and their geographical groups. Figure 5.8 shows their 
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geographic locations on a map of Australia. Table 5.6 presents 48 Japanese charitable 
organisations and their geographical groups. Figure 5.9 shows their geographic 
locations on a map of Japan.  
 
Table 5.5: Location of Australian charitable organisations 
 
This table presents location of a head office of sample charitable organisations in Australia 
State Number Australian Charities 
ACT 1 Care Australia                                  
 2 Diabetes Australia                               
NSW 3 Aglicare NSW                                   
 4 Caritas Australia                               
 5 Mission Australia                              
 6 Royal Flying Doctor South Eastern              
 7 Royal Institute for Deaf and Blind Children    
 8 Royal Rehabilitation Centre Sydney             
 9 RSPCA NSW                                      
 10 Salvation Eastern                              
 11 The Benevolent Society                          
 12 The Smith Family                               
 13 The Spastic Centre of NSW                      
 14 Wesley Mission Sydney                          
 15 WWF Australia                                  
 16 Zoological Parks and Gardens Board             
Queensland 17 Cerebral Palsy League of Queensland            
 18 Churches of Christ Care Q                        
 19 Endeavour Foundation                           
 20 Silver Chain                                    
 21 Uniting Care Queensland                        
South Australia 22 Anglicare SA                                                                              
 23 Minda 
Victoria 24 Anglicare Australia                            
 25 Anglicare Vic.                                 
 26 Annecto (change from WIN service)              
 27 Australian Red Cross                             
 28 Baptist Community Care Victoria                
 29 Benetas                                        
 30 Melbourne City mission                          
 31 Multiple Sclerosis Society of Victoria         
 32 Oxfam Australia                                
 33 Royal Freemasons' Homes of vic.                
 34 Salvation South                                
 35 Scope (Vic)                                     
 36 Southern Cross Care Victoria                   
 37 St Vincent de Paul Society VIC                  
 38 Uniting Care Victoria                          
 39 Villa Maria Society                            
 40 World vision of Australia                      
 41 Yooralla Society of Victoria                   
Western Australia 42 Activ Foundation                               
 43 Anglican Homes Western Australia  
 44 St Vincent de Paul Society WA                   
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Figure 5.8: Location of sample of Australian charitable organisations 
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Table 5.6: Locations for Japanese charitable organisations 
   
This table presents location of a head office of sample charitable organisations in Japan. 
Prefecture Number  Japanese Charities  
Tokyo 1 Aikoku 
 2 Asia addiction  
 3 Asia Environment 
 4 BHN Telecommunication 
 5 Bramer Cm/s 
 6 Chiiki Kyoryuu Centre 
 7 Chisistuosen 
 8 Furusato Ourai Club 
 9 Futoko 
 10 HIV 
 11 Hunger Free 
 12 IHMA Japan 
 13 J Karate 
 14 J Seijin 
 15 J Toshi 
 16 J Zaitaku 
 17 J. Wheelchair Dance 
 18 JPFI 2,3,4 
 19 Jutaku Seisan 
 20 Kenkokagaku 
 21 Kyoikushien 
 22 Kyukyu Heli 
 23 Nichu Engeki Koryuu 
 24 Nippon Iryo Fukushi 
 25 Nippon Ryujojo Kairyo Tsuchi 
 26 Project Hope J 
 27 RAS Fuhoutoki 
 28 Recycle Solution 
 29 Sogyo Shien Suishin 
 30 Tomnet 
 31 Toyo 
 32 UN Shien 
 33 We Can 
 34 Yigi 
 35 Zenkoku Kyoiku 
 36 Zenshichosonhoken 
Chiba 37 New Start 
Kanagawa 38 Corporate Governance  
 39 Kids Energy 
 40 Kokusai Kendo 
 41 L Engel International Volunteer 
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Table 5.6: Locations for Japanese charitable organisations (cont.) 
 
Prefecture Number  Japanese Charities  
Saitama 42 Joy Club 
Shizuoka 43 Nihon Kenpo 
Kyoto 44 Kiko Network 
  45 Saint John Ambulance 
Osaka 46 AB Free 
Hyogo 47 Sport and Intelligence 
Fukuoka 48 J. Kokusai Koryu 
 
Figure 5.9: Location of sample of Japanese Charities 
 
 
      NOTE: The number is associated with number in Table 5.6 and prefectures. 
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5.4.4.2 The specificity of the Japanese data 
 
This study uses data from NPO Corporations because since 2001 only NPO 
Corporations require disclosure of financial information among other non-profit 
organisations in Japan. Most NPO Corporations were established after 1998, at the time 
of enactment of NPO Corporation Law for Specified Non-profit Activities of 1998. 
With an average operational time of 10 years, they are not required to have audits. 
However, no organisation reported zero fundraising or administration costs, this study 
acknowledge the inadequacy of sample data of Japanese organisations.  
 
The data from the Japanese sample of charitable organisations show a much smaller 
scale of donations, organisational size, and number of volunteers, and shorter 
operational time period than the Australian sample, but these are not the only 
differences from Australian sampled charities.   
 
In Chapter 1, differences in the shares of the various sources of the individual 
organisation‘s revenues (private (D), government (G) and commercial activities (I)) 
were noted and briefly described. Another significant and closely related financial ratio 
is F/D. This is the ratio of Fund-raising expenditure, F, to the private Donations raised, 
D. If a charitable organisation is raising funds from the private sector, whether corporate 
or household, this necessarily involves costs. For it to be worthwhile for those costs to 
be incurred, it is clear that D must be greater than F. Of course in individual years, there 
can be miscalculations, changes in macroeconomic circumstances and so on. This 
means that a loss is made by the charity in these activities. Note that given other sources 
of revenue this does not mean that the organisation needs to have made a loss on the 
whole. This is why the ratio F / D is used as opposed to the ratio F/(D+G+I). However, 
if the Cournot model of oligopoly is to be applied successfully there should almost 
certainly be a majority of years when F/D < 1. 
 
As indicated, in examining the data for both Japan and Australia some distinct patterns 
was found. The ratio of fundraising expenditure to donations found that some 
organisations had F/D>1 for all years, or for some years for some organisations to be a 
greater ratio. If the ratio showed greater than one in just a minority of years among eight 
years of observation, it could arguably be discussed as being due to mistakes in 
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planning of marketing, perhaps too high expectations for raising funds for a few years, 
or simply an organisation failing to do a good job in raising funds in those years.  
 
The pattern, F/D < 1, shows individual years for several of the Australian organisations 
would not be matter. If, on the other hand, the organisation showed a consistent pattern 
of greater than one, in the ratio of fundraising expenditures to donations, an alternative 
explanation would almost certainly be required. In the case of Australia, this is 
relatively unusual, but there was an increasing tendency for F/D > 1 for years following 
2004. For some the losses continued after that period, which suggests a change in the 
fundraising regime. The modelling of this regime change could take considerable 
resources to identify and isolate, the reason(s) for the regime change, and this lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Most striking, however, is the fact that Japanese charities consistently show the ratio of 
fund raising expenditure to donations to be greater than 1. For almost all charities for all 
of the years for which they were sampled, i.e. F/D > 1. Consequently, it is inferred that 
Japanese charities cannot fit the (Cournot) oligopolistic model for donations 
competition. Of course, this does not imply that F/D < 1 for Australian charities does 
not mean they will conform to the oligopolistic model when econometrically tested. 
However, it is necessary to know the reason why Japan is consistently higher in this 
ratio. Can it represent rational behaviour on the part of Japanese charities? In other 
words, an alternative explanation is required for charitable organisations in Japan. In 
addition, if different models are offered for Japan and Australia, it must be reasonable to 
assume that both explanations fit within their different cultures.  
 
In brief, the reason for the ratio being greater than one falls into two parts. The first is 
that Japanese organisations rely on commercial activities for revenues, rather than 
soliciting donations. The second part is that Japanese organisations use these funds 
within their commercial activities – closer to the more normal form of commercial 
marketing – rather than for gathering donations. There is, for example, the use of 
fundraising expenditure (F) for rewarding volunteers (parties, gifts, etc as they remain 
unpaid). This is especially important in Japan if volunteers are to continue to offer 
unpaid labour to commercially oriented ventures. Japanese organisations may also 
include the costs involved in to obtain government grants. 
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5.4.5 Diagnosis of tests  
 
The sample data and variables were defined in the previous section. Correlation 
coefficients tend to be less reliable when estimated from small samples (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001); therefore, it is important to have a sample size large enough to obtain a 
reliable estimation for the correlation coefficients.  
 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggest that the sample size should be larger than the 
calculation of either (a) N > 50 + 8m for testing multiple correlations, or (b) N > 104 + 
m for testing the individual predictors (where m = the number of independent variables; 
this study employs 15 independent variables including 7 factors ). Taking into 
consideration the two criteria for sample size and using 15 independent variables in the 
calculations, the study established the minimum sample size as comprising 170 
observations for testing the multiple correlations and 119 observations for testing the 
individual predictors. With a sample size of 364 observations (172 for Australia and 192 
for Japan), the current study meets the criteria for sample size and demonstrates 
sufficiency for the descriptive analysis, factor analysis and multiple regression models.  
 
In this study, descriptive statistics on data are first presented, followed by a correlation 
matrix which discloses the general factorability (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).  
 
Second, the data are checked for normal distribution. If the variables are normally 
distributed, the solution is enhanced (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). However, the 
logarithm transformation for variables is to reduce the impact of outliers but it is 
necessary to check whether the variable gives a normal or near-normal distribution after 
the transformation of the data (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001,p.81).  
 
Thirdly, the outliers in the variables act as an influence on the factor solution. 
Univariate outliers are examined using the scatter plot and the histogram graphically, or 
testing from a standardised score of z scores on one or more variables, to see if it is in 
excess of 3.29 (p<0.001, two-tailed test) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). If outliers are 
detected, the data is eliminated after checking the accuracy of the data entry. In 
addition, the Mahalanobis Distance (MD) measurement is used to determine the outliers 
(Gujarati, 1995).  
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Pallant (2005) states that the identification of the multivariate outliers in multiple 
regressions is important, because a multiple regression is very sensitive to outliers. To 
identify multivariate outliers, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggest that a MD 
measurement be used to determine a point of leverage, which is described as the 
distance between each score of the independent variables based on a linear combination. 
Extreme outliers have the potential to distort the statistical results (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001). The multivariate outliers are then evaluated from the MD measurement to 
see if the MD measurement of the residuals in the OLS regression models is in excess of 
critical χ2 value (Pallant, 2005). 
 
Finally, heteroscedasticity is tested using the ―Newy West test‖. In regression analysis, 
the variance of the dependent variable is assumed to be the equal variance across the 
data (homogeneity of variance) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). The results of the 
―White test‖ are evaluated for the null hypothesis of heteroscedasticity in the residuals 
with F-statistic in p-value. This ‗Newy West test‘ also allows the results of 
heteroscedasticity to be adjusted using the weighted least squares (Norusis, 1993). 
 
5.5 Definitions of variables 
 
This section identifies the variables used in the data analysis, factor analysis and 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression models. Section 5.5.1 explains the dependent 
and independent variables for the OLS models. All the financial data from Japanese 
charitable organisations are converted into Australian dollars for comparison purposes. 
The average of the monthly exchange rates is employed for the currency conversion.  
 
5.5.1 Dependent and Independent Variables  
 
OLS regression analyses are conducted using the natural logarithm on total donations as 
the dependent variable (lnDit). ―Donations‖ are used as the dependent variable for the 
following reasons: 
1. Donations are more commonly used in studies of charitable organisations 
(Trussel and Parsons, 2004).  
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2. Donations are far more prevalent than government funding. ―Government 
funding‖ indicates that the contributor is a government entity rather than an 
individual, foundation or corporation (cf. Parsons, 2003). 
3. Donations include only monetary contributions and do not include gifts of 
goods, because gifts of goods are not reported by most charity organisations 
(Piliavin and Charng, 1990a). 
 
Based upon theoretical and empirical modelling, the following variables are included as 
independent variables in the models and they are all transformed to a logarithm.  
 
Fundraising expenditures (F): fundraising expenditures are included because the more a 
charitable organisation spends on fundraising activities, the objective of which is to 
raise additional donations, the more donations the charitable organisation should receive. 
Also spending on the fundraising expenditures may provide information or awareness 
for potential donors of the existence of a charitable organisation (Weisbrod and 
Dominquez, 1986; Gordon and Khumawala, 1999; Tinkelman, 2004).   
 
Administration Costs (AC): Administrative expenses are operating costs including 
managerial compensation as well as expenses on other activities related to the 
administration of the organisation. The effect of competition continues to hold when 
looking at reported administrative costs. In particular, an increase in competition or the 
level of informativeness decreases the proportion of donations reported as expenditures 
including administrative costs. The cross-partial effects are ambiguous (Castaneda et al., 
2007). From the previous proposition, the cross-partial effect for expenditures on 
administration is negative. Thus, the general assumption in the charitable sector is that 
donors view administrative expenses negatively as an alternation of funds from 
programme expenses. Hence, it becomes an empirical question to determine the sign of 
the cross-partial effect of reported expenses on total donations.  
 
Fixed Assets (A): Fixed assets are considered as a representation of the Organisational 
size, the amount of fixed assets at the end of financial year. Tinkelman (1999) finds that 
charitable organisations which are smaller in size tend to be more unstable and suffer 
financial problems (1983; Jensen, 1983). Because charitable organisations operate under 
a nondistribution constraint of their surplus (Rose-Ackerman, 1996) and no one has a 
legal claim to the organisation‘s earnings (Rose-Ackerman, 1996), effective charitable 
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organisations may, to some extent, have fixed assets, which are sufficient for 
fundraisers, spending less in order to raise money (Tinkelman, 2002).  
 
Organisational age (Age): organisational age, which is the length of charity operation 
since its creation, expects to represent the quality of the organisation. Trussel and 
Parsons (2004, 2008) find that the age of an organisation represents its good reputation 
and find that this has a positive impact on total donations (see also Weisbrod and 
Dominquez, 1986; Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Tinkelman, 1999; Parson and Trussel, 
2008). Also the charitable organisational age represents ―the stock of goodwill or the 
degree of familiarity‖ which has a positive effect on total donations (Khanna et al., 1995, 
p. 263).  
 
The number of volunteers (V): Piliavin and Charng suggest that volunteer labour may 
allow a measure of altruistic behaviour. Also a number of studies on voluntarism quote 
altruistic reasons for primary motivations to volunteer (Gidron, 1983; Smith, 1983; 
Unger, 1991). Some researchers find a correlation between altruistic behaviour and 
frequency of participation in volunteer activities (Chou, 1998; Bekkers, 2001; Rehberg, 
2005). Callen states that, ―volunteer labour at the organisational level is crucial for 
implementing the demand function for donations‖ (1994, p. 218). She finds a positive 
correlation between volunteer labour and donations. Similarly, Bekker and Graff (2005) 
and Gittell and Tebaldi (2006) find that the more people are involved in volunteering 
the more increase in the total donation in the charity sector. Thus, this study predicts 
that the number of volunteers influences an increase in total donations. 
 
Government grants (G): Charitable organisations compete for receiving government 
subsidies which are used for their activities and services in the provision of collective 
goods (Marcuello and Salas, 2001). Thus, government subsidies to charitable 
organisations indicate the high quality of organisation, since government provides 
support only to organisations with good management and operation. Thus information 
about receipt of government grants is included. Some previous studies find that 
government grants encourage private donors to donate more and others have found that 
government subsidies discourage private giving (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; Kingma, 
1989; Payne, 1998), or that any increased government assistance can partially reduce 
private donations. (Schokkaert and Ootegem, 1998). For example, the donors may think 
their donations are less important, which leads them to give to other organisations 
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(Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984). In addition, charitable organisations show less intereste in 
more aggressive fundraising strategies after receiving a government grant (Bergstrom et 
al., 1986). The thesis assumes that government grants have a significant positive effect 
on donations as the quality measurement of the charity (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; 
Kingma, 1989; Andreoni, 1990; Payne, 1998; Khanna and Sandler, 2000). Table 5.7 
summarises research variables and definitions. 
 
Table 5.7: Research variables and summary definitions 
Variables Definitions 
lnDi The natural logarithm of private donations (current dollars) to charitable 
organisation (CO) i  
lnFi The natural logarithm of fundraising expenditures of COi 
lnFj The natural logarithm of fundraising expenditures of COi‘s competitor COj, 
(Total fundraising expenditures in a group (F) – Fi). This value will vary 
between groups. 
lnFi/∑lnF The natural logarithm of ratio Fi to all competitors‘ F. This value will vary 
between groups.  
lnFi/lnFj The natural logarithm of ratio Fi to competitors‘ Fj, (alternative ratio to  
lnFi /∑lnF). This value will vary between groups.  
lnAi The natural logarithm of fixed assets of COi; used a proxy for the size and 
wealth of CO. 
lnAi/∑lnA The natural logarithm of ratio Ai to all competitors ‗A. This value will vary 
between groups. 
lnAi/lnAj The natural logarithm of ratio Ai to competitor‘s Aj (alternative ratio to 
lnAi/∑lnA). This value will vary between groups. 
lnVi The natural logarithm of number of persons per year working as volunteers for 
COi. 
lnAgei The natural logarithm of number of years since the COi was formally created 
(operational age). 
lnGi The natural logarithm of government subsidies/grants to COi.  
lnACi The natural logarithm of administrative costs of COi. 
NOTE: All variables are represented in number or monetary value for a financial year.   
 
5.6 Summary 
 
This chapter contains a family of models with 24 equations, and tests nine hypotheses, 
following the theoretical framework and theoretical modelling in Chapter 4. Outlined is 
the approach to testing the variables used in this study and the methods of model 
construction are defined. Finally, the chapter described a family of empirical modelling 
approaches for seeking consistency of results and accuracy of procedures. Figure 5.2 
presents the summary of research topics, research questions and hypotheses with 
empirical models of the thesis. A family of empirical models, closely related to each 
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other but mutually exclusive with different functional forms and specifications are 
expected to produce a consistent form to answer research questions.  
 
In the following Chapter 6, the results of the empirical analysis are presented and 
discussed.  
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Chapter 6  
The results of analysis on preliminary modelling 
  
The results of the empirical analysis of the competition models, using a sample of 
charitable organisations in Australia and Japan are presented.  
 
Section 6.1 discusses competitive model in the OLS regression with allocation of 
charitable organisations into similar industry and Section 6.2 provides a descriptive 
analysis of the variables for the Australian and Japanese samples of charitable 
organisations. Section 6.3 discusses the preliminary results for the Australian samples, 
testing hypotheses one (H1) to four (H4) using the family models, including sub-models 
1 to 24. Section 6.4 presents the preliminary results of testing the family models for 
Japanese sample of charitable organisations. Section 6.5 summarises and provides a 
conclusion. 
 
6.1 Competitive models in OLS regression, with allocation of 
charitable organisations into similar industry groups   
 
This section presents the results of the tested hypotheses using the models developed in 
Chapter 5. A sample of charitable organisations in Australia is grouped into eight 
groups. These are: 
1. All — all organisations combined (352 observations, 8 years of 44 organisations)  
2. Welfare (119) 
3. Humanitarian (42) 
4. Global (35) 
5 Disability (84) 
6. Animal (21) 
7. Science (and Culture) (28)  
8. Rural (49).  
 
Note that in this chapter all of the groups are underlined to allow easier recognition of 
specific groups when discussed. 
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As in Chapter 5, there are no animal or rural groups but culture and environment groups 
for the sample of Japanese charitable organisations. However, most of the groupings 
follow the Australian samples, including 
1. All (384) (8 years of 48 organisations) 
2. Welfare (72), 
3. Humanitarian (40) 
4. Global (72) 
5. Disability (32) 
6. Culture (and Science) (72) 
7. Education (56) and  
8. Environment (48).  
 
The purpose of the grouping is to allow competition effects from competitor charities, 
different organisations with similar missions and objectives. The research structure, 
research questions and the linked families of models for testing the hypotheses of the 
thesis were presented in the Chapter 5 (see Figure 5.2). 
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics  
 
Descriptive analysis is conducted in both raw and logarithm form. The sample contains 
352 observations (years) of 44 charitable organisations in Australia and 384 
observations (years) of 48 charitable organisations in Japan.  
 
6.2.1 Descriptive analysis for Australian and Japanese data 
 
Table 6.1 lists the sample means, maximum, minimum, standard deviations (std.) and 
Jarque-Bera statistic (JB) for selection data from 44 Australian an irregular charitable 
organisations for the period of 2001 to 2008. This yields pooled cross-section-time-
series of 352 observation-years of Australian samples and 384 observation-years of 
Japanese smaples. The dependent variable is total donations (D) and this is reported in 
the first level (raw data) and in natural log form (lnD). A number of the independent 
variables are presented in thousands of dollars including fundraising expenditure (Fi and 
Fj), fixed assets (Ai), government grants (G), administrative costs (AC) and the number 
of volunteers (V).  
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One major difference between the present study and the most similar of previous studies 
(Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Castaneda et al., 2007) is that they employed the 
fundraising competition index variables and the annected aggregation of group in 
charity types. Such aggregation would be fatal to the present study, since it would 
render meaningless the competition variables, which should vary between like charity 
groups. The competition variables are competitors fundraising expenditure, Fj, and the 
ratio of fundraising expenditure to all competitors, Fi/F or Fi/Fj  and ratio of 
organisational size to all competitors‘ size. The difference between Fi/F and Fi/Fj, or 
Ai/A and Ai/Aj is whether the denominator value includes the value of the charitable 
organisation in the former (Fi/F and Ai/A) or excludes it in the latter (Fi/Fj and Ai/A). 
These values are not different form each other when the group is large, but when the 
group is small, their differences would be large and so would affect results. The reason 
for using different denominators is to determine whether the empirical results are 
sensitive to the formulation used.  
 
A further difference lies on large standard deviations in variables of samples. As seen in 
Table 6.1, most of the raw variables are very different between charitable organisations 
and there are very large variations between samples at the raw level. This indicates 
outliers requiring logarithmic transformation of data for OLS estimation.  
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Table 6.1: Descriptive analysis for Australian data 
 
   Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Jarque-Bera 
Di (AUD000) 20,790 321,962 50 47822 7291 
Fi (AUD000) 6,267 191,062 38 14923 122580 
Fj(AUD000) 269,016 433,508 162,822 73430 74 
Ai (AUD000) 79,058 676,169 4 116018 2134 
Aj (AUD000) 3,318,155 3,696,164 2,465,530 229946 5 
Gi (AUD000) 137,792 8,347,453 36 811775 103604 
ACi(AUD000) 36,359 1,132,087 68 84789 118671 
Vi  3,504 33,510 86 6946 1227 
Agei 82 196 4 50 25 
lnD 8.526 12.682 3.902 1.779 1.263 
lnFi 7.754 12.160 3.638 1.387 6.177 
lnFj 12.470 12.980 12.000 0.249 35.352 
lnFi/lnF 0.014 0.022 0.007 0.003 7.210 
lnFi/lnFj 0.014 0.023 0.007 0.003 7.037 
lnAi 10.233 13.424 1.386 1.926 271.721 
lnAi/lnA 0.015 0.020 0.002 0.003 273.691 
lnAi/lnAj 0.016 0.021 0.002 0.003 260.319 
lnGi 10.024 15.937 3.584 1.703 197.700 
lnACi 9.422 13.940 4.223 1.655 17.163 
lnVi 7.104 10.420 4.454 1.315 33.012 
lnAgei 4.241 5.278 1.609 0.733 78.707 
Note: 1. This table summarises the sampling properties of Australian charitable organisations 
data in raw and logarithm form for the period of 2001-2008; 2. 352 observations (years); 3. i = 
charitable organisation (CO), j = a competitor COs of COi; 4. Di (lnDi) = total donation, D, 
(natural log), a dependent variable; Fi (lnFi) = fundraising expenditure, F, (natural log) for a 
year; Fj (lnFj) = fundraising expenditure; F, (natural log) of competitor CO for a year; lnFi/lnF 
(lnFi/lnFj) = natural log of ratio of Fi to all competitors F (Fj); Ai (lnAi) = fixed assets; A, 
(natural log) of COi for a year (a proxy of size); lnAi/lnA  (lnAi / lnAj ) = natural log of ratio of 
Ai to all competitors A (Aj); V (lnV) = volunteers for a year (natural log); AGE (lnAge) = the 
number of operational years (natural log); G (lnG) = total government grants to COi for a year 
(natural log);  AC (lnAC)= administrative costs of COi for a year (natural log). 
 
The financial data consists of a sample of charitable organisations based in Japan. The 
descriptive analysis is conducted in both raw and the logarithm form. The sample 
contains 384 observations (years) for 48 charitable organisations in Japan.  
 
Table 6.2 lists sample means, maximum, minimum, standard deviations and Jarque-
Bera for selection data for the period 2001 to 2008. All monetary values are presented in 
Australian dollars at an exchange rate of JPY80 for AUD 1.  
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Table 6.2: Descriptive analysis for Japanese data 
 
   Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Jarque-Bera 
Di (AUD000)            223              1,710                    1  27047 1021 
Fi (AUD000)              38                661                    0  5279 12640 
Fj (AUD000)          1,775              2,100              1,231  16068 15 
Ai (AUD000)            128              1,608                    0  18024 2871 
Aj (AUD000)          6,050              7,138              3,313  65529 40 
Gi (AUD000)              41              1,150                  -    10940 11327 
ACi (AUD000)            223              1,488                    1  20339 696 
Vi            443  8910 10 934 25956 
Agei 7 73 1 10 17353 
lnDi 8.759 11.919 3.807 1.662 12.616 
lnFi 14.011 17.783 9.259 1.417 4.505 
lnFj 18.766 18.938 18.405 0.117 22.725 
lnFi/lnF 0.016 0.020 0.010 0.002 4.055 
lnFi/lnFj 0.016 0.020 0.011 0.002 3.676 
lnAi 14.956 18.673 9.490 1.729 12.297 
lnAj 19.987 20.163 19.394 0.147 96.045 
lnAi/lnA 0.016 0.019 0.010 0.002 12.302 
lnAi/lnAj 0.016 0.020 0.010 0.002 11.636 
lnGi 1.730 11.430 0.000 3.584 192.321 
lnACi 16.066 18.596 11.278 1.270 46.449 
lnVi 5.165 9.095 2.303 1.326 4.770 
lnAgei 1.786 4.304 0.693 0.612 381.147 
Note: 1. This table summarises the sampling properties of Australian charitable organisations 
data in raw and logarithm form for the period of 2001-2008; 2. 352 observations-years;  
3. i = charitable organisation (CO), j = a competitor COs of COi  
4. Di (lnDi) = total donation, D, (with natural log), a dependent variable; Fi (lnFi) = fundraising 
expenditure, F, (with natural log) for a year; Fj (lnFj) = fundraising expenditure; F, (with natural 
log) of competitor CO for a year; lnFi/lnF (lnFi/lnFj) = natural log of ratio of Fi to all 
competitors F (Fj); Ai (lnAi) = fixed assets; A, (with natural log) of COi for a year (a proxy of 
size); lnAi/lnA  (lnAi / lnAj ) = natural log of ratio of Ai to all competitors A (Aj); V (lnV) = the 
number of volunteers for a year (with natural log); AGE (lnAge) = the number of operational 
years (with natural log); G (lnG) = total government grants to COi for a year (with natural log);  
AC (lnAC)= administrative costs of COi for a year (with natural log) and 1AUD = 80 JYP. 
 
6.2.2 Correlation analysis 
 
The matrices of the correlation between the variables for the Australian variables are 
shown in Table 6.3. Donations Di, is statistically significant and positively related to 
fundraising expenditure, Fi, but not surprisingly insignificant and negatively related to 
fundraising expenditure of competitors, Fj. In addition, Di, is not statistically significant 
but positively related to the size of charitable organisation, Ai. Di, is also statistically 
significant and positively related to volunteers, Vi, as expected, and consistent with 
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previous studies. Di, is statistically insignificant and negatively related to the 
organisational age, Agei. Di, is statistically insignificant but positively related to the 
government grants, Gi, to organisations and organisational administrative costs, ACi. 
This indicates government grants, Gi, may have a very little influence on donations, as 
with administrative costs, ACi, spending on appropriate amounts for staff may have 
little impact on donations. 
 
The natural log of total donations, lnDi, is statistically significant and positively related 
to the natural log of fundraising expenditure, lnF. lnDi, is also statistically significant 
and positively related to the natural log of the ratio of fundraising expenditure of charity 
i (Fi) to competitors‘ fundraising expenditure (F or Fj), lnFi/lnF or lnFi/lnFj, is found to 
have statistically similar significance and a positive relation. lnDi, is statistically 
significant and positively related to the natural log of volunteers, lnVi, is the highest 
correction among other variables. lnDi, is not statistically significant but positively 
related to the natural log of organisational age, lnAgei, and the natural log of 
government grants, lnGi, while with the natural log of administrative costs, lnACi, has 
insignificant and very weak correlation. 
 
Fundraising expenditure, Fi, is statistically significant and positively related to 
organisational size, Ai, the number of volunteers, Vi, and administrative costs, ACi. 
However, the natural logarithm of fundraising expenditure, lnFi, has a positive and 
statistically very significant correlation to the natural logarithm of ratio of Fi to 
competitors‘ F or Fj, lnFi/lnF and lnFi/lnFj, concerning autocorrelation.  
 
The correlation matrices for the Australia variables are presented in Table 6.3. Overall, 
the correlation analyses show that the correlation between the natural logarithm of total 
donations and other log variables are mostly positive. The exceptions are Age and 
competitor oranisations‘ fundraising expenditure.  
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Table 6.3: Correlation Matrix for Australian data 
  Di Fi Fj Ai Vi Agei Gi ACi lnD lnFi lnFj lnFi/lnF lnFi/lnFj 
Di 1.000             
Fi 0.281** 1.000            
Fj -0.010 -0.089 1.000           
Ai 0.115* 0.295** -0.084 1.000          
Vi 0.349** 0.340** -0.046 0.452** 1.000         
Agei -0.111* 0.080 0.001 0.290** 0.086 1.000        
Gi 0.003 0.024 -0.034 0.411** 0.037 -0.022 1.000       
ACi 0.068 0.666** -0.060 0.525** 0.237 0.113* 0.480 1.000      
lnD 0.641** 0.317** -0.038 0.199** 0.491** 0.042 0.050 0.153** 1.000     
lnFi 0.358** 0.608** -0.041 0.386** 0.351** 0.201** 0.091 0.369** 0.468** 1.000    
lnFj -0.014 -0.098 0.992** -0.089 -0.049 -0.002 -0.037 -0.064 -0.049 -0.055 1.000   
lnFi/lnF 0.350** 0.612** -0.044 0.388** 0.348** 0.201** 0.096 0.370** 0.462** 0.998** -0.060 1.000  
lnFi/lnFj 0.351** 0.614** -0.045 0.389** 0.350** 0.201** 0.096 0.372** 0.463** 0.998** -0.060 1.000 1.000 
lnAi 0.033 0.203** -0.019 0.621** 0.147** 0.462** 0.140** 0.322** 0.035 0.443** -0.024 0.442** 0.441** 
lnAi/lnA 0.036 0.205** -0.028 0.621** 0.144** 0.459** 0.144** 0.322** 0.033 0.440** -0.035 0.442** 0.441** 
lnAi/lnAj 0.036 0.206** -0.029 0.624** 0.146** 0.460** 0.146** 0.323** 0.033 0.440** -0.036 0.442** 0.441** 
lnVi 0.440** 0.352** -0.049 0.353** 0.817** 0.076 0.083 0.220** 0.616** 0.393** -0.056 0.389** 0.390** 
lnAgei -0.050 0.083 -0.001 0.253** 0.192** 0.847** 0.016 0.116* 0.121* 0.132** -0.003 0.131** 0.131** 
lnGi 0.165** 0.140** 0.066 0.429** 0.286** 0.086 0.426** 0.375** 0.151** 0.295** 0.069 0.293** 0.293** 
lnACi 0.076 0.291** 0.012 0.500** 0.119* 0.204** 0.197** 0.529** 0.059 0.527** 0.007 0.523** 0.522** 
Note: 1. sample size = 352; 2. i = charitable organisation (CO), j = a competitor COs; 3. Di (lnDi) = total donation, D, (with natural log), a dependent variable; Fi 
(lnFi) = fundraising expenditure (natural log); Fj (lnFj) = fundraising expenditure of competitor j (natural log); lnFi/lnF (lnFi/lnFj) = natural log of ratio of Fi to all 
competitors F (Fj);Ai (lnAi) = fixed assets, A, (natural log) of i (a proxy of size); lnAi/lnA  (lnAi / lnAj ) = natural log ratio of Ai to all competitors A (Aj); V (lnV) = 
the number of volunteers (natural log);Age (lnAge) = the number of operational age (natural log); G (lnG) = total government grants (natural log); AC (lnAC)= 
administrative costs (natural log); *, ** Correlation is significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.3 (cont.): Correlation Matrix for Australian data  
 
  lnAi lnAi/lnA lnAi/lnAj lnVi lnAgei lnGi lnACi 
lnAi 1.000       
lnAi/lnA 0.999** 1.000      
lnAi/lnAj 0.999** 1.000 1.000     
lnVi 0.013 0.011 0.013 1.000    
lnAgei 0.286** 0.283** 0.285** 0.144** 1.000   
lnGi 0.246** 0.242** 0.243** 0.157** 0.186** 1.000  
lnACi 0.664** 0.660** 0.661** 0.030 0.132** 0.483** 1.000 
Note: 1. sample size = 352; 2. i = charitable organisation (CO), j = a competitor COs;  
3. Di (lnDi) = total donation, D, (natural log), a dependent variable; Fi (lnFi) = fundraising 
expenditure of COi (natural log); Fj (lnFj) = fundraising expenditure of competitor COj (natural 
log); lnFi/lnF (lnFi/lnFj) = natural log of ratio of Fi to all competitors F (Fj);Ai (lnAi) = fixed 
assets, A, (natural log) of COi (a proxy of size); lnAi/lnA  (lnAi / lnAj ) = natural log of ratio of 
Ai to all competitors A (Aj);V (lnV) = the number of volunteers (natural log); 
Age (lnAge) = the number of operational age (natural log);G (lnG) = total government grants to 
COi (natural log); AC (lnAC)= administrative costs of COi (natural log); 
 *, ** Correlation is significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6.4 presents the correlation matrices for Japanese data which shows the 
coefficient of correlation is significantly different from zero.  
 
Overall, the correlation analyses for Japanese data show that the correlation between the 
natural logarithm of total donations and other logarithm of variables are mostly 
positively correlated. The exceptions are Age and Competitors‘ fundraising expenditure. 
This is consistent with Australian data. The correlation analyses for Australian data 
show that the correlations between donations and the number of volunteers are 
significantly positive in both the raw form and natural logs, whereas Japanese 
volunteers are only insignificantly negatively correlated with donations in raw form and 
positive but are insignificant in the natural log form.  
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Table 6.4: Pearson Correlations Matrix of Japanese sample data 
  Di Fi FJ Ai G AC V Age lnD lnFi lnFj lnFi/lnF lnFi/lnFj 
Di 1.000             
Fi 0.256** 1.000            
FJ -0.029 -0.264** 1.000           
Ai 0.233** -0.007 0.043 1.000          
G 0.203** 0.261** -0.012 0.016 1.000         
AC 0.538** 0.198** 0.027 0.280** 0.452** 1.000        
V -0.014 0.000 0.025 -0.057 0.089 0.011 1.000       
Age -0.062 -0.067 0.084 -0.072 -0.003 -0.059 -0.054 1.000      
lnD 0.726** 0.302** -0.053 0.103* 0.193** 0.419** 0.020 -0.011 1.000     
lnFi 0.380** 0.695** -0.131** 0.052 0.261** 0.341** -0.030 -0.009 0.517 1.000    
lnFj -0.027 -0.272** 0.998** 0.042 -0.008 0.034 0.025 0.088 -0.052 -0.132** 1.000   
lnFi/lnF 0.378** 0.693** -0.186** 0.050 0.258** 0.337** -0.032 -0.013 0.517** 0.998** -0.187** 1.000  
lnFi/lnFj 0.378** 0.695** -0.185** 0.050 0.258** 0.337** -0.031 -0.013 0.516** 0.998** -0.186** 1.000 1.000 
lnAi 0.333** 0.083 0.065 0.609** 0.088 0.359** 0.010 -0.052 0.342** 0.235** 0.065 0.231** 0.231** 
lnAi/lnA 0.332** 0.080 0.014 0.608** 0.084 0.355** 0.009 -0.056 0.341** 0.231** 0.015 0.230** 0.230** 
lnAi/lnAj 0.333** 0.080 0.014 0.609** 0.085 0.355** 0.009 -0.056 0.341** 0.231** 0.015 0.230** 0.229** 
lnG 0.197** 0.201** 0.017 -0.075 0.720** 0.210** 0.111 0.016 0.149** 0.177** 0.021 0.172 0.173** 
lnAC 0.452** 0.221** 0.008 0.297** 0.236** 0.784** -0.043 -0.039 0.484** 0.478** 0.014 0.475 0.475** 
lnV 0.058 0.068 0.015 0.062 0.168** 0.116* 0.671** -0.129 0.056 -0.016 0.016 -0.019 -0.018 
lnAge -0.029 -0.020 0.386** -0.021 0.072 0.039** -0.005 0.819** -0.021 0.058 0.404** 0.035 0.035 
Note: 1. This table summarises the sampling properties of Australian charitable organisations data in raw and logarithm form for the period of 2001-2008; 2. 352 
observations-years; 3. i = charitable organisation (CO), j = a competitor COs of COi;4. Di (lnDi) = total donation, D, (with natural log), a dependent variable; Fi (lnFi) 
= fundraising expenditure, F, (with natural log) for a year; Fj (lnFj) = fundraising expenditure; F, (with natural log) of competitor CO for a year; lnFi/lnF (lnFi/lnFj) = 
natural log of ratio of Fi to all competitors F (Fj); Ai (lnAi) = fixed assets; A, (with natural log) of COi for a year (a proxy of size); lnAi/lnA  (lnAi / lnAj ) = natural 
log of ratio of Ai to all competitors A (Aj); V (lnV) = the number of volunteers for a year (with natural log); AGE (lnAge) = the number of operational years (with 
natural log); G (lnG) = total government grants to COi for a year (with natural log);  AC (lnAC)= administrative costs of COi for a year (with natural log) and 1AUD 
= 80 JYP; *, ** Correlation is significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (2-tailed).  
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Table 6.4 (cont.): Pearson Correlations Matrix of Japanese sample data 
 
lnFi/lnFj lnAi lnAj lnAi/lnA lnAi/lnAj lnG lnAC lnV lnAge 
lnAi 1.000        
lnAj -0.083 1.000       
lnAi/lnA 0.998** -0.141** 1.000      
lnAi/lnAj 0.998** -0.142** 1.000 1.000     
lnG -0.054 0.099 -0.059 -0.059 1.000    
lnAC 0.428** 0.007 0.425 0.425** 0.074 1.000   
lnV 0.095 0.014 0.093 0.093 0.213** 0.042 1.000  
lnAge -0.007 0.378** -0.029 -0.029 0.105* 0.022 -0.056 1.000 
Note: 1. This table summarises the sampling properties of Australian charitable organisations 
data in raw and logarithm form for the period of 2001-2008; 2. 352 observations-years;  
3. i = charitable organisation (CO), j = a competitor COs of COi; 4. Di (lnDi) = total donation,  
D, (with natural log), a dependent variable; Fi (lnFi) = fundraising expenditure; F, (with natural 
log)  for a year; Fj (lnFj) = fundraising expenditure; F, (with natural log) of competitor CO for a 
year; lnFi/lnF (lnFi/lnFj) = natural log of ratio of Fi to all competitors F (Fj); Ai (lnAi) = fixed 
assets; A, (with natural log) of COi for a year (a proxy of size); lnAi/lnA  (lnAi / lnAj ) = natural 
log of ratio of Ai to all competitors A (Aj); V (lnV) = the number of volunteers for a year (with 
natural log); AGE (lnAge) = the number of operational years (with natural log);  
G (lnG) = total government grants to COi for a year (with natural log);   
AC (lnAC)= administrative costs of COi for a year (with natural log) and 1AUD = 80 JYP 
*, ** Correlation is significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (2-tailed). 
6.2.3 Normality, outlier and heteroscedasticity test  
 
The assumption of normal distribution of data needs to be considered for regression 
analysis. The normal distribution of data was assessed by graphical and statistical 
methods of skewness and kurtosis to calculate the Jarque-Bera statistic, which are 
presented in Table 6.1.  
 
The assumption of non-bias of results is also examined. Since this study aims to test the 
hypotheses using continuous variables for the eight years on ordinary least squares 
(OLS) of multiple regression models, and these models were based on the assumption of 
no misspecification of variables in the regression models and no distortion of the 
statistical results (Gujarati, 1995, 1999), it would seem necessary to test outliers of data 
and the error term of regression models. This entailed use of the heteroscedasticity test.  
 
Lastly, the univariate outliers were examined graphically from the scatter plot and 
histogram. Some variables were found to have minor univariate outliers from the 
statistic results, with standardized scores of slightly over 3.29 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001). However, there was no significant effect from these outliers (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001), given that the excess was only slightly over 3.29 with adequate size of 
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sample
21
 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Meyers et al., 2006). With a sample size of  352 
observations (years), there was no significant effect from univariate outliers on the 
results of analysis and no impact of departure from zero skewness, and there was 
reduced risk of underestimating the variance in existence of a significant level of 
kurtosis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). However the fact that the full set of data is not 
used in groups could have important impacts in terms of outliers skewness, etc. Pallant 
(2005) states that identification of multivariate outliers in multiple regressions is 
important because a multiple regression is highly sensitive to outliers; extreme outliers 
have the potential to significantly distort statistical results (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).  
 
6.3 Preliminary results for Australian data 
 
6.3.1 Competition model 1 
 
6.3.1.1 Major family of competition model 1 
 
The results of the regression analysis of Model 1 are in Table 6.5. Model 1 combines 
lagged and unlagged independent variables as determining donation. As discussed 
earlier, fundraising expenditure are the cost for fundraising activities for raising 
donations, therefore fundraising expenditure are expected to have a direct effect on 
current collection of donations. Other independent variables take longer to have an 
affect on the current donation, so Model 1 employs fundraising expenditure of the 
current year whereas other independent variables use information from the previous 
year.   
 
The empirical models are developed using the natural logarithm of total donation (lnDi) 
as a dependent variables and independent variables are also the natural logarithm (lnFi, 
lnFj, lnFi/lnF, lnAi, lnAi/lnA, lnAge and lnV). Consequently, the estimation results will 
be consistent and can potentially show diminishing marginal effects from the presumed 
underlying relationship between the dependent and the independent variables 
(Marcuello and Salas, 2001). Model 1 is as follows:  
 
                                                 
21
 Tabachnick and Fidell,(2001) stated that with a sample size of >100 there was no impact of departure 
of zero skewness or no risk of underestimating the variance with the existence of kurtosis; Meyers, 
Gamst, and Gurino (2006, p 467) also defined the adequacy of good sample size as more than 300.   
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ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + ε                                                         (1) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation;  
j indicates competing charitable organisations; t indicates the year;  
D is donations;  
F is fundraising expenditure;  
Fi /F is the ratio of Fi to F;  
A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size);  
Ai /A is the ratio of Ai to A;  
V is the number of volunteers;  
Age is organisational age and ε is the error term. 
 
The results of the parameter estimation of a log-log model are interpretable as 
elasticities; i.e. the percentage change in the dependent variable correlated with a one 
percent change in the independent variable. The underlying assumption is that the 
elasticities, rather than the absolute effects, are constant across the range of data.  
 
In Table 6.5 estimation results for each industry group and the coefficients of 
independent variables for each industry group are presented. As shown at the bottom of 
Table 6.5, the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
, of the models for the donations in combined lagged 
and unlagged independent variables in the All Groups group (All) are 0.455 and 0.442. 
Mose importantly, as hypothesised the explanatory power of regression models of each 
industry group is much higher than that of an aggregate of all data. This is an 
enormously encouraging result, consistent with the hypothesis of competition of like 
charities, and this is despite the greater sample size of the All group. In essence these 
results indicate that donors see ―like‖ charities as supplying substitute services to 
recipients. As shown in Table 6.5, the Animal Group is the highest in the R
2
at 0.838 
(adjusted R
2,
 at 0.751).  This is followed by Global with R
2
 at 0.832 (adjusted R
2
 at 
0.789.), Rural at 0.785 (0.740), Humanitarian at 0.711 (0.684), Science at 0.639 (0.512), 
Disability at 0.610 (0.574), and Welfare at 0.570 (0.543). Overall, the explanatory 
power of the first model is more than 0.50 in each a priori specified charity group.   
 
These results indicate several points: (1) the sample of Australian charitable 
organisations is successfully allocated in an appropriate group; (2) the competition 
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models fit well with the groups of charitable organisations; (3) most variables in the 
competition models one are related to total donations; and (4) charitable organisations 
compete within the same group of organisation. The structural form of the regression 
analysis indicates a Cournot type model of oligopolistic competition.  
 
In Table 6.5 in the first column, lnFi is shown as positive elasticity in most of the 
groups, as expected, except Rural. Thus, the coefficients of fundraising expenditure in 
all groups are the range between -0.010 and 10.016. lnFi shows significantly positive 
correlation in the Global, Disability and Science groups. As developed in Chapter 5, 
hypothesis one is tested as follows: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in most groups; All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Disability, Animal and 
Science groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Rural group.   
 
The coefficients in lnFj are significantly negative in the Global, Disability and Science 
groups as expected, while they are positive and significant in the Humanitarian industry 
and positive but insignificant in the All, Welfare, Animal and Rural groups, and the 
ranges are between -6.094 and 0.607. Hypothesis 2 is tested as: H0: Fj  0 and H1: Fj < 
0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Global, Disability and Science groups, while the 
Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Animal and Rural 
grops.  
 
The regression coefficient on the ratio of lnFi to all competitors, lnFi/∑lnF, garnered 
mixed results, with significantly positive elasticities in All, but insignificant but positive 
elasticities in the Humanitarian and Animal. Those of the Global, Disability and Science 
groups are negative but significant, but show negative and insignificant elasticities in 
the Welfare and Rural groups. Hypothesis 3 is tested as: Hypothesis 3: H0: Fi /F  0 and 
H1: Fi /F > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected the All, Humanitarian and Animal groups, 
whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Welfare, Global, Disability, Science 
and Rural groups.   
 
These results indicate that fundraising expenditure have a positive impact on the level of 
total donation in the most of groups except in the Rural group. The competitors 
fundraising activities impact on donors in the Global, Disability and Science groups to 
donate competitors by reducing donation to the original organisations. However, they 
increased the level of donations in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Animal and Rural 
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groups. In other words, competitors‘ fundraising activities may influence donors to 
increase overall support for their own preferred charitable causes especially in the 
Welfare, Humanitarian, Animal and Rural groups.  
 
The coefficient on size (lnAi) is shown to be positive and significant in the Disability 
group, and insignificant but positive in the Welfare, Animal, and Science groups as 
expected, whereas the coefficients in the All, Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups 
are obtained otherwise. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0: The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in the Welfare, Disability, Animal, and Science groups, while the 
Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups.  
 
The coefficient on the ratio of size to competitors‘ size is positive in the All, 
Humanitarian, Global, Science and Rural groups, while those in the Disability and 
Animal groups is negative but significant, and negative and insignificant in the Welfare 
group. Hypothesis 5 is tested as: H0: Ai /A  0 and H1: Ai /A > 0. The Null Hypothesis 
is rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global, Science and Rural groups, whereas the Null 
Hypothesis is not rejected in the Welfare, Disability and Animal groups.  
 
The above results indicate that the size of chariable organisations has a positive impact 
and encourages donors to donate more in the groups of Welfare, Animal and Disability.  
 
The coefficients on Volunteers (lnV) are either significantly positive or positive in all 
groups, significantly positive in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability and Rural 
groups, and positive but insignificant in the Animal group. Volunteers seem to impact 
and increase the level of total donations in all groups. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  
0 and H1: Vi > 0. Thus, the Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Disability, Rural groups of charitable organisations. Conversely the Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in the Animal group.  
 
The coefficient on Age (lnAge) also indicated mixed results. It was positive and 
significant in the Disability and positive but insignificant in the All and Science groups, 
whereas those of the Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups are negative but 
significant, and negative and insignificant in the Welfare and Animal groups. 
Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null hypothesis is rejected 
in the All, Disability and, Science and Culture groups of charitable orgnisaitons, while 
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the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Humanitarian, Global, Welfare, Animal and 
Rural groups of charitable organisations. 
 
Lastly the coefficients on constant show significantly positive in the Global, Disability, 
Animal and Rural groups, whereas those in the All, Welfare and Humanitarian groups 
are otherwise. 
 
Table 6.6 presents the results of Model 1_J. As explained in Chapter 5, Model 1_J, is a 
sub-family of Model 1; a modification of Model 1 using the value of competing 
charities j as a denominator in the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets, 
representing as lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Instead of using all 
competitors, F and A as denominators in each ratio, these are calculated from all 
competitors minus Fj and Aj, respectively as [Fi/Fj = Fi/(∑F-Fi)] or [Ai/Aj = Ai/(∑A- 
Ai)]. In smaller of group this may have impacts on the ratio, consequently the results of 
the coefficients on the ratios may differ to those of Model 1. Model 1_J of tested 
Equation (2) is : 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + ε                                                         (2) 
 
Apar from the fundraising ratio the variable are as in Model 1.  
 
As shown in Table 6.6, the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) are consistent with that of Model 1 in 
percentage and in the order of explanatory power. Overall, the explanatory power of the 
second model is mostly higher than 0.5 except in the All industry group. Animal is 
shown to be the highest in R
2
at 0.844 (adjusted R
2,
 at 0.760), followed by Global (R
2
 at 
0.833 and adjusted R
2
 at 0.789), Rural (0.785 and 0.740), Humanitarian (0.714 and 
0.688), Science and Culture (0.652 and 0.531), Disability (0.595 and 0.558), Welfare 
(0.571 and 0.544) and the lowest is All (0.455 and 0.442). Those results are consistent 
with Model 1. 
 
In Table 6.6, in the second column, lnFi shows a positive elasticity in the most of groups 
except the Animal group, whereas that of Rural was only negative in Model 1. The 
coefficients on lnFi are shown as ranging between -0.011 and 10.677 and that is positive 
and significant in the Global, Disability and Science group, where ranges indicate 
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similarity to the results of Model 1. Hypothesis 1 is tested as: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. 
The Null Hypothesis is rejected in most of the groups; All, Welfare, Humanitarian, 
Global, Disability, Science and Rural groups, whereas the Null Hypothesis is not 
rejected in the Animal group.   
 
The coefficients of competitors‘ fundraising expenditure, lnFj, are similar to the results 
from Model 1, negative but significant in the Global, Disability and Science groups and 
negative and insignificant in the Rural group, while the coefficients are positive and 
significant in the Humanitarian group and positive but insignificant in the All, Welfare 
and Animal groups. Those results are consistent with Model 1 except Rural, which has 
the opposite sign. Hypothesis 2 is tested: H0: Fj  0 and H1: Fj < 0. The Null Hypothesis 
is rejected in the Global, Disability, Science and Rural groups, while the Null 
Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, and Animal groups.    
 
Again in Table 6.6, the coefficient of the ratio of Fi to competitors, lnFi / ∑lnFj, is 
positive and significant in the Humanitarian group, and positive but insignificant in the 
All Welfare and Animal, while those in the Global, Disability and Science are 
statistically significant but negative, and negative and insignificant in the Rural group, 
which show similaritly with the results of Model 1. As we hypothesised in Chapter 5, 
Hypothesis 3 is tested: H0: Fi/Fj  0 and H1: Fi/Fj > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
the All, Humanitarian and Animal groups, whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected 
in the Welfare, Global, Disability, Science and Rural groups.   
 
The results indicate the effectiveness of fundraising activities of organisations, and these 
have positive impact on the level of total donations in most groups, except Animal 
group. In addition competitors‘ fundraising activities have a negative impact on the 
level of total donations in the Global, Disability and Science, while the competitors 
activities appear not have any significant impact on the Welfare, Humanitarian, Animal 
and Rural groups.  
 
As shown in Table 6.6, the coefficients of organisational size (lnAi) are positive in four 
groups, Welfare, Disability, Animal and Science, whereas they are negative but 
significant in the Humanitarian and Rural groups, and negative in the All and Global 
groups. As developed in Chapter 5, Hypothesis 4 is tested as follows: H0: Ai  0 and H1: 
Ai > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Welfare, Disability, Animal and Science 
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groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global and 
Rural groups.  
 
The coefficient on the ratio of organisational size to competitors‘ size is significantly 
positive in the Humanitarian industry and positive in the All, Global, and Rural groups, 
while that of Animal is shown negative but significant in the Animal and negative and 
insignificant in the Welfare, Disability, and Science groups. Hypothesis 5 is tested as: 
H0: Ai /Aj  0 and H1: Ai / Aj > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, 
Humanitarian, Global, and Rural groups, whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in 
the Welfare, Disability, Animal and, Science and Culture groups.   
 
These results indicate that the organisational size affects the collection of donations in 
the following year in the Welfare, Disability, Animal and Science, while those of the 
All, Humanitarian, Global and Rural are otherwise.  
 
The coefficient on Volunteers (lnV) has statistically significant and positive elasticities 
in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability and Rural and has positive elasticities in 
Global, and Science and Culture groups. It is negative but statistically significant 
elasticity for the Animal group. These results are again consistent with Model 1. 
Volunteers in most groups influence positively to raise total donations in the following 
year as we expected, but it is not so in the Animal group. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: 
Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Disability, Rural groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the 
Animal group.  
 
Organisational age may increase donor awareness and/or trust or it may be that age 
indicates organisational ability through experience. The coefficient on organisational 
Age (lnAge) is statistically significant and has positive elasticity in the Disability group 
and positive in the All, Animal, and Science and Culture groups, whereas negative but 
statistically significant in the Humanitarian, Global and Rural, with negative and 
insiginificant elasticity in the Welfare group. These results indicate information of 
organisational age has the effect on raising total donations in the All, Disability, Animal 
and, Science and Culture groups in the following year. Hypothesis 7, H0: Agei  0 and 
H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Disability, Animal and, Science 
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and Culture groups of charitable organisation, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected 
in the Humanitarian, Global, Welfare, and Rural groups of charitable organisations.  
 
6.3.1.2 Minor family of competition model 1: (Lagged variables) 
 
In Table 6.7 the results are presented. Model 1_L is again a sub-family model of Model 
1, using lagged independent variables only. As Weisbrod and Dominquez (1986) argue, 
fundraising activities increase the reputation and quality of the organisation. This may 
take a period of time to impact on the level of total donations (i.e. more than one annual 
donation raising campaign). Marcuello and Salas (2001) also find that fundraising 
expenditure that are lagged perform better on the level of total donation estimation 
model. Equation (3) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε                                                (3) 
 
Table 6.7 shows that the explanatory power of the regression is smaller than that of 
Model 1 in the Global, Animal and Rural groups, but the other groups are no different. 
Humanitarian is the highest in R
2
at 0.788 and adjusted R
2
, at 0.743 (higher than Model 
1), followed by Rural (0.745 and 0.722), Science (0.718 and 0.619), Disability (0.669 
and 0.631), Animal (0.667 and 0.488), Global (0.615 and 0.564), and Welfare (0.580 
and 0.553) and is the lowest in All (0.489 and 0.487). Overall, the explanatory power of 
the third model is higher than 0.5, except All. These results are similar to Model 1.  
 
As shown in Table 6.7, the results of this model are not examined in detail. However, 
the results indicate the effectiveness of spending on fundraising expenditure of 
charitable organisations and have positive impacts in most groups except All, and 
Disability groups in the following year. Also the number of volunteers shows a positive 
influence on donations in the following year in most groups. 
 
Overall, the results of the coefficients and the explanatory power of the model are 
improved upon those of Model 1.  
 
Table 6.8 presents the results of Model 1_LJ, a sub-family of Model 1, by including 
lagged independent variables only and using the value of competing charities j for the 
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denominators in the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets, such as lnFi / 
∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Equation (4) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε                                                (4) 
 
The results are not analysed in detail as these results are consistent with the results of 
Model 1 and Model 1_L. 
 
6.3.1.3 Minor family of competition model 1: (No time lags) 
 
In Table 6.9 the results of Model 1_U are presented. Model 1_U is a sub-family of 
Model 1, employing unlagged independent variables only. Equation (5) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + ε                                                         (5) 
 
The results for Model 1_U indicate organisational age has the effect of raising total 
donations in the All, Welfare, Disability and Science groups in the current year, but not 
for the Humanitarian, Global, Animal and Rural groups.  
 
Table 6.10 presents the results of Model 1_UJ, a sub-model of Model 1, employing 
unlagged independence variables only and using the value of competing charities j as 
denominators in the ratios of fundraising expenditure, Fi / Fj, and fixed assets Ait /Ajt. 
Equation (6), tested have is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + ε                                                            (6) 
 
Summary of results for Model 1 and its sub-families 
 
A family model of Model 1 consists of independent variables, including fundraising 
expenditure; competing charities‘ fundraising expenditure; the ratio of fundraising 
expenditure to the total of all competing charities‘ fundraising expenditure; fixed assets 
(as a proxy of established size); the ratio of fixed assets to the total of all competing 
charities‘ fixed assets; the number of volunteers and organisational age. A family model 
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of Models is constructed through modifications of Model 1. Thus Equations 2 to 6 use 
either the total of all competing charities‘ values or competing charities j‘s values for 
the denominator in the calculation of the ratios of fundraising expenditure or fixed 
assets combination, or use lagged or unlagged independent variables only.  
 
The results of Model 1 family indicate that the effectiveness of fundraising activities of 
charitable organisations and the positive effect of volunteers on the level of total 
donations in most groups except Humanitarian, Animal and Rural. The competing 
charities‘ fundraising expenditure are consistently negative in the Global, Disability and 
Science groups as expected, whereas in other five groups have obtained positive 
correlation to total donations in some variations of Model 1. Similarly, the sign of the 
ratio of fundraising expendidures in the Global, Disability and Science groups are, not 
as expected, constantly shown as negative, while the signs of that in other five groups 
vary as in Model 1.   
 
The results of correlation between the size of organisation and total donations vary in 
sign, similarily to Model 1, except that the Animal group is positive. The ratio of 
organisational size to total of competing charities‘ size is expected to have a positive 
correlation to total donations. However, the results vary again as with Model 1. 
Similarly, signs of correlation between the ratio of fixed assets and total donations vary 
similarity to Model 1.   
 
The number of volunteers is a significant and positive variable for most groups. As in 
Model 1, the exceptions are Welfare and Animal groups in Model 1_L, these models 
use unlagged independent variables only. However, as many volunteers engage in 
fundraising activities in the current year, the results may indicate that the volunteers 
enhanced the reputation and operations of a charity in which they were involved during 
in the previous year.   
 
The results of correlation of organisational age and total donations are found to be 
consistently postive in the All, Disability and Science groups, while the other five 
groups including the  Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Animal and Rural groups, are 
either negative or vary depending on variations of Model 1.  
 
  206 
6.3.2 Competition model 2 
 
6.3.2.1 Major family of competition model 2 
 
In Table 6.11 the results of the regression analysis of Model 2 are presented. Model 2 is 
a modification of Model 1 by just one additional variable, government grants (G). 
Previous studies find that information of government grants to a charitable organisation 
serves as an organisational quality indicator (Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Callen, 1994; 
Khanna et al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Okten and Weisbrod, 2000; Marcuello 
and Salas, 2001). Thus, government grants are expected to have a positive effect on 
total donations. The inclusion of government grants is important because of the 
―crowding out‖ debates (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Payne, 
1998; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Okten and Weisbrod, 2000; Marcuello and Salas, 
2001). Equation (7), tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1)  
+ β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1 + ε                                                                      (7) 
 
where: G is government grants and ε is the error term. 
 
As shown in Table 6.11, the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) are consistent with the results of Model 1 
(see Table 6.4). The explanatory power of the model is also the highest in the Animal 
group, the R
2
 at 0.838 (adjusted R
2
 at 0.751).  It is followed by Global at 0.832 (0.789), 
Rural at 0.785 (0.740), Humanitarian at 0.748 (0.722), Science at 0.639 (0.512), 
Disability at 0.611 (0.570), Welfare at 57% (0.543). Consistent with the results of 
Model 1, the lowest of the R
2
 is the All combined group at 0.455 (0.442). Thus, the 
explanatory power seems to be unaffected by the additional variable, government 
grants.  
 
These results are, therefore, not considered in detail. The exception is the government 
grant variable. The coefficients of government grants are, as expected, mostly positive 
in all groups, and significantly positive in Welfare and Humanitarian groups, positive 
but insignificant in All, Animal and Rural groups. They are negative but significant in 
the Science group and negative and insignificant in the Global and Disability groups. 
Hypothesis 8 is tested as: H0: Gi  0; and H1: Gi > 0, The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
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the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Animal and Rural groups, while the Null Hypothesis is 
not rejected in the Global, Disability and Science groups. 
 
Model 2_J is a sub-family of Model 2. Model 2_J is a modification of Model 1 by 
including an additional variable, government grants, (G); and using competing charities 
j as denominators in the ratio of fundraising expenditure and the ratio of fixed assets, 
representing as lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Table 6.12 presents the 
results of Model 2_J, Equation (8).  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1 + ε                                (8) 
 
Again these results are not covered in detail given their consistency with the result 
reported earlier in this chapter. 
 
Lastly, the coefficients of government grants are positive and significant in the Welfare 
and Humanitarian and positive but insignificant in the All, Animal and Rural groups, 
while those are negative and insignificant in the Global, Disability and Science groups, 
which are consistent with the results of Model 2. Hypothesis 8 is tested: H0: Gi  0; and 
H1: Gi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Animal 
and Rural groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Global, Disability and 
Science groups. 
 
6.3.2.2 Minor family of competition model 2: (Lagged variables) 
 
In Table 6.13 the results of the regression analysis are presented. Model 2_L is a family 
of Model 2. Thus, this model is modification of Model 1 by employing lagged 
independent variables only. Equation (9) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1 + ε                                (9) 
 
These results are consistent with previous modelling and are not covered in detail, 
except in Table 6.11. 
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The coefficients of government grants are positive and significant in the Welfare and 
Humanitarian and positive but insignificant in the All and Global groups, while those 
are negative but significnat in the Animal, Science and Rural groups, and negative and 
insignificant in the Disability group. Hypothesis 8 is tested: H0: Gi  0; and H1: Gi > 0. 
The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian and Global groups, 
while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Disability, Animal, Science and Rural 
groups. 
 
Table 6.14 presents the results of Model 2_LJ. Model 2_LJ is a sub-family of Model 2, 
including lagged independent variables only and using the value of competing charities j 
for the denominators in the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets, such as ln 
Fi / Σln Fjt-1 and ln Ai / Σln Ajt-1, respectively. Equation (10) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fi-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1+ ε                               (10) 
 
Again results consistent with previous models mean these are not covered in detail. 
However, the coefficient on Government grants (lnG) is positive and significant in the 
Welfare and Humanitarian, and positive but insignificant in the All and Global groups, 
whereas they are negative but significant in the Disability and Rural groups, and 
negative and insignificant in the Animal and Science groups. Hypothesis 8 is tested: H0: 
Gi  0; and H1: Gi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, 
Humanitarian and Global groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the 
Disability, Animal, Science and Rural groups. 
 
6.3.2.3 Minor family of competition model 2: (No time lags)  
 
Table 6.15 presents the results of the regression analysis of Model 2_U, employing 
unlagged independent variables only. Model 2_U, Equation (11) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln Git+ ε                                          (11) 
 
The results appear in Table 6.15. Table 6.15 shows that the coefficients of government 
grants are significantly positive in the Welfare and Humanitarian, and positive in the All 
  209 
and Disability groups, whereas those are significantly negative in the Science, and 
negative in the Global, Animal and Rural groups. Hypothesis 8 is tested: H0: Gi  0; and 
H1: Gi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability 
groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Global, Science, Animal and 
Rural groups. 
 
Table 6.16 presents the results of Model 2_UJ, employing unlagged independent 
variables only and using the ratio of Fi to competitors, Fj and the ratio of organisational 
size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, presenting as, ln Fit / Σln Fjt and ln Ait / Σln Ajt, respectively. 
Equation (12) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln Git+ ε                                     (12) 
 
Summary of Results for Model 2 and its sub-families 
 
The estimates of the fundraising expenditure elasticities in Model 2, major and minor 
family of models, consistently suggest that the effect of fundraising expenditure on 
charitable giving is both positive and significant.   
 
The results suggest that the effectiveness of fundraising activities of charitable 
organisations and the volunteers have a positive effect on the level of total donation in 
seven out of eight groups (except Animal). The number of volunteers is treated as an 
exogenous variable (Callen, 1994), and is statistically independent of the error term in 
the regression. In addition, the organisation‘s competitors‘ fundraising activities have a 
negative impact on the level of donations as expected. The ratio of organisational size to 
competitors and the ratio of fundraising expenditure to competitors show similar sign in 
the industry level; they are both positive in the Humanitarian, while they are both 
negative in the All, Welfare and Disability. Organisational size and age show similar 
results in aggregate industry, both positive in the Disability and Science groups, 
whereas both are negative in the other six groups. 
 
The estimates of the fundraising expenditure in Model 2, major and minor models, 
indicate that the direct effectiveness of fundraising activities on competition of 
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charitable organisations for donations, as fundraising expenditure affect on charitable 
giving, is both positive and significant.   
 
6.3.3 Major family of competition model 3 
 
6.3.3.1 Major family of competition model 3  
 
In Table 6.17 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 3 and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 3 is also a sub-family of Model 1. It includes an additional independent variable, 
administrative costs (AC). Equation (13) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + β8 ln ACi + ε                                     (13) 
 
Again not all of the results are presented in detail.  
 
Direct research question 2 asks if administrative costs affect raised donations. In Table 
6.17, the coefficients of administration costs are positive and significant in the Welfare, 
Humanitarian and Animal groups, and positive but insignificant in the Disability and 
Rural, whereas those are negative and insignificant in the All, Global and Science 
groups. Hypotheses 9 is tested as: H0: ACi  0; and H1: ACi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability, Animal and Rural groups, while the 
Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Global and Science groups.   
 
Table 6.18 presents the results of Model 3_J, a sub-family of Model 3. It includes an 
additional variable, administrative costs (AC), and using the ratio of fundraising 
expenditure to competing charities j and the ratio of size to competing charities j, as lnFi 
/ ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Equation (14) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                         (14) 
 
The coefficients of administration costs are significantly positive in the Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Disability and Animal groups, and positive but insignificant in the Rural, 
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whereas those are negative and insignificant in the All, Global and Science groups. 
Hypotheses 9 is tested as: H0: ACi  0; and H1: ACi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected 
in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability, Animal and Rural groups, while the Null 
Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Global and Science groups. 
 
6.3.3.2 Minor family of competition model 3: (Lagged variables) 
 
The results presented in Table 6.19 are for Model 3_L, a sub-family of Model 3, 
employing lagged independent variables only. Equation (15) is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                          (15) 
 
As shown in Table 6.19, the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 are similar to those of Models 1 and 2 
(see Table 6.5 and 6.11). Overall the explanatory powers of models are slightly 
increased.  
 
The coefficients of administration costs are positive and significant in the Humanitarian 
and Rural groups, and positive but insignificant in the Welfare, Disability and Science 
groups. They are negative but significant in the All group, and negative and 
insignificant in the Global and Animal groups. Hypotheses 9 is tested as: H0: ACi  0; 
and H1: ACi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Welfare, Humanitarian, 
Disability, Science and Rural groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the 
All, Global and Animal groups. 
 
An alternative calculation of the ratio of fundraising and size, neither affects the sign 
nor the significance of the other independent variables of Model 3. Table 6.20 presents 
the results of Model 3_LJ, another sub-family of Model 3. This model employs lagged 
independent variables only and uses the ratio of fundraising expenditure to competing 
charities j and the ratio of size to competing charities j, as lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, 
respectively. Equation (16) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fi-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                        (16) 
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6.3.3.3 Minor family of competition model 3: (No time lags) 
 
In Table 6.21 the results of the regression Model 3_U are presented. This model 
employs unlagged independent variables only. Equation (17) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln ACit + ε                                        (17) 
 
As shown in Table 6.21, the explanatory power of the models is very similar to Models 
1 and 2 in most groups (see Table 6.9 and 6.13). Explanatory power is lower when 
employing unlagged independent variables only.  
 
Table 6.22 presents the results of Model 3_UJ, a sub-family of Model 3. This sub-model 
includes unlagged independent variables only and uses the value of competing charities 
j for both denominators in the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets, such as 
lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Equation (18) tested is: 
 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln ACit +ε                                         (18) 
 
As shown in Table 6.22, the explanatory power of the models with unlagged 
independent variables is shown as being very similar to, or slightly lower than, Model 1. 
The ranges of the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) are the largest in the Animal, at 0.828 (0.736) and the 
Welfare group is again very low at 0.225 (0.147).  
 
Summary of Model 3 
 
The estimates of the fundraising expenditure elasticities in Model 3, major and minor 
family of models, suggest consistently that the direct information effect of fundraising 
expenditure on charitable donations is both positive and significant.   
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6.3.4 Competition model 4 
 
6.3.4.1 Major family of competition model 4  
 
In Table 6.23 the results of the regression Model 4 are presented. Model 4 is a sub-
family of Model 1, excluding an independent variable, organisational age (Age) and 
including an additional variable, government grants (G) on Model 1. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, previous studies found mixed results of government grants on function of 
donation. Equation (19) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε                                                         (19) 
 
The results of the All group are not presented in detail but in Table 6.21.  
 
Table 6.24 presents the results of Model 4_J, a modification of Model 1 but excluding 
the independent variable of organisational oge; including an additional variable, 
government grants (G); and using the ratio of fundraising expenditure to competing 
charities j and the ratio of size to competing charities j, presented as, ln Fit / Σln Fjt and 
ln Ait-1 / Σln Ajt-1. Equation (20) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                     (20) 
 
6.3.4.2 Minor family of competition model 4: (Lagged variables)  
 
In Table 6.25 the results of the regression Model 4_L are presented. Model 4_L is a 
family of Model 4 and is a modification of Model 1 by employing lagged independent 
variables only. Equation (21) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                     (21) 
 
As shown in Table 6.25, the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) are very similar to the results of Models 1,   
2 and 3, however the order of explanatory power of model among groups is slightly 
different. The R
2
 is shown as the highest in the Rural at 0.844. This is followed by 
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Global and Humanitarian groups both R
2
 at 0.787, Science at 0.773, Animal at 0.731, 
Welfare at 0.650, Disability at 0.527 and the lowest of All combined industry at 0.489.  
 
Table 6.26 presents the results of Model 4_LJ, a sub-family of Model 4.  This model 
uses lagged independent variables only. The value of competing charities j for both 
denominators in the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets are calculated as 
ln Fi / Σln Fjt-1 and ln Ai / Σln Ajt-1, respectively. Equation (22) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fi-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                     (22) 
 
The results are not discussed in detail but are found in Table 6.24.  
 
6.3.4.3 Minor family of competition model 4: (No time lags)  
 
In Table 6.27 the results of the regression analysis are presented. Model 4_U is a part of 
the family of Model 4, employing unlagged independent variables only. Equation (23) is 
tested as: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Git + ε                                                               (23) 
 
Table 6.28 presents the results of Model 4_UJ, a part of the family of Model 4. This 
model uses unlagged independent variables only, and uses the value of competing 
charities j for the denominators in both of the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed 
assets, such as lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Equation (24) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Git + ε                                                             (24) 
 
In Table 6.28, the explanatory power of the models using unlagged independent 
variables is shown very similar or identical in the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 with the results in 
Table 6.25, whose models employ the calculation of the ratios against the value of all 
competitors, instead of competitor j. Animal industry is the highest in the R
2
 (adjusted 
R
2
) at 0.805 (0.719). This is followed by Science at 0.778 (0.710), Global at 0.766 
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(0.714), Rural at 0.685 (0.639), Humanitarian at 0.641 (0.612), Welfare at 0.502 
(0.458), All at 0.454 (0.443) and the lowest is Disability at 0.339 (0.286).  
 
Summary of Model 4 
 
Our estimates of the fundraising expenditure in Model 4 consistently suggest that the 
direct information effect of fundraising expenditure on charitable giving is both positive 
and significant.   
 
6.3.5 Competitive model in geographic group (States)    
 
This section considers charitable organisations competing for donations as spartical 
competitors. As discussed in Chapter 2, a sample of charitable organisations is divided 
into geographical location grouping in 6 States, ACT, Victoria, New South Wales 
(NSW), Queensland (QLD), Western Australia (WA) and South Australia (SA). The 
details, such as the names of charitable organisations with their geographical group are 
reported in Chapter 2. The number of observations is 16 in ACT, 143 in Victoria, 98 in 
NSW, 28 in QLD, 28 in WA and 16 in SA. The following section presents the results of 
competition models 1 to 4 when applied to geographical groups.  
 
6.3.5.1 Competition model 1 with state grouping 
 
In Table 6.29 the results of the regression analysis of Model 1 are presented. Equation 
(1) is tested as: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + ε                                                         (1) 
 
Table 6.29 contains the estimation results of Model 1. The explanatory power of the 
regression models for the ACT is the highest at 0.976 (R
2
) (adjusted R
2,
 at 0.948). WA is 
the lowest at 0.382 (R
2
) (adjusted R
2,
 at 0.166). Overall, the explanatory power of Model 
1 varies enormously depending on the state. This suggests geographical groupings are 
not good indications of competition for donors. 
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The coefficients of fundraising expenditure are positive and significant in Victoria, and 
positive but insignificant in ACT, NSW and WA. Those of QLD and SA are negative 
and insignificant. Hypothesis one is tested as follows: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The 
Null Hypothesis is rejected in ACT, Victoria, NSW and WA, while the Null Hypothesis 
is not rejected in QLD and SA.  
 
The regression coefficients on lnFj are significantly negative in Victoria, but positive 
and insignificant in ACT and WA. Those of NSW, QLD and SA are insignificantly 
positive. Hypothesis 2: H0: Fj  0 and H1: Fj < 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
ACT, Victoria and WA, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in NSW, QLD and 
SA.  
 
The regression coefficients on lnFi/∑lnF garnered mixed results. Those of SA are 
positive but insignificant, and Victoria, ACT, NSW, QLD and WA are negative. 
Hypothesis 3: H0: Fi /F  0 and H1: Fi /F > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected SA, 
whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in ACT, Victoria, NSW, QLD and WA.   
 
The coefficients on size are positive but insignificant in Victoria, NSW and WA. Those 
of QLD and SA are significantly negative and ACT is insignificantly negative. 
Hypothesis 4 as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Victoria, 
NSW and WA, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in ACT, QLD and SA.  
 
The coefficient on the ratio of size to competitors‘ size is significantly positive in QLD, 
and positive in ACT and SA. Those of Victoria, NSW and WA are insignificantly 
negative. Hypothesis 5 is tested as: H0: Ai /A  0 and H1: Ai /A > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in ACT, QLD and SA, whereas the Null Hypothesis is not 
rejected in Victoria, NSW and WA.  
 
The coefficients on volunteers are mostly positive except WA which is negative but 
significant. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in ACT, Victoria, NSW, QLD and SA, whereas the Null Hypothesis is rejected 
in WA.  
 
The coefficients on age are positive and significant in Victoria and WA, and positive in 
ACT. Those of NSW, QLD and SA are negative. Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 
  217 
and H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in ACT, Victoria and WA, while the 
Null Hypothesis is not rejected in NSW, QLD and SA. The results of correlation of 
fundraising expenditure, volunteers, organisational size and age, and total donations are 
found to be consistently positive in Victoria, while other state groups vary depending on 
variations of Model 1.  
 
6.3.5.2 Competition model 2 with state grouping 
 
Model 2 is a modification of Model 1 by including an additional variable, government 
grants (G). Equation (7) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1)  
+ β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1 + ε                                                                      (7) 
 
In Table 6.30, the estimation results of Model 2 using aggregated groups of 6 states of 
charitable organisations are presented. The results of the explanatory powers of 
regression models are similar to those of Model 1. The explanatory power, the R
2
 
(adjusted R
2
) gives ACT as the highest among 6 states at 0.977 (at 0.939). This is 
followed by QLD at 0.913 (0.876), SA at 0.793 (0.462), Victoria at 0.57 (0.543), NSW 
at 0.454 (0.405) and WA at 0.399 (0.146).  
 
The results are not presented in detail because the results are similar to those of Model 
1.  
 
6.3.5.3 Competition model 3 with state grouping 
 
Model 3 is modification of Model 1, including an additional independent variable, 
administration costs (AC). AC is included to measure inefficiency of organisations as 
previous studies were used to compare the inefficiency valuation between different 
groups of organisations (Frumkin and Kim, 2001). The empirical Model 3, Equation 
(13) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + β8 ln ACi + ε                                     (13) 
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In Table 6.31, the estimation results of Model 3 using aggregated groups of 6 states of 
charitable organisations are presented. The results are similar to those of Model 1.  
 
6.3.5.4 Competition model 4 with states grouping 
 
In Table 6.32, the results of the regression analysis are presented. Model 4 is a sub-
family of Model 1, excluding an independent variable, organisational age (Age), and 
including an additional independent variable, government grants (G). The previous 
studies find that both government grants and organisation age affect total donations, 
however, government grants is affected by organisational age. So to find whether 
government grants relate to total donation without influence of age for the competition 
model, equation (19) tested is : 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε                                                         (19) 
 
In Table 6.32, the estimation results of Model 4 using aggregated groups of 6 states of 
charitable organisations are presented. The results of the explanatory powers of 
regression models are similar to those of Models 1, 2 and 3.  
 
6.3.6 Summary of Australian results 
 
Industry Groups 
The results show that the greater charitable organisations, fundraising expenditure (Fi), 
the more its total donations increased in the current year in all Australian charity groups 
except the Animal charity group. The results also indicated, as expected, that the more 
competing organisation competing organisational fundraising expenditure (Fj), the less a 
charitable organisation raises in total donations in Global, Disability and Science groups 
in the current year. Furthermore, when government grants were included as an 
additional explanatory variable in empirical models 2 and 4, the competing 
organisation‘s fundraising expenditure (Fj) also had a negative effect on total donations 
in the Welfare and Rural groups in the current year. The reasons for this remain unclear 
in terms of donor and organisational behaviour (Weisbrod and Dominquez, 1986; 
Khanna et al. 1995). In addition, the ratio of a charity‘s fundraising expenditure to its 
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competitors‘ fundraising expenditure in the current year had a positive effect on raising 
donations in the All, Humanitarian, and Animal groups. These results suggest the 
possibility that charitable organisations in similar service provider groups follow the 
major decisions of their rivals. For example, Red Cross Australia cancelled its annual 
door-knock appeal after the collection of large donations for the Victorian Bushfire in 
2009. It is highly likely that the spontaneous Red Cross realised donations would be 
small in the lightt of this competing claim on donors‘ munificence. 
 
The level of volunteers (V) had a significant positive effect on donations in most of 
groups except in the Animal industry in the following year with Welfare and Rural 
groups show strongest at 1% of significance (1.018 and 1.116, respectively). This was 
partly because volunteers are frequently heavily involved in the fundraising activities of 
the charity. Moreover many of them can be expected to donate to the charity they 
volunteer for. In addition, because volunteers have insight into how charitable 
organisations operate, donors might consider that the longer or the more volunteers are 
involved in a charitable organisation, the more they may trust that organisation.  
Similar to the volunteers, organisational size and age showed a positive affect on total 
donations. Thus, organisational size as measured by fixed assets (A) had a positive 
effect on donations in the Welfare, Disability, Animal and Science groups in the 
following years (from 0.015 to 1.856). Organisational age also has a positive effect in 
the All, Disability, Science and Rural industry groups (from 0.143 to 4.475).  
 
Government support (G) showed mixed results, and this is consistent with previous 
studies (see Section 3.5.2). Empirically, i.e. in five groups, All, Welfare, Humanitarian, 
Global, Animal and Rural groups, government grants created a crowded-in effect on 
total donations in the following year, whereas in the Global, Disability and Science 
groups, it crowded-out donations. The reasons for these differential impacts of 
government grants are especially difficult to disentangle at the conceptual, theoretical 
and empirical.  
 
Administrative costs (AC) had negative effect on total donations in the All, Global and 
Science groups in Australia. This result was consistent with previous studies which 
found that the more charitable organisations spent on administration, the less they 
received from donors using limited organisational data with very large donations in the 
US (Tinkelman and Mankaney, 2007). However, in five groups, i.e. Welfare, 
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Humanitarian, Disability, Animal and Rural, AC had a positive effect on donations 
during the following year. The reasons for this are currently impossible to discern. 
However they present a dilemma for organisations that believe donors react negatively 
to administration expenditures. 
 
In relation to geographic groups, some of the groups showed similar signs to the results 
of the industry groups, while some did not. Overall the empirical results are far more 
inconsistent. In the four states, Victoria, NSW, QLD and WA, fundraising expenditure 
was positive in relation to total donations and competitors‘ fundraising expenditures 
were negative but not in ACT and SA. However, the number of volunteers showed 
similar results with the industry groups, and was a significantly positive effect on total 
donations in the states except WA. The ratio of fundraising expenditure to competitors‘ 
fundraising expenditure obtained mixed results, being a positive in ACT and SA and 
negative in Victoria, NSW, QLD and WA. Organisational size and age also obtained 
mixed results. Organisational size was positive in Victoria, NSW and WA and negative 
in ACT, QLD and SA. Organisational age was positive in ACT, Victoria and WA, and 
negative in NSW, QLD and SA. Thus, government grants apparently crowded-in in 
ACT, Victoria, WA, while they crowded-out in NSW, QLD and SA. Administrative 
costs were positive in only two states, ACT and NSW. The states of Victoria, QLD, WA 
and SA, had negative coefficients.   
 
Overall the results of the geographic groups were much weaker than industry groups. 
This is good result, in that it is to be expected if donors have a focus on an 
organisation‘s charitable activities, rather than their locations. This is especially so as 
many charities operate well away from their area of administrative and donors‘ 
domicile.  
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Table 6.5: OLS estimation for Australian charities  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + e 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.709 -1.266 -4.026 32.919*** 64.777*** 30.224*** 31.845 13.650** 
 (5.658) (2.924) (4.365) (9.789) (16.962) (7.349) (25.291) (6.700) 
lnFi    (β1) 0.116 0.351 0.103 7.502*** 10.016*** 0.020 4.808** -0.010 
 (1.380) (0.356) (0.081) (2.587) (3.044) (0.575) (2.639) (0.576) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.325 0.024 0.607** -2.137*** -6.094*** 0.643 -4.024** 0.027 
 (0.447) (0.228) (0.359) (0.773) (1.516) (0.499) (2.043) (0.489) 
lnFi /ΣlnF (β3) 145.228 -9.597 7.171* -374.576*** -1305.326*** 4.376 -186.955** -6.179 
 (757.196) (64.776) (5.060) (143.195) (400.462) (17.699) (103.03) (55.186) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) -0.686 0.015 -0.484 -1.344 1.856** 0.178 0.387 -1.466* 
 (1.416) (0.183) (0.430) (1.573) (1.178) (0.291) (0.925) (1.064) 
lnAi t-1/ΣlnAt-1 (β5) 382.981 -18.724 82.331 73.543 -275.739** -39.811*** 1.364 92.648 
 (944.701) (41.424) (72.106) (95.283) (174.335) (13.181) (41.849) (105.94) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.679*** 1.116*** 0.771*** 0.245 0.373*** -2.488*** 0.307 1.018*** 
 (0.064) (0.113) (0.066) (0.252) (0.148) (0.859) (0.552) (0.123) 
lnAgei t-1   (β7) 0.143 -0.066 -0.227** -1.188*** 1.678*** -0.060 2.201 -1.099*** 
 (0.112) (0.122) (0.103) (0.294) (0.225) (0.345) (2.164) (0.278) 
R
2
 0.455 0.570 0.711 0.832 0.610 0.838 0.639 0.785 
Adjusted R
2
 0.442 0.543 0.684 0.789 0.574 0.751 0.512 0.740 
SE regression 1.319 1.003 0.734 0.521 1.034 0.298 1.117 0.663 
Observations 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %
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Table 6.6: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + e 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.737 -1.174 -5.229 44.112*** 73.695*** 30.003*** 30.376 15.928*** 
 (5.648) (2.848) (4.185) (12.155) (20.593) (7.182) (23.684) (6.501) 
lnFi    (β1) 0.006 0.370 0.099 8.759*** 10.677*** -0.011 6.495** 0.087 
 (1.375) (0.356) (0.084) (2.793) (3.773) (0.764) (3.147) (0.630 
lnFj    (β2) 0.330 0.013 0.733** -3.941*** -7.371*** 0.662 -5.372** -0.059 
 (0.448) (0.228) (0.357) (1.184) (1.971) (0.661) (2.479) (0.521) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) 199.774 -12.146 7.878* -323.697*** -1240.218*** 2.729 -163.836** -12.511 
 (733.862) (60.052) (5.642) (110.318) (441.450) (12.527) (79.616) (47.168) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) -0.635 0.026 -0.631* -0.794 0.818 0.216 0.707 -1.466* 
 (1.413) (0.179) (0.404) (1.298) (1.107) (0.278) (0.901) (1.067) 
lnAi t-1 /lnΣA t-1 (β5) 348.991 -20.039 97.359* 30.438 -100.281 -25.523*** -8.575 69.819 
 (942.970) (37.855) (61.372) (57.013) (134.736) (8.152) (27.263) (81.994) 
lnVi t-1   (β6) 0.678*** 1.116*** 0.761*** 0.198 0.369* -2.757*** 0.4986* 1.021*** 
 (0.064) (0.112) (0.066) (0.294) (0.151) (0.884) (0.528) (0.124) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) 0.143 -0.066 -0.232** -1.067*** 1.648*** 0.232 3.095 -1.088*** 
 (0.112) (0.122) (0.103) (0.298) (0.254) (0.392) (2.167) (0.279 
R
2
 0.455 0.571 0.714 0.833 0.595 0.844 0.652 0.785 
Adjusted R
2
 0.442 0.544 0.688 0.789 0.558 0.760 0.531 0.740 
SE of regression 1.319 1.002 0.730 0.520 1.054 0.293 1.095 0.663 
Observations 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %
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Table 6.7: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + e 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -1.270** 3.280 6.665** 30.469*** 56.654*** 1.726 32.178 -6.782* 
 (0.757) (0.122) (3.534) (11.290) (16.799) (8.583) (27.888) (4.017) 
lnFi    -0.495 0.054 0.920 5.860** -0.233 0.711 5.880* 0.038 
 (0.821) (1.152) (0.899) (2.605) (0.324) (0.773) (3.277) (0.986) 
lnFj     0.271*** -0.171 -0.002 -1.961** -4.275 0.227 -4.077 0.538 
 (0.058) (0.745) (0.304) (0.877) (3.353) (0.410) (2.561) (1.085) 
lnFi  440.035 33.204 -78.736 -283.119** -95.495 -17.417 -238.549 0.374 
/ΣlnF (448.816) (215.230) (63.519) (146.185) (404.284) (23.030) (141.361) (1.208) 
lnAi   0.029 0.350** -0.558 -0.281 -1.890** 0.149 -5.573 0.733*** 
 (0.108) (0.171) (0.517) (1.339) (0.827) (0.653) (4.346) (0.202) 
lnAi  -9.047 -98.820*** 44.988 11.028 193.959* 9.311 269.612 -0.821** 
/ΣlnA (59.543) (29.292) (38.958) (83.308) (113.082) (24.825) (192.106) (0.338) 
lnVi   0.691*** 0.997*** 0.712*** 0.165 0.378** 0.619 0.422 0.680*** 
 (0.061) (0.122) (0.084) (0.224) (0.180) (0.761) (0.531) (0.233) 
lnAgei  0.042 -0.019 -0.065 -1.046*** 2.177*** -0.975* 2.561 -0.954* 
 (0.114) (0.125) (0.369) (0.270) (0.422) (0.501) (2.123) (0.555) 
R
2
 0.489 0.580 0.787 0.615 0.669 0.667 0.718 0.745 
AdjR
2
 0.487 0.553 0.743 0.564 0.631 0.488 0.619 0.722 
S.E.OR 1.306 1.030 0.527 0.748 1.002 0.479 0.986 0.752 
Observations 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %
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Table 6.8: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + e 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -1.172* 2.525 2.578*** 43.166*** 57.452*** 1.363 50.887 -10.467** 
 (0.748) (3.841) (0.902) (9.982) (18.165) (6.770) (45.029) (4.865) 
lnFi    0.312*** 0.520** 0.032 8.789*** 6.110* 0.964* 5.849* 0.676** 
 (0.063) (0.264) (0.918) (3.098) (3.783) (0.642) (3.727) (0.394) 
lnFj     -0.461 0.044 -0.918 -3.916*** -5.681*** 0.093 -5.623** 1.083** 
 (0.790) (0.097) (0.170) (1.027) (1.767) (0.263) (3.417) (0.537) 
lnFi  386.632 -4.353 27.388 -325.398** -708.982* -14.009* -154.509* -16.183 
  /ΣlnF (420.198) (31.875) (109.439) (124.005) (448.216) (10.663) (112.201) (22.242) 
lnAi   0.026 -1.174* -0.071 -0.245 0.572 0.204 -4.675 0.222 
 (0.108) (0.761) (0.231) (0.402) (0.895) (0.701) (5.707) (0.417) 
lnAi  -8.031 80.227 -1.962 5.669 -69.575 4.120 147.855 9.495 
/ΣlnA (59.503) (100.559) (34.748) (12.836) (109.223) (14.709) (166.184) (27.052) 
lnVi   0.691*** 1.251*** 0.765*** 0.124 0.321** 0.692 0.289 0.396** 
 (0.061) (0.294) (0.076) (0.213) (0.140) (0.728) (0.459) (0.220) 
lnAgei  0.045 -0.062 -0.204*** -0.928*** 1.560*** -0.923* 1.215 -0.516* 
 (0.114) (0.238) (0.080) (0.273) (0.197) (0.562) (2.527) (0.356) 
R
2
 0.488 0.480 0.703 0.829 0.608 0.673 0.701 0.813 
AdjR
2
 0.477 0.427 0.675 0.785 0.572 0.497 0.597 0.728 
S.E.OR 1.307 1.171 0.745 0.525 1.038 0.474 1.015 0.667 
Obs 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 6.9: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + e 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 2.375 15.481*** -6.0375 34.172*** 45.835*** 12.662** 16.007 1.999 
 (3.657) (3.204) (7.636) (13.924) (14.745) (7.289) (21.512) (5.989) 
lnFi   1.194* 1.361*** -0.726 3.683** 5.768*** 0.768** 3.832** -0.753* 
 (0.750) (0.430) (0.890) (1.791) (2.112) (0.446) (2.202) (0.543) 
lnFj   -0.075 -0.542** 0.983 -1.838*** -4.559*** -0.141 -3.562** 0.598* 
 (0.286) (0.256) (0.607) (0.752) (1.407) (0.370) (1.674) (0.456) 
lnFi  -424.078 -205.702*** 60.287 -165.046** -616.045*** -15.326 -169.362** 75.472* 
/ΣlnFj   (411.384) (83.275) (54.487) (99.779) (238.587) (13.598) (84.720) (54.291) 
lnAi   -0.0004*** -0.472 0.243 1.167* -0.372* 0.666** 1.5028** -1.137** 
 (0.00041) (0.380) (0.196) (0.836) (0.236) (0.341) (0.726) (0.574) 
lnAi  -79.554*** 27.007 -2.057 -81.356* 34.342 -20.589 -46.900* 83.315* 
/ΣlnAj   (29.143) (92.423) (15.191) (51.306) (71.490) (16.021) (32.669) (58.070) 
lnVi   0.647*** -0.001** 0.516*** 0.348** 0.457*** -0.155 1.032** 0.863*** 
 (0.061) (0.001) (0.086) (0.206) (0.178) (0.520) (0.480) (0.101) 
lnAgei  0.109 0.058 -0.724** -1.273*** 1.955*** -0.886*** 4.698*** -0.927*** 
 (0.102) (0.157) (0.326) (0.262) (0.292) (0.232) (1.799) (0.289) 
R
2
 0.454 0.180 0.758 0.825 0.642 0.812 0.714 0.735 
Adj R
2
 0.443 0.136 0.716 0.787 0.608 0.729 0.631 0.697 
S.E.OR 1.325 1.403 0.558 0.516 1.019 0.327 0.954 0.735 
Obs. 352 136 48 40 96 24 32 56 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables,  
***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %
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Table 6.10: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + e 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 1.182 14.357** -1.306 36.304*** 45.643*** 11.362* 9.759 4.252 
 (3.849) (6.055) (7.481) (11.603) (16.635) (7.114) (20.930) (5.796) 
lnFi   2.185** 0.915 -0.098 5.143** 4.994** 0.885* 4.592** -0.716 
 (1.305) (0.833) (0.959) (2.339) (2.525) (0.648) (2.645) (0.599) 
lnFj   0.016 -0.477 0.607 -3.103*** -4.420*** -0.236 -4.288** 0.569 
 (0.304) (0.525) (0.666) (1.120) (1.608) (0.531) (2.077) (0.495) 
lnFi  -938.021* -105.403 8.469 -184.573** -455.214** -10.177 -127.236** 56.058 
/ΣlnFj   (693.730) (151.823) (55.358) (93.651) (244.364) (10.543) (66.088) (46.737) 
lnAi   -1.354 -0.130 0.277 1.033 -1.397** 0.587** 1.518** -1.039** 
 (1.467) (0.358) (0.192) (0.813) (0.790) (0.337) (0.699) (0.581) 
lnAi  802.214 -55.011 -5.166 -52.343* 112.505* -10.608 -31.867* 56.703 
/ΣlnAj   (954.469) (81.327) (10.363) (36.184) (87.164) (9.914) (21.040) (45.522) 
lnVi   0.646*** -0.001** 0.536*** 0.461** 0.441*** -0.193 1.146*** 0.869*** 
 (0.061) (0.001) (0.085) (0.236) (0.177) (0.592) (0.448) (0.109) 
lnAgei  0.115 0.040 -0.599 -1.210*** 1.839*** -0.746*** 5.453*** -1.891*** 
 (0.102) (0.160) (0.312) (0.268) (0.300) (0.319) (1.753) (0.288) 
R
2
 0.456 0.146 0.753 0.822 0.644 0.806 0.720 0.731 
Adj R
2
 0.445 0.099 0.710 0.784 0.610 0.722 0.638 0.692 
S.E.OR 1.326 1.432 0.564 0.520 1.017 0.332 0.945 0.741 
Obs. 352 136 48 40 96 24 32 56 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %
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Table 6.11: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1 + e 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.713 -0.147 -3.237 29.679*** 66.332*** 30.960*** 65.174*** 15.540** 
 (5.666) (2.748) (4.107) (11.786) (17.367) (8.436) (20.860) (7.113) 
lnFi    (β1) 0.142 0.409 0.131** 7.261*** 9.995*** 0.064 4.243** 0.174 
 (1.383) (0.333) (0.076) (2.665) (3.060) (0.635) (2.000) (0.620) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.316 -0.066 0.490* -1.812** -6.144*** 0.626 -2.819** -0.145 
 (0.448) (0.214) (0.339) (1.012) (1.528) (0.525) (1.573) (0.534) 
lnFi /ΣlnF (β3) 129.516 -35.239 6.464* -360.465*** -1300.665*** 3.257 -164.701** -26.332 
 (759.120) (60.887) (4.758) (147.814) (402.653) (19.182) (78.090) (60.610) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) -0.713 -0.019 -0.443 -1.438 1.760* 0.169 -0.428 -1.469* 
 (1.419) (0.172) (0.404) (1.606) (1.201) (0.305) (0.728) (1.069) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA t-1 (β5) 398.695 -21.205 68.936 82.016 -261.970* -39.750*** 23.455 88.765 
 (946.706) (38.737) (67.850) (98.035) (177.670) (13.698) (32.120) (106.571) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.676*** 0.962*** 0.691*** 0.391 0.353** -2.549*** -0.946** 1.022*** 
 (0.065) (0.112) (0.067) (0.382) (0.155) (0.941) (0.522) (0.124) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) 0.139* -0.040 -0.212** -1.383*** 1.676*** -0.125 -1.651 -1.009*** 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.097) (0.484) (0.226) (0.477) (1.899) (0.300) 
lnGi t-1  (β8) 0.020 0.184*** 0.134*** -0.133 -0.094 0.024 -1.720*** 0.063 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.040) (0.262) (0.201) (0.116) (0.430) (0.076) 
R
2
 0.455 0.628 0.748 0.834 0.629 0.839 0.804 0.790 
Adjusted R
2
 0.442 0.601 0.722 0.789 0.580 0.731 0.721 0.737 
 1.321 0.938 0.690 0.538 1.069 0.390 0.844 0.666 
Observations 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %
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Table 6.12: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
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 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.713 -0.005 -3.433 39.017*** 76.433*** 30.960*** 65.174*** 17.613*** 
 (5.666) (2.675) (4.001) (14.359) (21.009) (8.436) (20.860) (6.808) 
lnFi    (β1) 0.009 0.439* 0.130* 8.624*** 10.778*** 0.064 6.495** 0.289 
 (1.377) (0.333) (0.080) (2.828) (3.788) (0.635) (3.147) (0.674) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.348 -0.084 0.527* -3.361*** -7.481*** 0.626 -5.372** -0.241 
 (0.449) (0.215) (0.345) (1.466) (1.984) (0.525) (2.479) (0.564) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 204.522 -38.130 6.165 -315.358*** -1249.145*** 3.257 -163.836** -29.630 
 (734.746) (56.449) (5.367) (112.086) (443.042) (19.182) (79.616) (51.280) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) -0.618 0.002 -0.474 -1.163 0.761 0.169 0.707 -1.448* 
 (1.415) (0.167) (0.385) (1.418) (1.113) (0.305) (0.901) (1.071) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 349.408 -24.962 67.705 49.509 -93.886  -39.750** -8.575 66.537 
 (944.044) (35.383) (58.840) (63.975) (135.463) (13.698) (27.263) (82.387) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.676** 0.960*** 0.686*** 0.363 0.339** -2.549** 0.499 1.026*** 
 (0.065) (0.111) (0.067) (0.382) (0.157) (0.941) (0.528) (0.124) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) 0.137 -0.041 -0.215** -1.355*** 1.647*** -0.125 3.095* -0.995*** 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.098) (0.518) (0.255) (0.477) (2.167) (0.300) 
lnGi t-1  (β8) 0.020 0.186*** 0.128*** -0.194 -0.145 0.024 -1.720*** 0.066 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.283) (0.202) (0.116) (0.430) (0.076) 
R
2
 0.455 0.629 0.747 0.836 0.598 0.838 0.639 0.790 
Adjusted R
2
 0.442 0.602 0.721 0.785 0.555 0.751 0.512 0.738 
Observations 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %
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Table 6.13: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
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 All Welfare Hum Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -1.391** 16.982** 7.066*** 34.172*** 60.07*** -7.873 55.301** -20.325** 
 (0.796) (8.591) (2.959) (13.92) (16.799) (9.357) (27.598) (10.06) 
lnFi    (β1) -0.524 1.849** 0.645 6.401** -0.171 0.002 6.375** -1.361 
 (0.824) (1.122) (0.759) (2.885) (0.332) (0.801) (3.008) (1.065) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.272*** -1.269** -0.012 -2.292** -3.728 0.579* -3.732* 1.770** 
 (0.058) (0.721) (0.255) (1.137) (3.416) (0.419) (2.349) (0.877) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 453.171*** -312.49*5 -50.271 -314.75** -160.956 -4.251 -254.468** 169.448** 
 (450.130) (210.411) (54.236) (163.01) (411.735) (22.187) (129.617) (96.213) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) 0.021 -0.072 -0.804** -0.377 -1.906** 0.794 -5.264* 1.018*** 
 (0.110) (0.180) (0.443) (1.374) (0.828) (0.688) (3.981) (0.173) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) -9.338 -75.307*** 46.779* 14.980 182.376* -15.474 244.776* -2.938 
 (59.620) (27.299) (32.575) (84.96) (114.04) (26.236) (176.219) (2.791) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.691*** 0.877*** 0.651*** 0.039 0.347* 1.385** -0.311 0.254** 
 (0.061) (0.115) (0.074) (0.351) (0.183) (0.806) (0.589) (0.146) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) 0.041 -0.013 -0.491* -0.926*** 2.267*** 0.803 0.859 -0.699** 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.350) (0.375) (0.435) (1.049) (2.091) (0.363) 
lnGi t-1  (β8) 0.025 0.280*** 0.333*** 0.111 -0.209 -0.524** -1.202** -0.612*** 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.129) (0.237) (0.2374) (0.278) (0.545) (0.119) 
β0 0.489 0.650 0.816 0.827 0.673 0.743 0.776 0.858 
 0.475 0.625 0.771 0.774 0.630 0.572 0.681 0.829 
SE of regression 1.308 0.944 0.497 0.538 1.004 0.438 0.903 0.598 
Obs. 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.14: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1+ ε 
 All Welfare Hum. Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -1.302** 5.210** 2.214*** 46.987*** 62.105*** -7.882 68.655* -6.910** 
 (0.786) (2.889) (0.842) (12.599) (18.506) (8.320) (47.630) (3.749) 
lnFit-1    (β1) 0.306*** 0.449** 0.170 9.261*** 6.702** -0.107 6.542** 0.014 
 (0.063) (0.244) (0.889) (3.315) (3.816) (0.665) (3.806) (0.424) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) -0.505 -0.086 -0.10 -4.315*** -5.877*** 0.594** -5.233* 0.632** 
 (0.795) (0.090) (0.133) (1.319) (1.799) (0.342) (3.338) (0.373) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFt-1 (β3) 411.011 -24.887 6.561 -345.60*** -769.075** -1.305 -169.072* 27.760 
 (423.05) (30.057) (107.128) (133.270) (451.596) (10.350) (112.877) (26.632) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) 0.018 -1.270** -0.049 -0.269 0.443 0.921** -3.237 1.359*** 
 (0.110) (0.729) (0.227) (0.411) (0.911) (0.540) (5.577) (0.572) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA t-1 (β5) -8.684 81.603 -5.316 5.508 -54.946 -13.566 99.562 -36.576 
 (59.585) (97.816) (35.030) (12.939) (110.970) (11.625) (162.457) (30.286) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.690*** 1.02*** 0.694*** 0.019 0.261** 1.221* -0.423 0.232* 
 (0.061) (0.256) (0.073) (0.303) (0.136) (0.840) (0.377) (0.174) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) 0.044 -0.174 -0.193** -0.815** 1.548*** 1.141 -0.098 -0.224 
 (0.114) (0.230) (0.083) (0.358) (0.202) (0.906) (2.252) (0.300) 
lnGit-1 (β8) 0.027 0.321*** 0.132*** 0.098 -0.248** -0.551 -1.218 -0.539*** 
 (0.050) (0.137) (0.040) (0.189) (0.136) (0.225)*** (0.280)*** (0.206) 
R
2
 0.489 0.564 0.738 0.831 0.615 0.751 0.759 0.863 
AdjR
2
 0.475 0.513 0.710 0.779 0.574 0.585 0.657 0.836 
S.E.OR 1.308 1.080 0.704 0.533 1.035 0.431 0.937 0.578 
Obs 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 6.15: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β7 ln Git+ ε 
 
 All Welfare Hum. Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 2.377 13.430*** -5.749 27.527**6 45.763*** 9.203 52.290** -0.573 
 (3.663) (2.921) (7.336) (10.797) (14.860) (7.845) (24.586) (6.949) 
lnFit    (β1) 1.194* 1.029*** -0.876 3.543** 5.763*** 0.592 4.715** -0.970* 
 (0.751) (0.394) (0.858) (1.868) (2.131) (0.469) (2.037) (0.619) 
lnFjt (β2) -0.075 -0.569*** 1.017* -1.681** -4.548*** -0.071 -3.161** 0.844* 
 (0.288) (0.231) (0.583) (0.907) (1.420) (0.372) (1.533) (0.568) 
lnFit /ΣlnFt (β3) -423.935 -188.513*** 78.795 -157.132* -616.32*** -10.874 -183.08*** 101.679* 
 (412.024) (75.353) (66.380) (104.148) (240.249) (14.042) (77.330) (65.022) 
lnAif (β4) -0.0004*** -0.307 0.074 1.158* -0.373* 0.749** 0.214 -1.096** 
 (0.00041) (0.345) (0.205) (0.849) (0.237) (0.346) (0.846) (0.579) 
lnAit /ΣlnA t (β5) -79.630*** 3.106 -2.943 -79.220* 31.183 -22.460 -4.497 82.147* 
 (29.353) (83.673) (14.598) (52.461) (76.725) (15.967) (34.441) (58.366) 
lnVit  (β6) 0.647*** -0.001* 0.489*** 0.425* 0.464*** 0.142 -0.404 0.855*** 
 (0.061) (0.001) (0.084) (0.318) (0.189) (0.579) (0.733) (0.109) 
lnAgeit  (β7) 0.109 0.091 -1.143*** -1.365*** 1.956*** -0.533* 0.442 -1.070*** 
 (0.103) (0.147) (0.372) (0.388) (0.294) (0.388) (2.392) (0.349) 
lnGit (β8) 0.001 0.318*** 0.242*** -0.070 0.028 -0.129 -1.319*** -0.071 
 (0.045) (0.058) (0.116) (0.217) (0.236) (0.114) (0.540) (0.095) 
R
2
 0.454 0.335 0.782 0.826 0.642 0.826 0.773 0.738 
AdjR
2
 0.442 0.293 0.738 0.780 0.602 0.734 0.694 0.694 
Obs. 352 136 48 40 96 24 32 56 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %
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Table 6.16: OLS estimation for Australian charities   
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln Git+ ε 
 All Welfare Hum. Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 1.185* 16.43*** -1.498 35.262*** 43.615*** 7.694 50.758** 2.607 
 (3.855) (5.445) (7.229) (12.940) (16.917) (7.857) (25.443) (6.541) 
lnFi    (β1) 2.185 1.186* -0.345 5.097** 4.897** 0.645 5.872*** -0.875* 
 (1.307) (0.394) (0.935) (2.386) (2.537) (0.682) (2.466) (0.670) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.015 -0.880** 0.706 -2.986** -4.394*** -0.101 -4.188** 0.746 
 (0.305) (0.477) (0.645) (1.286) (1.614) (0.543) (1.892) (0.591) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) -938.21 -203.59 27.80 -182.40** -451.36** -6.747 -147.11*** 71.023* 
 (694.76) (137.32) (54.390) (95.747) (245.209) (10.96) (60.75) (54.192) 
lnAit   (β4) -1.355 0.045 0.111 0.993 -1.611** 0.666** 0.177 -1.003** 
 (1.470) (0.322) (0.204) (0.850) (0.844) (0.344) (0.842) (0.588) 
lnAit /ΣlnA jt (β5) 802.886 -78.694 -5.522 -49.874 139.005* -11.597 -2.004 55.630 
 (955.97) (73.09) (10.02) (38.87) (94.62) (9.91) (22.76) (45.89) 
lnVit  (β6) 0.646*** -0.001 0.511*** 0.502* 0.488*** 0.091 -0.299 0.865*** 
 (0.061) (0.001) (0.083) (0.320) (0.189) (0.645) (0.720) (0.110) 
lnAgeit  (β7) 0.114 0.078 -1.004*** -1.267*** 1.825*** -0.398 0.984 -0.989*** 
 (0.103) (0.143) (0.365) (0.401) (0.302) (0.453) (2.434) (0.340) 
lnGit  (β8) 0.002 0.338*** 0.233 -0.044 0.174 -0.145 -1.337*** -0.052 
 (0.045) (0.060) (0.119) (0.226) (0.238) (0.116) (0.549) (0.093) 
R
2
 0.455 0.318 0.775 0.823 0.647 0.820 0.777 0.733 
AdjR
2
 0.443 0.275 0.729 0.777 0.607 0.725 0.700 0.688 
SE of reg. 1.327 1.285 0.740 0.528 1.020 0.330 0.860 0.746 
Obs. 352 136 48 40 96 24 32 56 
Note: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations, Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 6.17: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.817 -1.671 -2.060 33.288*** 58.783*** 9.753 32.230 16.122** 
 (5.668) (2.857) (4.265) (9.982) (17.277) (10.781) (25.481) (9.529) 
lnFi    (β1) 0.116 0.163 0.039 7.616*** 9.777*** -0.060 4.893** 0.133 
 (1.381) (0.355) (0.081) (2.642) (3.023) (0.497) (2.661) (0.700) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.342 0.055 0.467* -2.164*** -5.674*** 0.623* -4.019** -0.139 
 (0.449) (0.223) (0.349) (0.788) (1.529) (0.430) (2.058) (0.669) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 151.811 -2.368 7.557* -378.572*** -1272.410*** 6.384 -192.482** -23.599 
 (758.148) (63.254) (4.871) (145.757) (397.676) (15.277) (103.994) (73.130) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) -0.667 -0.097 -0.488 -1.412 1.842* -0.689* 0.731 -1.485* 
 (1.418) (0.184) (0.414) (1.606) (1.168) (0.446) (1.017) (1.079) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 382.405 -11.585 68.272 78.051 -275.061* -2.076 -8.114 90.213 
 (945.778) (40.505) (69.583) (97.381) (172.865) (19.690) (43.633) (107.563) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.676*** 1.143*** 0.761*** 0.268 0.361*** -0.893 0.436 1.041*** 
 (0.065) (0.110) (0.064) (0.262) (0.147) (1.005) (0.577) (0.139) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) 0.138 -0.104 -0.309*** -1.212*** 1.729*** -0.516* 2.205 -1.124*** 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.104) (0.304) (0.225) (0.355) (2.180) (0.290) 
lnACi t-1  (β8) -0.036 0.218*** 0.166*** -0.069 0.145 0.948*** -0.197 0.048 
 (0.064) (0.085) (0.062) (0.166) (0.995) (0.404) (0.234) (0.131) 
R
2
 0.455 0.595 0.736 0.833 0.622 0.889 0.652 0.786 
Adjusted R
2
 0.441 0.565 0.708 0.782 0.581 0.815 0.505 0.733 
SE of regression 1.320 0.978 0.706 0.529 1.060 0.256 1.125 0.672 
Observations 307 119 42 35 84 21 28 41 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10  
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Table 6.18: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.844 -1.488 -2.533 44.359*** 67.424*** 11.250 30.654 19.208** 
 (5.658) (2.781) (4.202) (12.386) (20.952) (10.472) (23.943) (9.304) 
lnFi    (β1) 0.009 0.191 0.040 8.826*** 10.206*** -0.134 6.448** 0.313 
 (1.377) (0.354) (0.085) (2.848) (3.765) (0.670) (3.182) (0.783) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.348 0.038 0.523* -3.957*** -6.886*** 0.695 -5.320** -0.307 
 (0.449) (0.223) (0.357) (1.205) (1.990) (0.578) (2.506) (0.725) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 204.522 -7.311 7.669* -324.859*** -1184.278*** 4.557 -163.752** -33.424 
 (734.746) (58.607) (5.467) (112.253) (440.531) (10.983) (80.479) (63.544) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) -0.618 -0.076 -0.527* -0.836 0.669 -0.608* 0.851 -1.469* 
 (1.415) (0.179) (0.393) (1.327) (1.105) (0.441) (0.939) (1.080) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 349.408 -15.908 69.001 32.541 -83.235 -3.627 -9.357 66.984 
 (944.044) (36.969) (60.582) (58.347) (134.454) (12.106) (27.578) (83.139) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.675*** 1.142*** 0.753*** 0.212 0.357*** -1.066 0.580 1.053*** 
 (0.065) (0.110) (0.064) (0.301) (0.150) (1.081) (0.544) (0.140) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) 0.137 -0.104 -0.306*** -1.085*** 1.708*** -0.439 2.997* -1.124*** 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.104) (0.308 (0.256) (0.456) (2.194) (0.292) 
lnACi t-1  (β8) -0.036 0.218*** 0.155*** -0.054 0.137* 0.889** -0.168 0.066 
 (0.064) (0.084) (0.063) (0.166) (0.098) (0.397) (0.222) (0.133) 
R
2
 0.455 0.595 0.735 0.833 0.606 0.890 0.663 0.787 
Adj.R
2
 0.441 0.565 0.707 0.782 0.564 0.816 0.520 0.734 
Obs 307 119 42 35 84 21 28 41 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 6.19: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -1.604** 3.287 8.630** 28.614*** 54.942*** 4.226* 34.987 14.364* 
 (0.758) (8.861) (3.791) (11.535) (17.313) (11.859) (30.284) (10.061) 
lnFit-1    (β1) -0.273 0.035 0.767 5.960** -0.214 0.760 6.019** 1.856*** 
 (0.816) (1.160) (0.896 (2.619) (0.329) (0.816) (3.392) (1.004) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) 0.244*** -0.154 -0.027 -1.873** -4.418* 0.191 -4.280* -1.367* 
 (0.058) (0.752) (0.302) (0.887) (3.389) (0.439) (2.721) (0.851) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFjt-1 (β3) 311.661 37.464 -65.345 -283.716** -67.80 -18.696 -245.665** -158.352** 
 (446.002) (217.078) (63.585) (146.819) (411.32) (24.204) (146.98) (90.999) 
lnAit-1   (β4) 0.090 0.328* -0.534 -0.449 -1.846** 0.156 -5.375 0.833*** 
 (0.110) (0.200) (0.511) (1.358) (0.838) (0.677) (4.507) (0.174) 
lnAit-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) -4.625 -98.283*** 40.300 20.368 195.424** 8.132 259.597* 15.695*** 
 (58.883) (29.526) (38.673) (84.345) (113.852) (25.995) (199.957) (3.602) 
lnVit-1  (β6) 0.657*** 1.005*** 0.742*** 0.098 0.359** 0.330 0.400 -0.001 
 (0.061) (0.128) (0.086) (0.237) (0.186) (1.203) (0.5491) (0.157) 
lnAgeit-1  (β7) 0.024 -0.028 -0.429 -0.976*** 2.161*** -0.978** 2.537 0.264 
 (0.113) (0.132) (0.455) (0.282) (0.426) (0.519) (2.176) (0.354) 
lnACit-1  (β8) -0.208*** 0.027 0.188* -0.175 0.077 -0.277 0.071 0.769*** 
 (0.074) (0.118) (0.140) (0.200) (0.168) (0.869) (0.253) (0.180) 
R
2
 0.502 0.580 0.798 0.831 0.670 0.671 0.719 0.838 
Adj. R
2
 0.489 0.550 0.749 0.779 0.626 0.450 0.601 0.806 
Obs 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 6.20: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β7 ln ACit-1 ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -0.853 2.638 3.342*** 44.302*** 57.569*** 16.255 49.428 -9.801** 
 (0.781) (3.358) (0.927) (10.516) (19.970) (17.481) (39.020) (4.806) 
lnFit-1    (β1) 0.369*** 0.356* -0.044 8.835*** 5.818* 1.475* 5.843* 0.751** 
 (0.075) (0.252) (0.882) (3.149) (3.857) (0.919) (3.785) (0.391) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) -0.397 0.028 -0.043 -4.022*** -5.796*** -0.070 -5.627* 1.054** 
 (0.790) (0.083) (0.163) (1.071) (1.927) (0.347) (3.527) (0.530) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFjt-1 (β3) 347.214 -6.629 16.883 -331.979*** -689.152 -20.967* -154.531* -27.459 
 (420.478) (30.224) (106.628) (126.291) (459.410) (14.108) (115.080) (21.936) 
lnAit-1   (β4) 0.067 -1.438 -0.103 -0.240 0.429 0.876 -4.141 0.022 
 (0.112) (0.766) (0.235) (0.409) (0.857) (0.807) (7.010 (0.411) 
lnAit-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) -7.075 94.239 1.041 5.812 -52.820 -11.402 131.951 23.031 
 (59.412) (100.237) (36.142) (13.128) (104.733) (18.359) (203.726) (27.029) 
lnVit-1  (β6) 0.663*** 1.264*** 0.756*** 0.088 0.347*** -0.460 0.283 0.413** 
 (0.064) (0.299) (0.074) (0.228) (0.142) (1.433) (0.496) (0.216) 
lnAgeit-1  (β7) 0.029 -0.071 -0.284*** -0.897*** 1.704*** -0.414 1.340 -0.675** 
 (0.114) (0.245) (0.085) (0.282) (0.228) (0.757) (2.437) (0.366) 
lnACit-1  (β8) -0.091* 0.327** 0.164** 0.113 0.161* -0.890 0.050 0.152** 
 (0.065) (0.182) (0.071) (0.129) (0.111) (0.977) (0.560) (0.084) 
R
2
 0.492 0.515 0.722 0.831 0.620 0.693 0.701 0.817 
AdjR
2
 0.478 0.458 0.693 0.779 0.580 0.489 0.576 0.781 
S.E.OR 1.305 1.139 0.725 0.532 1.028 0.478 1.042 0.668 
Obs. 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.21: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β7 ln ACit + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 2.359 11.681*** -2.121 29.370*** 58.447*** 4.425 19.321 -3.328 
 (3.631) (4.291) (3.343) (6.658) (13.273) (9.973) (28.742) (5.160) 
lnFi    (β1) 1.362** 0.609** 0.088 3.842*** 7.432*** 0.746** 4.382* -0.955*** 
 (0.756) (0.326) (0.092) (1.480) (2.736) (0.346) (2.714) (0.380) 
lnFj    (β2) -0.045 -0.146* 0.412* -1.860*** -5.583*** -0.178 -4.205** 0.935*** 
 (0.283) (0.101) (0.255) (0.531) (1.206) (0.323) (2.306) (0.389) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) -490.256 -28.605 4.462 -171.729** -980.701*** -15.132* -202.163* 123.397*** 
 (409.729) (39.348) (4.428) (79.189) (366.100) (9.624) (125.250) (45.144) 
lnAi  (β4) -0.0004*** -1.934** 0.421* 1.117 -0.187 0.146 1.385** -1.392*** 
 (0.00005) (1.062) (0.265) (0.877) (0.8989) (0.576) (0.691) (0.523) 
lnAi/lnΣA  (β5) -44.321 188.947 -67.804** -78.278* 28.424 -2.705 -45.942* 121.697*** 
 (40.650) (166.150) (40.394) (52.803) (133.236) (23.552) (31.278) (52.096) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.632*** 0.001** 0.709*** 0.364** 0.313*** 0.451 1.143*** 0.781*** 
 (0.068) (0.000) (0.076) (0.199) (0.124) (0.742) (0.464) (0.085) 
lnAgei (β7) 0.096 0.150 -0.260*** -1.289*** 1.766*** -1.058*** 5.472*** -0.721** 
 (0.126) (0.258) (0.080) (0.250) (0.182) (0.253) (1.924) (0.311) 
lnAC (β8) -0.116** 0.161 0.102* -0.047 0.174** 0.547* 0.218 -0.357*** 
 (0.058) (0.227) (0.077) (0.160) (0.104) (0.384) (0.365) (0.112) 
R
2
 0.460 0.223 0.624 0.826 0.618 0.830 0.720 0.788 
Adjusted R
2
 0.447 0.145 0.590 0.781 0.582 0.739 0.623 0.752 
S.E. of regression 1.321 1.439 0.899 0.523 1.008 0.322 0.964 0.665 
Obs. 352 136 48 40 96 24 32 56 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.22: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β7 ln ACit + ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 1.233 12.664*** -9.995** 36.523*** 63.065*** 3.198 11.403 0.041 
 (3.868) (4.416) (5.840) (8.831) (15.928) (9.616) (26.131) (4.905) 
lnFi    (β1) 2.289** 0.602** -1.074** 5.247*** 7.765** 0.918** 5.314* -0.939*** 
 (1.274) (0.341) (0.584) (2.171) (3.380) (0.494) (3.352) (0.399) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.039 -0.148* 1.092** -3.127*** -6.251*** -0.329 -5.144** 0.907** 
 (0.303) (0.104) (0.487) (0.875) (1.566) (0.432) (2.876) (0.399) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) -968.569* -25.099 155.852** -187.905** -907.048** -10.758* -154.716* 94.455*** 
 (672.835) (36.407) (80.190) (84.210) (400.820) (7.414) (96.443) (36.665) 
lnAi  (β4) -1.269 -2.005** 0.336 1.001 -0.658 0.033 1.469*** -1.303*** 
 (1.490) (1.067) (0.276) (0.954) (0.787) (0.592) (0.609) (0.518) 
lnAi/lnΣA  (β5) 780.586 172.750 -50.966* -50.920 80.536 1.263 -34.016** 86.993** 
 (967.391) (144.449) (35.107) (41.621) (95.287) (15.273) (19.020) (40.032) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.631*** 0.001** 0.721*** 0.465** 0.309*** 0.572 1.345*** 0.788*** 
 (0.068) (0.000) (0.075) (0.201) (0.127) (0.893) (0.471) (0.088) 
lnAgei (β7) 0.101 0.147 -0.264*** -1.216*** 1.777*** -1.095*** 6.670*** -0.673** 
 (0.126) (0.258) (0.081) (0.256) (0.183) (0.410) (1.998) (0.310) 
lnAC (β8) -0.114** 0.158 0.104* -0.023 0.167* 0.591* 0.267 -0.349*** 
 (0.058) (0.227) (0.076) (0.176) (0.103) (0.387) (0.370) (0.114) 
R
2
 0.461 0.225 0.628 0.823 0.612 0.828 0.729 0.782 
Adjusted R
2
 0.448 0.147 0.593 0.777 0.577 0.736 0.635 0.744 
S.E. of regression 1.321 1.437 0.895 0.528 1.015 0.323 0.948 0.675 
Obs. 352 136 48 40 96 24 32 56 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.23: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.248 -0.312 -3.639 47.942*** 27.322 31.276*** 53.318*** -18.410** 
 (5.658) (2.697) (4.203) (11.134) (21.649) (8.045) (15.692) (8.088) 
lnFi    (β1) 0.124 0.413 0.131** 8.379*** 5.250* -0.029 3.929** 0.697 
 (1.384) (0.331) (0.078) (2.965) (3.941) (0.506) (1.956) (0.688) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.307 -0.068 0.466* -3.609*** -2.321* 0.699 -2.715** -0.682 
 (0.449) (0.213) (0.347) (0.891) (1.881) (0.428) (1.559) (0.583) 
lnFi /ΣlnF (β3) 134.849 -35.734 5.921 -430.695*** -571.793 -5.505 -156.337** -92.678* 
 (759.763) (60.630) (4.867) (163.928) (510.727) (16.522) (77.028) (65.634) 
lnAi  (β4) -0.620 -0.018 -0.426 -0.930 3.114** 0.156 -0.194 -1.239 
 (1.418) (0.171) (0.414) (1.795) (1.553) (0.290) (0.673) (1.222) 
lnAi/ΣlnA  (β5) 348.255 -21.027 66.038 -41.799 -455.672** -41.398*** 12.931 72.621 
 (946.636) (38.581) (69.485) (109.115) (229.860) (11.720) (29.571) (121.939) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.688*** 0.958*** 0.654*** -0.465** -0.109 -2.635*** -0.521*** 0.957*** 
 (0.064) (0.111) (0.066) (0.267) (0.185) (0.849) (0.184) (0.140) 
lnGi (β7) 0.025 0.185*** 0.138*** 0.456*** -0.119 -0.004 -1.530*** 0.157** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.181) (0.263) (0.084) (0.368) (0.081) 
R
2
 0.452 0.627 0.732 0.782 0.326 0.838 0.796 0.716 
Adjusted R
2
 0.439 0.604 0.708 0.725 0.264 0.751 0.725 0.656 
S.E. of regression 1.322 0.934 0.706 0.594 1.360 0.298 0.839 0.763 
Observations 307 119 42 35 84 21 28 41 
NOTES: A dependent variable is Log of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of dependent variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.
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Table 6.24: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.287 -0.173 -3.554 60.316*** 34.169* 30.466*** 56.983*** -19.294*** 
 (5.649) (2.623) (4.102) (13.049) (24.738) (7.969) (15.709) (7.751) 
lnFi    (β1) -0.005 0.443* 0.131* 9.682*** 7.298* 0.198 5.369** 0.792 
 (1.379) (0.332) (0.082) (3.087) (4.646) (0.711) (2.385) (0.750) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.313 -0.086 0.476* -5.710*** -3.554* 0.513 -3.861** -0.752 
 (0.449) (0.214) (0.352) (1.278) (2.340) (0.594) (1.901) (0.619) 
lnFi /ΣlnF (β3) 199.840 -38.528 5.414 -369.914*** -760.868* -0.174 -136.738** -79.555* 
 (736.110) (56.216) (5.490) (124.478) (540.948) (12.077) (60.235) (55.974) 
lnAi  (β4) -0.561 0.003 -0.424 -0.091 3.991*** 0.205 -0.103 -1.354 
 (1.415) (0.167) (0.394) (1.498) (1.233) (0.282) (0.641) (1.222) 
lnAi/ΣlnA  (β5) 308.332 -24.790 59.972 -4.637 -482.650*** -23.901*** 6.204 64.848 
 (944.623) (35.240) (60.211) (66.775) (150.372) (6.506) (18.456) (94.063) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.688*** 0.957*** 0.648*** -0.342 -0.046 -2.700*** -0.523*** 0.956*** 
 (0.064) (0.111) (0.067) (0.298) (0.180) (0.835) (0.180) (0.140) 
lnGi (β7) 0.025 0.186*** 0.133*** 0.409** -0.147 0.050 -1.564*** 0.155** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.042) (0.181) (0.250) (0.088) (0.359) (0.081) 
R
2
 0.452 0.628 0.731 0.792 0.375 0.843 0.803 0.718 
Adj R
2
 0.440 0.605 0.706 0.739 0.317 0.759 0.734 0.658 
S.E. of regression 1.322 0.933 0.708 0.579 1.310 0.293 0.824 0.760 
Observations 307 119 42 35 84 21 28 41 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of dependent variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.25: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 
 All Welfare Hum. Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -1.324** 17.014** 7.754*** 52.607***   22.733 -4.998 58.112** -13.523* 
 (0.772) (8.548) (3.319) (12.806) (18.735) (8.432) (26.173) (9.728) 
lnFi    -0.531 1.857** 0.867 9.050*** 0.134 0.266 6.365** -0.359 
 (0.823) (1.115) (0.844) (2.919) (0.390) (0.711) (2.945) (0.960) 
lnFj     0.275*** -1.276** -0.087 -3.939*** -7.565** 0.4061 -3.578* 0.896 
 (0.058) (0.715) (0.283) (1.003) (3.978) (0.348) (2.270) (0.776) 
lnFi  455.886 -313.952* -75.219* -471.916*** 502.235 -7.626 -240.68**0 75.453 
   /ΣlnF (449.410) (209.077) (58.282) (163.561) (466.94) (21.40 (125.38) (85.656) 
lnAi   0.029 -0.070 -0.910** -0.891 -0.865 0.554 -5.167* 1.150*** 
 (0.108) (0.178) (0.496) (1.481) (0.959) (0.603) (3.891) (0.164) 
lnAi  -9.134 -75.615*** 53.405* 39.791 252.695** -3.976 240.512* -1.676 
  /ΣlnA (59.530) (27.041) (36.656) (91.962) (135.03) (21.16) (172.22) (2.801) 
lnVi   0.692*** 0.874*** 0.696*** -0.568** 0.175 1.172* -0.534*** 0.090 
 (0.061) (0.111) (0.076) (0.273) (0.215) (0.744) (0.222) (0.123) 
lnGi  0.025 0.280*** 0.248** 0.510*** 0.079 -0.33** -1.285*** -0.515*** 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.130) (0.188) (0.275) (0.120) (0.496) (0.112) 
R
2
 0.489 0.650 0.787 0.787 0.527 0.731 0.773 0.844 
AdjR
2
 0.477 0.628 0.743 0.731 0.474 0.586 0.694 0.818 
S.E.OR 1.306 0.940 0.527 0.587 1.197 0.431 0.884 0.609 
Obs. 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.
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Table 6.26: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 
 All Welfare Hum. Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -1.229* 4.124* 1.555** 67.707*** 7.648 -5.031 68.053** -7.666** 
 (0.761) (3.025) (0.817) (11.790) (24.396) (6.666) (34.856) (3.489) 
lnFit-1    (β1) 0.304*** 0.451** 0.232 12.222*** -1.993 0.381 6.528** -0.085 
 (0.063) (0.247) (0.877) (3.103) (4.467) (0.628) (3.468) (0.403) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) -0.499 -0.065 -0.105 -6.499*** -0.137 0.349** -5.232* 0.586* 
 (0.794) (0.089) (0.132) (1.168) (2.183) (0.191) (3.289) (0.369) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFjt-1 (β3) 409.235 -24.792 -1.335 -472.399*** 343.783 -5.980 -169.13* 33.396* 
 (422.423) (30.441) (105.658) (124.309 (527.990) (10.460) (111.157) (24.765) 
lnAit-1   (β4) 0.027 -1.243** -0.046 -0.403 0.691 0.530 -3.154 1.519*** 
 (0.107) (0.735) (0.240) (0.381) (7.519) (0.641) (4.029) (0.513) 
lnAit-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) -8.321 83.589 -5.925 7.101 -0.220 -2.074 97.164 -41.838* 
 (59.492) (97.319) (37.108) (12.634) (0.140) (13.495) (117.026) (28.707) 
lnVit-1  (β6) 0.692*** 1.009*** 0.660*** -0.481** -0.010 1.136* -0.401** 0.153 
 (0.061) (0.254) (0.072) (0.263) (0.201) (0.706) (0.214) (0.125) 
lnGit-1  (β7) 0.028 0.313** 0.135*** 0.435*** -0.365 -0.313*** -1.212*** -0.558*** 
 (0.050) (0.139) (0.042) (0.183) (0.241) (0.127) (0.244) (0.201) 
R
2
 0.489 0.561 0.723 0.802 0.373 0.732 0.759 0.862 
AdjR
2
 0.477 0.516 0.698 0.750 0.315 0.588 0.674 0.838 
S.E.OR 1.306 1.076 0.718 0.566 1.312 0.429 0.913 0.574 
Obs.     308      119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
.   
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Table 6.27: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 2.602 12.8954*** -3.067 44.893*** 17.991 7.723 55.914*** 8.324* 
 (3.590) (2.310) (3.112) (9.672) (18.213) (9.302) (11.855) (6.242) 
lnFi    (β1) 1.200* -0.291*** 0.147** 5.080*** 1.681 0.387 4.869*** -0.018 
 (0.748) (0.097) (0.077) (1.875) (3.201) (0.398) (1.620) (0.339) 
lnFj    (β2) -0.073 0.428** 0.360* -3.388*** -1.268 0.007 -3.203*** -0.158 
 (0.280) (0.255) (0.238) (0.779) (1.471) (0.441) (1.354) (0.417) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) -430.246 -57.208** 3.314 -247.460*** -95.507 -7.421 -187.069*** -10.408 
 (408.077) (32.424) (4.955) (103.373) (424.167) (12.448) (70.586) (39.110) 
lnAi  (β4) -0.0005*** -2.074** 0.405** 1.137 0.234 0.880** 0.105 -1.087** 
 (0.00004) (0.906) (0.245) (1.052) (1.214) (0.408) (0.909) (0.570) 
lnAi/lnΣA  (β5) -71.345** 206.453* -61.200* -88.704* -31.740 -29.806* -0.298 80.079* 
 (33.254) (141.623) (38.462) (65.732) (177.833) (19.199) (34.431) (52.204) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.657*** 0.001*** 0.605*** -0.425* -0.210* 0.278 -0.535*** 0.833*** 
 (0.065) (0.000) (0.073) (0.265) (0.150) (0.657) (0.187) (0.111) 
lnGi (β7) 0.007 0.587*** 0.148*** 0.487*** -0.258* -0.255*** -1.392*** 0.091 
 (0.049) (0.100) (0.045) (0.158) (0.191) (0.069) (0.310) (0.108) 
R
2
 0.453 0.503 0.639 0.756 0.332 0.805 0.773 0.686 
AdjR
2
 0.441 0.459 0.611 0.703 0.279 0.719 0.706 0.640 
S.E. of reg. 1.328 1.145 0.867 0.609 1.324 0.334 0.850 0.801 
Obs. 352 136 48 40 96 24 32 56 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
.   
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Table 6.28: OLS estimation for Australian charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 1.478 13.775*** -7.434* 54.417*** 19.504 7.749 58.897*** 9.410* 
 (3.831) (2.434) (4.897) (11.215) (19.924) (9.375) (13.397) (6.314) 
lnFi    (β1) 2.136** 0.444** -0.475 6.609*** 2.045 0.486 6.214*** 0.006 
 (1.287) (0.265) (0.460) (2.441) (3.678) (0.537) (2.288) (0.385) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.013 -0.297*** 0.728** -5.081*** -1.580 -0.045 -4.285** -0.167 
 (0.303) (0.101) (0.402) (1.088) (1.758) (0.558) (1.903) (0.446) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) -915.233* -52.049** 84.528* -249.527*** -135.175 -5.256 -153.092*** -9.724 
 (679.208) (29.740) (65.325) (95.738) (432.342) (8.808) (61.927) (34.136) 
lnAi  (β4) -1.284 -2.023** 0.386* 1.308 1.132 0.816** -0.074 -1.052** 
 (1.486) (0.908) (0.262) (1.088) (1.165) (0.358) (0.796) (0.569) 
lnAi/lnΣA  (β5) 764.803 170.868* -53.996* -71.384* -135.386 -16.678* 4.428 59.302* 
 (967.589) (122.221) (34.469) (49.611) (139.745) (10.526) (19.950) (40.428) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.656*** 0.001*** 0.615*** -0.212 -0.177* 0.038 -0.580*** 0.833*** 
 (0.065) (0.000) (0.073) (0.260) (0.154) (0.766) (0.149) (0.112) 
lnGi (β7) 0.008 0.584*** 0.148*** 0.481*** -0.254* -0.197** -1.504*** 0.089 
 (0.049) (0.099) (0.046) (0.157) (0.181) (0.085) (0.288) (0.107) 
R
2
 0.454 0.502 0.641 0.766 0.339 0.811 0.778 0.685 
Adjusted R
2
 0.443 0.458 0.612 0.714 0.286 0.728 0.710 0.639 
S.E. of regression 1.328 1.146 0.874 0.594 1.318 0.328 0.845 0.802 
Obs. 351 136 48 40 96 24 32 56 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.29: OLS estimation for Australian charities with State  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε 
 
 ACT Victoria NSW QLD WA SA 
β0 27.314 36.250** 6.911 24.669 37.686 -771.311 
 (133.709) (17.192) (6.546) (15.101) (48.976) (1240.132) 
lnFi   2.763 4.462** 0.314 -0.366 3.589 -55.411 
 (7.515) (2.375) (0.789) (3.193) (4.944) (84.271) 
lnFj    -3.243 -3.170** 0.014 0.425 -2.061 58.568 
 (6.726) (1.448) (0.979) (1.481) (3.917) (85.227) 
lnFi /ΣlnF  -79.370 -816.334** -17.482 -2.083 -169.601 1659.846 
 (214.942) (494.868) (136.333) (140.908) (215.299) (2520.335) 
lnAi   -0.427 0.833 0.613 -1.517*** 0.220 -3.921* 
 (0.392) (1.443) (1.116) (0.506) (2.409) (2.461) 
lnAi/ΣlnA 3.737 -257.436 -97.735 63.897*** -0.593 1.779 
 (4.799) (358.908) (221.735) (95.283) (114.469) (9.812) 
lnVi   3.622 0.606*** 0.293*** 1.667*** -1.313** 2.959* 
 (4.777) (0.090) (0.070) (0.338) (0.728) (2.274) 
lnAgei  0.710 0.544*** -0.632*** -6.095*** 0.846* -10.270 
 (5.026) (0.128) (0.182) (1.826) (0.645) (10.944) 
R
2
 0.976 0.707 0.450 0.909 0.382 0.768 
Adj R
2
 0.948 0.689 0.407 0.877 0.166 0.494 
Obs 14 143 98 28 28 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables,  ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.30: OLS estimation for Australian charities with State 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β7 ln Git-1+ ε 
 ACT Victoria NSW QLD WA SA 
β0 -52.592 38.393** 7.476 26.934** 30.782 -1180.859 
 (214.302) (17.496) (6.592) (15.346) (50.436) (1388.800) 
lnFi    (β1) -2.454 4.882** 0.317 1.290 2.604 -86.387 
 (15.011) (2.436) (0.794) (3.664) (5.179) (95.999) 
lnFj    (β2) 2.135 -3.374** -0.033 -0.222 -1.146 90.605 
 (14.909) (1.480) (0.534) (1.640) (4.154) (97.474) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 73.020 -902.123** -27.396 -68.281 -130.309 2586.585 
 (435.813) (510.689) (137.083) (158.237) (224.316) (2872.861) 
lnAi (β4)  -0.576 0.643 0.642 -1.658*** 0.631 -3.143 
 (0.556) (1.471) (1.119) (0.530) (2.501) (2.739) 
lnAi/ΣlnA (β5) 5.403 -213.142 -103.244 62.975*** -7.225 9.611 
 (6.560) (356.143) (222.211) (25.394) (116.166) (14.344) 
lnVi   (β6) 5.403 0.573*** 0.285*** 1.502*** -1.794** 3.196* 
 (6.560) (0.102) (0.071) (0.382) (0.987) (2.374) 
lnAgei (β7) 4.475 0.537*** -0.705*** -4.987** 0.801 -16.516 
 (5.546) (0.128) (0.202) (2.184) (0.656) (13.914) 
lnGi (β8) -1.050 0.056 0.041 0.232 -0.163 -4.306 
 (2.545) (0.079) (0.049) (0.249) (0.223) (5.568) 
R
2
 0.977 0.570 0.454 0.913 0.399 0.793 
Adj.R
2
 0.939 0.543 0.405 0.876 0.146 0.462 
Obs. 14 126 98 35 28 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.31: OLS Estimation for Australian charities with States 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 ε 
 
 ACT Victoria NSW QLD WA SA 
β0 304.994* 29.024** 6.928 26.592 30.613 -872.581 
 (217.615) (17.166) (6.581) (23.808) (51.390) (1246.396) 
lnFi    (β1) 18.817* 3.233* 0.324 -0.354 2.621 -60.334 
 (12.475) (2.374) (0.795) (3.277) (5.316) (84.557) 
lnFj    (β2) -19.967* -2.510** 0.011 0.297 -1.189 61.533 
 (12.481) (1.450) (0.533) (1.939) (4.275) (85.421) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) -543.667* -537.115 -19.258 -3.469 -130.254 1772.952 
 (359.597) (500.580) (137.343) (145.112) (229.928) (2527.242) 
lnAi (β4)  0.153 1.291 0.583 -1.459** 0.544 -3.772* 
 (0.518) (1.431) (1.132) (0.748) (2.518) (2.470) 
lnAi/ΣlnA (β5) -0.368 -355.052 -93.113 62.943** -4.971 0.428 
 (5.095) (354.914) (224.082) (27.445) (116.732) (9.923) 
lnVi   (β6) -1.761 0.601*** 0.292*** 1.648*** -1.689** 3.010* 
 (5.562) (0.089) (0.071) (0.389) (0.998) (2.279) 
lnAgei (β7) -4.709 0.556*** -0.637*** -6.205*** 0.804 6.466 
 (5.753) (0.125) (0.184) (2.138) (0.661) (20.148) 
lnAgei (β8) 1.334* -0.213** 0.013 -0.030 -0.150 -2.780 
 (0.870) (0.092) (0.062) (0.277) (0.266) (2.808) 
R
2
 0.984 0.720 0.450 0.909 0.392 0.806 
Adj.R
2
 0.957 0.701 0.400 0.871 0.137 0.496 
Obs. 14 126 98 35 24 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.32: OLS estimation for Australian charities with States 
 
lnDt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 ACT Victoria NSW QLD WA SA 
β0 34.436 35.689** 11.108* 29.982** 60.044* -77.376 
 (84.683) (18.667) (6.901) (16.821) (44.931) (1066.350) 
lnFi    (β1) 2.755 4.531** 0.742 6.070** 5.340 -6.910 
 (6.329) (2.599) (0.834) (3.309) (4.277) (71.100) 
lnFj    (β2) -2.876 -3.051** 0.390 -2.330* -3.314 10.191 
 (6.990) (1.578) (0.555) (1.492) (3.802) (72.432) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) -73.957 -837.460* -113.000 -282.503** -254.239 218.708 
 (202.331) (544.979) (142.998) (140.205) (202.523) (2136.655) 
lnAi (β4)  -0.433 0.690 0.485 -1.821*** 0.359 -4.714** 
 (0.388) (1.571) (1.185) (0.578) (2.521) (2.478) 
lnAi/lnΣA (β5)  3.912 -213.651 -95.975 58.541** -1.252 8.891 
 (4.938) (41.424) (235.593) (27.859) (117.484) (14.812) 
lnVi  (β6) 2.574 0.692*** 0.366*** 1.802*** -1.670** 0.805 
 (2.448) (0.104) (0.071) (0.395) (0.993) (1.299) 
lnGi (β7) -0.331 0.085 -0.034 0.542*** -0.188 -0.470 
 (1.623) (0.084) (0.047) (0.230) (0.224) (4.686) 
R
2
 0.976 0.664 0.379 0.889 0.352 0.735 
Adj.R
2
 0.948 0.644 0.331 0.850 0.125 0.425 
 0.578 1.187 0.729 0.820 1.084 0.896 
Obs. 16 144 112 40 24 16 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.33: Summary of results of major model in Australia: Correct signs 
 
expected sign                             
/ industry 
+ Fi – Fj +K1 +Ai +K2  +Vi +Agei +Gi +ACi R
2
 
M1 All +  +  + +
***
 +   0.46 
 Welfare +   +  +
***
    0.57 
 Human +  +  + +
***
    0.71 
 Global +
***
 –***   + +     0.83 
 Disability +
***
 –***  +**  +*** + ***   0.61 
 Animal   + +       0.84 
 Science +
***
 –***  +  +* +   0.64 
 Rural        + +
***
       0.79 
 ACT + –   + + +   0.98 
 Victoria  + – **  +  +*** + ***   0.71 
 NSW +   +  +
***
    0.45 
 QLD     + 
**
 +
***
    0.91 
 WA + –  +   + *   0.38 
  SA        + +
*
       0.77 
M2 All +    + +
***
 +
*
 +  0.46 
 Welfare + – –   +***  +***  0.63 
 Human +    + +
***
  +
***
  0.75 
 Global + – ** – **  + +     0.83 
 Disability + – ** – *** +*  +*** +***   0.63 
 Animal +   +  –***  +  0.84 
 Science + – ** – **  + –***    0.80 
 Rural + –  –   + +***    +    0.79 
 ACT   +  + + +   0.98 
 Victoria  + 
**
  – **  +  +*** + *** +  0.57 
 NSW + –  +  +***  +  0.45 
 QLD + –   +*** +***  +  0.91 
 WA + –  +   +   0.40 
  SA      +    +  +
*
       0.79 
M3 All +  +  + +
***
 +   0.46 
 Welfare +     +
***
   +
***
 0.60 
 Human +  +
***
  + +
***
   +
***
 0.74 
 Global +
***
 –***   + +    0.83 
 Disability +
***
 –***  +*  +*** +***  + 0.62 
 Animal   +      +
***
 0.89 
 Science +
**
 –**  +  +    0.65 
 Rural + –      + +*** +    + 0.79 
 ACT +
*
 –*  +     +* 0.98 
 Victoria  +
*
 –**  +  +*** +***   0.72 
 NSW +   +  +
***
   + 0.45 
 QLD     +
**
 +
***
    0.91 
 WA + –   +   +   0.39 
  SA      +    +  +
*
 +     0.81 
Note: M1, M2, M3, M4 are major models in a family of empirical models (See in Figure 6.   ) 
F = fundraising expenditure; i = a charity i;  j = competing charities j; K1 = the ratio of Fi/ΣF 
or Fi/ΣFj (Fj = ΣF– F); K2 = the ratio of Ai/ΣA or Ai/ΣAj (Aj = ΣA– Ai); A = Fixed Assets; V 
= the number of volunteers; Age = the Organisational age; G = Government Grants; AC = 
Administrative costs. ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.33: Summary of results: Correct signs (cont.) 
expected sign                             
/ industry 
+ Fi – Fj +K1 +Ai +K2  +Vi +Agei +Gi +ACi R
2
 
M4 All +  +  + +
***
  +  0.45 
 Welfare + –     +***  +***  0.63 
 Human +
**
  +  + +
***
  +
***
  0.73 
 Global +
***
 –***      +***  0.78 
 Disability +
*
 – *  +**      0.33 
 Animal    +      0.84 
 Science +
**
 – **   +     0.80 
 Rural + –      + +*    +**   0.72 
 ACT + –    + +    0.98 
 Victoria  +
***
 – **  +  +***  +  0.66 
 NSW +   +  +
***
    0.38 
 QLD +
**
 – *   +** +***  +***  0.89 
 WA + –   +      0.35 
  SA      +   + +       0.74 
 
Table 6.34: Summary of major models in Australia: Incorrect signs 
 
expected sign                             
/ industry 
+ Fi – Fj +K1 +Ai +K2  +Vi +Agei +Gi +ACi R
2
 
M1 All  +  –      0.46 
 Welfare  + –   –  –   0.57 
 Human  +*  –   –   0.71 
 Global   – *** –   –   0.83 
 Disability   – ***   – ***     0.61 
 Animal – +    – *** – –    0.84 
 Science   – ***  –     0.64 
 Rural  + –  –   –     0.79 
 ACT   – –      0.98 
 Victoria    – **  –     0.71 
 NSW  + –  –  –   0.45 
 QLD – + – –   –   0.91 
 WA   –  – –    0.38 
  SA  – + –  –   –     0.77 
M2 All  +  –      0.46 
 Welfare   – – –  –   0.63 
 Human  +  –   –   0.75 
 Global   – ** –   – –  0.83 
 Disability   – ***  –   –  0.63 
 Animal  +   – –*** –   0.84 
 Science   – ** –  –*** – –  0.80 
 Rural   –  –   –     0.79 
 ACT – +  –    –  0.98 
 Victoria    –  –     0.57 
 NSW   –  –  –   0.45 
Note: M1, M2, M3, M4 are major models in a family of empirical models (See in Figure 6.   ) 
F = fundraising expenditure; i = a charity i;  j = competing charities j; K1 = the ratio of Fi/ΣF 
or Fi/ΣFj (Fj = ΣF– F); K2 = the ratio of Ai/ΣA or Ai/ΣAj (Aj = ΣA– Ai); A = Fixed Assets; V 
= the number of volunteers; Age = the Organisational age; G = Government Grants; AC = 
Administrative costs. ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.34: Summary of major models in Australia: Incorrect signs (cont.) 
 
expected sign                         
/ industry 
+ Fi –
Fj 
+K1 +Ai +K2  +Vi +Agei +Gi +ACi R2 
 QLD   – –   –   0.91 
 WA   –  – –  –  0.40 
  SA  – +   –    – –   0.79 
M3 All  +  –     – 0.46 
 Welfare  + – – –  –   0.60 
 Human  +  –   –   0.74 
 Global   – –   –  – 0.83 
 Disability   –  –     0.62 
 Animal  – +  – – – –   0.89 
 Science   –  –  –  – 0.65 
 Rural   –  –       0.79 
 ACT   –  – – –   0.98 
 Victoria    –  –    – 0.72 
 NSW  + –  –  –   0.45 
 QLD – + – –   –  – 0.91 
 WA   –  – –   – 0.39 
  SA  –  +    –       –  0.81 
M4 All    –       0.45 
 Welfare   – –  –     0.63 
 Human  +  –       0.73 
 Global   –  –  –  –     0.78 
 Disability   –   –  –   –   0.33 
 Animal – + –   –  –   –   0.84 
 Science   –  –   –   –   0.80 
 Rural   –  –         0.72 
 ACT   –  –     –  0.98 
 Victoria    –   –      0.66 
 NSW  + –   –    –  0.38 
 QLD   –  –      0.89 
 WA   –   – –  –   0.35 
  SA  –  +   –     –    0.74 
Note: M1, M2, M3, M4 are Major models in a family of empirical models (See in Figure 6.   ) 
F = fundraising expenditure; i = a charity i;  j = competing charities j; K1 = the ratio of Fi/ΣF 
or Fi/ΣFj (Fj = ΣF– F); K2 = the ratio of Ai/ΣA or Ai/ΣAj (Aj = ΣA– Ai); A = Fixed Assets; V 
= the number of volunteers; Age = the Organisational age; G = Government Grants; AC = 
Administrative costs. ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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6.4 Preliminary results for Japanese data  
 
This section presents the results testing hypotheses using empirical models, ordinary 
least squared (OLS) regression models. A sample of charitable organisations is grouped 
into eight groups: All (384 observations), Welfare (72), Humanitarian (40), Global (72), 
Disability (32), Culture (72), Education (56) and Environment (48). As with the 
Australian Models, the purpose of grouping is to compare or to find an effect from 
competitors, different organisation with similar missions and objectives, aiming to cover 
research topics and answer the research questions by testing the hypotheses discussed in 
Chapter 5.   
 
6.4.1 Competition model 1 
 
6.4.1.2 Major family of competition model 1 
 
In Table 6.35 the results are presented. The empirical Model 1, Equation (1), is 
modified from the previous studies‘ demand equation (Posnett and Sandler, 1989; 
Castaneda et al., 2007) by introducing additional the competition index variables as an 
addition. The estimation used OLS regression. The dependent variable of interest is total 
private donations, the variable used in the previous studies of donations. As developed 
in Chapter 5, Model 1 is as follows:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε                                                    (1) 
 
where the variables and subscipts are defined as in above section in Chapter 6. 
 
As shown in Table 6.35, the explanatory power, i.e. R
2
 and adjusted R
2
, of the models 
for donations in combined lagged and unlagged independent variables in all group data, 
All, is 0.329 and 0.315. The Educational group has the highest R
2
at 0.732 (adjusted R
2
 
at 0.687). This is followed by Environment in the R
2
at 0.674 (0.607), Humanitarian at 
0.660 (0.572), Welfare at 0.641 (0.595), Disability at 0.475 (0.282), Global at 0.393 
(0.316), Culture at 0.382 (0.303). The lowest is All as discussed above.  
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The results are significantly lower than for Australia and this continues throughout the 
Japanese results. The results higher in explanatory power in the seven groups indicate 
several issues: 1. a sample of Japanese charitable organisations is successfully allocated 
in an appropriate charity group; 2. the Japanese sample of charitable organisations are 
competing for donations within the same industry group of organisation; 3. the 
competition models are well associated with these industry groups of charitable 
organisations; and 4. each variable in the competition models is related to total 
donations.   
 
Table 6.35 presents the regression coefficient of Model 1. In the first column, the 
coefficients of lnFi are positive and significant in Environment, and positive but 
insignificant in the Humanitarian and Global groups, whereas those are negative but 
significant in the All, Disability, Culture and Educational support groups, and negative 
and insignificant in Welfare, and their ranges are between -11.334 and 2.431. 
Hypothesis one is tested: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
the Humanitarian, Global and Environment groups, whereas the Null Hypothesis is not 
rejected in the All, Welfare, Disability, Culture and Education support groups.  
 
The coefficients on lnFj are negative but significant in Environment industry, and 
negative and insignificant in the Welfare, Humanitarian and Global groups, while those 
are positive and significant in All, Disability and Educational support (hereafter refered 
to as Education) groups, and positive but insignificant in Culture industry, and their 
ranges are between -1.029 and 11.471. Hypothesis 2 is tested as: H0: Fj  0 and H1: Fj < 
0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Global and 
Environment groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Disability, 
Science and Education groups.   
 
The coefficients on the ratio of lnFi to all competitors, lnFi / ∑lnF, are positive and 
significant in the All, Disability, Culture and Education groups, and are positive in 
Welfare, whereas those are significantly negative in Environment, and insignificant and 
negative in the Humanitarian and Global groups. Hypothesis 3 is tested as: Hypothesis 
3: H0: Fi /F  0 and H1: Fi /F > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, 
Disability, Culture and Education groups, whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in 
the Humanitarian, Global and Environment groups.   
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The coefficient on size (lnAi) is positive and significant in the Welfare and 
Environment groups, and insignificant but positive in the Disability, whereas those are 
significantly negative in the Global and Culture, and negative in All, Humanitarian and 
Education. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in Welfare, Disability and Environment, while the Null Hypothesis is not 
rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global, Culture and Education groups. The 
coefficient on the ratio of size to competitors‘ size is significantly positive in the 
Culture, and positive in the All, Humanitarian, Global and Education groups, while 
those are significantly negative in Welfare, and negative in the Disability and 
Environment groups. Hypothesis 5 is tested as: H0: Ai /A  0 and H1: Ai /A > 0. The 
Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global, Science and Education 
group, whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Welfare, Disability and 
Environment groups  
 
The coefficients on volunteers (lnV) are positive and significant in the All and Welfare, 
and positive in the Disability, Culture and Education groups, whereas those are 
significantly negative in the Humanitarian and Environment groups, and negative in the 
Global industry. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. Thus, the Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, Disability, Culture and Education, and not 
rejected in the Humanitarian, Global and Environment groups.  
 
The coefficient on age (lnAge) is positive and significant in the Culture, while and 
significantly negative in the Welfare and Global, and negative in the All, Humanitarian, 
Disability, Education and Environment. Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: 
Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Culture, and not rejected in the All, 
Welfare, Global, Humanitarian, Disability, Education and Environment.  
 
In Table 6.36, the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 1_J and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 1_J is a sub-family model of Model 1. Thus this model is modification of Model 
1 by using the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets calculating the 
proportion to competing charities j presenting as lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, 
respectively. Equation (2) is: 
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ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + ε                                                         (2) 
 
In Table 6.36, the explanatory power, i.e. R
2
 and adjusted R
2
, of the models is very 
similar to those of Model 1. The highest R
2
 is the Education group at 0.738 (adjusted R
2
 
at 0.693). This is followed by Environment at 0.666 (0.598), Humanitarian at 0.661 
(0.573), Welfare at 0.639 (0.593), Disability at 0.492 (0.305), Culture at 0.375 (0296), 
Global at 0.397 (0.32), and the lowest is All combined at 0.326 (0.312), as expected.  
 
As shown in Table 6.36, the coefficients of lnFi are also similar in significance and sign 
of each variable with each industry to those in Model 1, however the ranges of 
coefficients are more widely spread out than those of Model 1. They are positive and 
significant in the Environment, and positive in the Humanitarian and Global groups, 
whereas those are significantly negative in the Disability, Culture and Educational 
support groups, and negative in the All and Welfare, and their ranges are between -
19.554 and 4.248.  
 
The coefficients on lnFj are also similar in significance and sign to those of Model 1, 
except Welfare, which is now positive and significant to total donation, and their ranges 
are more widely spread out than that of Model 1. They are negative but significant in 
the Environment industry, and insignificant and negative in the Humanitarian and 
Global groups, while those are significantly positive in the All, Disability and 
Education, and positive in the Welfare and Culture, and their ranges are between -1.750 
and 17.793.  
 
The coefficients on the ratio of lnFi to all competitors, lnFi / ∑lnF, are also similar to 
those of Model 1 except Humanitarian, which is positive. They are positive and 
significant in the Disability, Culture and Education groups, and positive in the All, 
Welfare and Humanitarian groups, whereas those are significantly negative in the 
Environment, and insignificant and negative in the Global industry group.  
 
The coefficients on size (lnAi) are also very similar to those in Model 1 except 
Education, which is a positive sign. They are significantly positive in Welfare, and 
insignificant but positive in Disability, Education and Environment, whereas those are 
significantly negative in Global and Culture, and negative in All and Humanitarian.  
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The coefficients on the ratio of size to competitors‘ size are similar to those of Model 1, 
except signs in Disability and Education, which change to positive and negative, 
respectively. They are positive and significant in Culture and Humanitarian, and 
positive in the All, Global and Disability groups, while those are significantly negative 
in Welfare, and negative in the Education and Environment groups.  
 
The coefficients on volunteers (lnV) are, similar to those of Model 1, significantly 
positive in Welfare, and positive in the All, Disability, Culture and Education groups, 
whereas those are significantly negative in the Humanitarian and Environment groups, 
and negative in Global industry, and their ranges are between -0.442 and 0.204.  
 
The coefficients on age (lnAge) are also similar to those in Model 1, positive in Culture, 
while those are significantly negative in Welfare and Global, and negative in All, 
Humanitarian, Disability, Education and Environment.  
 
6.4.1.2 Minor family of competition model 1: (Lagged variables) 
 
In Table 6.37 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 1_L and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 1_L is a family model of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 
by employing lagged independent variables only, and fundraising expenditure with lag 
are expected to perform better on the level of total donation in the estimation model 
(Marcuello and Salas, 2001). Equation (3) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε                                                (3) 
 
These results are not considered in detail. 
 
The results indicate that variables in each industry are not affected by using all lagged 
independent variables nor have fundraising expenditure show any difference except the 
explanatory power of models. The R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 in each industry are lower than 
those in Model 1.  
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Table 6.38 presents the results of Model 1_LJ. This Model 1_LJ is a family of Model 1. 
Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by including lagged independent 
variables only and using the value of competing charities j for the denominators in the 
ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets, such as lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, 
respectively. Equation (4) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε                                                (4) 
 
As before the results of this sub-family model are not examined in detail given their 
similarity to previous results. 
 
6.4.1.3 Minor family of competition model 1: (No time lags) 
 
In Table 6.39 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 1_U and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 1_U is a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
employing unlagged independent variables only. Equation (5) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + ε                                                         (5) 
 
Table 6.40 presents the results of Model 1_UJ. Model 1_UJ is a family of Model 1. 
Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by employing unlagged independent 
variables only and using the value of competing charities j as denominators in the ratios 
of fundraising expenditure, Fi / Fj, and fixed assets Ait /Ajt. Equation (6), tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + ε                                                            (6) 
 
Summary of Model 1  
 
The results indicate that the effectiveness of fundraising activities of charitable 
organisations and volunteers have a positive effect on the level of total donations. The 
results are summarised thus: 1. Fundraising expenditure are positive and significant and 
the competitors‘ fundraising expenditure are negative on total donations in three groups; 
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Humanitarian, Global and Environment; 2. organisational size is positive but 
insignificant on total donations in the Welfare, Disability and Education groups; 4. 
organisational age is positive in the Humanitarian and Culture groups; 4. volunteers are 
positive on total donations in the All, Disability and Culture groups; 5. the ratio of 
fundraising expenditure to those of competitors are positive in the Disability, Culture 
and Education groups; and 6. the ratio of organisational size to competitors‘ size is 
positive in the All, Global, Humanitarian, Disability, Culture, Environment groups.  
 
The results of Model 1s for the Japanese sample indicate as being weaker than those of 
Australian sample, especially in the areas of: 1. explanatory power, 2. the effectiveness 
of fundraising spending; 3. significance of volunteers. Thus, the results of the Australian 
sample are more stable and consistenty in outcomes of groups throughout family 
models, while those of the Japanese sample vary with the variation of models. These 
differences may be due to the immaturity of Japanese charitable organisations which 
have less support but are strongly controlled by government. Without tax exemptions 
for donations and deductible gift tax, it is difficult for Japanese charitable organisation 
to collect donations from the public.  
 
6.4.2  Competition model 2 
 
6.4.2.1 Major family of competition model 2 
 
In Table 6.41 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 2 and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 2 is a family of Model 1 and this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
including an additional variable, government grants (G) on Model 1. Analyses in the 
Australian sample data find government grants to total donations are positively 
correlated in some groups which are consistent with the findings in previous studies 
(Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Callen, 1994; Khanna et al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 
2000; Okten and Weisbrod, 2000; Marcuello and Salas, 2001). The variable of 
government grants is expected to have a positive effect on total donation. Equation (7), 
tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1)  
+ β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1 + ε                                                                      (7) 
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These results are consistent with the results of Model 1 and the summary is: 1. 
fundraising expenditure are positive to total donations, and at the same time, the 
competing charities fundraising expenditure is negative to total donations in the 
Humanitarian, Global and Environment groups; 2. organisational size is positive in the 
Welfare, Disability, Education and Environment groups; 3. volunteers are positive to 
total donations in the  All, Welfare, Disability and Culture groups; 4. Age is mostly 
negative to total donations except Culture; 5. Government grants are a positive to total 
donations in all groups.   
 
Table 6.42 presents the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of 
the regression Model 2_J and the standardised regression coefficients (β). Model 2_J is 
a family of Model 2 and Model 2 is also a family of Model 1. Model 2_J is a 
modification of Model 1 by including an additional variable, government grants, (G); 
and uses competing charities j as denominators for the calculation of the ratios of 
fundraising expenditure and fixed assets, as lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. 
Model 2_J of tested Equation (8) is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Ft + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1 + ε                                (8) 
 
These results are consistent with the results of Model 2.  
 
6.4.2.2 Minor family of competition model 2: (Lagged variables) 
 
In Table 6.43 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 2_L and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 2_L is a family of Model 2 and Model 2 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this 
model is a modification of Model 1 by employing lagged independent variables only. 
Equation (9) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1 + ε                                (9) 
 
Table 6.44 presents the results of Model 2_LJ. Model 2_LJ is a family of Model 2 and 
Model 2 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
  260 
including lagged independent variables only and uses the value of competing charities j 
for the denominators in the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets, such as ln 
Fi / Σln Fjt-1 and ln Ai / Σln Ajt-1, respectively. Equation (10) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fi-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1+ ε                               (10) 
 
6.4.2.3 Minor family of competition model 2: (No time lags) 
 
In Table 6.45 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 2_U and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 2_U is a family of Model 2 and Model 2 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this 
model is a modification of Model 1 by employing unlagged independent variables only. 
Model 2_U, Equation (11) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln Git+ ε                                          (11) 
 
These results indicate that the explanatory powers of models are slightly lower than for 
all of the groups in Model 1. 
 
Table 6.46 presents the results of Model 2_UJ. Model 2_UJ is a family of Model 2 and 
Model 2 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
employing unlagged independent variables only and using the ratio of Fi to competitors, 
Fj and the ratio of organisational size, Ai, to competitors, Aj, presenting as, ln Fit / Σln 
Fjt and ln Ait / Σln Ajt, respectively. Equation (12) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln Git+ ε                                     (12) 
 
Summary of Model 2 
 
These results from model 2 can be summarised as: 1. in the Welfare, Global and 
Environment groups, fundraising expenditure is a positive to total donations and the 
competing charities‘ fundraising expenditure is a negative to total donations as 
expected; 2. in the All, Humanitarian, Disability, Culture, and Education groups, the 
  261 
ratios of fundraising expenditure are positive as expected; 3. in the Welfare, Disability 
and Education (occasionally Environment) groups, organisational size is a positive on 
total donations as expected; 4. in the All, Disability and Culture groups (occasionally 
Welfare) volunteers are positive on total donations as expected; 5. Government grants 
are a positive to total donations in most of groups except Welfare and Environment.  
 
6.4.3 Major family of competition model 3 
 
6.4.3.1 Major family of competition model 3 
 
Table 6.47 presents the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of 
the regression Model 3, and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 3 is a sub-family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
including an additional independent variable, administrative costs (AC).  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + β8 ln ACi + ε                                     (13) 
 
Table 6.48 presents the results of Model 3_J. Model 3_J is a family of Model 3 and 
Model 3 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
including an additional variable, administrative costs (AC) and using the ratio of 
fundraising expenditure to competing charities j and the ratio of size to competing 
charities j, as lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Equation (14) tested is:  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                         (14) 
 
The explanatory power, the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
, are similar to those in Model 3, Table 
6.47. Education industry is the highest in the R
2
at 0.877 (adjusted R
2
 at 0.816), All is the 
lowest at 0.346 (0.33), as expected, and the explanatory power of models in other 
groups are very similar but slightly lower than those in Model 3, Table 7.15.  
 
 
The coefficients of administrative costs (AC) are a positive in most of groups except in 
Welfare where the results are consistent with those in Models 1 and 3. Thus, they are 
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significantly positive in the All, Disability, Culture and Education groups, positive in 
the Humanitarian, Global and the Environment groups, while negative in the Welfare 
industry, and ranges between -0.033 and 1.102. Hypotheses 9 is tested as: H0: ACi  0; 
and H1: ACi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global, 
Disability, Culture, Education and Environment groups, while the Null Hypothesis is 
not rejected Welfare industry. 
 
6.4.3.2 Minor family of competition model 3: (Lagged variables) 
 
In Table 6.49 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 3_L and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 3_L is a family of Model 3 and Model 3 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this 
model is a modification of Model 1 by employing lagged independent variables only. 
Equation (15) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                          (15) 
 
In Table 6.49, the explanatory power of regression model, the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 is the 
highest in Education industry at 0.865 and at 0.839, respectively. This is followed by 
Disability of the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) at 0.813 (0.735), Environment at 0.695 (0.621), 
Humanitarian at 0.548 (0.409), Global at 0.515 (0.444), Culture at 0.411 (0.324), 
Welfare at 0.346 (0.249), and the lowest is All at 0.312 (0.298).  
 
The coefficients of fundraising are insignificant but positive in the Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Global, Disability, Education and Environment groups, whereas those 
are negative in the All and Culture groups, with ranges between -0.283 and 1.808. 
Hypothesis one is tested: H0: Fi = 0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
the Humanitarian, Welfare, Disability, Global, Education and Environment groups, 
whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All and Culture groups.  
 
Table 6.50 presents the results of Model 3_LJ. Model 3_LJ is a family of Model 3 and 
Model 3 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
employing lagged independent variables only and using the ratio of fundraising 
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expenditure to competing charities j and the ratio of size to competing charities j, as lnFi 
/ ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Equation (16) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fi-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 + ε                        (16) 
The explanatory power of regression model, the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) are consistent with 
those in Model 1_L as the highest is in Education industry at 0.865 (0.837) and the 
lowest in All at 0.312 (0.298), and other groups are also very similar. These results 
indicate that uses of alternative calculation of ratios have no significant impact on the 
explanatory power of regression models.  
 
6.4.3.3 Minor family of competition model 3: (No time lags) 
 
In Table 6.51, the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 3_U and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 3_U is a family of Model 3 and Model 3 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this 
model is a modification of Model 1 by employing unlagged independent variables only. 
Equation (17) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln ACit + ε                                        (17) 
 
The explanatory power of regression models is higher than those in Model 1 in most 
groups. Disability industry is the highest of the R
2
at 0.88 (adjusted R
2
 at 0.839). This is 
followed by Education in the R
2
at 0.856 (0.831), Humanitarian at 0.658 (0.569), 
Environment at 0.621 (0.544), Welfare at 0.614 (0.565), Global at 0.61 (0.56), Culture 
at 0.411 (0.336) and, as expected, All is the lowest at 0.363 (0.349).  
 
The coefficients of lnFi are similar to most of groups in Model 1 and Model 1_U. Thus, 
they are significantly positive in Humanitarian and Environment, and positive in the 
Global and Education groups, whereas those are insignificant and negative in the All, 
Welfare, Disability and the Culture groups, and their ranges are between -1.092and 
1.273. Hypothesis one is tested: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in the Humanitarian, Global, Education and Environment groups, whereas the 
Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Welfare, Disability and Culture groups.  
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Table 6.52 presents the results of Model 3_UJ. Model 3_UJ is a family of Model 3 and 
Model 3 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
including unlagged independent variables only and employing the alternative 
calculation for the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets, such as lnFi / 
∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Equation (18) tested is: 
 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln ACit +ε                                         (18) 
 
Summary of Model 3 
 
These results from model 3 are summarised as: 1. fundraising expenditure are expected 
to be positive to total donations and at the same time the competing charities fundraising 
expenditure is negative to total donations in the Global and Environment groups (or/and 
occasionally Welfare and Humanitarian), in Model 3; 2. the ratio of fundraising 
expenditure is expected to be positive, and All and Culture (or/and Disability and 
Humanitarian) are positive in Model 3; 3. Organisational size is positive on total 
donations in Welfare only in Model 3; 4. Volunteers are positive on total donations in 
All and Disability in Model 3 (or/and occasionally Welfare) as expected; 5. 
Organisational age is positive in Humanitarian only in Model 3; 6. Administrative costs 
are positive to total donations in most groups (occasionally except Welfare and 
Environment).  
 
6.4.4 Competition model 4 
 
6.4.4.1 Major family of competition model 4 
 
In Table 6.53 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 4 and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 4 is a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
excluding an independent variable, organisational age (Age) and including an additional 
variable, government grants (G) on Model 1. As discussed in Chapter 3, previous 
studies found the mixed results from government grants on function of donation; 
however, this study expects a positive effect on collection of total donation, as 
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government grants increase credibility of the organisation (Posnett and Sandler, 1989; 
Callen, 1994; Khanna et al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Okten and Weisbrod, 
2000; Marcuello and Salas, 2001). Thus, government grants are expected to have a 
positive effect on total donation. Model 4, Equation (19) tested is: 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε                                                         (19) 
 
The explanatory power of regression model is the highest in Education industry in the 
R
2
at 0.769 (adjusted R
2
 at 0.729). This is followed by Humanitarian at 0.681 (0.598), 
Environment at 0.665 (0.596), Welfare at 0.56 (0.504), Disability at 0.487 (0.298), 
Global at 0.408 (0.333), Culture at 0.368 (0.288) and the lowest is All at 0.331 (0.317). 
These results indicate that the explanatory power of regression models is consistently 
slightly lower than each group in Model 1. 
 
Table 6.54 presents the results of Model 4_J. Model 4_J is a family of Model 4 and 
Model 4 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
excluding an independent variable of organisational age, including an additional 
variable, government grants (G); and using the ratio of fundraising expenditure to 
competing charities j and the ratio of size to competing charities j, presenting as, ln Fit / 
Σln Fjt and ln Ait-1 / Σln Ajt-1. Equation (20) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                     (20) 
 
In Table 6.54, consistent with the results of Model 1, the explanatory power in the R
2
 
(adjusted R
2,
) is the highest in Education at 0.763 (0.722). This is followed by 
Humanitarian in the R
2
at 0.68 (0.597), Environment at 0.657(0.586), Welfare at 0.563 
(0.507), Disability at 0.493 (0.305), Global at 0.409 (0.334), Culture at 0.366 (0.285) 
and as expected, the lowest is All at 0.327 (0.313).   
 
These above results indicate that they are consistent with the results of Model 1 and the 
summary is: 1. the explanatory power is higher than 30%; 2. fundraising expenditure are 
positive to total donations in 3 groups, Humanitarian, Global and Environment; 4. 
competing charities fundraising expenditure is negative to total donations in the 
Humanitarian, Global and Environment groups, whereas the ratios of fundraising to all 
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competitors are negative in those organisations; 4. volunteers are positive to total 
donations in the All, Welfare, Disability and Culture groups; 4. government grants in 
this sample are positive in most organisation except the Humanitarian and Welfare 
groups and this may indicate that government grants provide credibility to some 
charities but not for the Humanitarian and Welfare groups in Japan.   
 
6.4.4.2 Minor family of competition model 4: (Lagged variables) 
 
In Table 6.55 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 4_L and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 4_L is a family of Model 4 and Model 4 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this 
model is a modification of Model 1 by employing lagged independent variables only. 
Equation (21) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Ft-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1/ Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 
 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                     (21) 
 
The explanatory power of regression model is the highest in Education industry in the 
R
2
at 0.704 (adjusted R
2
 at 0.653). This is followed by Environment at 0.665 (0.596), 
Humanitarian at 0.554 (0.439), Welfare at 0.545 (0.12), Global at 0.448 (0.378), 
Disability at 0.375 (0.156), Culture at 0.22 (0.288) and the lowest is All at 0.331 
(0.317). These results indicate that the explanatory power of regression models is 
slightly lower than each industry in Model 1. 
 
Table 6.56 presents the results of Model 4_LJ. Model 4_LJ is a family of Model 4 and 
Model 4 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
including lagged independent variables only and using the value of competing charities j 
for both denominators in the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed assets, those 
calculations as ln Fi / Σln Fjt-1 and ln Ai / Σln Ajt-1, respectively. Equation (22) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fi-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1  
+ β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε                                                     (22) 
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6.4.4.3 Minor family of competition model 4: (No time lags) 
 
In Table 6.57 the results of the regression analysis, the explanatory power (R
2
) of the 
regression Model 4_U and the standardised regression coefficients (β) are presented. 
Model 4_U is a family of Model 4 and Model 4 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this 
model is a modification of Model 1 by employing unlagged independent variables only. 
Equation (23) tested is: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Git + ε                                                               (23) 
 
The explanatory power of regression model, the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
), is the highest in 
Education industry at 0.718 (0.677). This is followed by Humanitarian at 0.647 (0.57), 
Environment at 0.634 (0.57), Welfare at 0.596 (0.552), Global at 0.444 (0.384), 
Disability at 0.446 (0.285), and All at 0.329 (0.316). However, the explanatory power 
was expected to be higher in the industry level than All, only Culture industry in 
empirical model 4 is lower than All in  the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) at 0.289 (0.211).  
 
These results above indicate that they are consistent with the results of Model 1 and 
they are summarised as: 1. fundraising expenditure is positive to total donations and at 
the same time the competing charities fundraising expenditure is negative to total 
donations in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Global and Environment groups; 2. 
organisational size is positive on total donations in the Welfare, Disability and 
Education groups; 3. volunteers are positive effect on total donations in the All, 
Disability and Culture groups; 4. government grants are a positive to total donations in 
most groups except Welfare and Environment.   
 
Table 6.58 presents the results of Model 4_UJ and the results of the regression analysis, 
the explanatory power (R
2
) of the regression Model 4_UJ and the standardised 
regression coefficients (β) are presented. Model 4_UJ is a family of Model 4 and Model 
4 is also a family of Model 1. Thus, this model is a modification of Model 1 by 
including unlagged independent variables only and using the value of competing 
charities j for the denominators in both of the ratios of fundraising expenditure and fixed 
assets, such as lnFi / ∑lnFj and lnAi / ∑lnAj, respectively. Equation (24) tested is: 
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ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt)+ β4 ln Ait  
+ β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Git + ε                                                             (24) 
 
The explanatory powers of regression models in each industry, the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
), are 
consistent with the results of Model 4_U (Table 7.25). The highest is in Education 
industry at 0.718 (0.677) and the lowest in Culture at 0.303 (0.227). This is followed by 
Humanitarian at 0.648 (0.571), Environment at 0.65 (0.589), Welfare at 0.597 (0.553), 
Global at 0.442 (0.381), Disability at 0.516 (0.375), and All at 0.329 (0.316).  
 
Summary of Model 4: 
 
These above results indicate that they are consistent with the results of Model 1 and are 
summarised as: 1. fundraising expenditure are positive to total donations and at the 
same time the competing charities fundraising expenditure is negative to total donations 
in the Welfare, Global and Environment groups in Model 4; 2. Organisational size is 
positive on total donations in the Disability and Education groups in Model 4; 3. 
volunteers are positive effect on total donations in the All, Disability and Culture 
groups; 4. government grants are a positive to total donations in most groups except 
Welfare and Environment.   
 
6.4.5 Competitive models in geographic grouping  
 
This section presents the results of empirical models with geographical groups. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, a sample of charitable organisations is divided into geographical 
location grouping in Tokyo, Kanagawa and Kyoto. The number of observations is: 
Tokyo with 251 observations, Kanagawa with 28 observations and Kyoto with 16 
observations. The following section presents the results of competition models 1 to 4. 
However, a sample of data in Kanagawa receives no government grants; therefore, 
Kanagawa will not report Models 2 and 4.  
 
6.4.5.1 Competition model 1 with geographic grouping 
 
Table 6.59 presents the results of the regression analysis of Model 1. Initial empirical 
Model 1 has two models; Model 1 and Model 1_J in equation (1) and (2). As explained 
in Section 7.2.1.1, the difference between Model 1 in equation (1) and Model 1_J in 
equation (2), the denominators in the calculation of the ratios of fundraising expenditure 
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and fixed assets are used a total of ∑F (or ∑A) and ∑Fj (or ∑Aj), respectively. The left 
side of Table 7.27 presents the results of Model 1 in equation (1) and the right side is 
the results of Model 1_J in equation (2).  
 
The explanatory power of regression models with the data in the Kyoto area is the 
highest at 0.719 and 0.725 in the R
2
. This is followed by the R
2
 of Kanagawa at 0.476 
and 0.493, and Tokyo, with the lowest in explanatory power at 0.476 in Model 1 for 
both equation (1) and (2). Overall, the explanatory power of Model 1 is higher than 0.47 
in geographic groups.  
 
The coefficients of fundraising expenditure in both equations of Model 1 are 
insignificant but positive in Kanagawa and Kyoto, whereas in Tokyo it is significantly 
negative. Hypothesis one is tested as follows: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in Kanagawa and Kyoto, while the Null Hypothesis is not 
rejected in Tokyo.  
 
The coefficients on lnFj in both equations of Model 1 are insignificant and negative in 
Kanagawa and Kyoto, while significantly positive in Tokyo. Hypothesis 2 is tested as: 
H0: Fj  0 and H1: Fj < 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Kanagawa and Kyoto, 
whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in Tokyo.  
 
The coefficients on the ratio of lnFi to competing charities in both equations of Model 1 
are significantly positive in Tokyo, while those are insignificantly negative in 
Kanagawa and Kyoto except Kyoto in equation (2) is significantly negative. Hypothesis 
3: H0: Fi /F  0 and H1: Fi /F > 0 (or, Fi /Fj  0 and Fi /Fj > 0). The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in Tokyo, whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in Kanagawa and Kyoto.   
 
The coefficients on size in both equations are insignificant and positive in Kanagawa 
and Kyoto, whereas those in Tokyo are negative. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 
and H1: Ai > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Kanagawa and Kyoto, while the Null 
Hypothesis is not rejected in Tokyo.  
 
The coefficients on the ratios of sizes to competing size in both equations are 
insignificant but positive in Tokyo and Kyoto, while those are significantly negative in 
Kanagawa. Hypothesis 5 is tested as: H0: Ai /∑A  0 and H1: Ai /∑A > 0 (or, H0: Ai 
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/∑Aj  0 and H1: Ai /∑Aj > 0). The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Tokyo and Kyoto, 
whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in Kanagawa.  
 
The coefficients on volunteers in both equations are significantly positive in Tokyo and 
Kyoto, while those in Kanagawa are significantly negative. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: 
H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Tokyo and Kyoto, whereas 
the Null Hypothesis is rejected in Kanagawa.  
 
The coefficients on age in both equations are insignificantly negative in all three 
geographic groups. Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is not rejected in Tokyo, Kanagawa and Kyoto.  
 
Despite the explanatory powers of Model 1s are relatively high in geographic group, the 
most variables are insignificant with some exceptiton. These exceptitons are the ratio of 
fundraising expenditure in Tokyo and volunteers in Kyoto and Tokyo. Thus, the results 
in the geographic groups show as being much weaker than those in similar industry 
groups.  
 
6.4.5.2  Competition model 2 and 4 with geographic grouping  
 
Table 6.60 presents the results of the regression analysis of Model 2 on the left side of 
the table and Model 4 on the right. Both Models 2 and 4 are modifications of Model 1 
with an additional variable of government grants (G), or an additional variable of 
government grants (G) after excluding organisational age, respectively. As explained 
previously, the sample of charitable organisations in Kanagawa did not receive 
government grants; therefore there are no results of Models 2 and 4 in Kanagawa.  
 
On the left of Table 6.60, the results of Model 2 and Model 2_J are reported and on the 
right of Table 6.60, the results of Model 4 and Model 4_J are reported.  
 
The explanatory power of regression models with the data in Kyoto is higher than 
Tokyo at 0.848 and 0.852 in Model 2 and 0.798 and 0.799 in Model 4, whereas those in 
Tokyo are consistent in both Models 2 and 4 at 0.394  
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As shown in Table 6.60, the coefficients of fundraising expenditure in Models 2 and 4 
are positive but insignificant in Kyoto in both models, except show as positive and 
significant in Model 4_J, whereas in Tokyo they are all negative but significant. 
Hypothesis one is tested as follows: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in Kyoto, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in Tokyo.  
 
The coefficients on lnFj in Kanagawa and Kyoto with Models 2 are negative but 
significant, and that of Model 4 are positive but insignificant, while in Tokyo these are 
positive and significant in both Models 2 and 4. Hypothesis 2 is tested as: H0: Fj  0 and 
H1: Fj < 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Kanagawa and Kyoto, while the Null 
Hypothesis is not rejected in Tokyo.  
 
The coefficients on the ratio of lnFi to competing charities in both models are consistent 
with each other in their signs and significance, such as being positive and significant in 
Tokyo, while they are negative but significant in Kyoto. Hypothesis 3: H0: Fi /F  0 and 
H1: Fi /F > 0 (or, Fi /Fj  0 and Fi /Fj > 0). The Null Hypothesis is rejected Tokyo, 
whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in Kyoto.   
 
The coefficients on size are also the same in signs and significance. They are positive 
but insignificant in Kyoto, but negative and insignificant in Tokyo. Hypothesis 4 is 
tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Kyoto, while the 
Null Hypothesis is not rejected in Tokyo.  
 
The coefficients on the ratios of sizes to competing size are positive and significant in 
Model 4, and positive but insignificant in Model 2 in Tokyo, whereas in Kyoto, those in 
Model 4 are positive and significant but in Model 2 negative and insignificant. 
Hypothesis 5 is tested as: H0: Ai /∑A  0 and H1: Ai /∑A > 0 (or, H0: Ai /∑Aj  0 and 
H1: Ai /∑Aj > 0). The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Models 2 and 4 in Tokyo and 
Kyoto, and not rejected in Model 2 in Kyoto.  
 
The coefficients on volunteers are positive and significant in Tokyo and Kyoto, except 
those in Tokyo in Model 2 are positive but insignificant. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: 
Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Tokyo and Kyoto. 
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The coefficients on age are negative and insignificant in Tokyo and Kyoto. H0: Agei  0 
and H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is not rejected in Tokyo and Kyoto.  
 
The coefficients on government grants are positive and significant in Kyoto and positive 
but insignificant in Tokyo. H0: Gi  0 and H1: Gi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
Tokyo and Kyoto.  
 
6.4.5.3 Competition model 3 with geographic grouping  
 
Table 6.61 presents the results of the regression analyses of Model 3 and Model 3_J. On 
the left the results of Model 3 are presented and on the right are the results of Model 
3_J. The explanatory power of regression models with the data in Kanagawa is the 
highest at 0.782 of Model 3_J and in Model 3 at 0.771. This is followed by the R
2
 of 
Kyoto in Model 3_J at 0.729 and Model 3 at 0.723 and in Tokyo in Model 3_J at 0.437 
and Model 3 at 0.436.  
 
The coefficients of fundraising expenditure are positive and significant in Kanagawa 
and positive but insignificant in Kyoto, whereas in Tokyo it is negative but significant 
in Model 3_J and negative and insignificant in Model 3. Hypothesis 1 is tested as 
follows: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Kanagawa and 
Kyoto, and not rejected in Tokyo.  
 
The coefficients on lnFj are negative but significant in Kanagawa, and negative and 
insignificant in Kyoto, while in Tokyo these are positive and significant. Hypothesis 2 is 
tested as: H0: Fj  0 and H1: Fj < 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Kanagawa and 
Kyoto, and not rejected in Tokyo.  
 
The coefficients on the ratio of lnFi to competing charities are positive and significant in 
Tokyo, while those are negative but significant in Kanagawa, and negative and 
insignificant in Kyoto. Hypothesis 3: H0: Fi /F  0 and H1: Fi /F > 0 (or, Fi /Fj  0 and Fi 
/Fj > 0). The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Tokyo, and not rejected in Kanagawa and 
Kyoto.   
 
The coefficients on size in Model 3 and Model 3_J are both positive but insignificant in 
Kanagawa and Kyoto except in Model 3 those are positive and significant in Kanagawa, 
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whereas in Tokyo those are both negative and significant. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: 
Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Kanagawa and Kyoto, and not 
rejected in Tokyo.  
 
The coefficients on the ratios of sizes to competing size in both equations are positive 
and significant in Tokyo and positive but insignificant in Kyoto, while those are 
negative but significant in Kanagawa. Hypothesis 5 is tested as: H0: Ai /∑A  0 and H1: 
Ai /∑A > 0 (or, H0: Ai /∑Aj  0 and H1: Ai /∑Aj > 0). The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
Tokyo and Kyoto, and not rejected in Kanagawa.  
 
The coefficients on volunteers in both equations are positive and significant in Tokyo 
and Kyoto, while in Kanagawa these are negative but significant in Model 3_J and 
negative and insignificant in Model 3. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 
0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Tokyo and Kyoto, and not rejected in Kanagawa.  
 
The coefficients on age are positive but insignificant in Tokyo, while in Kanagawa these 
are negative but significant, and in Kyoto they are negative and insignificant. 
Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in Tokyo, and not rejected in Kanagawa and Kyoto. 
 
The coefficients on administrative costs (AC) are positive and significant in Tokyo, 
while in Kanagawa these are negative but significant, and in Kyoto negative and 
insignificant. Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: ACi  0 and H1: ACi > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in Tokyo, and not rejected in Kanagawa and Kyoto. 
 
As discussed in the results, the signs and significance of independent variables in 
geographic groups are consistent with all Models 1 to 4.  
 
6.4.6 Summary of Japanese results 
 
A sample of Japanese charitable organisations shows that fundraising expenditure (Fi) 
has a positive effect on donations in the Humanitarian, Global and Environment groups 
in the current year, while competitors‘ fundraising expenditure (Fj) has negative effect 
in the Humanitarian, Global and Environment groups. This is for current year. However, 
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when government grants are included in the empirical models (Models 2 and 4), 
competitors‘ fundraising expenditures in the Welfare and Rural groups also shows a 
negative effect on donations.  
 
The ratio of fundraising expenditure to the competitors‘ fundraising expenditure (K1) 
has a consistently positive and significant effect on donations in the All Groups, 
Disability, Culture and Education groups in the current year. The number of volunteers 
(V) has significantly positive effect on donations but is consistently very small (from 
0.047 to 0.214) in the All, Welfare and Disability groups and has positive but 
insignificant effect on donations on the Culture and Education groups in the following 
year. Organisational size (A) has a significantly positive effect on donations in the 
Welfare and Environment groups, and positive but insignificant on donation in the 
Disability industry in the following years, while organisational age has a positive and 
significant effect on donation but only in the Culture group, and other groups show a 
negative effect. On the other hand, government grants (G) have a positive effect on 
donations in most of the groups in the following year. Administrative costs (AC) have a 
consistently significant positive effect on donations in most groups except the Welfare 
group in the following year.  
 
As discussed in Section 2.5.2, the samples of Japanese charitable organisations are 
classified into three geographical groups of Tokyo, Kanagawa and Kyoto. The results of 
these geographic groups show similarities with those of the industry groups. But the 
results of these geographic groups distinct were much weaker than those for the industry 
groups in Japan. These results indicate that a sample of Japanese charitable 
organisations consistently show that only a few group indicate a positive effect on 
donations. However, each of the charitable organisations in the All, Humanitarian, 
Global, Disability, Culture, Education and Environment shows an interest in the major 
decisions of their competitors in terms of fundraising.  
 
The results of Australian charities are far better than the results of Japanese charities, 
including significance and expected sign of explanatory variables and overall levels of 
explanation. There remain some concerns with the multicollinearity problems between 
variables in these family models. Firstly the empirical results of family models may be 
biased due to the muliticollinearity problem, especially among the logarithms of 
fundraising expenditure of a charity i (lnFi), competitors‘ fundraising expenditure (lnFj) 
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and the ratio of logged fundraising expenditure in each group (lnFi/ΣlnF). Secondly, the 
variables among donations, fundraising expenditure and volunteers may be 
simultaneously related to each other. This simultaneity may affect the results of family 
models. This is because volunteers and donations are both contributions to charitable 
organisations by individuals, one in the form of people‘s time and labour and the other 
in monetary form, and many volunteers in each organisation are engaged in fundraising 
events to increase donations. Thirdly in both Australia and Japan the significant effect 
of volunteers on total donations places more emphasis on volunteers. This is a very 
different input to production that is found in normal oligopoly models.  
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Table 6.35: OLS estimation for Japanese charities  
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε 
 
cc All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -103.570** 8.055 13.634 26.833 -110.868*** -21.007* -17.073*** 18.961*** 
 (48.327) (8.724) (14.090) (24.196) (35.138) (15.533) (6.915) (7.667) 
lnFi    (β1) -5.873* -1.039 0.315 2.431 -11.334** -2.843* -1.625 * 1.531** 
 (3.655) (1.138) (0.305) (3.390) (6.132) (2.201) (1.117) (0.797) 
lnFj    (β2) 5.319** -0.240 -0.198 -1.029 11.471*** 1.581 1.828*** -0.945* 
 (2.536) (0.754) (0.888) (1.343) (3.664) (1.395) (0.568) (0.658) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) 5905.489** 119.195 -0.091 -203.700 469.279** 340.304** 117.920** -87.072* 
 (3341.950) (111.123) (34.843) (353.743) (212.868) (205.689) (85.180) (57.216) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) -0.659 3.669*** -0.190 -0.260** 0.573 -2.936* -0.148 0.597** 
 (0.864) (1.173) (0.177) (0.146) (0.989) (1.904) (0.786) (0.347) 
lnAi t-1/lnΣAt-1 (β5) 816.089 -262.818*** 13.946 3.901 -4.205 316.886** 16.141 -21.453 
 (832.076) (108.995) (11.073) (11.489) (86.145) (190.610) (53.806) (23.113) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.080* 0.214** -0.295*** -0.089 0.180 0.147 0.052 -0.436*** 
 (0.058) (0.125) (0.078) (0.257) (0.344) (0.126) (0.121) (0.081) 
lnAgei t-1   (β7) -0.108 -3.619*** -0.544 -0.660** -0.269 2.314** -0.096 -0.479 
 (0.156) (1.028) (0.878) (0.387) (1.385) (1.388) (0.525) (0.417) 
R
2
 0.329 0.641 0.660 0.393 0.475 0.382 0.732 0.674 
Adj R
2
 0.315 0.595 0.572 0.316 0.282 0.303 0.687 0.607 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 27 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.36: OLS estimation for Japanese charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + ε 
 
cc All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -78.789* 3.703 12.937 37.727 -141.074*** -21.265 -17.592*** 19.758*** 
 (47.345) (9.483) (14.216) (30.362) (43.760) (16.693) (6.963) (7.580) 
lnFi    (β1) -4.073 -1.474 0.298 4.248 -19.554** -3.435* -2.553** 1.755** 
 (3.728) (1.371) (0.295) (4.570) (9.175) (2.569) (1.138) (0.935) 
lnFj    (β2) 4.084* 0.088 -0.143 -1.750 17.793*** 2.063 2.064*** -1.182* 
 (2.524) (0.905) (0.9098) (1.813) (5.636) (1.662) (0.6218) (0.739) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) 4125.400 138.867 1.742 -342.880 500.863*** 334.423** 199.011*** -77.610* 
 (3301.068) (114.606) (29.578) (415.837) (211.661) (203.580) (69.742) (49.917) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) -0.661 3.626*** -0.197 -0.249** 0.397 -2.553* 0.575 0.372 
 (0.880) (1.205) (0.179) (0.141) (0.917) (1.820) (0.722) (0.343) 
lnAi t-1/lnΣAt-1 (β5) 787.383 -218.963** 11.501* 3.079 9.838 236.647* -24.498 -4.850 
 (822.214) (94.556) (8.865) (8.775) (65.865) (155.558) (38.019) (17.456) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.073 0.204* -0.294*** -0.078 0.184 0.147 0.009 -0.442*** 
 (0.058) (0.125) (0.078) (0.257) (0.339) (0.127) (0.115) (0.082) 
lnAgei t-1   (β7) -0.114 -3.595*** -0.592 -0.665** -0.374 2.005 -0.167 -0.458 
 (0.157) (1.054) (0.896) (0.381) (1.338) (1.338) (0.496) (0.424) 
R
2
 0.326 0.639 0.661 0.397 0.492 0.375 0.738 0.666 
Adjusted R
2
 0.312 0.593 0.573 0.320 0.305 0.296 0.693 0.598 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 27 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.37: OLS estimation for Japanese charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -26.634 10.228 18.992 25.757 -52.940** -21.717* -8.915 22.610*** 
 (45.867) (9.172) (17.336) (20.622) (31.782) (15.442) (7.050) (6.537) 
lnFi    (β1) -1.217 0.570 0.087 1.163 -3.964 -0.683 -1.179 1.994*** 
 (3.605) (1.158) (3.045) (2.936) (5.809) (1.960) (0.966) (0.713) 
lnFj    (β2) 1.307 -0.690 -0.577 -0.978 5.747** 1.845* 1.244** -1.255** 
 (2.412) (0.802) (0.999) (1.127) (3.415) (1.373) (0.596) (0.588) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) 1552.904 -47.046 19.583 -79.346 180.176 134.042 132.366** -117.577*** 
 (3284.517) (114.138) (310.599) (305.298) (192.847) (183.649) (75.225) (49.216) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) -0.788 2.281** -0.153 -0.331*** 0.115 -6.009** -0.149 0.530* 
 (1.453) (1.112) (0.189) (0.137) (0.956) (2.774) (0.729) (0.364) 
lnAi t-1/lnΣAt-1 (β5) 986.392 -125.015 11.370 18.302** 30.301 631.459** 18.784 -15.746 
 (1395.207) (101.782) (10.586) (9.771) (82.871) (279.248) (50.019) (24.115) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.071 0.187* -0.211*** -0.293* 0.490* 0.111 -0.061 -0.462*** 
 (0.060) (0.135) (0.084) (0.224) (0.315) (0.147) (0.142) (0.079) 
lnAgei t-1   (β7) -0.085 -1.961*** -0.148 -0.505* -1.266 2.265** -0.353 -0.384 
 (0.145) (0.772) (0.624) (0.342) (1.566) (1.236) (0.370) (0.387) 
R
2
 0.286 0.583 0.548 0.451 0.376 0.254 0.673 0.695 
Adjusted R
2
 0.270 0.530 0.431 0.381 0.158 0.159 0.617 0.632 
Obs. 336 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 6.38: OLS estimation for Japanese charities 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε 
 
cc All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -29.624 7.138 -5.756 23.987 -89.909** -25.833* -10.557* 22.962*** 
 (48.327) (10.091) (22.478) (26.198) (43.211) (16.287) (7.414) (6.478) 
lnFi    (β1) -1.502 0.278 -5.230 0.781 -12.497* -2.611 -1.897** 2.146*** 
 (3.584) (1.429) (4.195) (4.045) (8.976) (2.368) (1.0857) (0.8557) 
lnFj    (β2) 1.499 -0.499 0.961 -0.876 11.532** 1.619** 1.495** -1.489** 
 (2.460) (0.971) (1.380) (1.555) (5.645) (1.373) (0.679) (0.658) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) 1757.111 -14.874 492.090* -34.069 316.952* 263.364* 150.571** -99.661** 
 (3164.694) (120.307) (374.614) (367.298) (203.775) (189.458) (68.237) (43.921) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) -0.795 2.183** -0.094 -0.323*** 0.162 -4.440** 0.551 0.315 
 (1.415) (1.155) (0.185) (0.136) (0.906) (2.407) (0.700) (0.373) 
lnAi t-1/lnΣAt-1 (β5) 963.377 -98.114 5.717 14.230** 25.248 404.536** -21.840 -1.145 
 (1317.580) (89.390) (8.303) (7.621) (64.007) (206.627) (37.141) (18.833) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.070 0.185* -0.188** -0.302* 0.552** 1.699 -0.086 -0.477*** 
 (0.060) (0.136) (0.082) (0.224) (0.302) (1.124) (0.135) (0.079) 
lnAgei t-1   (β7) -0.089 -1.900*** 0.075 -0.517* -0.894 0.110* -0.219 -0.337 
 (0.145) (0.800) (0.584) (0.339) (1.499) (0.148) (0.367) (0.396) 
R
2
 0.286 0.579 0.576 0.450 0.420 0.258 0.676 0.691 
Adj. R
2
 0.271 0.526 0.466 0.380 0.217 0.163 0.621 0.627 
Obs. 336 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.39: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with unlag 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -53.035 4.308 30.711*** 21.694 -67.862*** -18.588* -12.649** 24.991*** 
 (44.180) (8.580) (12.378) (20.529) (28.627) (13.635) (6.656) (7.605) 
lnFi    (β1) -2.164 -0.369 0.619*** 1.968 -7.625* -0.452 -2.022** 1.866** 
 (3.443) (1.077) (0.217) (2.944) (5.292) (1.750) (0.9907) (0.830) 
lnFj    (β2) 2.704 -0.251 -0.864* -0.804 7.069** 1.474 1.719*** -1.533** 
 (2.358) (0.752) (0.604) (1.132) (3.070) (1.224) (0.6168) (0.678) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) 2412.957 64.669 30.588* -149.874 310.419** 119.458 161.907*** -112.583** 
 (3040.205) (105.997) (23.446) (306.081) (175.626) (164.556) (61.909) (57.581) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) -0.630 2.579*** -0.789 -0.364*** 0.389 -6.356*** 0.224 -0.266 
 (1.326) (1.033) (0.731) (0.137) (0.465) (2.209) (0.640) (0.433) 
lnAi t-1/lnΣAt-1 (β5) 808.252 -155.172* -3.210 13.481* 14.640 663.242*** -5.233 38.102 
 (1272.053) (95.568) (6.063) (9.467) (34.052) (222.919) (33.962) (28.799) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.055 -0.029 -0.201*** -0.071 0.437* 0.105 -0.071 -0.483*** 
 (0.054) (0.122) (0.066) (0.210) (0.283) (0.121) (0.114) (0.091) 
lnAgei t-1   (β7) -0.132 -1.557** 0.797 -0.462* -0.827 2.340*** -0.364 -0.240 
 (0.128) (0.715) (0.793) (0.311) (1.418) (0.909) (0.314) (0.417) 
R
2
 0.325 0.613 0.655 0.416 0.439 0.344 0.700 0.620 
Adjusted R
2
 0.312 0.571 0.580 0.352 0.275 0.272 0.656 0.553 
Obs. 383 63 40 72 32 72 56 48 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.40: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with unlag 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Science Education Environment 
β0 55.031 0.661 22.750** 27.575 -119.187*** 14.850 -14.195** 27.634*** 
 (44.162) (9.323) (10.257) (25.930) (38.837) (18.345) (8.193) (7.824) 
lnFi    (β1) -2.167 -0.807 0.611*** 2.492 -18.539** -2.014 -2.022** 1.589* 
 (3.438) (1.316) (0.227) (4.048) (7.967) (2.128) (0.990) (0.972) 
lnFj    (β2) 2.713 0.049 -0.811* -1.046 14.844*** 2.214* 1.719*** -1.494** 
 (2.360) (0.901) (0.628) (1.559) (4.966) (1.455) (0.616) (0.738) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) 2416.043 92.123 -25.000 -178.118 459.567*** 222.259* 161.907*** -72.702* 
 (3035.822) (110.421) (20.871) (367.271) (180.735) (170.485) (61.909) (50.104) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) -0.638 2.553*** -0.060 -0.346*** 0.499 -5.189*** 0.244 -0.580* 
 (1.332) (1.069) (0.160) (0.136) (0.432) (1.938) (0.640) (0.427) 
lnAi t-1/lnΣAt-1 (β5) 791.209 -129.304* 3.571 9.840* 9.711 465.584*** -5.233 44.867** 
 (1230.345) (83.474) 7(.019) (7.370) (24.904) (166.698) (33.962) (21.627) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.055 -0.035 -0.216*** -0.071 0.479** 0.095 -0.071 -0.488*** 
 (0.054) (0.122) (0.066) (0.210) (0.263) (0.121) (0.114) (0.088) 
lnAgei t-1   (β7) -0.132 -1.548** 0.018 -0.473* -0.479 1.983*** -0.364 -0.123 
 (0.128) (0.736) (0.492) (0.308) (1.320) (0.839) (0.314) (0.412) 
R
2
 0.325 0.612 0.644 0.415 0.500 0.347 0.700 0.638 
Adjusted R
2
 0.312 0.574 0.566 0.350 0.355 0.276 0.656 0.575 
S.E. 1.337 1.172 0.594 1.397 1.446 1.555 0.866 0.635 
Obs. 383 72 40 72 32 72 56 48 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 6.41: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with combined (M2) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β7 ln Git-1+ ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -105.901** 10.486 15.746 23.947 -110.403*** -23.251* -15.974*** 16.216** 
 (48.318) (8.913) (13.983) (23.269) (35.816) (15.717) (6.513) (8.029) 
lnFi    (β1) -6.053** -1.204 0.302 1.378 -11.667** -2.945* -1.151 1.184* 
 (3.655) (1.141) (0.300) (3.286) (6.236) (2.205) (1.067) (0.853) 
lnFj    (β2) 5.450** -0.325 -0.308 -0.697 11.103*** 1.873* 1.799*** -0.635 
 (2.535) (0.754) (0.879) (1.298) (3.664) (1.428) (0.534) (0.713) 
lnFi /ΣlnF (β3) 6056.505** 124.279 -3.843 -120.163 477.538** 352.862** 145.430** -66.231 
 (3341.043) (110.721) (34.469) (341.547) (216.160) (206.239) (81.072) (60.019) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) -0.689 4.099*** -0.196 -0.418*** 0.928 -3.234** -0.235 0.699** 
 (0.863) (1.221) (0.174) (0.156) (1.126) (1.930) (0.739) (0.357) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA t-1 (β5) 843.503 -301.8548*** 12.079 4.686 -6.603 343.748** 25.093 -27.430 
 (831.601) (108.995) (11.008) (11.039) (87.413) (192.768) (50.691) (23.651) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.062 0.201** -0.327*** -0.100 0.166 0.100 -0.149 -0.467*** 
 (0.060) (0.125) (0.081) (0.247) (0.349) (0.135) (0.139) (0.085) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) -0.133 -4.117*** -0.306 -0.767** -0.344 2.064* -0.173 -0.661* 
 (0.157) (1.102) (0.884) (0.374) (1.409) (1.413) (0.494) (0.447) 
lnGi t-1  (β8) 0.028 0.062 0.042* 0.135** 0.105 0.095 0.100*** 0.047 
 (0.022) (0.051) (0.031) (0.057) (0.151) (0.099) (0.039) (0.042) 
R
2
 0.333 0.650 0.682 0.451 0.489 0.392 0.769 0.686 
Adjusted R
2
 0.316 0.598 0.584 0.369 0.262 0.302 0.723 0.609 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 27 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.   
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Table 6.42: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with combined (M2) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β7 ln Git-1+ ε 
 
cc All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -78.848** 6.203 15.016 32.797 -139.061*** -22.994* -14.746** 17.539** 
 (47.316) (9.790) (14.117) (29.264) (45.289) (16.841) (6.817) (7.973) 
lnFi    (β1) -4.073 -1.488 0.283 2.864 -19.259** -3.504* -2.010** 1.439* 
 (3.726) (1.370) (0.291) (4.433) (9.447) (2.575) (1.122) (0.998) 
lnFj    (β2) 4.095* -0.051 -0.254 -1.272 17.398*** 2.323* 1.810*** -0.907 
 (2.523) (0.915) (0.901) (1.755) (5.909) (1.691) (0.608) (0.799) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 4113.312 132.072 -1.304 -239.620 493.026** 342.185** 166.366*** -63.239 
 (3299.068) (114.752) (29.280) (402.182) (218.288) (204.180) (68.693) (52.424) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) -0.681 3.946*** -0.202 -0.410*** 0.540 -2.803* 0.728 0.447 
 (0.879) (1.244) (0.176) (0.152) (1.043) (1.846) (0.696) (0.353) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 813.817 -243.233*** 9.973 3.700 10.067 255.623* -30.543 -8.178 
 (822.015) (95.401) (8.826) (8.440) (67.488) (157.348) (36.606) (17.868) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.056 0.193* -0.327*** -0.090 0.178 0.104 -0.171 -0.467*** 
 (0.060) (0.126) (0.081) (0.247) (0.347) (0.137) (0.139) (0.086) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) -0.136 -3.978*** -0.357 -0.765** -0.438 1.751 -0.250 -0.610* 
 (0.158) (1.118) (0.902) (0.368) (1.386) (1.371) (0.478) (0.456) 
lnGi t-1  (β8) 0.026 0.052 0.041* 0.134*** 0.048 0.088 0.088** 0.039 
 (0.022) (0.051) (0.031) (0.057) (0.151) (0.099) (0.041) (0.043) 
R
2
 0.329 0.646 0.682 0.453 0.495 0.384 0.765 0.675 
Adjusted R
2
 0.312 0.593 0.584 0.372 0.270 0.293 0.717 0.596 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 27 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %
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Table 6.43: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with lag(M2) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln Git-1+ ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -30.155 11.123 19.489 27.944* -56.329** -22.411* -6.291 21.453*** 
 (45.896) (9.622) (17.558) (20.229) (32.285) (15.527) (6.690) (6.627) 
lnFit-1    (β1) -1.573 0.805 0.201 0.683 -4.342 -0.951 -0.945 1.819*** 
 (3.612) (1.3601) (3.087) (2.887) (5.872) (1.998) (0.911) (0.723) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) 1.501 -0.814 -0.592 -0.944 5.711** 1.965* 1.060** -1.165** 
 (2.414) (0.888) (1.011) (1.104) (3.442) (1.387) (0.563) (0.594) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFjt-1 (β3) 1863.285 -65.984 5.890 -51.790 191.474 157.962 116.576** -108.559** 
 (3289.565) (128.085) (315.029) (299.329) (194.809) (186.978) (70.821) (49.944) 
lnAit-1   (β4) -0.729 2.124** -0.1626 -0.405*** 0.518 -6.072** 0.028 0.522* 
 (1.452) (1.214) (0.192) (0.140) (1.081) (2.785) (0.687) (0.364) 
lnAit-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 938.158 -110.027 10.886 12.254 32.596 635.313** 9.881 -15.023 
 (1394.193) (111.855) (10.739) (10.121) (83.557) (280.352) (47.041) (24.104) 
lnVit-1  (β6) 0.029 0.190* -0.227*** -0.288* 0.469* 0.057 -0.285** -0.455*** 
 (0.023) (0.137) (0.088) (0.219) (0.318) (0.164) (0.159) (0.079) 
lnAgeit-1  (β7) -0.109 -1.864** -0.102 -0.651** -1.368 2.196** -0.520* -0.358 
 (0.146) (0.830) (0.636) (0.344) (1.583) (1.244) (0.353) (0.388) 
lnGit-1  (β8) 0.029* -0.023 0.023 0.108** 0.137 0.082 0.107*** -0.028 
 (0.023) (0.069) (0.037) (0.059) (0.164) (0.108) (0.042) (0.027) 
R
2
 0.289 0.584 0.555 0.483 0.398 0.262 0.719 0.704 
Adjusted R
2
 0.272 0.522 0.418 0.406 0.145 0.153 0.663 0.632 
Obs. 336 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.44: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with lag (M2) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit-1 + β2 ln Fjt-1 + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β7 ln Git-1+ ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -30.692 -6.512 -4.491 28.395 -98.373** 4.720 -12.163* 19.289*** 
 （46.019） (13.881) (23.037) (25.487) （45.230） (21.368) (8.597) (7.075) 
lnFit-1    (β1) -1.654 0.440 -5.112 0.220 -13.086* -2.878 -1.404* 2.016*** 
 （3.582） (1.609) (4.255) (3.973) (9.041) (2.399) (1.041) (0.864) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) 1.564 -0.558 0.936 -0.804 11.666** 2.877** 1.073* -1.377** 
 (2.458) (1.005) (1.399) (1.523) (5.673) (1.632) (0.662) (0.666) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFjt-1 (β3) 1877.883 -26.144 479.891 -2.906 329.398* 283.484 119.591** -92.410** 
 (3163.073) (131.065) (301.101) (360.026) (205.180) (191.774) (65.505) (44.437) 
lnAit-1   (β4) -0.752 2.070** -0.101 -0.401*** 0.584 -4.491** 0.921* 0.349 
 (1.414) (1.267) (0.187) (0.139) (1.024) (2.416) (0.676) (0.374) 
lnAit-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 931.049 -89.005 5.370 9.569 27.120 406.579** -38.766 -2.692 
 (1316.560) (98.647) (8.433) (7.881) (64.337) (207.338) (35.659) (18.874) 
lnVit-1  (β6) 0.053 0.187* -0.202*** -0.296* 0.529** 0.055 -0.315** -0.469*** 
 (0.061) (0.137) (0.087) (0.219) (0.304) (0.164) (0.157) (0.0799 
lnAgeit-1  (β7) -0.112 -1.829** 0.120 -0.662** -1.003 1.623* -0.355 -0.323 
 (0.146) (0.864) (0.597) (0.341) (1.511) (1.132) (0.350) (0.396) 
lnGit-1  (β8) 0.029 -0.015 0.020 0.108** 0.142 0.085 0.108*** -0.028 
 (0.022) (0.067) (0.036) (0.059) (0.158) (0.107) (0.044) (0.027) 
R
2
 0.289 0.580 0.581 0.483 0.444 0.266 0.720 0.701 
Adj R
2
 0.272 0.518 0.452 0.406 0.209 0.158 0.663 0.628 
Obs. 336 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.45: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with unlag (M2) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β7 ln Git+ ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -54.908 5.839 30.769*** 22.319 -69.948*** -20.377* -10.016 23.117*** 
 (44.040) (8.850) (12.499) (19.549) (28.976) (13.642) (6.534) (7.650) 
lnFi    (β1) -2.320 0.064 0.581*** 1.002 -8.046* -0.784 -1.664 1.671** 
 (3.432) (1.227) (0.228) (2.825) (5.361) (1.761) (0.969) (0.833) 
lnFj    (β2) 2.817 -0.471 -0.865* -0.634 7.017** 1.680* 1.469* -1.383** 
 (2.351) (0.810) (0.610) (1.080) (3.095) (1.229) (0.606) (0.680) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 2533.043 29.702 -28.559 -78.487 322.661** 150.275 140.155* -98.230** 
 (3030.423) (116.227) (23.900) (292.589) (177.705) (165.542) (60.547) (57.946) 
lnAit   (β4) -0.665 2.276** -0.778 -0.474*** 0.620 -6.760*** 0.436 -0.292 
 (1.321) (1.114) (0.738) (0.136) (0.553) (2.221) (0.625) (0.429) 
lnAit /ΣlnA jt (β5) 851.241 -126.370 -3.825 6.552 18.301 701.081*** -14.903 39.973 
 (1267.886) (103.374) (6.202) (9.359) (34.636) (223.828) (33.056) (28.530) 
lnVit  (β6) 0.030 -0.018 -0.218*** -0.077 0.444* 0.037 -0.212** -0.240 
 (0.055) (0.123) (0.072) (0.200) (0.285) (0.132) (0.128) (0.413) 
lnAgeit  (β7) -0.155 -1.376** 0.843 -0.610** -0.788 2.411*** -0.370 -0.475*** 
 (0.128) (0.757) (0.8056) (0.301) (1.430) (0.907) (0.3038) (0.090) 
lnGit  (β8) 0.039** -0.044 0.019 0.147*** 0.104 0.117 0.081** -0.043* 
 (0.021) (0.059) (0.0307) (0.053) (0.132) (0.092) (0.0389) (0.032) 
R
2
 0.331 0.616 0.659 0.478 0.454 0.361 0.727 0.637 
Adjusted R
2
 0.317 0.568 0.572 0.412 0.263 0.279 0.681 0.563 
Obs. 383 72 40 72 32 72 56 48 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.   
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Table 6.46: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with unlag (M2) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β8 ln Git+ ε 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Science Education Environment 
β0 -54.758 2.267 22.866** 28.114 -124.808*** 15.858 -13.025** 25.647*** 
 (44.021) （9.617） (10.355) (24.678) (39.422) (18.287) (7.918) (7.953) 
lnFi    (β1) -2.340 -0.374 0.572*** 1.397 -19.368*** -2.332 -1.664** 1.411* 
 (3.427) (1.449) (0.237) (3.872) (8.041) (2.134) (0.969) (0.978) 
lnFj    (β2) 2.819 -0.179 -0.805 -0.807 15.052*** 2.397** 1.469*** -1.331** 
 (2.352) (0.957) (0.634) (1.486) (4.986) (1.456) (0.606) (0.747) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 251.299 62.117 -23.168 -104.350 476.998*** 247.068* 140.155** -62.512 
 (3026.333) (118.318) (21.263) (350.554) (182.243) (170.947) (60.547) (50.540) 
lnAit   (β4) -0.649 2.240** -0.064 -0.462*** 0.762* -5.500*** 0.436 -0.549* 
 (1.318) (1.157) (0.161) (0.136) (0.518) (1.946) (0.625) (0.425) 
lnAit /ΣlnA jt (β5) 811.071 -104.261 3.168 4.493 12.571 489.782*** -14.903 43.357** 
 (1226.201) (90.634) (7.113) (7.275) (25.168) (167.144) (33.056) (21.543) 
lnVit  (β6) 0.030 -0.024 -0.233*** -0.075 0.487** 0.030 -0.212** -0.478*** 
 (0.055) (0.123) (0.072) (0.200) (0.264) (0.132) (0.128) (0.088) 
lnAgeit  (β7) -0.155 -1.360 0.070 -0.617** -0.421 2.025*** -0.370 -0.140 
 (0.128) (0.783) (0.503) (0.298) (1.325) (0.836) (0.303) (0.410) 
lnGit  (β8) 0.039** -0.042 0.020 0.148*** 0.115 0.133 0.081** -0.037 
 (0.021) (0.057) (0.031) (0.053) (0.124) (0.091) (0.038) (0.031) 
R
2
 0.331 0.616 0.648 0.478 0.518 0.363 0.727 0.651 
Adjusted R
2
 0.317 0.567 0.558 0.412 0.351 0.282 0.681 0.580 
Obs. 383 72 40 72 32 72 56 48 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 6.47: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with combined (M3) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -81.752** 10.486 14.899 21.160 -45.839** -14.707 4.459 14.294* 
 (48.202) (8.818) (14.497) (23.075) (27.408) (15.770) (6.559) (10.637) 
lnFi    (β1) -4.373 -1.049 0.315 2.799 -7.710** -2.149 0.973 1.183 
 (3.639) (1.168) (0.309) (3.222) (4.216) (2.209) (0.973) (0.971) 
lnFj    (β2) 4.083* -0.231 -0.307 -0.860 4.782** 0.989 -0.165 -0.645 
 (2.535) (0.786) (0.925) (1.277) (2.838) (1.420) (0.564) (0.813) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 4459.452* 120.561 -4.386 -246.415 285.269** 257.342 -56.108 -63.729 
 (3330.459) (110.721) (36.305) (336.281) (148.966) (208.767) (77.564) (68.305) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) -0.795 3.669*** -0.169 -0.403*** 0.058 -2.373 -0.220 0.607** 
 (0.853) (1.184) (0.183) (0.149) (0.678) (1.906) 12.951 (0.350) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 890.296 -262.711*** 13.436 5.345 -26.044 242.999 25.093 -24.522 
 (521.504) (110.019) (11.271) (10.923) (58.468) (193.030) (41.039) (23.806) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.074* 0.221** -0.283*** -0.187 -0.026 0.080 -0.176** -0.430*** 
 (0.057) (0.129) (0.083) (0.247) (0.237) (0.131) (0.101) (0.082) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) -0.098 -3.615*** -0.420 -0.455*** -0.264*** 1.770 -0.176 -0.453 
 (0.1547) (1.042) (0.923) (0.375) (0.937) (1.406) (0.401) (0.423) 
lnACi t-1  (β8) 0.223** -0.007 0.054 0.472 1.123** 0.431* 0.672*** 0.165 
 (0.071) 8.031 (0.105) (0.179) (0.232) (0.262) (0.122) (0.258) 
R
2
 0.349 0.641 0.664 0.463 0.772 0.411 0.848 0.678 
Adjusted R
2
 0.333 0.587 0.560 0.383 0.671 0.324 0.818 0.600 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 27 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.48: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with combined (M3) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β8 ln ACit-1 ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -56.670** 3.442 14.199 33.942 -51.110* -14.851 3.537 15.720* 
 (47.207) (9.642) (14.637) (28.820) (37.676) (16.832) (6.691) (10.610) 
lnFi    (β1) -2.481 -1.553 0.298 4.939 -9.191* -2.609 0.732 1.427 
 (3.711) (1.431) (0.299) (4.341) (7.013) (2.571) (1.075) (1.117) 
lnFj    (β2) 2.811 0.151 -0.253 -1.710 6.806* 1.349 -0.101 -0.896 
 (2.521) (0.958) (0.9485) (1.719) (4.778) (1.686) (0.629) (0.910) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 2641.510 146.787 -1.833 -411.064 223.709* 253.262 -29.729 -61.025 
 (3288.778) (121.313) (30.839) (395.066) (164.988) (205.659) (68.969) (58.767) 
lnAi t-1   (β4) -0.822 3.637*** -0.177 -0.387*** -0.159 -2.020 -0.122 0.397 
 (0.869) (1.216) (0.186) (0.143) (0.671) (1.816) (0.574) (0.349) 
lnAi t-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 891.156 -219.330** 11.086 3.864 -6.104 175.889 4.534 -7.771 
 (811.569) (95.401) (9.029) (8.325) (47.473) (156.979) (29.932) (18.420) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.068 0.198 -0.283*** -0.171 -0.017 0.078 -0.159 -0.435*** 
 (0.057) (0.129) (0.082) (0.246) (0.248) (0.131) (0.094) (0.083) 
lnAgei t-1  (β7) -0.099 -3.583*** -0.469 -0.463 -0.523 1.500 -0.242 -0.439 
 (0.155) (1.064) (0.941) (0.369) (0.962) (1.348) (0.401) (0.430) 
lnACi t-1  (β8) 0.229*** -0.033 0.053 0.477*** 1.102*** 0.447** 0.657*** 0.146 
 (0.072) (0.153) (0.105) (0.178) (0.254) (0.261) (0.123) (0.266) 
R
2
 0.346 0.639 0.664 0.468 0.751 0.408 0.847 0.669 
Adj R
2
 0.330 0.586 0.561 0.389 0.641 0.320 0.816 0.589 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 27 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.49: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with lag (M3) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Ft-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β7 ln ACit-1 ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -6.885 10.364 18.674 20.885 2.861 -16.024 6.288 20.951** 
 (45.199) (9.224) (17.982) (19.628) (19.710) (14.743) (4.997) (9.857) 
lnFit-1    (β1) -0.263 0.668 0.019 0.943 2.508 -0.283 0.975* 1.808** 
 (3.547) (1.175) (3.187) (2.784) (3.403) (1.853) (0.689) (0.939) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) 0.153 -0.804 -0.552 -0.817 0.354 1.262 -0.279 -1.146* 
 (2.380) (0.825) (1.053) (1.070) (2.081) (1.315) (0.436) (0.766) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFjt-1 (β3) 591.683 -62.160 27.651 -65.215 -97.736 74.149 -56.875 -108.791** 
 (3233.656) (117.157) (327.831) (289.387) (116.025) (174.960) (54.853) (63.121) 
lnAit-1   (β4) -0.724 2.361** -0.155 -0.435*** -0.716* -4.548** -0.189 0.524* 
 (1.421) (1.125) (0.194) (0.135) (0.553) (2.675) (0.473) (0.370) 
lnAit-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 864.752 -134.137* 11.287 15.779** -2.281 454.894** 9.333 -16.322 
 (1365.223) (103.319) (10.822) (9.307) (46.785) (271.670) (32.490) (24.589) 
lnVit-1  (β6) 0.071 0.207* -0.225** -0.388** 0.083 -0.010 -0.247*** -0.458*** 
 (0.059) (0.140) (0.096) (0.215) (0.187) (0.146) (0.096) (0.082) 
lnAgeit-1  (β7) -0.098 -2.063*** -0.155 -0.437* -1.087 1.373 -0.357* -0.377 
 (0.1547) (0.793) (0.640) (0.325) (0.880) (1.213) (0.240) (0.394) 
lnACit-1  (β8) 0.267*** 0.106 -0.015 0.448*** 1.595*** 0.697*** 0.702*** 0.060 
 (0.074) (0.165) (0.156) (0.167) (0.239) (0.254) (0.093) (0.264) 
R
2
 0.312 0.586 0.548 0.515 0.813 0.346 0.865 0.695 
Adj. R
2
 0.298 0.525 0.409 0.444 0.735 0.249 0.839 0.621 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
  291 
Table 6.50: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with lag (M3) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit-1 / Σ ln Fjt-1) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln Ajt-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β7 ln ACit-1 ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -12.463 -8.085 -5.206 26.575 7.168 3.557 7.940 19.215** 
 (45.491) (12.352) (23.150) (24.654) (30.540) (20.160) (6.653) (10.069) 
lnFit-1    (β1) -0.603 0.400 -5.249 1.367 2.270 -1.791 0.986 2.008** 
 (3.529) (1.456) (4.275) (3.842) (5.804) (2.261) (0.809) (1.073) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) 0.476 -0.621 0.980 -0.992 0.022 1.989 -0.275 -1.376* 
 (2.433) (1.003) (1.413) (1.474) (3.811) (1.559) (0.504) (0.846) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFjt-1 (β3) 876.598 -29.089 495.111* -95.247 -60.622 180.275 -45.965 -92.933** 
 (3118.293) (123.863) (382.200) (348.992) (134.707) (181.889) (51.883) (54.223) 
lnAit-1   (β4) -0.630 2.238** -0.098 -0.424*** -0.698 -3.378* -0.292 0.318 
 (1.391) (1.167) (0.1919 (0.134) (0.522) (2.312) (0.472) (0.378) 
lnAit-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 749.327 -103.519 5.675 11.794* -2.265 288.513* 12.275 -1.955 
 (1295.621) (90.513) (8.463) (7.282) (38.009) (200.151) (24.750) (19.461) 
lnVit-1  (β6) 0.069 0.202* -0.194** -0.386** 0.114 -0.010 -0.231*** -0.472*** 
 (0.059) (0.140) (0.094) (0.215) (0.192) (0.147) (0.090) (0.082) 
lnAgeit-1  (β7) -0.076 -1.977*** 0.059 -0.441* -0.932 0.954 -0.400** -0.332 
 (0.143) (0.817) (0.606) (0.323) (0.844) (1.098) (0.241) (0.402) 
lnACit-1  (β8) 0.265*** 0.091 -0.021 0.448*** 1.575*** 0.690*** 0.699*** 0.058 
 (0.074) (0.166) (0.146) (0.167) (0.254) (0.254) (0.094) (0.265) 
R
2
 0.313 0.582 0.576 0.515 0.808 0.347 0.865 0.691 
Adj. R
2
 0.296 0.520 0.446 0.443 0.728 0.251 0.837 0.617 
S.E. 1.396 1.241 0.674 1.291 0.939 1.626 0.602 0.554 
Obs. 336 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 6.51: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with unlag (M3) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β7 ln ACit + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture&Science Education Environment 
β0 -32.347 4.506 30.695*** 11.995 -2.823 -13.543 3.094 21.714** 
 (43.230) (8.647) (12.532) (16.995) (15.243) (13.162) (5.160) (11.253) 
lnFi    (β1) -1.092 -0.302 0.604*** 1.273 -0.240 -0.007 0.700 1.598* 
 (3.359) (1.095) (0.223) (2.428) (2.623) (1.680) (0.792) (1.075) 
lnFj    (β2) 1.480 -0.330 -0.904* -0.457 0.681 0.941 0.054 -1.315* 
 (2.310) (0.778) (0.617) (0.934) (1.606) (1.186) (0.491) (0.877) 
lnFi /LnΣF (β3) 1358.213 54.474 -33.155* -93.184 -2.755 58.364 -23.662 -95.203* 
 (2968.161) (109.250) (24.377) (252.271) (89.580) (158.861) (50.584) (72.709) 
lnAi  (β4) -0.406 2.630*** -0.761 -0.559*** -0.700*** -5.326*** -0.606* -0.276 
 (1.292) (1.047) (0.742) (0.118) (0.249) (2.145) (0.464) (0.439) 
lnAi/lnΣA  (β5) 523.418 -160.876** -2.280 10.453* 2.521 534.644*** 28.721 36.942 
 (1240.359) (97.081) (6.459) (7.815) (16.122) (218.340) (24.264) (29.251) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.047 -0.016 -0.189*** -0.278* -0.030 -0.005 -0.214*** -0.475*** 
 (0.053) (0.126) (0.072) (0.177) (0.143) (0.123) (0.083) (0.094) 
lnAgei (β7) -0.122 -1.617** 0.815 -0.326 -0.560 1.727** -0.580*** -0.235 
 (0.124) (0.733) (0.804) (0.257) (0.670) (0.899) (0.222) (0.422) 
lnACi (β8) 0.314*** 0.065 0.053 0.799*** 1.641*** 0.596*** 0.646*** 0.115 
 (0.067) (0.149) (0.114) (0.143) (0.178) (0.223) (0.091) (0.287) 
R
2
 0.363 0.614 0.658 0.610 0.880 0.411 0.856 0.621 
Adjusted R
2
 0.349 0.565 0.569 0.560 0.839 0.336 0.831 0.544 
Obs. 382 72 40 72 32 72 56 48 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.   
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Table 6.52: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with unlag (M3) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Fjt) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln Ajt) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Ageit + β7 ln ACit + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture&Science Education Environment 
β0 -32.392 0.900 22.977** 26.660 -6.755 15.226 7.278 25.943** 
 (43.210) (9.417) (10.394) (21.295) (23.375) (17.551) (6.482) (11.280) 
lnFit    (β1) -1.086 -0.730 0.589*** 3.141 -2.092 -1.210 0.700 1.447 
 (3.355) (1.346) (0.234) (3.326) (4.409) (2.058) (0.792) (1.194) 
lnFjt    (β2) 1.489 -0.028 -0.859* -1.150 1.790 1.506 0.054 -1.373* 
 (2.312) (0.936) (0.644) (1.280) (2.905) (1.417) (0.491) (0.943) 
lnFit /LnΣFt (β3) 1352.744 83.352 -26.926 -251.031 41.244 142.780 -23.662 -65.682 
 (2964.005) (114.361) (21.507) (301.898) (102.426) (165.864) (50.584) (60.692) 
lnAit  (β4) -0.422 2.583*** -0.048 -0.583*** -0.648*** -4.434*** -0.606* -0.547* 
 (1.289) (1.081) (0.163) (0.117) (0.254) (1.876) (0.464) (0.433) 
lnAit/lnΣAt  (β5) 523.129 -132.241* 3.768 6.781 1.024 379.988*** 28.721 43.830** 
 (1199.519) (84.536) (7.117) (6.077) (12.453) (162.751) (24.264) (22.437) 
lnVit  (β6) 0.047 -0.026 -0.203*** -0.261* -0.001 -0.013 -0.214*** -0.483*** 
 (0.053) (0.126) (0.073) (0.176) (0.142) (0.123) (0.083) (0.092) 
lnAgeit (β7) -0.122 -1.587** 0.075 -0.318 -0.441 1.459** -0.580*** -0.123 
 (0.124) (0.750) (0.512) (0.255) (0.658) (0.826) (0.222) (0.417) 
lnACit (β8) 0.314*** 0.049 0.056 0.805*** 1.604*** 0.589*** 0.646*** 0.059 
 (0.067) (0.150) (0.117) (0.143) (0.187) (0.244) (0.091) (0.281) 
R
2
 0.363 0.613 0.646 0.611 0.881 0.412 0.856 0.639 
Adjusted R
2
 0.349 0.564 0.555 0.562 0.840 0.337 0.831 0.564 
S.E. 1.340 1.180 11.204 1.147 11.938 1.488 0.606 0.643 
Obs. 382 72 40 72 32 72 56 48 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.
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Table 6.53: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with combined (M4) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -103.855** -0.622 19.884*** 23.236 -110.339*** -19.014 -16.528*** 18.716*** 
 (48.236) 9.339 (7.147) (23.934) (34.918) (15.605) (6.250) (7.985) 
lnFi    (β1) -5.818* 0.230 0.378* 2.880 -12.395** -2.116 -0.974 1.164* 
 (3.643) (1.194) (0.200) (3.295) (5.341) (2.153) (0.928) (0.868) 
lnFj    (β2) 5.326** -0.060 -0.576* -0.824 11.061*** 1.845 1.788*** -0.958* 
 (2.530) (0.834) (0.413) (1.333) (3.655) (1.443) (0.525) (0.690) 
lnFi /ΣlnF (β3) 5843.584** 11.404 -13.966 -263.587 499.513*** 279.886* 132.534** -69.385 
 (3330.095) (118.391) (17.976) (343.887) (191.637) (202.154) (71.444) (61.018) 
lnAi  (β4) -0.950 -0.093 -0.165 -0.402*** 1.001 -1.330 -0.328 0.600** 
 (0.806) (0.533) (0.147) (0.160) (1.059) (1.439) (0.683) (0.357) 
lnAi/ΣlnA  (β5) 1095.662* 86.011** 9.321 10.043 -16.356 151.148 31.292 -20.872 
 (775.983) (49.968) (7.475) (11.033) (75.818) (142.095) (46.986) (23.634) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.066 0.139 -0.325*** -0.102 0.199 0.119 -0.141 -0.456*** 
 (0.059) (0.138) (0.079) (0.254) (0.314) (0.136) (0.135) (0.087) 
lnGi (β7) 0.025 -0.009 0.044* 0.121** 0.102 0.122 0.099*** 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.052) (0.030) (0.058) (0.147) (0.098) (0.0394) (0.040) 
R
2
 0.331 0.560 0.681 0.408 0.487 0.368 0.769 0.665 
AdjR
2
 0.317 0.504 0.598 0.333 0.298 0.288 0.729 0.596 
S.E. of regression 1.374 1.261 8.903 1.413 1.463 1.585 0.777 0.568 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 27 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.   
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Table 6.54: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with combined (M4) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -74.976* -1.652 19.803*** 31.256 -140.324*** -19.778 -15.702*** 19.662*** 
 (47.084) (10.500) (7.136) (30.122) (44.030) (16.747) (6.508) (7.903) 
lnFi    (β1) -3.673 -0.021 0.368** 4.226 -20.544*** -2.632 -1.787** 1.386* 
 (3.695) (1.438) (0.194) (4.514) (8.321) (2.497) (1.029) (1.009) 
lnFj    (β2) 3.874* 0.104 -0.570* -1.383 17.657*** 2.200* 1.848*** -1.182* 
 (2.509) (1.006) (0.414) (1.806) (5.711) (1.698) (0.598) (0.781) 
lnFi /ΣlnF (β3) 3760.216 30.941 -11.189 -351.591 519.831*** 277.131* 153.676*** -63.701 
 (3272.256) (122.393) (14.988) (410.376) (196.291) (198.856) (63.681) (53.026) 
lnAi  (β4) -0.962 -0.130 -0.165 -0.381*** 0.607 -1.268 0.617 0.351 
 (0.816) (0.533) (0.147) (0.156) (0.996) (1.408) (0.657) (0.350) 
lnAi/ΣlnA  (β5) 1077.322* 75.401** 7.429 7.660 0.874 123.002 -24.975 -3.302 
 (762.769) (42.305) (5.944) (8.466) (59.429) (118.898) (34.707) (17.693) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.060 0.138 -0.324*** -0.097 0.222 0.122 -0.155 -0.457*** 
 (0.059) (0.137) (0.079) (0.254) (0.311) (0.137) (0.135) (0.087) 
lnGi (β7) 0.024 -0.009 -0.044* 0.120** 0.041 0.114 0.086** 0.019 
 (0.022) (0.053) (0.030) (0.058) (0.146) (0.098) (0.041) (0.040) 
R
2
 0.327 0.563 0.680 0.409 0.492 0.366 0.763 0.657 
Adj R
2
 0.313 0.507 0.597 0.334 0.305 0.285 0.722 0.586 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 27 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.55: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with lag (M4) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture&Science Education Environment 
β0 -27.859 8.473 19.950 21.835 -52.382** -15.178 -6.323 23.232*** 
 (45.761) (9.894) (17.007) (20.432) (31.757) (15.261) (6.785) (6.327) 
lnFit-1    (β1) -1.623 1.644 0.004 2.046 -7.047* -1.412 -0.860 1.751*** 
 (3.6083) (1.355) (2.781) (2.861) (4.936) (2.019) (0.922) (0.717) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) 1.367 -0.923 -0.628 -0.803 5.211* 1.646 0.992** -1.356*** 
 (2.406) (0.9194) (0.969) (1.127) (3.372) (1.401) (0.570) (0.556) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFjt-1 (β3) 1906.919 -129.028 25.048 -171.651 269.855* 189.228 107.592* -108.618** 
 (3286.805) (129.494) (34.469) (299.327) (171.301) (189.678) (71.559) (49.836) 
lnAit-1   (β4) -0.821 -0.333 -0.149 -0.422*** 0.496 -1.724* 0.199 0.434 
 (1.446) (0.548) (0.173) (0.143) (1.074) (1.322) (0.687) (0.350) 
lnAit-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 1026.906 115.852** 9.913 20.067** -20.151 198.314* -1.849 -8.700 
 (1388.140) (50.847) (8.710) (9.454) (81.783) (133.860) (47.020) (23.060) 
lnVit-1  (β6) 0.058 0.154 -0.226*** -0.185 0.584** 0.099 -0.253* -0.456*** 
 (0.061) (0.141) (0.087) (0.217) (0.288) (0.165) (0.160) (0.078) 
lnGit-1  (β7) 0.027 -0.077 0.024 0.082* 0.126 0.096 0.096** -0.029 
 (0.022) (0.067) (0.036) (0.059) (0.162) (0.109) (0.042) (0.027) 
R
2
 0.288 0.545 0.554 0.448 0.375 0.220 0.704 0.665 
AdjR
2
 0.273 0.487 0.439 0.378 0.156 0.120 0.653 0.596 
Obs. 335 63 35 63 27 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
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Table 6.56: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with lag (M4) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -27.002 10.612 -4.762 23.118 -99.940*** -13.357 -13.754* 21.354*** 
 (45.739) (11.631) (22.585) (25.971) (44.533) (17.418) (8.456) (6.575) 
lnFit-1    (β1) -1.581 1.511 -4.845 1.740 -16.057*** -3.215* -1.441* 1.906** 
 (3.579) (1.575) (3.968) (3.992) (7.744) (2.410) (1.041) (0.849) 
lnFjt-1    (β2) 1.358 -0.877 0.962 -0.744 12.141*** 2.754** 1.076* -1.519*** 
 (2.442) (1.079) (1.368) (1.560) (5.548) (1.645) (0.663) (0.640) 
lnFit-1 /ΣlnFjt-1 (β3) 1811.678 -100.235 457.093 -120.934 390.955*** 304.719* 120.434** -90.062** 
 (3159.919) (130.238) (356.188) (363.678) (180.448) (193.028) (65.524) (44.126) 
lnAit-1   (β4) -0.866 -0.363 -0.115 -0.407*** 0.570 -1.512 1.050* 0.254 
 (1.406) (0.549) (0.170) (0.143) (1.009) (1.246) (0.664) (0.354) 
lnAit-1 /ΣlnA jt-1 (β5) 1038.829 100.192** 6.322 15.660** 19.779 151.492* -45.820* 2.374 
 (1308.237) (43.025) (6.844) (7.410) (62.486) (107.523) (34.989) (17.738) 
lnVit-1  (β6) 0.057 0.156 -0.203*** -0.195 0.612*** 0.096 -0.283** -0.477*** 
 (0.061) (0.141) (0.085) (0.218) (0.274) (0.163) (0.154) (0.078) 
lnGit-1  (β7) 0.027 -0.067 0.019 0.082* 0.134 0.098 0.101*** -0.029 
 (0.022) (0.065) (0.035) (0.059) (0.155) (0.107) (0.043) (0.027) 
R
2
 0.288 0.545 0.580 0.446 0.431 0.238 0.712 0.695 
AdjR
2
 0.273 0.478 0.471 0.376 0.231 0.142 0.663 0.632 
S.E. 1.419 1.282 0.658 1.366 1.577 1.740 0.866 0.543 
Obs. 336 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.  
 
  298 
Table 6.57: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with unlag (M4) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -48.972 3.245 19.983*** 18.977 -67.990*** -12.342 -10.436* 24.385*** 
 (43.796) 8.890 7.103 (19.945) (28.337) (13.919) (6.559) (7.271) 
lnFit    (β1) -2.326 0.656 0.524*** 2.509 -9.674** -1.130 -1.728** 1.613** 
 (3.434) (1.204) (0.222) (2.791) (4.409) (1.838) (0.972) (0.820) 
lnFjt    (β2) 2.487 -0.499 -0.580 -0.614 6.728** 1.322 1.438*** -1.519*** 
 (2.337) (0.824) (0.546) (1.105) (3.006) (1.278) (0.608) (0.633) 
lnFit /LnΣFt (β3) 2532.522 -15.131 -18.994 -218.320 369.958*** 171.876 141.932*** -97.705** 
 (3032.357) (115.605) (22.123) (291.134) (153.338) (173.006) (60.841) (57.457) 
lnAit  (β4) -0.680 0.426 -0.145 -0.483*** 0.688* -1.692* 0.692 -0.376 
 (1.322) (0.459) (0.425) (0.140) (0.531) (1.193) (0.248) (0.401) 
lnAit/lnΣAt  (β5) 868.901 45.436 1.231 12.858* 7.170 191.641 -28.439 45.869** 
 (1268.612) (42.580) (3.904) (9.037) (27.727) (121.074) (31.306) (26.443) 
lnVit  (β6) 0.036 -0.042 -0.226** -0.014 0.507** 0.095 -0.191* -0.481*** 
 (0.055) (0.125) (0.072) (0.202) (0.258) (0.136) (0.128) (0.089) 
lnGit (β7) 0.037** -0.078* 0.016 0.128*** 0.106 0.102 0.081** -0.043* 
 (0.021) (0.057) (0.030) (0.054) (0.130) (0.096) (0.038) (0.032) 
R
2
 0.329 0.596 0.647 0.444 0.446 0.289 0.718 0.634 
Adj R
2
 0.316 0.552 0.570 0.384 0.285 0.211 0.677 0.570 
Obs. 383 72 40 72 32 72 56 48 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.
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Table 6.58: OLS estimation for Japanese charities with unlag (M4) 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait + β5 (ln Ait / Σ ln At) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 -48.873 1.811 21.853*** 25.664 -125.984*** -8.355 -15.219** 26.641*** 
 (43.781) (9.764) (7.280) (25.275) (38.505) (15.889) (7.752) (7.316) 
lnFit    (β1) -2.341 0.389 0.568*** 3.065 -20.666*** -2.600 -1.728** 1.350* 
 (3.429) (1.403) (0.232) (3.884) (6.792) (2.211) (0.972) (0.951) 
lnFjt    (β2) 2.492 -0.332 -0.738** -0.879 15.260*** 2.246* 1.438*** -1.392** 
 (2.338) (0.968) (0.403) (1.523) (4.849) (1.509) (0.608) (0.717) 
lnFit /LnΣFt (β3) 2546.215 9.364 -22.176 -240.438 503.884*** 263.509* 141.932*** -60.936 
 (3028.232) (116.150) (19.733) (353.069) (158.307) (177.196) (60.841) (49.768) 
lnAit  (β4) -0.672 0.392 -0.072 -0.461*** 0.799* -1.581* 0.692 -0.603* 
 (1.318) (0.462) (0.149) (0.139) (0.496) (1.123) (0.592) (0.390) 
lnAit/lnΣAt  (β5) 834.942 40.652 3.694 9.350* 8.027 154.203* -28.439 46.209*** 
 (1226.814) (36.096) (5.944) (7.062) (20.306) (97.114) (31.306) (19.628) 
lnVit  (β6) 0.036 -0.043 -0.233*** -0.014 0.519** 0.093 -0.191* -0.481*** 
 (0.055) (0.125) (0.071) (0.203) (0.239) (0.134) (0.128) (0.087) 
lnGit (β7) 0.037** -0.075* 0.019 0.128*** 0.116 0.104 0.081** -0.037 
 (0.021) (0.055) (0.030) (0.054) (0.121) (0.094) (0.038) (0.031) 
R
2
 0.329 0.597 0.648 0.442 0.516 0.303 0.718 0.650 
Adj R
2
 0.316 0.553 0.571 0.381 0.375 0.227 0.677 0.589 
S.E. 1.373 1.195 0.590 1.363 1.422 1.606 0.839 0.625 
Obs. 383 72 40 72 32 72 56 48 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), see Table 5.7 for definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %.
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Table 6.59: OLS estimation for Japanese charities in geographic group (M2) 
 
Model 1: ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + ε 
 
 Tokyo Kanagawa Kyoto Tokyo Kanagawa Kyoto 
β0 -109.669*** 247.322 19.664 -120.663*** 265.731* 16.201 
 (42.919) (297.846) (20.107) (38.497) (199.568) (19.522) 
lnFi    (β1) -5.908** 16.030 0.341 -6.828*** 17.298 0.470 
 (3.134) (21.932) (0.741) (2.590) (14.382) (0.817) 
lnFj    (β2) 5.599*** -12.299 -0.540 6.310*** -13.308 -0.721 
 (3.134) (15.771) (0.844) (2.060) (10.537) (0.909) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 4451.821** -1227.759 -41.893    
 (2138.015) (1654.701) (33.549)    
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3)    4870.917*** -1323.164 -12.643* 
    (1710.601) (1087.623) (9.583) 
lnAit   (β4) -0.763 0.048 0.262 -0.783 0.069 0.256 
 (0.950) (0.112) (1.019) (0.827) (0.116) (1.020) 
lnAi/ΣlnA (β5) 700.078 -12.531* 15.826    
 (672.017) (8.018) (31.866)    
lnAi/ΣlnAj(β5)    684.123 -8.715* 4.005 
    (562.185) (5.759) (7.987) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.105* -0.106* 0.315* 0.103* -0.108** 0.326** 
 (0.074) (0.079) (0.196) (0.065) (0.064) (0.190) 
lnAgei (β7) -0.020 -0.233 -0.515 -0.015 -0.230 -0.580 
 (0.183) (0.244) (1.942) (0.115) (0.207) (1.903) 
R
2
 0.392 0.476 0.719 0.392 0.493 0.725 
Adj R
2
 0.374 0.239 0.391 0.375 0.315 0.405 
S.E. of regression 1.390 0.355 0.448 1.389 0.349 0.443 
Obs 251 28 14 251 28 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables,  ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.60: OLS estimation for Japanese charities for geographic groups 
 
 Model 2: ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Ageit-1 + β7 ln Git-1+ ε 
Model 4: ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln F) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Gi + ε 
 Tokyo Kyoto Tokyo Kyoto Tokyo Kyoto Tokyo Kyoto 
β0 -109.796*** 26.399*** -119.660*** 15.180 -109.667*** 34.527*** -119.598*** 26.559*** 
 (42.923) (10.938) (37.752) (14.672) (42.833) (9.396) (37.782) (8.931) 
lnFi    (β1) -5.934** 0.314 -6.764*** 0.389 -5.914** 0.151 -6.752*** 0.186*** 
 (3.134) (0.436) (2.524) (0.468) (3.127) (0.548) (2.526) (0.569) 
lnFj    (β2) 5.611*** -0.436 6.261*** -0.554 5.600*** -0.872** 6.255*** -0.967** 
 (2.264) (0.512) (2.018) (0.599) (2.259) (0.475) (2.020) (0.530) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 4461.726** -37.407**   4448.701** -44.643**   
 (2138.198) (17.684)   (2132.945) (23.999)   
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3)   4821.600*** -10.700**   4814.361*** -12.030** 
   (1668.446) (5.720)   (1669.496) (6.616) 
lnAi (β4)  -0.785 0.681 -0.793 0.687 -0.885 0.133 -0.878 0.111 
 (0.950) (0.769) (0.827) (0.760) (0.801) (0.626) (0.750) (0.625) 
lnAi/ΣlnA (β5) 722.215 -15.486   793.072* 4.954   
 (672.446) (24.230)   (567.060) (11.622)   
lnAi/ΣlnAj (β5)   697.878 -3.921   755.236* 1.391 
   (562.848) (6.023)   (511.423) (2.782) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.085 0.397*** 0.084 0.402*** 0.087 0.306*** 0.086* 0.305*** 
 (0.076) (0.168) (0.067) (0.163) (0.076) (0.104) (0.066) (0.101) 
lnAgei (β7) -0.036 -1.579 -0.030 -1.618     
 (0.183) (1.963) (0.114) (1.908)     
lnGi (β7) or (β8) 0.024 0.110*** 0.022 0.110*** 0.024 0.081*** 0.022 0.080*** 
 (0.025) (0.044) (0.020) (0.043) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) 
R
2
 0.394 0.848 0.394 0.852 0.394 0.798 0.394 0.799 
Adj R
2
 0.374 0.605 0.374 0.617 0.374 0.561 0.377 0.564 
S.E. of regression 1.390 0.361 1.390 0.356 1.390 0.381 1.387 0.380 
Obs 251 14 251 14 251 14 251 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables,  ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.61: OLS estimation for Japanese charities for geographic groups 
 
Model 3: ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit / Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit-1 + β7 ln Git-1 + ε 
 Tokyo Kanagawa Kyoto Tokyo Kanagawa Kyoto 
β0 -89.805** 393.141*** 22.996 -100.083*** 410.106** 18.832 
 (41.661) (198.989) (18.373) (35.234) (200.203) (17.440) 
lnFi    (β1) -4.501 26.834** 0.354 -5.367* 28.064** 0.479 
 (3.041) (14.830) (0.781) (2.313) (14.932) (0.860) 
lnFj    (β2) 4.363** -19.935** -0.457 5.018*** -20.877** -0.635 
 (2.202) (10.534) (1.065) (1.891) (10.605) (1.133) 
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3) 3438.834** -2028.557** -40.092    
 (2075.922) (1120.073) (37.563)    
lnFi /ΣlnFj (β3)    3864.082*** -2121.146** -12.137 
    (1554.897) (1127.426) (10.698) 
lnAi (β4)  -1.344* 0.079** 0.287 -1.405** 0.091 0.282 
 (0.926) (0.094) (1.133) (0.746) (0.092) (1.134) 
lnAi/ΣlnA (β5) 1042.103* -14.873*** 11.778    
 (653.129) (6.509) (41.916)    
lnAi/ΣlnAj (β5)    1039.936** -9.574*** 2.999 
    (508.279) (3.922) (10.487) 
lnVi  (β6) 0.108* -0.175 0.367* 0.107** -0.174*** 0.376* 
 (0.071) (0.044) (0.274) (0.060) (0.042) (0.269) 
lnAgei (β7) 0.060 -0.390*** -0.826 0.069 -0.381*** -0.882 
 (0.177) (0.136) (2.731) (0.115) (0.134) (2.662) 
lnACi (β8) 0.365*** -0.233*** -0.229 0.367*** -0.235*** -0.226 
 (0.084) (0.031) (0.641) (0.105) (0.030) (0.625) 
R
2
 0.436 0.771 0.723 0.437 0.782 0.729 
Adj R
2
 0.417 0.675 0.280 0.418 0.690 0.297 
S.E. of regression 1.341 0.240 0.487 1.340 0.235 0.482 
Obs 251 28 14 251 28 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 5.7 presents definition of variables,  ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.62: Summary results of major models in Japan: Correct signs 
 
expected sign                             
/ industry 
+Fi – Fj +K1 +Ai +K2  +Vi +Agei +Gi +ACi R
2
 
M1 All   +
***
  + +
*
    0.33 
 Welfare   +  +
***
  +
**    0.64 
 Human + –   +     0.66 
 Global + –   +     0.39 
 Disability   +
***
 +  +    0.48 
 Culture   +
**
  +
**
 + +
**
   0.38 
 Education   +
***
  + +    0.73 
 Environment + –  +***      0.67 
 Tokyo   +
***
  + +
*
    0.39 
 Kanagawa + –  +      0.48 
 Kyoto + –  + + +*    0.72 
M2 All   +
**
  + +  +  0.33 
 Welfare   +  +
***
  +
**  +  0.65 
 Human + –   +   +
*
  0.68 
 Global + –   +   +
***
  0.45 
 Disability   +
***
 +  +  +  0.49 
 Culture   +
**
  +
**
 + +
**
 +  0.39 
 Education   +
**
  + +  +
***
  0.77 
 Environment +
*
 –  +**    +  0.69 
 Tokyo   +
***
  + +
***
  +  0.39 
 Kyoto + –  +    +***  0.85 
M3 All   +  + +   +
***
 0.35 
 Welfare   +  +
***
  +    0.64 
 Human + –   +    + 0.66 
 Global + –   +    +
***
 0.47 
 Disability   +
*
      +
***
 0.75 
 Culture   +  + + +  +
**
 0.41 
 Education + –   +    +*** 0.85 
 Environment + –  +***     + 0.67 
 Tokyo   +
**
  +
**
 +
**
 +  +
***
 0.44 
 Kanagawa +
**
 –**  +      0.77 
 Kyoto + –  + + +*    0.72 
M4 All   +
**
  +
*
 +  +  0.33 
 Welfare + – +   +** +    0.56 
 Human +
*
 –*   +   +
*
  0.68 
 Global + –   +   +
**
  0.41 
 Disability   +
***
 +  +  +  0.49 
 Culture   +
*
  + +  +  0.37 
 Education   +
**
  +   +
***
  0.77 
 Environment +
*
 –*  +***    +  0.67 
 Tokyo   +
**
  +
*
 +  +  0.39 
 Kyoto +
***
 –**  + + +***  +***  0.80 
Note: M1, M2, M3, M4 are Major models in a family of empirical models (See in Figure 6.   ) 
F = fundraising expenditure; i = a charity i;  j = competing charities j; K1 = the ratio of 
Fi/ΣF or Fi/ΣFj (Fj = ΣF– F); K2 = the ratio of Ai/ΣA or Ai/ΣAj (Aj = ΣA– Ai); A = Fixed 
Assets; V = the number of volunteers; Age = the Organisational age; G = Government 
Grants; AC = Administrative costs. ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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Table 6.63: Summary results of major models in Japan: Incorrect signs 
 
expected sign                             
/ industry 
+Fi – Fj +K1 +Ai +K2  +Vi +Agei +Gi +ACi R
2
 
M1 All – +  –   –   0.33 
 Welfare – +   –  –   0.64 
 Human   – –  – –   0.66 
 Global   – –  – –   0.39 
 Disability – +   –  –   0.48 
 Culture – +  –      0.38 
 Education – +  –   –   0.73 
 Environment   –  – – –   0.67 
 Tokyo – +  –   –   0.39 
 Kanagawa   –   – –   0.48 
 Kyoto   –    –   0.72 
M2 All – +  –   –   0.33 
 Welfare – +   –  –   0.65 
 Human   – –  – –   0.68 
 Global   – –  – –   0.45 
 Disability – +     –   0.49 
 Culture – +  –      0.39 
 Education – +  –   –   0.77 
 Environment      – –   0.69 
 Tokyo – + * –   –   0.39 
 Kyoto   –  – – –   0.85 
M3 All – +  –   –   0.35 
 Welfare – +   –  –  – 0.64 
 Human   – –  – –   0.66 
 Global   – –  – –   0.47 
 Disability – +  – – – –   0.75 
 Culture – +  –      0.41 
 Education   – –  – –   0.85 
 Environment   –  – – –   0.67 
 Tokyo – +  –      0.44 
 Kanagawa   –  – – –  – 0.77 
 Kyoto   –    –  – 0.72 
M4 All – +  –      0.33 
 Welfare    –    –  0.56 
 Human   – –  –    0.68 
 Global   – –  –    0.41 
 Disability – +   –     0.49 
 Culture – +  –      0.37 
 Education – +  –  –    0.77 
 Environment   –  – –    0.67 
 Tokyo –   –      0.39 
 Kyoto   –       0.80 
Note: M1, M2, M3, M4 are major models in a family of empirical models (See in Figure 6.   ) 
F = fundraising expenditure; i = a charity i;  j = competing charities j; K1 = the ratio of 
Fi/ΣF or Fi/ΣFj (Fj = ΣF– F); K2 = the ratio of Ai/ΣA or Ai/ΣAj (Aj = ΣA– Ai); A = fixed 
assets; V = the number of volunteers; Age = the organisational age; G = government 
Grants; AC = administrative costs. ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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6.5 Conclusions  
 
This section discussed the results from a family of empirical models for each industry 
and geographic group in Australia and Japan. The primary conclusion from the 
Industry groups analysis is that an oligopoly model may have some empirical validity, 
if only for Australia. The family of empirical models were based on discussion in 
Chapters 1 to 5. The research framework described in Chapter 4, variables of this 
preliminary modelling were tested in a family of empirical models and the results 
show varied effects on total donations in varied groups as summarised in the previous 
sections (Section 6.3 Summary of Australian Results and Section 6.4 Summary of 
Japanese Results). Consequently the results are not discussed in detail here. Note that 
in this chapter, because to analysis is exploratory ―p‖ values are reported rather than 
the ―t‖ statistic of subsequent Chapters. 
 
However, discussed in the summary of the results from Japan, there are some 
concerns of multicollinearity problems between variables of lnFi, lnFi/ΣlnF and lnFj, 
considerations of simultaneous relations between donations, fundraising and 
volunteers, and reaction curve of fundraising expenditure and volunteers in 
oligopolistic competition. Therefore several points that need to be dealt with. These 
are: (a) adjustment for multicollinearity; (b) adjustment for simultaneousness; (c) 
more emphasis on volunteers; (d) better fit with oligopolistic theory; (e) F/D > 1 in 
some financial years of some organisations; (f) reaction curves. In the following 
sections, empirical OLS models of share of donations, share of fundraising 
expenditure and share of volunteers are developed, the results of these models are 
presented.  
 
As a result of the problems with the Japanese data and the resulting empirical 
estimations problems, all of the empirical analysis in the following Chapters is for 
Australia alone.  
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Chapter 7  
The results of oligopolistic competition among charities 
 
Preliminary empirical results of the family models were based on the discussion in the 
previous chapter. This chapter presents the analysis of Shares Models, Shares of 
Donations, Shares of Fundraising Expenditures and Shares of Volunteers, 
modeifications of the previous models designed partly to avoid multicollinearity 
problems with some variables. Again the emphasis is on competition between charitable 
organisations in an oligopolistic situation.  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Very high relationships between variables such as the natural log of fundraising 
expenditure of charity i (Fi) and the natural log of ratio of Fi to competitors‘ fundraising 
expenditure (Fi/F or Fi/Fj) (at 0.998 in both Australia and Japan), the natural log of 
fixed assets of charity i (Ai) and the natural log of ratio of Ai to competitors‘ fixed 
assets (Ai/A or Ai/Aj) (at 0.999 and 0.998, Australia and Japan, respectively) (also see 
Tables, 6.3 and 6.4) create concern over multicollinearity.  
 
To avoid multicollinearity, the variables of shares were estimated combining both 
variables, Fi and, Fi/F or Fi/Fj, and Ai and, Ai/A or Ai/Aj into one variable, Shares of 
Fundraising Expenditures (ShrF) and Share of Fixed Assets (ShrA), respectively. 
Employing these two variables may enhance the results of regression models. However, 
the results of the family models in Chapter 6 provided interesting results. The 
fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers presented significantly positive 
effects of total donations in most industy groups in Australia (but not always in Japan). 
 
This section employs OLS estimation on Shares of Donations, Shares of Fundraising 
Expenditures and Share of Volunteers as dependent variables. Most dependent variables 
are considered to have positive effects with a time lag. The ShrD, ShrF and ShrV 
Models are constructed as follows:  
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ShrD Model: ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrFit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε; 
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ShrF Model: ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε: 
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ShrV Model: ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrFit-1 + β3 ShrAit-1 + β4 ShrVit-1+ β5 RelAgeit 
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Shares of Donations (ShrD) = the proportion of Total Donations of charity i (Dit) to 
Total Donations of all charities in the same industry at year t (∑Dit); 
Shares of Fundraising Expenditures (ShrF) = the proportion of Fundraising 
Expenditures of charity i (Fit) to total of Fundraising Expenditures of all charities in the 
same industry at year t (∑Fit); 
Shares of Fixed Assets (ShrA) = the proportion of Fixed Assets of charity i (Ait) to the 
total Fixed Assets of all charities in the same industry at year t (∑Ait); 
Shares of the Number of Volunteers (ShrV) = the proportion of the Number of 
Volunteers of charity i (Vit) to total the Number of Volunteers of all charities in the 
same industry at year t (∑Vit); and  
Relations of Age (RelAgeit) = the proportion of the difference between Organisational 
Age of charity i (AGEit) and Average of Organisational Age of all charities in the same 
industry (AvAGEt) to Average of Organisational Age of all charities in the same 
industry at year t (AvAGEt).  
 
In comparison to the results of the family models in Chapter 6, the ShrD Model 
increased the explanatory power of most of industry groups except Science and Rural 
groups in Australia, as expected. On the other hand, in the sample of Japanese charitable 
organisations, the ShrD Model led to a decrease in explanatory power except in the 
Welfare, Humanitarian, and Environment groups. The ShrV Model achieved the highest 
of R
2
 and significance of variables in most of industry groups except for the Disability 
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group in Australia and for the Welfare group in Japan. In terms of geographic groups, 
states in Australia and prefectures in Japan, the results of Shr D explanatory power 
indicate that ShrV models produced the best estimation results.  
 
The analyses of Shares Models include Shares of Donations (ShrD), Shares of 
Fundraising Expenditures (ShrF) and Shares of total number of Volunteers (ShrV) 
Models. The results of Shares Models are tested with the same hypotheses as in Chapter 
6 except hypothesis 9 as H0: Di  0 and H1: D > 0.    
 
The consequent results are discussed in detail in the following section.  
 
7.2 Analysis of Shares Models 
 
This section presents the results of the analysis of Shares Models, Shares of Donations 
(ShrD) as a dependent variable with independent variables, including Shares of 
Fundraising Expenditure (ShrF), Share of Fixed Assets (ShrA), Shares of total number 
of Volunteers (ShrV), Relation to Age (RelAge) and those independent variables are 
with lagged value except RelAge.  
 
A problem appears when lagged dependent variables are used as instrumental or 
independent variables. This is the problem of auto-correlation in time-series. This can 
cause bias in the estimated coefficients, and can also lead to instability in estimated 
coefficients. In the purely time-series this can be tested using the unit-root test. If found 
any first-order linear auto-correlation can be corrected using standard applications from 
those commonly available in mainstream econometrics package. However, this requires 
time-series of sufficient length, i.e. sufficient numbers of observations.  
 
In the case of this thesis, the data are problematic in being (a) pooled cross-sectional 
time-series and (b) having that time-series are very short (mostly 8 annual-
observations). This makes use of correction technique impossible. Nevertheless it is 
clear from some of the results in this chapter and the following chapter, that first-order 
auto-correlation is probably present and in some cases appears to be very strong. This 
implies the results from estimated efficiencies using lagged dependent variable have to 
be treated extreme caution.  
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7.2.1 Analysis of industry group in relation to the ratios of 
fundraising-to-donations  
 
Before constructing Shares Models, each industry group of charitable organisations was 
examined to see whether the ratios of Fundraising (expenditure)-to-Donations are 
greater than one (F/D > 1) and the scatter plots of this calculated ratio was also 
examined in Australia and Japan. This is reported in the following section. 
Most of the charitable organisations in the Japanese samples calculated the ratios of 
fundraising-to-donations as greater than one (F/D>1), whereas nine charitable 
organisations in the Australian samples obtained the ratios of fundraising-to-donations 
as less than one (F/D<1). Those nine charitable organisations showed similar temporal 
patterns, such as dramatically dropping donations for the years following 2004 when the 
world‘s natural disaster (The Boxing Day tsunami) occurred (1. Annecto, 2. Anglican 
Home Western Australia, 3. Baptist Community Care Victoria, 4. Benetas, 5.Churches 
of Christ Care Queensland, 6.Minda, 7. Uniting Care Victoria, 8. Villa Maria Society, 9. 
Wesley Mission Sydney). Total donations to the Villa Maria Society dropped in 2004 
and 2005, but finally recovered to 2003 level in 2008. However, some organisations did 
not show any recovery, even by 2008. Annecto, Anglican Home Western Australia, 
Baptist Community Care Victoria, Benetas, Churches of Christ Care Queensland and 
Uniting Care Victoria showed dramatic decreases in donations in 2004 and these 
decreased amounts were almost one third of the amounts received in 2003, which did 
not recover, even in 2008. Similarly the fundraising-to-donations ratios to Minda were 
below one for the first four years (2001-2004). However, in 2004 this ratio dropped to 
become less than 10% in 2003 and 4% in 2004 and 2005. It didi not recover its 
donations in 2008. In the case of Wesley Mission Sydney, its fundraising-to-donations 
ratios showed slightly greater than one for seven years. These organisations were mostly 
in the groups of Welfare (6 organisations) or Disability (3 organisations) and these 
groups of organisations mainly relied government subsidies for their revenue. For 
example, Churches of Christ Care reported in its annual report in 2001 that the revenues 
received more ―63% from government grants and 35% from fees and charges (on 
average)‖ (Churches of Christ Care, 2001). Thus only 2% came from donations. There 
is, therefore, the possibility that its fundraising expenditure may include the cost of 
trying to get government grants or for rewarding volunteers. These organisations were 
not included in the Shares Models in the Australian samples. Therefore total 
observations of industry groups of Australian charitable organisations were changed to: 
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245 observations in the All Groups group, 77 in the Welfare group and 63 in the 
Disability group. The number of observations on other industry groups employed same 
observation number, with the family models as 42 observations in the Humanitarian 
group, 35 in the Global group, 21 in the Animal group, 28 in the Science group and 49 
in the Rural group.  
 
In the case of Japanese industry groups the number of observations employed was the 
same as for the family models.  
 
7.2.2 Shares of donation models in Australian charities  
 
The results of the regression analysis of Shares of Total Donations (Shr D) are presented 
in Table 7.1. The empirical model is constructed with ShrD as the independent variable, 
using total donations of charity i divided by total donations of all charities in the same 
industry group (ShrD = Dit / ∑Dit). The independent variables are Shares of Fundraising 
Expenditures (ShrF), Shares of Fixed Assets (ShrFi) and Shares of Volunteers (ShrV) 
with lagged value and Relation of Age (RelAgei) with no time lags in ShrD regression 
model. The ShrD equation tested is: 
 
ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrFit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε                          (7-1) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit / ∑Dit; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit-1 = Fit-1 / ∑Fit-1;  
A is fixed assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
V is the number of volunteers; Shr Vit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1;  
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
The estimation results were similar to the results of the family models. However, the 
explanatory power of regression models of each of the industry groups is higher than 
that of the aggregated All group. Compared to the results of the family models, the R
2
 
and adjusted R
2 
of Share of Donations Models in the industry groups are slightly 
increased, except for the Science and Rural groups.  
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The coefficients of Shares of fundraising expenditure (ShrF) shows a positive 
relationship in most of the industry groups as expected, consistent with the results of the 
family models, except for the Science and Rural groups. Thus, the coefficients of ShrF 
are significantly positive on the Welfare, Global and Disability groups. Testing 
Hypothesis 1 is as H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the: All, 
Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Disability and Animal groups, and not rejected in the 
Science and  Rural groups. 
 
The coefficients on Shares Fixed Assts (ShrA) are a positive, again as hypothesised 
except in the Global, Animal and Rural groups. The coefficients are significantly 
positive in the Welfare and Humanitarian groups and positive but insignificant in the 
All, Disability and Science groups. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0: 
The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability and 
Science groups, and not rejected in the Animal, Global and Rural groups.  
 
The coefficients on Shares of Volunteers (ShrV) are significantly positive in the All, 
Humanitarian, Global, Science and Rural.groups and in the Welfare, Disability and 
Animal are significantly negative. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. 
The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global, Science and Rural 
groups and not rejected in the Welfare, Disability and Animal groups.  
 
The coefficients on Relation of Age (RelAge) show mixed results. It was significantly 
positive in Science group and, positive but insignificant in the Disability and Animal 
groups. Those of the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups are 
significantly negative. Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The 
Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Disability, Science and Animal groups and not 
rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups.  
 
7.2.3 Shares of fundraising expenditure models in Australian charities  
 
Table 7.2 presents the results of Shares of Fundraising Expenditure Models (ShrFs).  
 
The tested equation (7.2) is: 
ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε                            (7.2) 
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Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit = Fit / ∑Fit;  
D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit-1 / ∑Dit-1; 
A is fixed assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
V is the number of volunteers; Shr Vit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1;  
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
As shown in Table 7.2, the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) are consistent with these of the ShrD model.  
In Table 7.2, ShrD shows positive relationship in the groups except for the Science and 
Rural groups. This is consistent with those groups in the ShrD model. The coefficients 
of ShrD are significantly positive in the All, Welfare, Global and Disability groups. 
Hypothesis 9 is tested as: H0: Di  0; and H1: Di > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Disability and Animal groups, and not rejected 
in the Science and Rural groups.   
 
The coefficients of ShrA show mixed results, a positive relationship in the All, 
Disability, Science and Rural groups, but negative in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Global 
and Animal groups. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0: Thus, the Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Disability, Science and Rural groups but not rejected 
in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Global and Animal groups. 
 
The coefficients of ShrV have a positive relationship except in the Animal group. The 
coefficients of ShrA are significantly positive in the All, Welfare, Disability, Science 
and Rural groups, and positive but insignificant in the Humanitarian and Global groups. 
Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. Thus, the Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Disability, Science and Rural groups 
but not rejected in the Animal group. 
 
The coefficients on Relation of Age (RelAge) show positive relationship in all industry 
groups except Disability which has a significantly negative relationship. Significantly 
positive were the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups, and 
insignificant and positive in the Animal and Science groups. Hypothesis 7 is tested as: 
H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, 
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Humanitarian, Global, Animal, Science and Rural groups, and not rejected in the 
Disability group. 
 
The results indicate the effectiveness of fundraising activities of organisations is 
increased by the numbers of volunteers, and organisational age enhances those 
activities, but not the size of the organisations. However, a positive impact of shares of 
fundraising expenditures on the shares of total donation and shares of donation on 
shares of fundraising expenditures are consistent with the industry groups as expected.  
 
7.2.4 Shares of volunteer models in Australian charities 
 
Table 7.3 presents the results of Shares of Volunteers Models (ShrVs).  
 
The ShrV tested equation (7.3) is: 
ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrFit-1 + β3 ShrAit-1 + β4 ShrVit-1+ β5 RelAgeit + ε         (7.3) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
V is the number of volunteers as a dependent variable; ShrVit = Vit / ∑Vit; and  
as an independent variable: ShrVit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1; 
D is total donations; Shr Dit-1 = Dit-1 / ∑Dit-1; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit-1 = Fit-1 / ∑Fit-1;  
A is fixed assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
As shown in Table 7.3, the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) are increased compared to the family 
models and the ShrD and ShrF models, except in the Disability group.  
 
The highest explanatory power is the Animal group and this is because in the Animal 
group the Australian sample of organisations has relatively few observations which may 
mislead the results – e.g. the R2 and adjusted R2 ≈1.00. The lowest is in the Disability 
group (the R
2
 at 0.347 and adjusted R
2
 at 0.290). The second highest is in Science of the 
R
2
at 0.991 (adjusted R
2
 at 0.989), followed by Global (the R
2
 at 0.990 and adjusted R
2
 at 
0.988), Rural (0.967 and 0.953), Welfare (0.964 and 0.961), All (0.894 and 0.891) and 
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the second lowest is the Humanitarian group (0.837 and 0.814). Thus, the R
2
 (adjusted 
R
2
) are shown relatively high in ShrV model except in the Disability group.  
 
In Table 7.3, ShrD shows positive relationship in the groups except in the Welfare, 
Disability and Science groups which have insignificant but negative relationship. The 
coefficients of ShrD are significantly positive in the All and Humanitarian groups and 
positive but insignificant in the Global, Animal and Rural groups. Hypothesis 9 is tested 
as: H0: Di  0; and H1: Di > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Humanitarian, 
Global, Animal and Rural groups and not rejected in the Welfare, Disability and 
Science groups.   
 
The coefficients of ShrF have a positive relationship except in the Global, Animal and 
Rural groups which had insignificant negative relationship. The coefficient of ShrF is 
significantly positive in the Science group, but insignificant and positive in the All, 
Welfare, Humanitarian, and Disability groups. Hypothesis 1 is tested as H0: Fi  0; and 
H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability 
and Science groups and not rejected in the Global, Animal and Rural groups. 
 
As shown in Table 7.3, the coefficients of ShrA are positive in five industry groups, All, 
Welfare, Humanitarian, Global and Rural, but negative in the Disability, Animal and 
Science groups. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups and 
not rejected in the Disability, Animal and Science groups.  
 
The coefficients on lag of ShrV are significantly positive in all industry groups in the 
All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Disability, Science, and Animal and Rural groups.  
Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
every group.   
 
In Table 7.3, the coefficients of RelAge are a positive relationship except in the 
Welfare, Humanitarian and Science groups, wich have insignificantly negative 
relationship. Thus, the coefficients of RelAge are significantly positive in the Animal 
group, and positive but insignificant in the All, Global, Disability and Rural groups. 
Hypothesis 7, H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, 
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Global, Disability, Animal and Rural groups and not rejected in the Welfare, 
Humanitarian and Science groups.  
 
7.2.5 Shares of models in geographical groups in Australian charities 
 
This section reports the results of the analyses on Shares Models, ShrD, ShrF and ShrV 
in the geographical groups. Tables 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 present the results of ShrD (Equation 
7.1), ShrF (Equation 7.2) and ShrV (Equation 7.3) models, respectively. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, a sample of charitable organisations is divided into geographical location 
grouping in 6 states (total number of observations), including ACT (14 observations), 
Victoria (91), NSW (98), QLD (21), WA (28) and SA (14). Shares Models and each 
model‘s equations are presented and the analyses are discussed. However, in the results 
of ShrD, ShrF, ShrV models, ACT is excluded because in the Australian sample data 
which located its head office in the ACT, there are too few organisations (2 
organisations) and too few observations which could lead to untrustworthy results — 
e.g. R
2
 close to 1.0.  
 
7.2.5.1  Shares of donations models in Australia with state grouping 
 
The ShrD model is: 
ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrFit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε                          (7-1) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit / ∑Dit; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit-1 = Fit-1 / ∑Fit-1;  
A is fixed assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
V is the number of volunteers; Shr Vit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1;  
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
Table 7.4 presents the results of ShrD model in 5 states, Victoria NSW, QLD, WA and 
SA. The explanatory power of the models, the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
, are higher than for 
those in the family models in the 5 states (Chapter 5), except in WA and SA. However, 
the percentage in terms of order is consistent with that of the family model. Overall, the 
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explanatory power of ShrD varies enormously depending on the state. This also 
suggests that geographical groupings are not related to market competition for donors. 
This supports the Cournot modelling. 
 
The coefficients of ShrF are positive in NSW, Victoria and WA, but negative QLD and 
SA. These results are consistent with the results of the major family models in terms of 
the fundraising expenditure related variables. Hypothesis 1 is tested as follows: H0: Fi  
0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Victoria, NSW and WA, and not 
rejected in QLD and SA.  
 
The coefficients of ShrA are a negative in most states except NSW, which has a 
statistically significant positive relationship. Hypothesis 4 as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. 
The Null Hypothesis is rejected in NSW and not rejected in Victoria, QLD, WA and 
SA.  
 
The coefficients of ShrV are positive in WA and SA, and positive and significant in 
NSW and OLD. However Victoria is negative and insignificant. Hypothesis 6 is tested 
as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in NSW, QLD, WA and 
SA, and not rejected in Victoria.  
 
The coefficients of RelAge are positive in Victoria and WA, and negative in NSW, 
QLD and SA. Those results are consistent with the results of family model in relation to 
organisational age related variable. Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei 
> 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Victoria and WA, and not rejected in NSW, 
QLD and SA.  
 
7.2.5.2 Shares of fundraising expenditure in Australia with state grouping 
 
The ShrF model is: 
ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε                            (7.2) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit = Fit / ∑Fit;  
D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit-1 / ∑Dit-1; 
A is Fixed Assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
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V is the number of volunteers; Shr Vit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1;  
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
In Table 7.5, the estimation results of ShrF model using the aggregated groups of the 5 
States of charitable organisations are presented. The results of the explanatory powers 
of regression models are similar to those of theShrD model and the family of Model 1. 
However, some states are slightly higher (Victoria and WA) and some are slightly lower 
(NSW, QLD and WA) than the previous results. The coefficients of ShrD are positive in 
all States except NSW and SA. Hypothesis 9 is tested as follows: H0: Di  0; and H1: Di 
> 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Victoria, QLD and WA, and not rejected in 
NSW and SA.  
 
The coefficients of ShrA are positive in all states, except NSW, with a significantly 
positive relationship. Hypothesis 4 as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in NSW, and not rejected in Victoria, QLD, WA and SA.  
 
The coefficients of ShrV are mostly either positive (WA and SA) or significantly 
positive (Victoria, NSW and QLD). Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. 
The Null Hypothesis is rejected in all States.  
 
The coefficients of RelAge are ositive in most states, except Victoria and SA.  
Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in NSW, QLD and WA, and not rejected in Victoria and SA.  
 
The results indicate that significant and positive relationship between ShrF and ShrV.  
 
7.2.5.3 Shares of volunteer in Australia with state grouping 
 
The ShrV model is: 
ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrFit-1 + β3 ShrAit-1 + β4 ShrVit-1+ β5 RelAgeit + ε         (7.3) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
V is the number of volunteers as a dependent variable; ShrVit = Vit / ∑Vit; and  
as an independent variable: ShrVit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1; 
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D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit-1 / ∑Dit-1; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit-1 = Fit-1 / ∑Fit-1;  
A is fixed assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
The results of the explanatory powers of ShrV models are increased in all states 
comparison to those of ShrD or ShrF models or the family of Model 1 in states. Overall, 
the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) in 5 states are higher than 0.850. 
 
The coefficients of ShrD are a positive in all states except in SA which is significantly 
negative. Hypothesis 9 is tested as follows: H0: Di  0; and H1: Di > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in Victoria, NSW, QLD and WA, and not rejected in SA.  
 
The coefficients of ShrA present mixed results; positive in Victoria, QLD and WA, and 
negative in NSW and SA. Hypothesis 4 as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in Victoria, QLD and WA, and not rejected in NSW and SA.  
 
The coefficients of ShrV are all positive except in SA. Hypothesis 5 is tested as: H0: Vi 
 0 and H1: Vi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Victoria, NSW, QLD and WA, 
and not rejected in SA.  
 
The coefficients of RelAge are negative except in SA. Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: 
Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Victoria, NSW, QLD and 
WA, and not rejected in SA.  
 
7.2.6 Shares of donation models in Japanese charities  
 
Table 7.7 presents the results of the regression analysis of the ShrD model. The ShrD 
model is: 
 
ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrFit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε                          (7-1) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
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D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit / ∑Dit; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit-1 = Fit-1 / ∑Fit-1;  
A is fixed assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
V is the number of volunteers; Shr Vit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1;  
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
Table 7.7 presents the explanatory power of model as the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
, and 
standard errors of regression model and the number of observations are also reported. 
The explanatory power of models is decreased in comparison to that of the family of 
Model 1 in most of the industry group, except for the Environment group. The lowest is 
All at 0.093 (0.082).   
 
These results are significantly worse than for the equivalent Australia equation and this 
continues throughout the Japanese results.   
 
In Table 7.7, the coefficients of ShrF are significantly positive in most of the industry, 
except Environment with ositive but insignificant result, as the range between 0.128 and 
0.414. Hypothesis 1 is tested: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected 
in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global Disability, Culture, Education and 
Environment groups.  
 
The coefficients of ShrA are also positive in most of the industry groups, except for the 
Global group, and have significant negative relationship, as the range is between -0.112 
and 1.439. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability, Culture, Education and 
Environment groups, and not rejected in the Global group.  
 
The coefficients on ShrV are positive in the All, Welfare, Culture and Education groups, 
and significantly negative in the Humanitarian, Global and Environment groups, and 
negative in the Disability group. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. 
Thus, the Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, Culture and Education groups 
and not rejected in the Humanitarian, Global, Disability and Environment groups.  
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The coefficients on RelAge are positive in the Humanitarian, Culture and Education 
groups, and negative in the All, Welfare, Global, Disability and Environment groups. 
Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in the Humanitarian, Culture and Education groups, and not rejected in the All, 
Welfare, Global, Disability and Environment groups.  
 
7.2.7 Shares of fundraising expenditure models in Japanese charities  
The ShrF model is: 
 
ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε                            (7.2) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit = Fit / ∑Fit;  
D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit-1 / ∑Dit-1; 
A is fixed assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
V is the number of volunteers; Shr Vit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1;  
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
Table 7.8 presents the explanatory power of models and the results indicate a further 
drop in value compared to the ShrD models in most of industry groups, except for the 
Disability group.  
 
In Table 7.8, the coefficients of ShrD in ShrF models show a positive relationship in 
most of the groups, consistent with those in ShrD model. The coefficients of ShrD are 
significantly positive in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Culture and Environment 
groups, and positive in the Global, Disability and Education groups. Hypothesis 9 is 
tested as: H0: Di  0; and H1: Di > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Global, Disability, Eduction and Environment groups. The results are 
consistent with the results of the coefficients in ShrD for Australian groups of charitable 
organisations.  
 
The coefficients of ShrA are a negative in all groups except in the Humanitarian and 
Culture groups. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null 
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Hypothesis is rejected in the Humanitarian and Culture groups, and not rejected in the 
All, Welfare, Global, Disability, Education and Environment groups. The results 
indicate completely different and contradictory results from those in ShrA of ShrF 
models in the Australian groups.  
 
The coefficients on ShrV are negative in all groups in Japan, except for the Disability 
and Education groups with a positive relationship. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 
and H1: Vi > 0. Thus, the Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Disability and Education 
groups, and not rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Culture and 
Environment groups.  
 
The coefficients on RelAge are positive in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Education and 
Environment groups, and negative in the All, Global, Disability and Culture groups. 
Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Education and Environment groups, and not 
rejected in the All, Global, Disability and Culture groups.  
 
Overall, the results indicate that ShrF models obtained mostly negative relationship with 
independent variables in all industry groups except the relationship with ShrD. They 
clearly show very weak results compared to those of the ShrF model in Australian 
industry groups.   
 
7.2.8 Shares of volunteer models in Japanese charities 
 
The ShrV model is: 
 
ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrFit-1 + β3 ShrAit-1 + β4 ShrVit-1+ β5 RelAgeit + ε         (7.3) 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
V is the number of volunteers as a dependent variable; ShrVit = Vit / ∑Vit; and  
as an independent variable: ShrVit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1; 
D is total donations; Shr Dit-1 = Dit-1 / ∑Dit-1; 
A is fixed assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
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As shown in Table 7.9, the explanatory power of ShrV model, the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) are 
higher in the industry groups than those in ShrF models except in the Welfare group. 
The results of the coefficients in ShrD are negative in most of the industry groups, not 
pointing as hypothesised the coefficients of ShrD present only two groups, Culture and 
Education, with a positive relationship. Hypothesis 9 is tested as: H0: Di  0; and H1: Di 
> 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Culture and Education groups but not 
rejected in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Disability and Environment groups.   
 
The coefficients of ShrF presents positive relationships in the Welfare, Global, 
Disability and Education groups, and negative in other industry groups such as the All, 
Humanitarian, Culture and Environment groups. Hypothesis 1 is tested as H0: Fi  0; 
and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Welfare, Global, Disability and 
Education groups, and not rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Culture and Environment 
groups. 
 
The coefficients of ShrA are negative in the industry groups in Japan, except for the 
Welfare and Environment groups with positive relationship. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: 
H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Welfare and 
Environment groups, and not rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global, Disability, 
Culture and Education groups.  
 
The coefficients on lagged ShrV are significantly positive in all industry groups, as 
expected. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in all of the groups.  
 
In Table 7.9, the coefficients of RelAge are negative except in the Welfare, Global and 
Environment groups. Hypothesis 7 is, H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in the Welfare, Global and Environment groups, and not rejected 
in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability and Education groups.  
 
Overall, the coefficients of each independent variable in each industry group are mostly 
opposite in sign to those groups in Australia.  
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7.2.9 Shares of models in geographical groups in Japanese charities 
 
This section discusses the results of Shares of Donations (ShrD) model, Shares of 
Fundraising expenditure (ShrF) and Shares of Volunteers (ShrV) models in the 
geographic groups of Japanese sample organisations, discussion of grouping in Chapter 
2. The ShrD, ShrF and ShrV models are presented: 
 
ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrFit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε                          (7-1) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit / ∑Dit; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit-1 = Fit-1 / ∑Fit-1;  
A is fixed assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
V is the number of volunteers; Shr Vit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1;  
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
The ShrF model is:  
ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε                            (7.2) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit = Fit / ∑Fit;  
D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit-1 / ∑Dit-1; 
A is Fixed Assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
V is the number of volunteers; Shr Vit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1;  
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei  
and ε is error term. 
 
The ShrV model is:  
ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrFit-1 + β3 ShrAit-1 + β4 ShrVit-1+ β5 RelAgeit + ε         (7.3) 
 
Where i indicates the charitable organisation and t indicates the year; 
V is the number of volunteers as a dependent variable; ShrVit = Vit / ∑Vit; and  
as an independent variable: ShrVit-1 = Vit-1 / ∑Vit-1; 
D is total donations; ShrDi = Dit-1 / ∑Dit-1; 
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F is fundraising expenditures; Shr Fit-1 = Fit-1 / ∑Fit-1;  
A is Fixed Assets; Shr Ait-1 =Ait-1 / ∑Ait-1; 
Age is organisational age; RelAgeit = (Agei Age 
and ε is error term. 
 
The Japanese sample of charitable organisations is spread over 9 locations, with their 
main office. There was one organisation located in each of 6 different prefectures 
including Saitama, Chiba, Shizuoka, Osaka, Hyogo and Fukuoka. This study focused on 
those locations with more than 1 organisation located in the prefectures: Tokyo, 
Kanagawa and Kyoto.  
 
In Table 7.10 the results of ShrD, ShrF and ShrV models with geographical groups of 
Japanese charitable organisations are presented. The results of the explanatory power 
indicate a similar pattern for the industry groups of Japan. The ShrV models are higher 
in the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 than those in ShrD and ShrF. However, only ShrV shows a 
positive relationship in the 3 prefectures.  
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Table 7.1: OLS Estimation for Australian charities (ShrD Model) 
 
ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrFit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε; 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 0.011 0.024 0.009 -0.044 0.049 0.885 0.072 0.081 
(t-stat) (0.004) (3.258) (0.518) (-3.374) (3.167) (7.011) (0.998) (3.115) 
Shr Fit-1 0.347 0.319 0.012 1.264 0.571 0.148 -0.210 -0.154 
(t-stat) (1.903) (6.615) (0.167) (21.829) (7.189) (1.160) (-0.502) (-2.097) 
ShrAit-1 0.028 0.558 0.473 -0.373 0.080 -1.168 0.219 0.000 
(t-stat) (0.226) (8.362) (3.177) (-1.238) (1.469) (-4.470) (1.111) (-0.002) 
ShrVit-1 0.242 -0.032 0.464 0.330 -0.081 -0.641 0.704 0.590 
(t-stat) (2.241) (-5.222) (4.407) (0.919) (-0.807) (-6.683) (3.819) (4.482) 
RelAgeit -0.017 -0.137 -0.076 -0.189 0.032 0.137 0.602 -0.128 
(t-stat) (-4.073) (-2.789) (-2.721) (-5.529) (1.755) (1.486) (2.989) (-1.859) 
R
2
 0.243 0.581 0.840 0.931 0.625 0.877 0.468 0.362 
Adjusted R
2
 0.231 0.558 0.822 0.921 0.599 0.846 0.376 0.304 
SE regression 0.048 0.036 0.060 0.065 0.062 0.056 0.195 0.144 
Observations 245 77 42 35 63 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations of each organisation in each group (ShrD). 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
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Table 7.2: OLS Estimation for Australian charities (ShrF Model) 
 
ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε: 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 0.009 0.056 0.213 0.035 -0.059 0.903 0.070 0.067 
(t-stat) (2.127) (4.883) (12.168) (2.886) (-2.860) (0.802) (2.286) (2.460) 
ShrDit-1 0.350 0.518 0.055 0.789 0.784 1.157 -0.057 -0.108 
(t-stat) (7.268) (4.951) (0.144) (21.272) (4.296) (1.465) (-0.776) (-1.094) 
ShrAit-1 0.055 -0.586 -0.644 -0.302 0.150 -2.668 0.239 0.259 
(t-stat) (0.372) (-4.599) (-3.458) (-1.435) (1.047) (-0.876) (2.903) (1.003) 
ShrVit-1 0.278 0.027 0.313 0.338 0.660 -0.198 0.536 0.381 
(t-stat) (3.859) (4.611) (0.947) (1.398) (3.814) (-0.198) (3.643) (2.106) 
RelAgeit 0.004 0.447 0.190 0.168 -0.096 1.178 0.129 0.073 
(t-stat) (2.144) (8.775) (4.889) (4.717) (-2.741) (1.177) (0.802) (2.182) 
R
2
 0.334 0.529 0.243 0.968 0.731 0.726 0.631 0.380 
Adjusted R
2
 0.323 0.503 0.161 0.963 0.693 0.658 0.566 0.324 
SE of regression 0.041 0.062 0.123 0.036 0.069 0.125 0.099 0.136 
Observations 245 77 42 35 63 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations of each organisation in each group. 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
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Table 7.3: OLS Estimation for Australian charities (ShrV Model ) 
 
ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrFit-1 + β3 ShrAit-1 + β4 ShrVit-1+ β5 RelAgeit + ε: 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 0.000 -0.001 -0.026 0.030 0.050 0.104 -0.010 -0.007 
(t-stat) (0.222 (-0.020) (-2.086) (2.340) (2.656) (2.291) (0.007) (-1.138) 
ShrDit-1 0.019 -0.174 0.487 0.048 -0.111 0.028 -0.023 0.150 
(t-stat) (0.475) (-0.580) (4.222) (0.388) (-1.157) (0.782) (-1.219) (1.563) 
Shr Fit-1 0.045 0.157 0.166 -0.081 0.130 -0.035 0.184 -0.007 
(t-stat) (0.620) (0.987) (1.433) (-0.487) (1.892) (-1.321) (3.641) (-0.207) 
ShrAit-1 0.038 0.134 0.011 0.791 -0.065 -0.240 -0.063 0.119 
(t-stat) (0.630) (0.827) (0.088) (2.258) (-0.644) (-2.240) (-1.437) (1.426) 
ShrVit-1 0.891 0.964 0.490 0.091 0.522 0.934 0.942 0.784 
(t-stat) (22.855) (30.816) (4.707) (0.203) (3.572) (28.728) (23.445) (6.534) 
RelAgeit 0.001 -0.101 -0.041 0.029 0.021 0.086 -0.008 0.025 
(t-stat) (0.582) (-1.134) (-1.804) (1.806) (0.813) (2.221) (-0.233) (1.160) 
R
2
 0.894 0.964 0.837 0.990 0.347 0.999 0.991 0.967 
Adjusted R
2
 0.891 0.961 0.814 0.988 0.290 0.999 0.989 0.953 
SE regression 0.017 0.099 0.070 0.033 0.060 0.009 0.025 0.035 
Observations 245 77 42 35 63 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations of each organisation in each group. 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
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Table 7.4: OLS Estimation for Australian charities with State (ShrD Model) 
 
ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrFit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε; 
 
 Victoria NSW QLD WA SA 
β0 0.018 0.009 -0.015 0.031 2.504 
(t-stat) (2.283) (1.799) (-4.037) (0.356) (1.702) 
Shr Fit-1 1.268 0.021 -0.059 1.600 -1.166 
(t-stat) (9.256) (0.365) (-0.238) (2.443) (-0.682) 
ShrAit-1 -0.423 0.428 -0.525 -0.488 -4.264 
(t-stat) (-2.091) (3.585) (-1.686) (-0.426) (-2.038) 
ShrVit-1 -0.075 0.430 1.387 0.279 1.421 
(t-stat) (-0.489) (6.464) (8.908) (0.672) (0.589) 
RelAgeit 0.015 -0.037 -2.540 0.010 -0.361 
(t-stat) (1.787) (-5.057) (-2.803) (0.123) (-0.090) 
R
2
 0.748 0.834 0.848 0.172 0.581 
Adj R
2
 0.737 0.827 0.810 0.028 0.395 
SE of regression 0.073 0.037 0.152 0.142 0.278 
Obs 91 91 21 14 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations of each organisation in each group. 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
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Table 7.5: OLS Estimation for Australian charities with State (ShrF Model) 
 
ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε: 
 
 Victoria NSW QLD WA SA 
β0 -0.001 0.055 0.244 -0.075 -0.328 
(t-stat) (-0.098) (3.279) (4.621) (-2.564) (-0.699) 
ShrDit-1 0.562 -0.083 0.370 0.105 -0.077 
(t-stat) (21.415) (-0.251) (1.263) (2.231) (-0.612) 
ShrAit-1 0.297 -0.303 0.450 1.598 1.352 
(t-stat) (2.874) (-0.874) (1.474) (4.571) (1.854) 
ShrVit-1 0.149 0.622 0.470 0.498 0.382 
(t-stat) (2.870) (2.575) (1.081) (2.321) (0.638) 
RelAgeit -0.024 0.066 5.679 0.016 -1.622 
(t-stat) (-3.662) (3.582) (4.248) (0.789) (-1.434) 
R
2
 0.876 0.242 0.840 0.685 0.464 
Adj R
2
 0.870 0.209 0.800 0.630 0.226 
SE of regression 0.038 0.102 0.128 0.065 0.102 
Obs 91 91 21 14 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations of each organisation in each group. 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
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Table 7.6: OLS Estimation for Australian charities with State (ShrV Model) 
 
ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrFit-1 + β3 ShrAit-1 + β4 ShrVit-1+ β5 RelAgeit + ε: 
 Victoria NSW QLD WA SA 
β0 0.001 -0.017 -0.016 -0.077 1.218 
(t-stat) (0.352) (-2.700) (-0.328) (-2.924) (5.139) 
ShrDit-1 0.009 0.596 0.247 0.013 -0.210 
(t-stat) (0.208) (3.493) (0.787) (0.594) (-4.819) 
Shr F_1 -0.014 0.192 -0.137 0.173 -0.578 
(t-stat) (-0.245) (1.553) (-1.070) (0.581) (-2.157) 
ShrAit-1 0.021 -0.069 0.180 0.216 -0.594 
(t-stat) (0.338) (-0.418) (0.468) (0.582) (-1.705) 
ShrVit-1 0.972 0.516 0.711 2.206 -0.053 
(t-stat) (12.765) (3.180) (1.641) (7.783) (-0.173) 
RelAgeit -0.001 -0.005 -0.412 -0.039 1.989 
(t-stat) (-0.427) (-0.645) (-0.319) (-1.542) (4.625) 
R
2
 0.968 0.857 0.911 0.920 0.992 
Adj R
2
 0.966 0.850 0.881 0.893 0.987 
SE of regression 0.037 0.048 0.084 0.033 0.031 
Obs 91 91 21 14 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations of each organisation in each group. 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
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Table 7.7: OLS Estimation for Japanese charities (ShrD Model) 
 
ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrFit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε; 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 0.013 0.006 0.070 0.119 -0.291 0.014 0.073 0.104 
(t-stat) (5.891) (0.437) (2.611) (3.474) (-2.183) (0.542) (1.783) (6.463) 
Shr Fit-1 0.196 0.160 0.414 0.337 1.048 0.323 0.128 0.215 
(t-stat) (2.714) (2.694) (2.641) (2.492) (2.138) (2.090) (0.757) (3.619) 
ShrAit-1 0.161 0.700 0.424 -0.112 1.439 0.510 0.148 0.373 
(t-stat) (3.169) (8.807) (1.898) (-2.702) (5.991) (3.342) (1.240) (7.770) 
ShrVit-1 0.015 0.087 -0.135 -0.296 -0.323 0.038 0.227 -0.163 
(t-stat) (0.462) (0.940) (-2.853) (-2.454) (-0.845) (0.591) (1.151) (-5.409) 
RelAgeit -0.001 -0.152 0.524 -0.029 -0.506 0.423 0.517 -0.097 
(t-stat) (-3.121) (-2.578) (0.743) (-3.114) (-1.477) (3.012) (2.334) (-2.586) 
R
2
 0.093 0.715 0.472 0.293 0.319 0.337 0.139 0.820 
Adj R
2
 0.082 0.695 0.401 0.244 0.201 0.291 0.061 0.801 
SE of regression 0.030 0.076 0.107 0.128 0.343 0.164 0.199 0.063 
Obs. 336 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations of each organisation in each group. 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
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Table 7.8: OLS Estimation for Japanese charities (ShrF Model) 
 
ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε: 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 0.016 0.066 0.072 0.116 0.251 0.072 0.011 0.156 
(t-stat) (6.430) (3.494) (1.123) (6.420) (8.798) (2.946) (0.351) (5.579) 
ShrDit-1 0.294 1.048 0.530 0.240 0.028 0.434 0.163 0.461 
(t-stat) (4.807) (3.811) (2.215) (1.344) (0.480) (5.909) (0.970) (3.150) 
ShrAit-1 -0.056 -0.587 0.368 -0.073 -0.340 0.001 -0.074 -0.166 
(t-stat) (-1.619) (-2.473) (1.992) (-1.330) (-5.014) (0.01+) (-1.040) (-1.993) 
ShrVit-1 -0.019 -0.054 -0.012 -0.207 0.308 -0.081 0.896 -0.252 
(t-stat) (-0.644) (-0.822) (-0.177) (-1.912) (2.769) (-1.635) (2.537) (-2.818) 
RelAgeit -0.002 0.167 1.508 -0.035 -0.289 -0.263 1.387 0.714 
(t-stat) (-4.309) (1.172) (2.090) (-5.289) (-2.253) (-2.967) (2.892) (2.816) 
R
2
 0.066 0.242 0.354 0.252 0.512 0.266 0.474 0.329 
Adj R
2
 0.055 0.190 0.267 0.201 0.427 0.215 0.426 0.256 
SE of regression 0.035 0.151 0.123 0.110 0.095 0.136 0.154 0.144 
Obs. 336 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations of each organisation in each group. 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
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Table 7.9: OLS Estimation for Japanese charities (ShrV Model) 
 
ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrFit-1 + β3 ShrAit-1 + β4 ShrVit-1+ β5 RelAgeit + ε: 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Culture Education Environment 
β0 0.006 0.028 0.105 0.016 0.068 0.010 -0.004 0.108 
(t-stat) (2.425) (1.719) (2.095) (2.202) (1.182) (1.001) (-0.929) (2.811) 
ShrDit-1 -0.066 -0.350 -0.232 -0.029 -0.021 0.007 0.114 -0.204 
(t-stat) (-1.740) (-1.675) (-0.993) (-1.510) (-0.181) (0.102) (2.041) (-0.883) 
ShrFit-1 -0.011 0.183 -0.099 0.043 0.020 -0.012 0.045 -0.206 
(t-stat) (-0.490) (1.562) (-0.677) (1.150) (0.085) (-0.320) (0.670) (-1.300) 
ShrAit-1 -0.014 0.290 -0.231 -0.007 -0.002 -0.062 -0.002 0.187 
(t-stat) (-0.791) (1.825) (-1.627) (-0.321) (-0.016) (-1.936) (-0.085) (2.643) 
ShrVit-1 0.779 0.629 0.869 0.847 0.730 0.973 0.866 0.612 
(t-stat) (7.557) (2.894) (4.761) (9.298) (4.926) (13.760) (13.886) (4.306) 
RelAgeit -0.001 0.077 -0.037 0.004 -0.286 -0.041 -0.138 0.419 
(t-stat) (-2.077) (0.728) (-0.057) (1.031) (-1.299) (-0.450) (-1.217) (1.211) 
R
2
 0.628 0.464 0.743 0.830 0.752 0.813 0.927 0.664 
Adj R
2
 0.622 0.417 0.699 0.815 0.696 0.796 0.918 0.617 
SE of regression 24 0.116 0.145 0.041 0.108 0.081 0.040 0.117 
Obs. 336 63 35 63 28 63 49 42 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations of each organisation in each group. 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
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Table 7.10: OLS Estimation for Japanese charities (ShrD, ShrF & ShrV Models) 
ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrFit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε; ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrAit-1 + β3 ShrVit-1 + β4 RelAgeit+ ε: 
ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrDit-1 + β2 ShrFit-1 + β3 ShrAit-1 + β4 ShrVit-1+ β5 RelAgeit + ε: 
 ShrD Model ShrF Model ShrV Model 
 Tokyo Kanagawa Kyoto Tokyo Kanagawa Kyoto Tokyo Kanagawa Kyoto 
β0 0.017 0.330 0.254 0.023 0.400 0.453 0.013 0.169 -0.322 
(t-stat) (6.233) (14.166) (0.639) (6.986) (4.565) (1.078) (4.074) (1.660) (-2.586) 
ShrDit-1    0.220 -0.364 -0.571 -0.068 -0.519 0.268 
(t-stat)    (3.697) (-1.484) (-2.545) (-1.539) (-2.263) (6.463) 
ShrFit-1 0.152 -0.227 -0.634    0.021 0.192 -0.149 
(t-stat) (2.493) (-4.074) (-2.415)    (0.551) (3.575) (3.619) 
ShrAit-1 0.153 -0.120 0.810 -0.058 0.108 0.244 0.014 -0.208 0.375 
(t-stat) (3.098) (-2.593) (1.725) (-1.632) (0.809) (0.563) (0.644) (-2.850) (7.770) 
ShrVit-1 0.069 -0.015 0.316 0.020 -0.348 0.422 0.563 0.854 1.150 
(t-stat) (1.029) (-0.386) (1.514) (0.327) (-5.273) (1.554) (4.407) (7.380) (-5.409) 
RelAgeit -0.001 0.034  -0.002 0.609  -0.001 0.337  
(t-stat) (-3.318) (0.473)  (-4.391) (2.222)  (-2.719) (1.586)  
R
2
 0.085 0.477 0.773 0.044 0.457 0.505 0.431 0.938 0.934 
Adj R
2
 0.070 0.386 0.705 0.029 0.362 0.357 0.420 0.924 0.904 
SE of reg. 0.039 0.066 0.136 0.045 0.130 0.213 0.029 0.068 0.083 
Obs. 252 28 14 63 28 14 252 28 14 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Shares of Donations, Shares of Fundraising Expenditures, and Shares of Volunteers of each organisation in each group. 
ShrF_1: Lag of shares of Fundraising Expenditures (F) of each organisation in each group 
ShrA_1: Lag of shares of Fixed Assets (A) of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lag of shares of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group
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7.3 Conclusions 
 
This Chapter aims to achieve an enhancement of the results in the family models 
concerned with the mulicollinarity problems in Chapter6.  
 
To avoid the multicollinearity problem, this section employed Share of Donations, 
Share of Fundraising Expenditure and Shares of Volunteers models and this section 
presents the discussion and analysis of Shares of Donations, Shares of Fundraising 
Expenditure and Shares of Volunteers models using both Australian and Japanese 
charitable organisations.  The cost of this ―whole of model‖ approach is that the ratio 
of own fundraising expenditure to competitors‘ expenditures cannot be used as a 
variable on the oligopolistic model this is an important loss. 
 
There were some concerns in the results from the family models in Chapter 6 due to 
multicollinearity problems. If they exist, the estimated results of the individual p-
values and the confidence intervals on the regression coefficients in the independent 
variables might be misleading and the tested hypotheses might not show the whole 
picture due to high relationships between the natural log of fundraising expenditure of 
charity i (Fi) and the natural log of ratio of Fi to competitors‘ fundraising expenditure 
(Fi/F or Fi/Fj) and the natural log of fixed assets of charity i (Ai) and the natural log 
of ratio of Ai to competitors‘ fixed assets (Ai/A or Ai/Aj). To avoid multicollinearity 
problems in these variables, these variables are combined into one variable, Shares of 
Fundraising Expenditures (ShrF) and Share of Fixed Assets (ShrA). Employing these 
two variables, the results of regression models are increased in the explanatory power 
and significance of the coefficients in Australian industry groups, but give mixed 
results in Japanese industry groups.  
 
Employing a Shares of Donations model increased significance in the results of the 
coefficients, and also gave higher explanatory power than those in the family model in 
most industry groups in Australia. The results of Shares of Fundraising Expenditures 
models were consistent with these of Shares of Donations models, which might 
provide reliability of the results in both models. The results of Shares of Donations in 
grouping with states were also increased in geographical groups of 4 states; however, 
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the results of Shares of Fundraising Expenditure models in state grouping obtained 
mixed results. 
 
Shares of Volunteers models were higher in explanatory power and the coefficients of 
variables were more significant than those in Shares of donations and Shares of 
Fundraising models in both the industry groups and geographic groups in Australia 
and Japan. Those in the Japanese samples obtained mixed results in both Shares of 
donations models and shares of fundraising expenditure, the coefficients of Shares of 
Volunteers models gave confusing results. Shares of Donations, Shares of Fundraising 
Expenditures and Shares of Volunteers in the geographical groups also gave mixed 
results. Compared to the results of Australian industry groups and geographical 
groups, Japanese groups were not improved by employing those 3 shares models. 
Employing shares models shows consistecy with the family models in most of the 
industry groups but did enhance the results.  
  
 
337 
Chapter 8  
The Empirical Results for Oligopolistic Modelling 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results of oligopolistic modelling using two stage 
least squares (2 SLS) on Australian samples. Chapter 6 presented and discussed the 
preliminary empirical results of the family of equations, which were based on the 
discussion and analysis in Chapters 1 to 5. To avoid multicollinearity problems for the 
family equations, Chapter 7 analysed shares equations, based on oligopolistic theory to 
establish share of donations (ShrD), reaction curves for share of fundraising expenditure 
(ShrF) and share of volunteers (ShrV) equations. This chapter analyses the 
simultaneousness (similarity?) of those three variables using 2 SLS equations.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, before constructing shares equations, for each 
charitable organisation we calculated the ratios of fundraising-to-donations. From these 
calculations charitable organisations were eliminated from the regression modelling, if 
the ratios of fundraising-to-donations were greater than unity. Thus, nine charitable 
organisations were excluded from the samples of Australian data. Note that for reasons 
discussed in Chapter 6 the Japanese data are not analysed.  
 
This chapter reports only the results for the 2SLS estimates of the linear three equations. 
An identical model structure was estimated for all of the groups but in a log-linear form. 
The results obtained were virtually identical to the linear model in terms of overall 
goodness-of-fit, the same signs for almost all coefficients and the same level so 
statistical significance. These results, therefore, added little to the testing of the model 
and, as a consequence, are not reported here.  
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8.2. Empirical results of Two Stage Least Squares  
8.2.1 Empirical results of two-stage least squares by industry 
grouping 
 
This section presents the results of the two-stage-least squares (2SLS) estimation of the 
potentially jointly dependent variables, ShrD, ShrF and ShrV, using the 8 industrial 
groups and 6 geographical groups of Australian sample organisational data. The three 
equations are constructed with the equations for ShrD presented in equation (8-1); ShrF 
in equation (8-2) and ShrV in equation (8-3). These two-stage square (2SLS) models 
contain the same instrumental variables with each other and these are ShrA, RelAge, 
and lagged ShrD, lagged ShrF, lagged ShrA and lagged ShrV. Tables 8.1 to 8.8 present 
the result of each of the ShrD, ShrF and ShrV equations from testing for the All Groups 
group, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Disability, Animal, Science and Rural industry 
groups in the Australian samples. They are followed by the results of geographical 
groups of state, ACT, Victoria, New South Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), South 
Australia (SA) and Western Australia (WA) state groups on Tables 8-9 to 8-8-13 in the 
following section 8.2.2. The modelling relies upon the Cournot oligopoly model, for its 
framework and is modified and reinforced by the impact of volunteers. Not only do the 
charitable organisations give away their output but they receive some free inputs, 
especially volunteer labour. A feature of volunteer labour is the high degree of 
continued support of existing volunteers - thus Vit = f (Vit-1) loading to almost certain 
autocorrelation problems. 
 
Three 2SLS estimation equations are as follows: 
 
ShrD Equation:  
ShrDt = β0 + β1 ShrAit + β2 RelAgeit + β3 ShrFit + β4 ShrVit + β5 ShrVit-1 + IV+ε;    (8-1) 
 
ShrF Equation:  
ShrFt = β0 + β1 ShrAit + β2 RelAgeit + β3 ShrDit  +β4 ShrVit + β5 ShrVit-1 + IV+ ε;    (8-2) 
 
ShrV Equation:  
ShrVt = β0 + β1 ShrAit + β2 RelAgeit + β3 ShrDit + β4 ShrFit +β5 ShrVit + β6 ShrVit-1  
+ IV + ε                                                                                                                    (8-3) 
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where IV represents all other Instrumental Variables to enter the equations.  
share of donations (ShrD) = the proportion of total donations of charity i (Dit) to total 
donations of all charities in the same industry at year t (∑Dit); 
share of fundraising expenditure (ShrF) = the proportion of fundraising expenditure of 
charity i (Fit) to total of fundraising expenditure of all charities in the same industry at 
year t (∑Fit); 
share of fixed assets (ShrA) = the proportion of fixed assets of charity i (Ait) to the total 
fixed assets of all charities in the same industry at year t (∑Ait); 
share of the number of volunteers (ShrV) = the proportion of the number of volunteers 
of charity i (Vit) to total the number of volunteers of all charities in the same industry at 
year t (∑Vit); and relative organisatonal age (RelAgeit) = the proportion of the 
difference between organisational age of charity i (AGEit) and average of organisational 
age of all charities in the same industry (AvAGEt) to average of organisational age of all 
charities in the same industry at year t (AvAGEt).  
 
The All group  
 
Table 8.1 shows the results of the All Groups group. The regression coefficient 
estimates from testing the ShrA variable in both the ShrD and ShrF equations are 
significantly negative, whereas in the ShrV equation it is insignificant but positive. The 
regression coefficient estimates from testing the RelAge variable in both the ShrD and 
ShrV equations are negative, but positive in the ShrF equation. The coefficient on 
lagged ShrV in both the ShrD and ShrF equations is negative and insignificant but 
positive and significant in the ShrV equation. The regression coefficient on the ShrD 
variable in both the ShrF and ShrV equations is positive but insignificant. The 
coefficient on ShrF in both the ShrD and ShrV equations is also positive but 
insignificant. Similarly the coefficient on ShrV in both the ShrD and ShrF equations is 
insignificant and positive. Overall the main characteristics of the ShrD, ShrF and ShrV 
variables in each of the shares equations, ShrD, ShrF and ShrV, are positive but 
insignificant in the All group.  
 
In other words, the results indicate that for the charitable organisations in the All 
Groups group, the donations of each organisation are affected by the number of 
volunteers at the current year and the level of fundraising expenditure. The level of 
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fundraising expenditure of each organisation is affected by organisational age, the level 
of donations and the number of volunteers in the current year. The number of volunteers 
in the current year of each organisation is affected by organisational size and age, level 
of donations, level of fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers during the 
previous year. 
 
Table 8.1 indicates that what determines the share of donations and the share of 
fundraising expenditures are unclear in this group. These results cannot be explained 
readily in terms of fitting with oligopoly theory. Nevertheless independent variables of 
share of fundraising expenditure (ShrD) and share of volunteer (ShrV) are the correct 
sign in the ShrD equation, and the relation of age (RelAge), ShrD and ShrV are also the 
correct sign in the ShrF equation, they are not statistically significant. Finally the share 
of the volunteer equation shows an extremely strong follow-on from the previous year‘s 
volunteers. Not only is the level of carry-over of volunteers extremely high (estimated 
coefficient equal 0.870 but the level of significance (t = 19.777) is very high. This 
model indicates limited support for the Cournot model but the result sare not for a 
coherent groups of like charities but is a mere aggregation.   
 
The Welfare group 
 
Table 8.2 shows the results of the Welfare group. The regression coefficients estimates 
from testing the ShrA variable and lagged ShrV variable in both the ShrD and ShrV 
equations have a positive relationship but in the ShrF equation they are significant and 
negative with respect to the dependent variable. The regression coefficients estimate 
from testing the RelAge variable in both the ShrD and ShrV equations are negative in 
relation to each dependent variable but in the ShrF equation it is significant and 
positive. The coefficient on ShrD in the ShrF equation is positive but in the ShrV 
equation it is negative. Similarly the coefficient on ShrV in the ShrF equation is 
significantly positive but in the ShrD equation it is negative. The coefficient on ShrD in 
the ShrF and ShrV equations also shows the opposite, being positive in the ShrF 
equation and negative in the ShrV equation.  
 
Overall in the Welfare industry group, the coefficients on each of 6 independent 
variables in each of three share equations present mixed results in all independent 
variables. The results indicate that, for the charitable organisations in the Welfare 
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industry group, the level of donations is affected by organisational size, the level of 
fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers from the previous year. The level 
of fundraising expenditure is affected by organisational age, level of donations and the 
number of volunteers in the current year. The number of volunteers in the current year is 
affected by organisational size, level of fundraising expenditure and the number of 
volunteers from the previous year.   
 
The results in Table 8.2 suggest that share of donations received is very heavily 
determined by the share of fixed assets an organisation has. The variable of greatest 
interest from the oligopoly point of view is ShrF. While this is of the correct sign it is 
not statistically significant. Nor are any of the other variables of interest. Unexpectedly 
the share of volunteers at time t is negative (the incorrect sign). What determines the 
share of fundraising expenditure is essentially the age of the organisation. Again, this 
cannot be explained readily in terms of oligopoly theory. Nevertheless it does have the 
correct sign in the ShrD equation and this relationship with organisational age may be 
an indication of organisational experience – a willingness to spend in order to raise 
donations.  
 
Finally the volunteers equation shows an enormously strong follow-on from the 
previous year‘s volunteers. Not only is the level of carry-over of volunteers extremely 
high (estimated coefficient equal 0.949 but the level of significance (t = 27.530) is very 
high. Overall this model in the Welfare group indicates only moderate support for the 
Cournot model at best. This may be because all other effects are swamped by the 
strength of the volunteers relationship. 
   
The Humanitarian group 
 
Table 8.3 shows the results of the Humanitarian industry group. The regression 
coefficient estimates on the ShrA and lagged ShrV variables in both the ShrD and ShrF 
equations are negative. In other words, organisational size is not an influence on 
increasing donations nor on fundraising expenditures. However, in the ShrV equation, 
they are both positive. This means that organisational size and fundraising expenditures 
help to increase the number of volunteers. The coefficient on the RelAge variable in 
both the ShrD and ShrF equations is significantly positive but in the ShrV equation it is 
significantly negative. The regression coefficient estimate on the ShrD variable in the 
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ShrV equation is positive and significant, but in the ShrF equation it is significant and 
negative. A similar pattern can be found in the coefficient on the ShrF variable. In the 
the ShrV equation it is significantly positive but in the ShrD equation it is significantly 
negative. The coefficient estimates from testing the ShrV variable in both the ShrD and 
ShrF equations are both positive and significant. Overall in the Humanitarian industry 
group, the coefficients on each variable in each of the ShrD, ShrF and ShrV equations 
present inconsistent signs with each variable, with the exception of a positive sign of the 
ShrV variable in both the ShrD and ShrF equations.  
 
The results indicate that, for the charitable organisations in the Humanitarian group, the 
level of donations and the level of fundraising expenditure are both affected by the 
organisational age and the current number of volunteers. The number of volunteers in 
the current year is affected by organisational size, level of donations, level of spending 
of fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers from the previous year for the 
charitable organisation in the Humanitarian group. 
 
Table 8.3 shows that the share of donations received is largely determined by the share 
of volunteers an organisation has – the greater ShrV the greater is ShrD. This differs 
from the Welfare group, as previously discussed. None of the other variables are 
statistically significant. In Cournot terms this might be explained in terms of volunteers 
putting their labour into fundraising, obviating the need for high fundraising 
expenditure. Moreover this argument does not appear valid across all organisations. The 
age of the organisation also shows as major determinant of the share of fundraising 
expenditure. This is similar to the results in the Welfare group but is also not integrally 
related to a test of oligopoly theory. With the correct sign in the ShrD equation, this 
relationship with organisational age may indicate organisational willingness to spend in 
order to raise donations. The ShrF model indicates some level of support for the 
Cournot model and this may be because almost all variables are close to being 
statistically significance in supporting the share of fundraising. The share of volunteers 
equation shows close relationships between the volunteers and raising donations, and 
the current year‘s volunteers and the previous year‘s volunteers.  
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The Global group 
 
Table 8.4 shows the results of the Global group. The regression coefficient estimates 
from testing the ShrA variable in both the ShrF and ShrV equations are positively 
related to the jointly dependent variables, but in the ShrD equation it is insignificantly 
negative. The coefficients on the RelAge variable in both the ShrD and ShrF equations 
are significantly positive but in the ShrV equation are significantly negative. The 
coefficient on lagged ShrV in both the ShrD and ShrV equations is significantly positive 
but in the ShrF equation it is significantly negative. The regression coefficient on the 
ShrD variable in the ShrF equation is significantly positive but in the ShrV equation it is 
insignificantly negative. Similarly the coefficient on ShrV in the ShrF equation is 
insignificantly positive but in the ShrD equation it is insignificantly negative. The 
coefficient on ShrF in both the ShrD and ShrV equations is positive (i.e. significantly 
positive in the ShrD equation and insignificantly positive in the ShrV equation). Overall 
in the Global group, the main variables of the ShrD, ShrF and ShrV in each of the share 
equations, ShrD, ShrF and ShrV, show mixed results, with the exception of the 
coefficient on ShrF, which is consistently positive with the results in ShrD and ShrV.  
 
In other words, these results indicate that, for the charitable organisations in the Global 
group, the level of donations is positively affected by the level of fundraising 
expenditure and the number of volunteers from the previous year. The level of 
fundraising expenditure is affected by the organisational age and size, the level of 
donations, and the number of volunteers in the current year. The number of volunteers 
in the current year is affected by organisational size, level of fundraising expenditure 
and the number of volunteers from the previous year.  
 
Table 8.4 shows that share of donations received finds greatest support from 
fundraising. From the view of the oligopoly theory – the greater ShrF the greater is 
ShrD – this is a supportive result. This can be explained readily in terms of the Cournot 
oligopoly theory. However, as opposed to the Welfare and Humanitarian groups, 
unfortunately the share of organisational age at time t and share of volunteers are both 
negative (the incorrect sign). The share of fundraising is consistent with the ShrD 
model, as fundraising expenditure increases donations and, in a feed-forward loop, 
much of the fundraising effort is supported by donations. Also organisational age 
supports spending on fundraising. Finally, very different from the Welfare and 
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Humanitarian groups, this Global group shows that the current year‘s volunteers were 
for less made up from the previous year‘s volunteers. This is a result that deserves 
further exploration. Several explanations, none mutually contradictory, present 
themselves. One is simply this is a less loyal group. But this begs the question of why? 
One possibility is that a Global focus increases the likelihood that this group travels and 
so they do not stay long with the organisation.  
 
The Disability group 
 
Table 8.5 shows the results of the Disability group in three share equations using 2SLS 
regression. The coefficients on the ShrA variable and the RelAge variable in both the 
ShrD and ShrV equations are both positively related to each dependent variable. 
However, in the ShrF equation they are both negative with respect to each dependent 
variable. The coefficient on the RelAge variable in both the ShrD and ShrV equations 
shows a statistically insignificant and negative relationship to each dependent variable, 
except in the ShrF equation where it is statistically insignificant but positive.  
 
The coefficient on ShrD in the ShrF equation is significantly positive but in the ShrV 
equation it is insignificantly negative. Similarly the coefficient on ShrV in ShrF 
equation is insignificantly positive but in the ShrD equation it is insignificantly 
negative. However, the coefficient on ShrF in the ShrD equation is both significant and 
positive and in the ShrV equation it is insignificant but positive. Overall in the 
Disability industry group, the coefficients on the main three jointly dependent variables, 
ShrD, ShrF and ShrV, in each of three share equations, ShrF, ShrV and ShrD, present 
mixed results. ShrF appears as positive in both the ShrD and ShrV equations. These 
results indicate that, for charitable organisations in the Disability group, the level of 
donations and the number of volunteers in the current year is affected by organisational 
size and age, as well as the level of fundraising expenditure. The level of fundraising 
expenditure is affected by the level of donations and the number of volunteers from the 
previous and current years.  
 
Table 8.5 shows a similar result to the Global group in that the share of donations 
received is largely determined by the share of fundraising expenditures. However, none 
of the other variables in this equation are statistically significant. In the share of 
fundraising expenditure equation the share of donations is important but again no other 
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variables are statistically significant. Lastly, in the share of volunteers none of the 
variables are statistically significant.  
 
The Animal group 
 
Table 8.6 shows the results of the Animal group. The regression coefficient on the ShrA 
variable in the ShrF equation is significant but negative and in the ShrV equation it is 
also negative, but statistically insignificant, whereas in the ShrD equation it is 
significantly positive. The coefficient on the RelAge variable in the ShrD equation is 
significantly positive and in ShrV equation it is also positive but insignificant, while in 
the ShrF equation it is insignificantly negative. The coefficient on lagged  ShrV in both 
the ShrD and ShrF equations is insignificantly negative but in ShrV it is positive but 
insignificant.  
 
The regression coefficient on the ShrD variable in the ShrF equation is significantly 
positive and in ShrV equations is also positive but insignificant. The coefficients on 
ShrF in both the ShrD and ShrV equations are also both positive. Similarly the 
coefficients on ShrV in both the ShrD and ShrF equations are also positive. Overall in 
the Animal group, the ShrD, ShrF and ShrV variables in each share equation, ShrD, 
ShrF and ShrV, are all positive. These results indicate that the level of donations for 
charitable organisations in the Animal group is affected by organisational size, level of 
fundraising expenditures and the number of volunteers in the current year. The number 
of volunteers in the current year is affected by organisational age, level of donations, 
level of fundraising expenditures and the number of volunteers from the previous year. 
 
Table 8.6 shows that the share of donations received is significantly influenced by the 
share of fixed assets, representing organisational size, but the share of organisational 
age is negatively affected. In contradiction, the share of fundraising expenditure 
increases significantly with the share of organisational age, whilst with the share of 
fixed assets, it rather decreases significantly. In both equations, none of other variables 
show significance. In these two equations, we cannot find any relationship to oligopoly 
theory. Lastly the share of volunteers‘ equation shows an enormously strong follow on 
from the previous year‘s volunteers. Not only is the level of volunteers extremely high 
(estimated coefficient of 0.977 but the level of significance (t = 41.298) is also very 
high). Similar to the Welfare group, this equation indicates moderate support for the 
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Cournot model, but this may be because the previous year‘s share of volunteers 
overpowered other variables.  
 
The Science group 
 
Table 8.7 shows the results of the Science group. The regression coefficient on the ShrA 
variable in the ShrF equation is significantly negative, and in the ShrD equation it is 
also negative but insignificant. In the ShrF equation it is significantly positive. The 
coefficients on the RelAge variable in both the ShrD and ShrV equations are both 
positive, but in ShrF equation they are insignificantly negative. The coefficient on 
lagged ShrV in the ShrV equation is significantly positive and in the ShrD equation it is 
also positive but insignificant, and in the ShrF equation it is insignificantly negative.  
 
The coefficient on ShrD in the ShrF equation is insignificantly positive but in the ShrV 
equation it is insignificantly negative. Similarly the coefficient on ShrV in the ShrF 
equation is negative and in ShrD equation it is negative. The coefficients on ShrF in 
both the ShrD and ShrV equations are both positive. In other words, these results 
indicate that, for a charitable organisation in the Science group, the level of donations is 
affected by organisational age, level of fundraising expenditures and the number of 
volunteers from the previous year. Conversely, the level of fundraising expenditure is 
affected by organisational size, level of donations and the number of volunteers in the 
current year. The number of volunteers in the current year is affected by organisational 
age, level of fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers from the previous 
year. 
 
Table 8.7 shows that in the share of donations equation, organisational age, fundraising 
expenditures and the number of volunteers in the current year are positively related to 
the share of donations, as expected. However, their coefficients are not significant. 
Other variables are also insignificant or have wrong sign. On the other hand, the share 
of fundraising equation is largely affected by the share of fixed assets, a proxy of 
organisational size, but neither the share of organisational age nor the share of 
volunteers is statistically significant. Nor are any of the other variables. What 
determines the share of fundraising expenditure in this group is the age of the 
organisation. However, this is not explained in terms of oligopoly theory. Finally the 
share of volunteers equation shows an extremely high coefficient (0.913) and the level 
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of significance (t = 5.556) is also high. The share of fundraising expenditure shows high 
statistical support, but the other variables are neither significant nor high. This model 
indicates some level of support for the Cournot model. 
 
The Rural group 
 
Table 8.8 shows the results of the Rural group. The regression coefficients on the ShrA, 
RelAge and lagged ShrV variables in both the ShrF and ShrV equations are all positive 
but in the ShrD equation they are all significantly negative. The coefficients on the 
ShrD variable in both the ShrF and ShrV equations are positive. The coefficients on 
ShrF and ShrV variables in the ShrD equation are both positive, but in the ShrD and 
ShrF equations, respectively, they are both negative. Overall in the Rural group the 
results on ShrD are consistent with both the ShrF and ShrV equation, but the ShrF and 
ShrV variables are not consistent with the signs on ShrD and ShrV, and the ShrD and 
the ShrF equations. In other words, these results indicate that, for charities in the Rural 
group, the level of donations is affected by organisational age, level of fundraising 
expenditure and the number of volunteers from the previous year. The level of 
fundraising expenditure is affected by organisational size, level of donations and the 
number of volunteers in the current year. The number of volunteers in the current year is 
affected by organisational age, level of fundraising expenditure and the number of 
volunteers from the previous year.  
 
Table 8.8 shows that share of donations received is determined partly by the share of 
volunteers. But the share of fixed assets and the age of the organisation have largely the 
opposite effect on raising donations. This cannot be explained in terms of oligopoly 
theory. What determines the share of fundraising expenditure is essentially the age of 
the organisation. Unexpectedly, only the share of volunteers at time t is negative (the 
incorrect sign) but is not significant.  
 
Finally the volunteers equation shows an enormously strong follow on from the 
previous year‘s volunteers. Not only is the level of volunteers relatively high (estimated 
coefficient equal 0.788) but the level of significance (t = 6.198) is also high. This 
pattern has been seen in other groups (All, Welfare, Animal and Science). This model 
indicates no support for the Cournot model, because none of other variables are 
significant.  
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The summary of Tables 8.9a, 8.9b and 8.9c is produced to discuss the most important 
results in the industry group. They present the results in a form more appropriate for 
judging them as a whole in relation to oligopolistic structures. Table 8.9a presents the 
regression coefficient estimates from testing both the ShrF and ShrV variables in ShrD 
equation. Table 8.9b presents the regression coefficients estimates from testing both the 
ShrD and ShrV variables in ShrF equation (2SLS). Table 8.9c presents the regression 
coefficients estimates from testing both the ShrD and ShrF variables in ShrV equation 
(2SLS). Table 8.9a shows that the coefficient on ShrF is significantly positive in Global 
and Disability industry groups and positive in all other industry groups, except the 
Humanitarian group. A comparison of the results shown for ShrF in Table 8.9a with the 
results shown for ShrF in Table 8.9c, indicates that the results from testing ShrF and 
ShrD together are generally qualitatively similar to results from testing ShrF only. 
However, there is one notable exception. In the industry group of charitable 
organisations, ShrF is significantly positive in two industry groups, the Global and 
Disability groups, where ShrF is tested but is not significant in any industry group in the 
ShrV equation where both ShrF and ShrD are tested together.  
 
A comparison of the results shown for ShrD in Table 8.9b and the results shown for 
ShrD in Table 8.9c indicates that the results from testing ShrD and ShrF together are 
different to results from testing ShrD only. There is one notable difference. Table 8.9b 
shows that the coefficient on ShrD is significantly positive in the  Global and Disability 
industry groups, and positive in all other industry groups, except the Humanitarian 
group,  where  ShrD is tested with ShrF (in Table 8.9c)and  shows  negative in the 
Welfare, Global, Disability and Science groups.  
 
Table 8.9a shows that the coefficient on ShrV is significantly positive in Humanitarian 
groups and positive in the All, Animal and Rural groups, but negative in all other 
groups. A comparison of the results shown for ShrV in Table 8.9b with the results 
shown for ShrV in Table 8.9a indicates that the results from testing ShrV and ShrD 
together are generally similar. However, there is one notable difference. Table 8.9c 
presentst the coefficient on ShrV as being positive in most of all the  industry groups, 
except the Global and Rural groups, whereas in Table 8.9a, ShrV with ShrD shows 
negative in the Welfare, Global, Disability and Science groups. 
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Overall these results, taking the groups as a whole rather than individually, suggest 
some weak conformity to aspects of an amended Cournot oligopoly mode. However, 
the shares model is designed to cope with multicollinearity and forms a less complet 
picture than the industry groupings tests in Section 8.2.3. 
 
8.2.2 Empirical results of two-stage least squares in state grouping  
 
Tables 8.10 to 8.15 present the result from testing the ShrD, ShrF and ShrV equation in 
geographic groups of 6 states but otherwise following the procedure for industry groups. 
The 6 ―states‖ include the ACT, Victoria, NSW, QLD, WA and SA, which are 
discussed in Chapter 2.  The results are found in table 8.10 through to 8.15 inclusive.  
 
With some signs of olibopolistic competition can be found in some of the industry 
groups, they are found not with State groups. This results is encouraging, indicating that 
the groups do represent competitive groups whereas location doest not.  
 
Consequently, in the following section, further investigation is conducted adopting two-
stage-least squares (2SLS) estimation model of the jointly dependent variables in a 
linear model with, total donations (D), fundraising expenditures (F) and the number of 
volunteers (V).  
 
8.2.3 Empirical results of two-stage least squares in industry grouping  
 
This section presents the results of the two-stage-least squares (2SLS) estimation of the 
potentially jointly dependent variables, total donations (D), fundraising expenditures (F) 
and the number of volunteers (V), using 8 industrial groups of Australian sample 
organisational data. These three 2SLS models are labelled after each dependent variable 
and each equation is presented below as D Equation in (8-4), F Equation in (8-5) and V 
Equation in (8-6). Tables, 8.16 to 8.23 present the result of these equations from testing 
for the All Groups group, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Disability, Animal, Science 
and Rural industry groups.  
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As shown in equations, (8-4), (8-5) and (8-6), their independent variables consist with 
the following variables: A: fixed assets of organisation, AGE: charitable organisation‘s 
operational age, and ShrF: the ratio of the number of volunteers divided by the total 
number of volunteers of each industry group of charitable organisations, and/or D: total 
donations, F: fundraising expenditures, V: the number of volunteers of each 
organisation and V_1: a lagged value of V. Additionally, each three equations carries 
the same instrumental variables (IV), A, AGE, lagged value of D, lagged value of F, 
lagged value of A, lagged value of V and lagged share of fundraising expenditure. IV 
represents other Instrumental Variables in all three equations. 
 
D Equation:  
Dt = β0 + β1 Ait + β2 Ageit + β3 Fit + β4 ShrFit + β5Vit + β6 Vit-1 + IV +ε;       (8-4) 
 
F Equation:  
Ft = β0 + β1 Ait + β2 Ageit + β3 Dit + β4 ShrFit + β5Vit + β6 Vit-1 + IV +ε;       (8-5) 
 
V Equation:  
Vt = β0 + β1 Ait + β2 Ageit + β3 Dit + β4Fit + β5 ShrFit +  β6 Vit-1 + IV +ε;       (8-6) 
  
where IV represents all other Instrumental Variables to enter the equations.  
Donations (D) = total donations of charity i at year t, 
Fundraising expenditure (F) = total fundraising expenditure of charity i at year t, 
Fixed assets (A) = total fixed assets of charity i at year t,  
Operational length of organisation (AGE) = operational age of charity i at year t,  
Volunteers (V) = total number of volunteers of charity i at year t,  
Share of fundraising expenditure (ShrF) = the proportion of fundraising expenditure of 
charity i (Fit) to total of fundraising expenditure of all charities in the same industry at 
year t (∑Fit) for charity i at year t .  
 
The All group 
 
Table 8.16 shows that the donation equation (D equation) cannot be used to draw clear 
conclusions. The fundraising spending does not explain donations. In other words, 
potential donors are not interested on the level of spending on fundraising of each 
charity but at the same time they are interested in fundraising expenditures related to 
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other charities. In addition, the donations raised is related to the number of the previous 
year‘s volunteers. The fundraising equation (F equation) shows that the level of 
fundraising expenditure spending of each organisation is heavily influenced by the level 
of other charities‘ spending on fundraising. Charities are paying attention to each other 
in terms of the level of own spending on fundraising. Not surporisingly the volunteers 
equation shows the previous year‘s volunteers affect on the current year‘s volunteers but 
in the totally opposite direction.  
 
Although the results are similar to the other models, the All Groups group is merely an 
aggregation. We cannot draw any. The reason for this estimation is to compare the 
samples with the same industry groups from conclusions from the results.  
 
The Welfare group 
 
Table 8.17 shows that in the D equation, donations increased with fundraising 
expenditure, but not from the share of fundraising. This is of interest from the view 
point of the oligopoly theory – the greater F, the greater D but this is ―controlled‖ by 
others‘ spending on fundraising expenditure ShrF. This can be explained readily in 
terms of the Cournot oligopoly theory. Also Table shows, as expected, the volunteer 
increases donations received. Secondly in the fundraising equation, there is little 
explanatory power. Certainly there is no apparent oligopoly reaction curve.  
 
Finally the V equation in Table 8.17 is consistent with the results in the ShrV equation.  
The current year‘s volunteers are apparently largely the previous year‘s volunteers. 
 
The Humanitarian group 
 
Table 8.18 shows very similar pattern of relationship between donation and fundraising 
with the Welfare group in the D equation. It shows that strong interest from the view of 
the oligopoly theory –the greater F, the greater is D. Furthermore, the results of D 
equation show that the organisational age and size, and volunteers are also significant 
determinants of donations. However, similar to the Welfare group, the F equation shows 
ShrF as the main determinant factor. In terms of volunteers, also similar to the results of 
the Welfare group, the current year‘s volunteers follow on from the previous year‘s 
volunteers. 
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The Global group 
 
Table 8.19 shows a very similar pattern of relationships to the Welfare and 
Humanitarian groups in the D equation. This again is of interest from the view of the 
oligopoly theory – the greater F, the greater D. Similarly this is consistent with the 
Cournot oligopoly theory. The results of the D equation also show that volunteers in the 
current year and previous year are also important determinants of donations raised, but 
this is not so for organisational age and size. However, in the F equation organisational 
age and size, and donations affect the level of fundraising expenditure. It shows the 
greater AGE, the larger A and the greater D are the greater F. In relation to shrF, it 
shows significant effects on fundraising, the meaning of which is unclear. In the V 
equation, the results again show the influence of the previous year‘s volunteers, which 
is consistent with the results of the Welfare and Humanitarian groups but nowhere near 
as strong.  
 
The Disability group 
 
Table 8.20 shows a pattern similar to the All group. The determinants of donations 
indicate the share of fundraising expenditure is positive. This goes against the Cournot 
oligopoly approach. In relation to other independent variables, these are difficult to 
explain as organisational size is negatively related to fundraising. In the V equation, the 
results are consistent with the results of other groups and the previous year‘s volunteers 
is very large problem (coefficient 0.940 and t-stat 10.090).  
 
The Animal group 
 
Table 8.21 shows that in the F equation, the results are consistent with other groups in 
lacking explanatory power. In the D equation, donations increases with spending on 
fundraising, as expected, and from the share of fundraising. However these results are 
confused and their meanings are unclear. The relationship between F and D in the D 
equation shows some support of the Cournot oligopoly interpretation. Confused is the 
result that relates to the volunteers. The current year‘s volunteers increases donations 
but not the previous years‘ volunteers. However, the current year‘s volunteers follow on 
heavily from the previous year‘s volunteers. This result in the V equation shows a 
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growing volunteer force and it leads difficult to trust the results (coefficient of V_1 at 
1.030 and t-stat at 23.016).  
 
The Science group 
 
Table 8.22 shows that in the D equation, the hypothesised signs on fundraising and 
share of fundraising are not as expected. Furthermore, the sign on current year‘s 
volunteers is also as not expected. Similar issue, can be found in the F equation, the sign 
on the current year‘s volunteer is negative but that of the previous year‘s volunteers is 
positive. In other words, fundraising is not supported by the current year‘s volunteers 
but the number from the previous year. And donations increased with spending on 
fundraising but not from the share of fundraising.  
 
Table 8.22 shows, as expected, that volunteers support increased donation. However in 
the fundraising equation in the Table, what determines fundraising is not seen. Finally V 
equation in Table 8.22 shows consistent with the results in the ShrV equation as the 
current year‘s volunteers is very closely related to the previous year‘s volunteers. 
 
The Rural group 
 
Table 8.23 shows that in the F equation, the results are consistent with other groups in 
that all explanatory variables are insignificant. Similar to the results of the Animal 
group, the D equation shows that donations are increased by spending on fundraising, as 
expected, but also by the share of fundraising. This tends to support a Cournot oligopoly 
interpretation.  
 
Again, the current year‘s volunteers increase donations, but not the previous years‘ 
volunteers. However, in the V equation, the current year‘s volunteers largely follow on 
from the previous year‘s volunteers. This result in the V equation may indicate that 
volunteers, a free input, are mainly helping from the administrative point of view, but 
not helping to raise funds such as fundraising.  
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8.3. Summary  
 
This chapter showed the results and analysis of the share equations (share of donations,  
share of fundraising expenditure and share of volunteers) in the oligopolistic 
competition using the two stage least squares approach.  
 
Chapter 6 presented and discussed the preliminary empirical results of the family 
equations, which are based on the discussion in Chapters 1 to 5. To avoid 
multicollinearity problems for the family equations, Chapter 7 analysed share equations, 
which are based on oligopolistic theory to establish share of donations (ShrD) on 
reaction curves for share of fundraising expenditure (ShrF) and share of volunteers 
(ShrV) equations.  
 
This chapter further analyses the simultaneous relations of those three including ShrD, 
ShrF and ShrV using 2 SLS equations.  
 
The results indicate that, for the charitable organisations in the Welfare industry group, 
the level of donations is affected by organisational size, level of fundraising expenditure 
and the number of volunteers from the previous year. The level of fundraising 
expenditure is affected by organisational age, level of donations and the number of 
volunteers in the current year. The number of volunteers in the current year is affected 
by organisational size, level of fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers 
from the previous year.   
 
In the Humanitarian group the results indicate that the level of donations and the level 
of fundraising expenditure are both affected by organisational age and the number of 
volunteers in the current year. The number of volunteers in the current year is affected 
by organisational size, level of donations, level of spending of fundraising expenditure 
and the number of volunteers from the previous year for the charitable organisations in 
the Humanitarian group. 
 
For the charitable organisations in the Global group, the level of donations is affected 
by the level of fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers from the previous 
year. The level of fundraising expenditure is affected by organisational age and size, 
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level of donations, the number of volunteers in the current year. The number of 
volunteers in the current year is affected by organisational size, level of fundraising 
expenditure and the number of volunteers from the previous year for the charities in the 
Global group.  
 
For charitable organisations in the Disability group, the level of donations and the 
number of volunteers in the current year is affected by organisational size and age, and 
the level of fundraising expenditure. The level of fundraising expenditure is affected by 
the level of donations and the number of volunteers from the previous and current years.  
 
The level of donations for charitable organisations in the Animal group is affected by 
organisational size, level of fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers in the 
current year. The number of volunteers in the current year is affected by organisational 
age, level of donations, level of fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers 
from the previous year. 
 
For the Science group, the level of donations is affected by organisational age, level of 
fundraising expenditure and the number of volunteers from the previous year. The level 
of fundraising expenditure is affected by organisational size, level of donations and the 
number of volunteers in the current year. The number of volunteers in the current year is 
affected by organisational age, level of fundraising expenditure and the number of 
volunteers from the previous year for the charities in the Science group. 
 
For charities in the Rural group, the level of donations is affected by organisational age, 
level of fundraising expenditures and the number of volunteers from the previous year. 
The level of fundraising expenditure is affected by organisational size, level of 
donations and the number of volunteers in the current year. The number of volunteers in 
the current year is affected by organisational age, level of fundraising expenditure and 
the number of volunteers from previous years for charitable organisations in the Rural 
group. 
 
The results from the geographic groups had mixed results but this was expected and 
welcomed compared to the industry groups. However, the results from the industry 
groups can support the Oligopolistic theory as in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, 
Disability, Animal and Rural groups. They show that the share of fundraising support 
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share of donations. However, it is difficult to conclude that these industry groups are 
lully supportive of the Oligopolistic theory because they employ share of variables not 
the first level of variables. Therefore this study, further, employed the first level of 
variables to conduct oligopolistic explanatory 2SLS model with three equations. 
 
The results of the Welfare, Humanitarian and Global groups in the D equation show 
some support for the Cournot oligopoly theory. They show that spending sufficient 
amounts to fundraising earns greater donations.  
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Table 8.1: Two-stage least squares estimation for All Groups group 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 0.001 0.007 0.000 
(t-stat) (0.175) (0.794) -0.216 
Shr A -0.300 -0.674 0.069 
(t-stat) (-0.449) (-0.521) (1.385) 
RelAGE  -0.018 0.006 0.000 
(t-stat) (-2.170) (0.440) (-0.140) 
ShrD  0.115 0.009 
(t-stat)  (0.169) (0.155) 
ShrF 0.559  0.060 
(t-stat) (1.231)  (0.581) 
ShrV 6.418 8.953  
(t-stat) (0.859) (0.566)  
ShrV_1 -5.709 -7.630 0.870 
(t-stat) (-0.870) (-0.545) (19.777) 
S.E. of regression 0.118 0.156 0.017 
Observations 245 245 245 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of Fundraising Expenditures 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of Fixed Assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
 
 
Table 8.2: Two-stage least squares estimation for Welfare group  
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 -0.019 0.030 -0.013 
(t-stat) (-0.279) (0.441) (-0.360) 
Shr A 0.893 -1.094 0.508 
(t-stat) (2.563) (-1.654) (1.319) 
RelAGE  -0.436 0.566 -0.259 
(t-stat) (-1.195) (4.611) (-1.627) 
ShrD  1.172 -0.534 
(t-stat)  (1.082) (-0.902) 
ShrF 0.770  0.446 
(t-stat) (1.130)  (1.386) 
ShrV -1.521 1.932  
(t-stat) (-1.069) (1.506)  
ShrV_1 1.437 -1.828 0.949 
(t-stat) (1.052) (-1.469) (27.530) 
S.E. of regression 0.156 0.199 0.102 
Observations  77  77  77 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of Fundraising Expenditures 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of Fixed Assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of Volunteers (V) of each organisation in each group 
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Table 8.3: Two-stage least squares estimation for Humanitarian group 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 0.065 0.181 -0.035 
(t-stat) (2.710) (2.328) (-2.697) 
Shr A -0.118 -0.331 0.064 
(t-stat) (-0.590) (-0.515) (0.611) 
RelAGE  0.086 0.240 -0.046 
(t-stat) (1.730) (3.958) (-1.925) 
ShrD  -2.766 0.535 
(t-stat)  (-1.520) (4.022) 
ShrF -0.360  0.193 
(t-stat) (-1.536)  (1.589) 
ShrV 1.868 5.173  
(t-stat) (4.038) (1.582)  
ShrV_1 -0.780 -2.162 0.418 
(t-stat) (-2.011) (-1.339) (3.501) 
S.E. of regression 0.118 0.328 0.063 
Observations 42 42 42 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising expenditure 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
 
 
Table 8.4: Two-stage least squares estimation for Global group 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 -0.051 0.042 0.011 
(t-stat) (-4.839) (5.291) (0.649) 
Shr A -0.127 0.114 0.553 
(t-stat) (-0.556) (0.631) (2.974) 
RelAGE  -0.189 0.147 -0.010 
(t-stat) (-5.588) (5.348) (-0.172) 
ShrD  0.773 -0.107 
(t-stat)  (30.102) (-0.338) 
ShrF 1.274  0.127 
(t-stat) (30.233)  (0.299) 
ShrV -0.375 0.270  
(t-stat) (-0.965) (0.863)  
ShrV_1 0.484 -0.369 0.370 
(t-stat) (2.429) (-2.206) (1.706) 
S.E. of regression 0.043 0.034 0.034 
Observations 35 35 35 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising Expenditures 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
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Table 8.5: Two-stage least squares estimation for Disability group 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 0.065 -0.085 0.143 
(t-stat) (2.206) (-2.423) (0.583) 
Shr A 0.155 -0.205 0.343 
(t-stat) (0.980) (-1.045) (0.539) 
RelAGE  0.023 -0.031 0.052 
(t-stat) (0.754) (-0.721) (0.363) 
ShrD  1.317 -2.207 
(t-stat)  (5.190) (-0.485) 
ShrF 0.759  1.676 
(t-stat) (5.190)  (0.512) 
ShrV -0.453 0.597  
(t-stat) (-0.485) (0.511)  
ShrV_1 -0.103 0.136 -0.227 
(t-stat) (-0.205) (0.202) (-0.146) 
S.E. of regression 0.072 0.094 0.158 
Observations 63 63 63 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising Expenditures 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
 
 
 
Table 8.6: Two-stage least squares estimation for Animal group 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 -0.690 1.083 0.010 
(t-stat) (-1.376) (2.986) (0.227) 
Shr A 2.176 -2.893 -0.054 
(t-stat) (2.150) (-2.956) (-0.507) 
RelAGE  -0.960 1.237 0.022 
(t-stat) (-2.540) (3.281) (0.468) 
ShrD  0.936 0.038 
(t-stat)  (1.443) (0.550) 
ShrF 0.652  0.011 
(t-stat) (1.603)  (0.266) 
ShrV 1.535 0.624  
(t-stat) (0.370) (0.127)  
ShrV_1 -1.293 -0.916 0.977 
(t-stat) (-0.325) (-0.194) (41.298) 
S.E. of regression 0.078 0.110 0.011 
Observations 21 21 21 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising Expenditures 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
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Table 8.7: Two-stage least squares estimation for Science group 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 -0.008 0.035 -0.012 
(t-stat) (-0.070) (0.613) (-0.494) 
Shr A -0.561 0.331 -0.132 
(t-stat) (-0.814) (3.104) (-1.713) 
RelAGE  0.586 -0.107 0.061 
(t-stat) (1.325) (-0.305) (0.368) 
ShrD  0.261 -0.133 
(t-stat)  (0.552) (-0.547) 
ShrF 1.626  0.399 
(t-stat) (0.821)  (1.615) 
ShrV -4.407 2.119  
(t-stat) (-0.716) (1.233)  
ShrV_1 4.375 -1.850 0.913 
(t-stat) (0.813) (-1.030) (5.556) 
S.E. of regression 0.268 0.116 0.051 
Observations 28 28 28 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising Expenditures 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
 
 
Table 8.8: Two-stage least squares estimation for Rural group 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 0.045 -0.146 -0.007 
(t-stat) (1.219) (-0.501) (-0.917) 
Shr A -0.946 3.115 0.150 
(t-stat) (-2.3984) (0.697) (1.483) 
RelAGE  -0.205 0.676 0.033 
(t-stat) (-2.209) (3.291) (1.212) 
ShrD  3.291 0.159 
(t-stat)  (0.766) (1.595) 
ShrF 0.297  -0.047 
(t-stat) (0.749)  (-0.678) 
ShrV 6.295 -20.736  
(t-stat) (1.588) (-0.680)  
ShrV_1 -4.961 16.353 0.788 
(t-stat) (-1.294) (0.666) (6.198) 
S.E. of regression 0.241 0.795 0.038 
Observations 49 49 49 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising Expenditures 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group
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Table 8.9: Summary of Results of ShrD, ShrF and ShrV 
 
 
Table 8.9a:  All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural 
ShrDequation         
ShrF (t-stat) 0.559 (1.231) 0.770 (1.130) -0.360 (-1.536) 1.247(30.233)*** 0.759(5.190)*** 0.652 (1.603) 1.626 (0.821) 0.297 (0.749) 
ShrV (t-stat) 6.418 (0.859) -1.521 (-1.069) 1.863(4.036)*** -0.375 (-0.965) -0.453 (-0.485) 1.535 (0.370) -4.407 (-0.716) 6.295 (1.588) 
         
Table 8.9b         
ShrF equation         
ShrD (t-stat) 0.115 (0.169) 1.172 (1.082) -2.766 (-1.520) 0.773(30.102)*** 1.317(5.190)*** 0.936 (1.443) 0.261 (0.552) 3.291 (0.766) 
ShrV (t-stat) 8.953 (0.566) 1.932 (1.506) 5.173 (1.582) 0.270 (0.863) 0.597 (0.511) 0.624 (0.127) 2.119 (1.233) -20.736 (-0.680) 
         
Table 8.9c         
ShrV equation         
ShrD (t-stat) 0.009 (0.155) -0.534 (-0.902) 0.535 (4.022)*** -0.107 (-0.338) -2.207 (-0.485) 0.038 (0.550) -0.133 (-0.547) 0.159 (1.595) 
ShrF (t-stat) 0.060 (0.581) 0.446 (1.386) 0.193 (1.589) 0.127 (0.299) 1.676 (0.512) 0.011 (0.266) 0.399 (1.615) -0.047 (-0.678) 
         
 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 %. 
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Table 8.10: Two-stage least squares estimation for ACT (State) 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 -0.468 0.036 -0.051 
(t-stat) (-4.799) (0.031) (-1.206) 
Shr A -0.002 0.096 -0.005 
(t-stat) (-0.170) (1.145) (-1.878) 
RelAGE  0.207 -0.211 0.055 
(t-stat) (1.881) (-0.186) (1.928) 
ShrD  -0.829 -0.001 
(t-stat)  (-0.527) (-0.016) 
ShrF -0.040  0.028 
(t-stat) (-0.454)  (2.477) 
ShrV -0.022 11.380  
(t-stat) (-0.017) (1.128)  
ShrV_1 2.000 -9.719 1.080 
(t-stat) (1.357) (-0.808) (7.122) 
S.E. of regression 0.007 0.034 0.001 
Observations 14 14 14 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising expenditure 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
 
 
Table 8.11 : Two-stage least squares estimation for Victoria 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 -0.038 0.024 0.001 
(t-stat) (-0.285) (0.330) (0.328) 
Shr A -1.507 0.946 0.028 
(t-stat) (-0.218) (0.218) (0.616) 
RelAGE  0.046 -0.030 -0.001 
(t-stat) (0.276)) (-0.284) (-0.388) 
ShrD  0.621 0.015 
(t-stat)  (0.839) (0.187) 
ShrF 1.566  -0.024 
(t-stat) (1.231)  (-0.195) 
ShrV 47.621 -29.889  
(t-stat) (0.252) (-0.260)  
ShrV_1 -46.194 29.005 0.969 
(t-stat) (-0.256) (0.265) (12.419) 
S.E. of regression 1.013 0.636 0.021 
Observations 91 91 91 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising expenditure 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
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Table 8.12 : Two-stage least squares estimation for New South Wales (NSW) 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 0.026 0.085 -0.020 
(t-stat) (3.859) (1.792) (-2.937) 
Shr A 0.047 -0.430 0.052 
(t-stat) (0.323) (-0.907) (0.433) 
RelAGE  0.003 0.070 -0.010 
(t-stat) (0.288) (1.811) (-0.788) 
ShrD  -1.638 0.607 
(t-stat)  (-0.823) (3.177) 
ShrF -0.219  0.193 
(t-stat) (-1.920)  (1.396) 
ShrV 1.181 2.808  
(t-stat) (2.755) (0.992)  
ShrV_1 -0.377 -0.933 0.431 
(t-stat) (-0.834) (-0.545) (2.311) 
S.E. of regression 0.061 0.168 0.052 
Observations 98 98 98 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising expenditure 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
 
 
Table 8.13: Two-stage least squares estimation for Queensland (QLD) 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 -0.167 0.226 -0.060 
(t-stat) (-1.250) (2.867) (-0.350) 
Shr A -0.768 0.373 -0.082 
(t-stat) (-2.965) (0.879) (-0.160) 
RelAGE  -4.623 5.348 -1.532 
(t-stat) (-1.393) (2.632) (-0.370) 
ShrD  0.209 -0.055 
(t-stat)  (0.405) (-0.109) 
ShrF 0.497  0.027 
(t-stat) (0.649)  (0.038) 
ShrV -0.192 0.027  
(t-stat) (-0.153) (0.041)  
ShrV_1 0.979 0.674 1.002 
(t-stat) (0.783) (0.594) (1.391) 
S.E. of regression 0.121 0.129 0.092 
Observations 21 21 21 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising expenditure 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
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Table 8.14 : Two-stage least squares estimation for South Australia (SA) 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 -1.978 -0.571 2.253 
(t-stat) (-1.638) (-1.515) (1.152) 
Shr A 3.727 1.077 -3.357 
(t-stat) (2.150) (1.958) (-1.003) 
RelAGE  -10.662 -3.078 9.363 
(t-stat) (-5.177) (-4.292) (1.167) 
ShrD  -0.289 0.680 
(t-stat)  (-11.491) (1.042) 
ShrF -3.459  2.371 
(t-stat) (-11.689)  (1.050) 
ShrV 0.090 0.026  
(t-stat) (0.065) (0.065)  
ShrV_1 4.598 1.327 -3.199 
(t-stat) (4.402) (4.102) (-0.932) 
S.E. of regression 0.133 0.039 0.120 
Observations 14 14 14 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising expenditure 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
 
 
Table 8.15: Two-stage least squares estimation for Western Australia (WA) 
      
Dependent Variables ShrD ShrF ShrV 
β0 -0.732 0.447 -0.062 
(t-stat) (-0.454) (0.259) (-2.096) 
Shr A 1.273 -0.676 0.114 
(t-stat) (0.175) (-0.103) (0.197) 
RelAGE  -0.478 0.284 -0.039 
(t-stat) (-0.437) (0.251) (-1.488) 
ShrD  0.495 -0.054 
(t-stat)  (0.245) (-0.341) 
ShrF 1.628  0.109 
(t-stat) (0.247)  (0.229) 
ShrV -12.054 7.322  
(t-stat) (-0.440) (0.290)  
ShrV_1 26.014 -15.742 2.150 
(t-stat) (0.463) (-0.282) (6.177) 
S.E. of regression 0.428 0.254 0.034 
Observations 21 21 21 
NOTE: Dependent variables are Share of donations (ShrD), Share of fundraising expenditure 
(ShrF) and Share of Volunteers (ShrV).  
ShrF: Share of Fundraising expenditures, ShrA: Share of fixed assets of organisations 
ShrV: Share of total numbers of Volunteers (V) 
RelAge: Relative Age of each organisation in each group 
ShrV_1: Lagged share of volunteer (V) of each organisation in each group 
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Table 8.16: Two-stage least squares estimation for All group 
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 1748 -454.847 -8.697 
(t-stat) (1.146) (-0.206) (-0.029) 
A 0.083 0.010 0.002 
(t-stat) (0.724) (0.695) (1.119) 
AGE  -269.309 -7.759 -1.304 
(t-stat) (-1.601) (-0.313) (-0.406) 
D  -0.003 -0.001 
(t-stat)  (-0.102) (-0.242) 
F -1.485  -0.071 
(t-stat) (-0.313)  (-1.121) 
V -46.866 -7.182  
(t-stat) (-1.008) (-1.522)  
V_1 44.147 6.780 -10.939 
(t-stat) (1.010) (1.535) (31.754) 
ShrF 2149127 411262 37883 
(t-stat) (1.065) (4.197) (1.936) 
S.E. of estimation 133139.700 18899.123 2558 
Obs 245 245 245 
NOTE: Dependent variables are total donations (D), fundraising expenditure (F) and the number 
of volunteers (V). All independent variables in each equation are: A: Fixed assets of 
organisations, AGE: Organisational operational age, F: Fundraising expenditures, V: Total 
numbers of Volunteers, V_1: Lagged volunteers (V), ShrF: Share of fundraising expenditure,  
and for instrumental variables, A, AGE, lagged D, lagged F, lagged A, lagged V.  
 
 
Table 8.17: Two-stage least squares estimation for Welfare group  
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 -7061 -210 223 
(t-stat) (-0.328) (-0.941) (1.192) 
A -0.050 -0.001 0.001 
(t-stat) (-0.470) (-0.580) (2.073) 
AGE  -50.746 0.509 0624 
(t-stat) (-5.37) (0.359) (0.506) 
D  0.057 -0.007 
(t-stat)  (0.861) (-0.110) 
F 25.699  0.499 
(t-stat) (0.473)  (1.446) 
V 20.186 0.653  
(t-stat) (0.405) (1.461)  
V_1 -12.371 -0.680 0.852 
(t-stat) (-0.342) (-1.863) (6.428) 
ShrF -457233 21258 -11909 
(t-stat) (-0.455) (11.210) (-1.686) 
S.E. of estimation 15830.497 496.940 438.725 
Obs 77 77 77 
NOTE: Dependent variables are total donations (D), fundraising expenditure (F) and the number 
of volunteers (V). All independent variables in each equation are: A: Fixed assets of 
organisations, AGE: Organisational operational age, F: Fundraising expenditures, V: Total 
numbers of Volunteers, V_1: Lagged volunteers (V), ShrF: Share of fundraising expenditure,  
and for instrumental variables, A, AGE, lagged D, lagged F, lagged A, lagged V.  
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Table 8.18: Two-stage least squares estimation for Humanitarian group 
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 -5935 2851 3703 
(t-stat) (-0.218) (0.710) 1.174 
A 0.030 0.007 0.011 
(t-stat) (0.360) (0.537) (1.030) 
AGE  100.667 -41.686 -42.176 
(t-stat) (0.354) (-1.044) (-1.415) 
D  0.041 0.028 
(t-stat)  (0.663) (0.429) 
F 2.107  -0.176 
(t-stat) (0.733)  (-0.374) 
V 4.434 -0.548  
(t-stat) (0.894) (-0.705)  
V_1 -1.397 -0.374 0.711 
(t-stat) (-0.360) (0.643) (3.880) 
ShrF -247253 102796 30374 
(t-stat) (-0.814) (7.630) (0.662) 
S.E. of estimation 37298.391 5758.390 6155.968 
Obs 42 42 42 
NOTE: Dependent variables are total donations (D), fundraising expenditure (F) and the number 
of volunteers (V). All independent variables in each equation are: A: Fixed assets of 
organisations, AGE: Organisational operational age, F: Fundraising expenditures, V: Total 
numbers of Volunteers, V_1: Lagged volunteers (V), ShrF: Share of fundraising expenditure,  
and for instrumental variables, A, AGE, lagged D, lagged F, lagged A, lagged V.  
 
 
Table 8.19: Two-stage least squares estimation for Global group 
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 41759 -2118 -479 
(t-stat) (2.374) (-2.488) -0.237 
A -1.038 0.072 0.075 
(t-stat) (-0.949) (2.084) (1.563) 
AGE  -1294 68.359 24.042 
(t-stat) (-2.501) (3.160) (0.399) 
D  0.049 0.004 
(t-stat)  (3.735) (0.096) 
F 17.741  -0.405 
(t-stat) (3.055)  (-0.519) 
V 1.197 -0.319  
(t-stat) (0.084) (-0.566)  
V_1 4.956 -0.124 0.497 
(t-stat) (0.619) (-0.328) (1.699) 
ShrF -446550 29010 19845 
(t-stat) (-1.409) (4.208) (0.946) 
S.E. of estimation 28343.085 1217.604 1478.202 
Obs 35 35 35 
NOTE: Dependent variables are total donations (D), fundraising expenditure (F) and the number 
of volunteers (V). All independent variables in each equation are: A: Fixed assets of 
organisations, AGE: Organisational operational age, F: Fundraising expenditures, V: Total 
numbers of Volunteers, V_1: Lagged volunteers (V), ShrF: Share of fundraising expenditure,  
and for instrumental variables, A, AGE, lagged D, lagged F, lagged A, lagged V.  
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Table 8.20: Two-stage least squares estimation for Disability group 
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 4572 1897 256 
(t-stat) (0.785) (0.133) 1.384 
A 0.066 0.019 0.002 
(t-stat) (0.638) (0.194) (0.622) 
AGE  -10.496 18.347 -0.118 
(t-stat) (-0.182) (0.355) (-0.050) 
D  -0.708 -0.043 
(t-stat)  (-0.224) (-1.187) 
F -4.961  -0.593 
(t-stat) (-0.287)  (-0.058) 
V -6.481 -2.365  
(t-stat) (-0.115) (-0.048)  
V_1 5.350 2.665 0.940 
(t-stat) (0.096) (0.056) (10.090) 
ShrF 217291 57604 1887 
(t-stat) (0.362) (0.469) (0.923) 
S.E. of estimation 7359.771 4725.252 355.558 
Obs 63 63 63 
NOTE: Dependent variables are total donations (D), fundraising expenditure (F) and the number 
of volunteers (V). All independent variables in each equation are: A: Fixed assets of 
organisations, AGE: Organisational operational age, F: Fundraising expenditures, V: Total 
numbers of Volunteers, V_1: Lagged volunteers (V), ShrF: Share of fundraising expenditure,  
and for instrumental variables, A, AGE, lagged D, lagged F, lagged A, lagged V.  
     
 
Table 8.21: Two-stage least squares estimation for Animal group 
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 15178 -2928 -217.819 
(t-stat) (4.339) (-1.398) (-0.748) 
A 0.069 -0.009 -0.001 
(t-stat) (1.081) (-0.511) (-0.611) 
AGE  -249.966 39.768 3.824 
(t-stat) (-1.816) (0.875) (0.746) 
D  0.189 0.014 
(t-stat)  (1.386) (0.7546) 
F 2.413  -0.024 
(t-stat) (0.908)  (-0.332) 
V 30.060 0.376  
(t-stat) (0.660) (0.992)  
V_1 -32.096  1.030 
(t-stat) (-0.702)  (23.016) 
ShrF 10932 3222 -272.382 
(t-stat) (0.326) (0.506) (-0.440) 
S.E. of estimation 5695.156 1211.928 2353.071 
Obs 21 21 21 
NOTE: Dependent variables are total donations (D), fundraising expenditure (F) and the number 
of volunteers (V). All independent variables in each equation are: A: Fixed assets of 
organisations, AGE: Organisational operational age, F: Fundraising expenditures, V: Total 
numbers of Volunteers, V_1: Lagged volunteers (V), ShrF: Share of fundraising expenditure,  
and for instrumental variables, A, AGE, lagged D, lagged F, lagged A, lagged V.  
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Table 8.22: Two-stage least squares estimation for Science group 
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 707.512 1250.451 129.709-479 
(t-stat) (0.050) (0.039) (0.069) 
A 0.030 0.059 0.005 
(t-stat) (0.171) (0.132) (0.085) 
AGE  41.589 81.506 6.509 
(t-stat) (0.160) (0.154) (0.080) 
D  -1.911 -0.164 
(t-stat)  (-10.133) (-0.160) 
F -0.495  -0.080 
(t-stat) (-0.150)  (-0.097) 
V -5.798 -10.935  
(t-stat) (-0.156) (-5.818)  
V_1 7.130 13.614 1.198 
(t-stat) (0.300) (6.846) (0.307) 
ShrF 7280 13686 1302 
(t-stat) (0.080) (0.066) (0.150) 
S.E. of estimation 9149.627 17490.324 1500.095 
Obs 28 28 28 
NOTE: Dependent variables are total donations (D), fundraising expenditure (F) and the number 
of volunteers (V). All independent variables in each equation are: A: Fixed assets of 
organisations, AGE: Organisational operational age, F: Fundraising expenditures, V: Total 
numbers of Volunteers, V_1: Lagged volunteers (V), ShrF: Share of fundraising expenditure,  
and for instrumental variables, A, AGE, lagged D, lagged F, lagged A, lagged V.  
 
 
Table 8.23: Two-stage least squares estimation for Rural group  
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 102096 -23680 -1489 
(t-stat) (1.583) (-0.613) (-1.177) 
A -0.255 0.028 0.004 
(t-stat) (-1.541) (0.282) (1.837) 
AGE  -917 232 13.911 
(t-stat) (-1.531) (0.668) (1.303) 
D  0.277 0.014 
(t-stat)  (0.859) (2.081) 
F 0.425  -0.005 
(t-stat) (0.315)  (-0.212) 
V 59.924 -13.143  
(t-stat) (2.214) (-0.615)  
V_1 -54.526 12.885 0.916 
(t-stat) (-2.080) (0.660) (13.807) 
ShrF 105789 -4146 -1876 
(t-stat) (0.388) (-0.047) (-0.429) 
S.E. of estimation 140413.184 41578.232 2324.329 
Observations 49 49 49 
NOTE: Dependent variables are total donations (D), fundraising expenditure (F) and the number 
of volunteers (V). All independent variables in each equation are: A: Fixed assets of 
organisations, AGE: Organisational operational age, F: Fundraising expenditures, V: Total 
numbers of Volunteers, V_1: Lagged volunteers (V), ShrF: Share of fundraising expenditure, 
and for instrumental variables, A, AGE, lagged D, lagged F, lagged A, lagged V.  
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Chapter 9  
Summary and Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The vast majority of studies in the charitable sector have analysed donor behaviour, 
with few focused on charitable organisations and their behaviour. Most of these donor 
oriented studies used data for the US or the UK. Their results are mixed.    
 
Conversely, the central core of this thesis was to analyse the behaviour of charitable 
organisations, and for Australia and Japan rather than the US and UK. It argues that 
there is a Cournot-style oligopolistic competition between these organisations for both 
corporate and private donations. In the economics literature, the main alternative model 
is Bertrand price-competition oligopoly, but this is inappropriate in a charity setting 
when many goods are free on both the input and output sides. To analyse this Cournot-
style competition, charitable organisations were organised into groups of organisations 
with like functions. This meant that in terms of their interests, expertise and objectives 
and especially their pool of donors, these organisations are relatively homogeneous. 
They can either cooperate, compete or even do both simultaneously. In terms of 
fundraising, for whatever reasons, the organisations in Australia and Japan have chosen   
competition. This compares with the USA where the United Way is a cooperative 
fundraising effort among many charities. One implied conclusion that can be drawn 
from the result that charities behave competitively with respect to each other is that they 
do not behave entirely altruistically. A potential and crucial irony is that if such 
competition creates efficiency then it is far better for the recipients of charity to have 
their support organisations as competitive rather than exhibiting completely altruistic 
organisational behaviour.   
 
Overall, it is believed that a better understanding of the use and function of fundraising 
expenditure behaviours, based on an empirical modelling of oligopolistic competition in 
Australia, was achieved. The empirical results imply that while the model appears to 
work for Australian charitable organisations, it did not do so for Japan. This difference 
  
 
370 
can be explained. The findings for Australia support hypotheses and ideas that modify 
the mainstream charitable organisational literature and the findings are consistent 
throughout the family of empirical equations in Australia. Nevertheless the empirical 
support for the oligopolistic model is not overwhelmingly strong. The models and tests 
need to be redefined and reapplied and data sets from outside Australia also could be 
used.  
 
As a result, it is believed that the thesis has raised a number of issues which can be used 
to improve the importance of financial information in the charity sector and redirect 
research in the area of charitable organisations. 
 
9.2 Summary  
 
The thesis examined the effect of the fundraising expenditures of the charitable 
organisational competition on donations in a modified form of (Cournot) oligopolistic 
market in Australia and Japan. Thus, in oligopolistic markets, each charitable 
organisation generated donations through its own fundraising expenditures.  Consistent 
with the Cournot theory, a charity‘s level of donations can be negatively affected by the 
fundraising efforts of other charitable organisations in the same charity sector. The 
investigation was concerned with what level of fundraising expenditures determines the 
level of private donations; how charitable organisation maximise private donations, and 
whether or not competition between charitable organisations affect donor behaviour and 
donations. 
 
In addition this thesis attempted to investigate what organisational characteristics and 
other factors affect donations. This thesis provides evidence of the effect on total 
donations in Australia and Japan of financial reporting information; fundraising 
expenditures; competitors‘ fundraising expenditures; the ratio of fundraising 
expenditures to those of competitors; fixed assets; the ratio of fixed assets to those of 
competitors; the number of volunteers; organisational age; government grants and 
administrative costs. One of the most important issues considered was the role of 
volunteers in competition between organisations. Such volunteers appear to be faithful 
to organisations and not surprisingly, they generally have a positive impact on 
donations. 
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The research conducted theoretical modelling on the basis of modified oligopolistic 
competition of the donations market, and from this constructed a family of explanatory 
empirical equations. A major aspect of these was the prior recognition of the focussed 
nature of many charitable organisations. As discussed in Section 2.4, recognising 
national and cultural differences, the Australian charities had two Australia specific 
industry groups, the Animal and Rural that did not appear in Japan. Similarly the 
Japanese charities had two Japanese specific groups, Education and Environment that 
did not appear in Australia. There were six groups in common: Welfare, Humanitarian, 
Global, Science and Culture, Disability and All groups. In addition, geographic 
subgroups were used, e.g. in Australia, the subgroup consisted of five mainland States 
and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and in Japan, three prefectures of Tokyo, 
Kanagawa and Kyoto. This was based on the possibility that donors based their 
―giving‖ on locality rather than function. In general it was found that, consistent with 
the oligopolistic groups, the results of industry groups outperformed the geographic 
groups. Moreover, a ―group‖ (All) was made up of the entire sample. Such an 
aggregation should not conform to an oligopolistic model and this was the case. 
 
In addition, as discussed in the results for the family of empirical models for Japan, 
there are multicollinearity problems between the variables lnFi, lnFi/ΣlnF and lnFj, and 
considerations of simultaneity between donations, fundraising and volunteers, as well as 
the reaction curve of fundraising expenditure and volunteers in oligopolistic 
competition. Therefore, alternative specifications using share of donations, share of 
fundraising expenditure and share of volunteers for the family models were all tested. 
Employing the shares models the results showed consistency with the results of the 
family of models in most of the industry groups, but did not enhance the results. 
Employing a Shares of Donations model increased significance in the results of the 
coefficients, and also gave higher explanatory power than those in the family model for 
most industry groups in Australia. However, compared to the results of Australian 
industry groups and geographical groups, the results for Japanese organisations, neither 
group improved in the Shares of Donation, Shares of Fundraising Expenditure and 
Shares of Volunteers models. Therefore, this study focused empirically on Australian 
charitable organisations. The results from the industry groups support the Oligopolistic 
theory which indicated that an increased share of fundraising supported and increased 
share of donations. The comparisons of family of empirical models and share models 
are now summarised.  
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A sample of Australian charitable organisations suggested direct positive effects on total 
donations of fundraising expenditures and fundraising of competitors‘ fundraising 
expenditures on total donations in most of the groups except for Animal charities. Also 
the number of Volunteers significantly and positively affected total donations in most of 
groups except Animal. This result is of itself unsurprising but it does suggest the 
rational use of an (almost) free input, i.e. volunteers, albeit subject to diminishing 
returns. As discussed in Section 6.4, Volunteers contributed not only time but also they 
donated financially to charities. The organisational size showed as a positive 
determinant of total donations in Welfare, Disability, Animal and Science groups. 
Organisational age also showed a positive effect on total donations in All, Disability, 
Science and Rural groups. Government grants showed crowding in effect on total 
donations in All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Animal and Rural groups in the 
following year, whereas in Global, Disability and Science, it showed crowding-out of 
donations. Administrative costs showed a positive impact on total donations in most 
groups except All, Global and Science. Although not considered important, the results 
of the geographic groups also showed varied effects on total donations.  
 
A sample of Japanese charitable organisations showed that the estimates of the 
fundraising expenditure were consistent with Australian results. This was in the direct 
effectiveness of fundraising activities on donations in the Humanitarian, Global and 
Environment groups. But in the Welfare, Disability and Environment groups, 
organisational attributes including size, seemed to be major determinants for total 
donations. The number of Volunteers also contributed directly and positively on the 
level of donation in All, Disability and Culture groups. Organisational size had a 
positive effect on the level of total donations in All, Global, Humanitarian, Disability, 
Culture and Environment groups, while Organisational age had a mostly negative 
impact on the level total donations, except in the Culture group. The positive effect of 
an organisation‘s age in this group is understandable. Government grants had a positive 
effect on total donations in most of groups except Welfare and Environment. Given the 
very recent institutional history of Japanese charities, this is not too surprising. Despite 
previous studies which used the level of project costs as measurement of inefficiency of 
management, in this study the level of Administrative costs showed a positive impact on 
total donations in groups of All, Global, Disability, Culture, and Education groups. 
Additionally government grants had a significantly positive effect on total donations.  
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The results of the geographic groups also showed varied effect on variables, having 
positive effects on fundraising expenditure and the organisational size. A negative effect 
for competing charities‘ fundraising expenditures showed in Kanagawa and Kyoto, 
whereas organisational age showed a positive on total donations in Tokyo. Volunteers 
showed also a positive impact on total donations in Tokyo and Kyoto, while the 
administrative costs were a positive on total donations in Tokyo. It is re-emphasised that 
the spatial groupings‘ results were not as good as for the industry groups. This suggests 
that donors are interested in the type of charity they donate to, rather than its locality. 
 
9.3 Conclusions  
 
The results of the empirical analysis are summarised below. As both common sense and 
theory suggest, fundraising expenditures enhance the generation of donations partly by 
increasing awareness of charitable organisation‘s activities. The findings suggest that 
there is an oligopolistic competition market in Australian charitable organisations. The 
indications are that: (1) increases in fundraising expenditure increase donations; (2) an 
increase in fundraising expenditure competition is positively related to total fundraising 
spending and the total level of donation in the current year. However, (3) the effects of 
the fundraising spending of competitors also relate closely but negatively to the level of 
donations to individual organisations in the current year. It was also found that (4) the 
level of volunteers significantly increases the level of donations in the following year; 
and (5) organisational age and size, government grants and administrative costs and 
other characteristics vary in their impact across groups of charitable organisations but 
still indicate the value of using the Oligopoly model.  
. 
Conclusions from the empirical results of the equations have to be tempered by the fact 
it worked well for Australia but not for Japan. As a consequence, there is an, ―after the 
fact‖ need to attempt to explain why the model does not work well empirically for 
Japan. On the basis of the historical and institutional analysis in Chapter 2, it was 
concluded that the response for this poor empirical fit in Japan relates to the fact that the 
sample of Japanese charitable organisations employed in this thesis were of the legal 
form of charitable organisations (NPO Corporations) established in 1998. This made the 
Japanese sample much smaller in numbers, consisting of younger organisations with 
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shorter organisational histories. Of the sample of Japanese charitable organisations, for 
example, only two were given deductible gift tax status by the relevant ministry. With 
such a limited tax exemption, the total donations are much smaller than in Australian 
organisations. This means that the status of charitable organisations in Japan is vastly 
different from those in Australia, especially the relationships to government and donors. 
Most importantly, it appears that Japanese charities provide welfare services on a more 
commercialised basis. This type of activity is very small in Australia, albeit growing. 
 
In charitable organisation studies an equivalent to a price was found by using the 
efficiency of fundraising expenditure i.e. the ratio of fundraising expenditure per 
donated dollar. Cournot‘s theory of oligopoly was tested and gave significant results for 
Australia when charitable organisations were placed into homogeneous groups. As with 
Cournot theory, the empirical results suggested the possibility of the over-supply of 
fundraising expenditure to each charitable organisation market segment. This suggests 
cooperative fundraising, working together as a monopoly in fundraising in a segment of 
the fundraising market, could be a dynamically efficient form of supra-organisational 
cooperation. These results are consistent with the equilibrium state of the Cournot 
model.  
 
Indeed, several results stand out as consistent with a homogeneous output or slightly 
differentiated output Cournot equation. These are that: (a) donations increase as 
fundraising expenditure increases but at a decreasing rate; (b) an organisation‘s 
fundraising expenditure‘s impact is diminished as it competitions increase their 
fundraising expenditure and (c) the use of a priori specified groups based on the 
charities identified areas of operation increased the efficacy of the Cournot modelling. 
Methodologically it is important to note that the groups were not constructed as best fit 
groups on the basis of ex post examination of empirical results.  
 
9.4 Limitations of the study and future research 
 
This study has a number of limitations. In part this is because this is the first research to 
deal with charitable organisation utilising oligopoly theory. As a consequence, first, if 
the proposed model proves viable in the longer term, a vast number of improvements 
are expected. The second is that, given the model works reasonably well with respect to 
  
 
375 
the Australian data, with hindsight the Japanese data are currently too weak to provide a 
satisfactory test. Even more than this, one implication is that an alternative rational 
behavioural model is required for Japan. A related third point is that the equation 
assumes equilibrium. It does not provide a dynamic view. While this need not be a 
severe limitation in the Australian situation, in the more rapidly changing Japanese 
situation it is certainly a severe weakness. In particular it cannot cope with the dramatic 
and discontinuous historical changes that are occurring in charitable organisations in 
Japan. This is especially so in relation to their relatively recent arrival on the scene and 
the very large constraints placed on them by the Japanese authorities. As discussed 
before, the data of Japanese samples of NPO Corporations are also much smaller in 
scale of donations, organisational size, and number of volunteers, and younger in 
operational age than that of the Australian sample charitable organisation. It seems more 
likely that future research will entail comparing Australian with countries such as the 
USA, UK, Canada and New Zealand where the cultural commonalities and the history 
of the charitable organisations are much stronger and older. A separate research 
program is almost certainly required for Japan. 
 
Several areas of research are suggested by the present modelling. One, already 
indicated, is to increase the sophistication of both the theoretical and empirical 
modelling. This can include investigating the role played by the assets of the 
organisation, an area mostly overlooked in the present competitive market model. This 
is particularly appropriate in charitable organisations, and this can be argued in two 
opposing ways. One is that greater assets suggest that the charitable organisation has a 
greater ability to be effective and therefore donors may move towards it. The other is 
that greater assets imply that the donations may go to building up the organisation rather 
than to those who should be the recipients of the charity. Finally, donors may see their 
donation as simply marginal to the larger organisations, whereas for smaller charitable 
organisations they can feel they have greater impact and significance. In this latter case 
the donor may feel more appreciated. Furthermore it may interest to see how recent 
Tsunami disaster has affected organisational behaviour and fundraising capacity of 
activities. 
  376 
Appendix 
Table of log-linear 1: Two-stage least squares estimation for All group 
Dependent Variables lnD lnF lnV 
β0 -114.407 12.467 29.974 
(t-stat) (-2.057) (54.631) (2.248) 
lnA -.160 -.001 .038 
(t-stat) (-1.487) (-.118) (1.373) 
lnAGE  -0.29 .009 -.008 
(t-stat) (-.125) (.434) (-.141) 
lnD  .010 .045 
(t-stat)  (.762) (1.207) 
lnF 9.746  -2.431 
(t-stat) (2.200)  (-2.283) 
lnV 1.775 -.098  
(t-stat) (1.974) (-1.295)  
lnV_1 -1.116 .092 .964 
(t-stat) (-1.236) (1.228) (22.746) 
lnShrF -9.452 1.017 2.461 
(t-stat) (-2.087) (59.651) (2.268) 
S.E. of estimation 2.606 0.242 0.682 
Observations 245 245 245 
NOTE: Dependent and independent variables are all transformed in logarithm: lnD; total 
donations, lnF; fundraising expenditure, lnV; the number of volunteers (lnV). Independent 
variables are: lnA; fixed assets, lnAGE; organisational age, lnF, lnV, lnV_1; lagged 
volunteers, lnShrF: share of fundraising expenditure.  
 
Table log-linear 2: Two-stage least squares estimation for Welfare group 
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 -87.956 9.854 8.599 
(t-stat) (-1.133) (15.677) (0.754) 
lnA 0.369 -0.034 -0.037 
(t-stat) (0.892) (-0.659) (-0.719) 
lnAGE  -0.104 0.011 0.008 
(t-stat) (-0.300) (0.344) (0.187) 
lnD  0.093 0.100 
(t-stat)  (1.177) (1.371) 
lnF 8.899  -0.869 
(t-stat) (1.116)  (-0.744) 
lnV 8.812 -0.799  
(t-stat) (1.401) (-0.802)  
lnV_1 -8.468 0.772 0.968 
(t-stat) (-1.315) (0.796) (15.081) 
lnShrF -9.194 1.029 0.901 
(t-stat) (-1.138) (15.517) (0.764) 
S.E. of estimation 2.374 0.230 0.259 
Observations 77 77 77 
NOTE: Dependent and independent variables are all transformed in logarithm: lnD; total 
donations, lnF; fundraising expenditure, lnV; the number of volunteers (lnV). Independent 
variables are: lnA; fixed assets, lnAGE; organisational age, lnF, lnV, lnV_1; lagged 
volunteers, lnShrF: share of fundraising expenditure.  
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Table log-linear 3: Two-stage least squares estimation for Humanitarian group 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 -9.922 10.507 4.154 
(t-stat) (-0.870) (2.386) (.922) 
lnA -0.083 -.563 .034 
(t-stat) (-.243) (-.048) (.233) 
lnAGE  .426 -.451 -.179 
(t-stat) (.493) (-.599) (-.511) 
lnD  1.016 -.395 
(t-stat)  (1.132) (-1.007) 
lnF .951  .414 
(t-stat) (1.119)  (1.660) 
lnV 2.378 -2.426  
(t-stat) (1.672) (-1.025)  
lnV_1 -1.579 1.613 .668 
(t-stat) (-1.158) (.875) (3.544) 
lnShrF -1.463 1.525 .609 
(t-stat) (-1.429) (3.244) (1.298) 
S.E. of estimation 1.184 1.210 0.498 
Observations 42 42 42 
NOTE: Dependent and independent variables are all transformed in logarithm: lnD; total 
donations, lnF; fundraising expenditure, lnV; the number of volunteers (lnV). Independent 
variables are: lnA; fixed assets, lnAGE; organisational age, lnF, lnV, lnV_1; lagged 
volunteers, lnShrF: share of fundraising expenditure.  
 
 
Table log-linear 4: Two-stage least squares estimation for Global group 
 
Dependent Variables lnD F V 
β0 -20.040 -7.276 .682 
(t-stat) (-.256) (4.902) (.305) 
lnA -.489 .119 .022 
(t-stat) (-.452) (2.862) (.716) 
lnAGE  -1.229 .189 .044 
(t-stat) (-1.001) (1.583) (.800) 
lnD  .131 0.28 
(t-stat)  (1.822) (0.726) 
lnF 3.933  -.132 
(t-stat) (.492)  (-.477) 
lnV 42.465 -1.830  
(t-stat) (.618) (-.694)  
lnV_1 -41.141 1.330 .899 
(t-stat) (-.582) (.527) (6.817) 
lnShrF -2.461 .763 .083 
(t-stat) (-.338) (8.339) (.373) 
S.E. of estimation 2.141 0.130 0.051 
Observations 35 35 35 
NOTE: Dependent and independent variables are all transformed in logarithm: lnD; total 
donations, lnF; fundraising expenditure, lnV; the number of volunteers (lnV). Independent 
variables are: lnA; fixed assets, lnAGE; organisational age, lnF, lnV, lnV_1; lagged 
volunteers, lnShrF: share of fundraising expenditure.  
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Table log-linear 5: Two-stage least squares estimation for Disability group 
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 148.856 10.274 -19.123 
(t-stat) (.669) (8.524) (-.348) 
lnA .248 .016 -.031 
(t-stat) (.369) (.386) (-.252) 
lnAGE  -.326 -.021 .028 
(t-stat) (-.680) (-.852) (.210) 
lnD  -0.52 .072 
(t-stat)  (-.547) (.198) 
lnF -14.250  1.847 
(t-stat) (-.628)  (.345) 
lnV 1.882 .175  
(t-stat) (-.149) (.226)  
lnV_1 -.897 -.107 .920 
(t-stat) (-.071) (-.130) (2.075) 
lnShrF 13.770 .957 -1.809 
(t-stat) (.652) (9.759) (-.357) 
S.E. of estimation 2.822 0.195 0.416 
Observations 63 63 63 
NOTE: Dependent and independent variables are all transformed in logarithm: lnD; total 
donations, lnF; fundraising expenditure, lnV; the number of volunteers (lnV). Independent 
variables are: lnA; fixed assets, lnAGE; organisational age, lnF, lnV, lnV_1; lagged 
volunteers, lnShrF: share of fundraising expenditure.  
 
 
Table log-linear 6: Two-stage least squares estimation for Animal group 
 
Dependent Variables D F V 
β0 2.252 4.320 1.149 
(t-stat) (.319) (.386) (.823) 
lnA .232 -.126 -.011 
(t-stat) (1.034) (-.479) (-.221) 
lnAGE  -1.225 .519 -.028 
(t-stat) (-2.936) (.648) (-.174) 
lnD  .579 .006 
(t-stat)  (1.499) (.055) 
lnF 1.078  -.041 
(t-stat) (2.425)  (-.276) 
lnV -.021 -3.077  
(t-stat) (-.035) (-.425)  
lnV_1  2.898 .927 
(t-stat)  (.431) (8.805) 
lnShrF -.648 .960 .087 
(t-stat) (-1.036) (1.727) (.639) 
S.E. of estimation 0.432 0.450 0.080 
Observations 21 21 21 
NOTE: Dependent and independent variables are all transformed in logarithm: lnD; total 
donations, lnF; fundraising expenditure, lnV; the number of volunteers (lnV). Independent 
variables are: lnA; fixed assets, lnAGE; organisational age, lnF, lnV, lnV_1; lagged 
volunteers, lnShrF: share of fundraising expenditure.  
  
  379 
Table log-linear 7: Two-stage least squares estimation for Science group 
 
Dependent Variables lnD F V 
β0 -7.397 -5.981 -2.537 
(t-stat) (-.408) (-.378) (-.230) 
lnA .531 .430 .188 
(t-stat) (1.712) (1.019) (.523) 
lnAGE  3.763 3.052 1.312 
(t-stat) (1.091) (1.000) (.338) 
lnD  -.810 -.353 
(t-stat)  (-1.274) (-.454) 
lnF -1.229  -.434 
(t-stat) (-1.272)  (-.441) 
lnV -2.728 -2.211  
(t-stat) (-.449) (-.437)  
lnV_1 3.590 2.911 1.302 
(t-stat) (.620) (.595) (1.580) 
lnShrF 1.107 .900 .390 
(t-stat) (.874) (1.089) (.401) 
S.E. of estimation 1.246 1.009 0.442 
Observations 28 28 28 
NOTE: Dependent and independent variables are all transformed in logarithm: lnD; total 
donations, lnF; fundraising expenditure, lnV; the number of volunteers (lnV). Independent 
variables are: lnA; fixed assets, lnAGE; organisational age, lnF, lnV, lnV_1; lagged 
volunteers, lnShrF: share of fundraising expenditure.  
 
Table log-linear 8: Two-stage least squares estimation for Rural group 
 
Dependent Variables lnD F V 
β0 10.314 10.018 -2.325 
(t-stat) (.463) (1.635) (-.581) 
lnA -.480 -.099 .095 
(t-stat) (-1.319) (-.325) (1.312) 
lnAGE  -.889 .022 .165 
(t-stat) (-1.219) (.037) (.895) 
lnD  -.050 .190 
(t-stat)  (-.083) (1.933) 
lnF -.075  .054 
(t-stat) (-.033)  (.122) 
lnV 4.905 .940  
(t-stat) (2.007) (.314)  
lnV_1 -3.744 -.711 .771 
(t-stat) (-1.723) (-.307) (8.046) 
lnShrF -.129 .816 -.006 
(t-stat) (-.067) (3.818) (-.016) 
S.E. of estimation 1.728 0.568 0.353 
Observations 49 49 49 
NOTE: Dependent and independent variables are all transformed in logarithm: lnD; total 
donations, lnF; fundraising expenditure, lnV; the number of volunteers (lnV). Independent 
variables are: lnA; fixed assets, lnAGE; organisational age, lnF, lnV, lnV_1; lagged 
volunteers, lnShrF: share of fundraising expenditure.  
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